0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/595 Thanks! 1 00:00:16,329 --> 00:00:18,609 And hi, my name's Custo 2 00:00:18,610 --> 00:00:20,889 by well, 3 00:00:20,890 --> 00:00:22,959 I'm a technologist and 4 00:00:22,960 --> 00:00:24,429 a researcher, and I work for an 5 00:00:24,430 --> 00:00:26,499 organization, a small NGO called Tactical 6 00:00:26,500 --> 00:00:28,569 Tech based in Berlin, which 7 00:00:28,570 --> 00:00:30,729 primarily works with rights activists, 8 00:00:30,730 --> 00:00:33,549 helping them use 9 00:00:33,550 --> 00:00:35,319 digital technology and information more 10 00:00:35,320 --> 00:00:37,509 effectively and advocacy work. 11 00:00:37,510 --> 00:00:39,609 But I also spend chunks of 12 00:00:39,610 --> 00:00:41,829 my time in India where for 13 00:00:41,830 --> 00:00:43,659 the last few years I've been doing some 14 00:00:43,660 --> 00:00:45,909 research on the current state of Internet 15 00:00:45,910 --> 00:00:48,699 censorship and mass surveillance 16 00:00:48,700 --> 00:00:50,259 that the government and government of 17 00:00:50,260 --> 00:00:52,059 India has been implementing in that 18 00:00:52,060 --> 00:00:53,060 country. 19 00:00:54,160 --> 00:00:56,079 Today, I'm going to be discussing a 20 00:00:56,080 --> 00:00:58,239 specific incident 21 00:00:58,240 --> 00:01:01,179 that happened earlier this year, which 22 00:01:01,180 --> 00:01:03,789 was a censorship order 23 00:01:03,790 --> 00:01:06,099 well, where 24 00:01:06,100 --> 00:01:07,749 censorship order that the government of 25 00:01:07,750 --> 00:01:09,819 India issued, which brought down a 26 00:01:09,820 --> 00:01:12,699 bunch of really popular websites 27 00:01:12,700 --> 00:01:15,279 for several days in the country. 28 00:01:15,280 --> 00:01:17,260 And I'm going to. 29 00:01:18,510 --> 00:01:20,639 Talk about how what 30 00:01:20,640 --> 00:01:23,759 prompted this order, how it was 31 00:01:23,760 --> 00:01:25,559 issued by the government, the Ministry of 32 00:01:25,560 --> 00:01:27,149 Communications and Information Technology 33 00:01:27,150 --> 00:01:29,699 of India, and how the ISPs 34 00:01:29,700 --> 00:01:31,859 reacted to it and implemented these 35 00:01:31,860 --> 00:01:34,109 blocks and what they could 36 00:01:34,110 --> 00:01:35,849 have done differently. 37 00:01:35,850 --> 00:01:38,129 And also some of the research 38 00:01:38,130 --> 00:01:40,259 we did about how these 39 00:01:40,260 --> 00:01:42,399 blocks were implemented 40 00:01:42,400 --> 00:01:44,099 in terms of what technology was used by 41 00:01:44,100 --> 00:01:46,979 the Internet service providers and 42 00:01:46,980 --> 00:01:49,319 how users could 43 00:01:49,320 --> 00:01:51,600 circumvent these specific blocks. 44 00:01:53,640 --> 00:01:55,979 So last 45 00:01:55,980 --> 00:01:58,049 year, around the 17th of December, 46 00:01:58,050 --> 00:02:00,299 there was order 47 00:02:00,300 --> 00:02:02,549 issued, a censorship order issued by 48 00:02:02,550 --> 00:02:04,829 the Ministry of Communications and I.T., 49 00:02:04,830 --> 00:02:06,929 which asked every single Internet 50 00:02:06,930 --> 00:02:08,939 service provider in the country to block 51 00:02:08,940 --> 00:02:11,008 access to thirty two 52 00:02:11,009 --> 00:02:12,479 websites. 53 00:02:12,480 --> 00:02:15,029 We saw a bunch of websites 54 00:02:15,030 --> 00:02:16,860 going down every now and then 55 00:02:17,940 --> 00:02:19,529 across different ISPs in the country 56 00:02:19,530 --> 00:02:21,719 didn't quite understand what was going on 57 00:02:21,720 --> 00:02:23,789 until the 31st of December, which 58 00:02:23,790 --> 00:02:26,249 was a day after last Congress 59 00:02:26,250 --> 00:02:28,949 when I woke up in a hotel room in Hamburg 60 00:02:28,950 --> 00:02:31,289 to a leaked a copy 61 00:02:31,290 --> 00:02:33,449 of one of the secret order that 62 00:02:33,450 --> 00:02:36,089 was leaked, which revealed 63 00:02:36,090 --> 00:02:38,639 that there was a ban 64 00:02:38,640 --> 00:02:42,209 implemented by the makatea, 65 00:02:42,210 --> 00:02:44,369 which was issued to every single 66 00:02:44,370 --> 00:02:46,979 ISP and asked the ISPs 67 00:02:46,980 --> 00:02:49,079 not to disclose that this order 68 00:02:49,080 --> 00:02:51,389 was issued or what was in that order. 69 00:02:51,390 --> 00:02:53,539 I'm not 70 00:02:53,540 --> 00:02:55,439 not sure how legible that is on the 71 00:02:55,440 --> 00:02:58,619 screen, but basically what they said was 72 00:02:58,620 --> 00:03:00,719 block 32, you are allowed that are listed 73 00:03:00,720 --> 00:03:02,909 in this in 74 00:03:02,910 --> 00:03:05,789 this letter immediately 75 00:03:05,790 --> 00:03:07,020 and that. 76 00:03:09,220 --> 00:03:11,769 No ISP is allowed to actually disclose 77 00:03:11,770 --> 00:03:14,919 the contents of the of this letter 78 00:03:14,920 --> 00:03:17,679 or reproduce the names of the users 79 00:03:17,680 --> 00:03:18,680 in the letter. 80 00:03:21,650 --> 00:03:23,360 This was done using 81 00:03:24,770 --> 00:03:26,779 the Section 69 of the Information 82 00:03:26,780 --> 00:03:28,939 Technology Act, which the 83 00:03:28,940 --> 00:03:31,489 idea is from the year 2000, 84 00:03:31,490 --> 00:03:33,859 but it was amended in 2008 85 00:03:33,860 --> 00:03:35,989 right after the Mumbai terrorist attacks. 86 00:03:35,990 --> 00:03:37,159 And now is this 87 00:03:38,720 --> 00:03:41,149 draconian law which is used by 88 00:03:41,150 --> 00:03:43,249 the government of India 89 00:03:43,250 --> 00:03:45,559 to conduct enormous 90 00:03:45,560 --> 00:03:47,929 amounts of mass surveillance, but also 91 00:03:47,930 --> 00:03:49,699 censorship in the country. 92 00:03:49,700 --> 00:03:51,439 We've had some wins to get rid of 93 00:03:51,440 --> 00:03:53,419 specific sections of this act, one of 94 00:03:53,420 --> 00:03:55,609 which was called 95 00:03:55,610 --> 00:03:58,519 66. A witch 96 00:03:58,520 --> 00:04:00,949 in the face of it existed to prevent 97 00:04:00,950 --> 00:04:03,139 online harassment, but 98 00:04:03,140 --> 00:04:05,389 was, well, mostly used 99 00:04:05,390 --> 00:04:08,029 by politically 100 00:04:08,030 --> 00:04:10,759 powerful politicians to go after 101 00:04:10,760 --> 00:04:12,769 innocent citizens trying to criticize 102 00:04:12,770 --> 00:04:14,449 governance in the country. 103 00:04:14,450 --> 00:04:15,769 Sixty nine is still exists. 104 00:04:15,770 --> 00:04:18,169 Unfortunately, it something that gives 105 00:04:18,170 --> 00:04:20,299 them a lot of control over 106 00:04:20,300 --> 00:04:21,469 being able to 107 00:04:23,000 --> 00:04:25,339 block any any Internet resource 108 00:04:25,340 --> 00:04:28,039 without having to go 109 00:04:28,040 --> 00:04:30,199 to the courts. And this is what was used. 110 00:04:30,200 --> 00:04:32,599 And what this does not 111 00:04:32,600 --> 00:04:34,669 state, however, is that these orders have 112 00:04:34,670 --> 00:04:35,479 to be secret. 113 00:04:35,480 --> 00:04:37,579 That was something that they 114 00:04:37,580 --> 00:04:40,159 said in that order and then said that 115 00:04:40,160 --> 00:04:41,600 any ISP who 116 00:04:43,200 --> 00:04:45,319 who refused to keep their 117 00:04:45,320 --> 00:04:46,850 order secret could be, 118 00:04:48,350 --> 00:04:50,029 well, they could take action against 119 00:04:50,030 --> 00:04:51,199 them. 120 00:04:51,200 --> 00:04:52,519 Now, what were 121 00:04:53,570 --> 00:04:54,329 what was the reason? 122 00:04:54,330 --> 00:04:55,489 This is something we learned a little bit 123 00:04:55,490 --> 00:04:58,519 later. The reason that they 124 00:04:58,520 --> 00:05:00,679 sent the secret order out, turns 125 00:05:00,680 --> 00:05:03,439 out, was because the Mumbai police, 126 00:05:03,440 --> 00:05:05,329 the anti-terrorism squad of the Mumbai 127 00:05:05,330 --> 00:05:07,069 police on the 15th of November went to 128 00:05:07,070 --> 00:05:08,689 the Ministry of Communication in India 129 00:05:08,690 --> 00:05:10,909 and said that we found instances 130 00:05:10,910 --> 00:05:12,979 of jihadi propaganda 131 00:05:12,980 --> 00:05:15,229 on by 132 00:05:15,230 --> 00:05:16,789 the national groups, on specific 133 00:05:16,790 --> 00:05:18,859 websites. Therefore, we would like you 134 00:05:18,860 --> 00:05:21,319 to pass an order requesting 135 00:05:21,320 --> 00:05:23,419 ISPs to block access to these 136 00:05:23,420 --> 00:05:24,420 websites. 137 00:05:25,340 --> 00:05:27,290 Some of the others that were affected 138 00:05:28,550 --> 00:05:29,550 were 139 00:05:31,970 --> 00:05:33,679 giving you a second to process that. 140 00:05:33,680 --> 00:05:35,089 Yeah, GitHub, dot com, 141 00:05:36,500 --> 00:05:38,539 Vimeo, dot com pastebin, sourceforge 142 00:05:38,540 --> 00:05:40,370 archive, dot org, among others. 143 00:05:42,020 --> 00:05:43,309 Turns out they found 144 00:05:44,720 --> 00:05:46,819 some objectionable content on gift, dot, 145 00:05:46,820 --> 00:05:48,949 github, dot com and on pastebin 146 00:05:48,950 --> 00:05:51,169 dot com, which prompted them to 147 00:05:51,170 --> 00:05:53,509 say block these. 148 00:05:53,510 --> 00:05:55,310 We have no idea why Vimeo was blocked. 149 00:05:56,870 --> 00:05:58,459 Something that I find disturbing and 150 00:05:58,460 --> 00:06:00,169 hilarious at the same time was 151 00:06:00,170 --> 00:06:02,419 SourceForge specifically 152 00:06:02,420 --> 00:06:04,549 URL that was that was blocked on. 153 00:06:04,550 --> 00:06:06,769 SourceForge was an open source project, 154 00:06:06,770 --> 00:06:09,049 which was a clone of 155 00:06:09,050 --> 00:06:10,050 Pastebin. 156 00:06:10,940 --> 00:06:12,619 So they were not blocking content in this 157 00:06:12,620 --> 00:06:14,149 case. They were actually blocking access 158 00:06:14,150 --> 00:06:16,309 to open source code, which they did 159 00:06:16,310 --> 00:06:17,510 not want people to download. 160 00:06:20,000 --> 00:06:21,650 That's the complete blocked list. 161 00:06:22,880 --> 00:06:25,519 Probably not very legible again, but 162 00:06:25,520 --> 00:06:28,129 it's, um, it's mostly 163 00:06:28,130 --> 00:06:31,069 Bassman and similar services. 164 00:06:31,070 --> 00:06:33,169 It also has some free web hosting 165 00:06:33,170 --> 00:06:35,749 services which are blocked 166 00:06:35,750 --> 00:06:37,969 and popular media services 167 00:06:37,970 --> 00:06:40,099 such as Vimeo dot com and Dailymotion dot 168 00:06:40,100 --> 00:06:42,259 com and archive dot dot org, 169 00:06:42,260 --> 00:06:44,629 which is basically the largest Internet 170 00:06:44,630 --> 00:06:46,909 archive on the Internet. 171 00:06:46,910 --> 00:06:47,910 Um. 172 00:06:50,210 --> 00:06:52,459 So, yeah, this was 173 00:06:52,460 --> 00:06:54,589 New Year's Eve, I was at a party 174 00:06:54,590 --> 00:06:56,749 with a few friends, a 175 00:06:56,750 --> 00:06:59,059 bunch of geeks like 176 00:06:59,060 --> 00:07:00,439 we do on New Year's, hang out with our 177 00:07:00,440 --> 00:07:01,440 friends. 178 00:07:01,850 --> 00:07:03,559 And I started talking to a few people. 179 00:07:03,560 --> 00:07:05,419 A couple of them are in this room right 180 00:07:05,420 --> 00:07:07,939 now. And we thought 181 00:07:07,940 --> 00:07:10,459 maybe a maybe a good idea to 182 00:07:10,460 --> 00:07:12,979 conduct some investigation about 183 00:07:12,980 --> 00:07:14,839 how these blocks are being implemented 184 00:07:14,840 --> 00:07:16,429 and how people could circumvent these 185 00:07:16,430 --> 00:07:17,509 blocks. 186 00:07:17,510 --> 00:07:19,399 So between the first and the third of 187 00:07:19,400 --> 00:07:21,649 January, we spent 188 00:07:21,650 --> 00:07:22,670 several hours. 189 00:07:23,960 --> 00:07:26,179 I'm trying to collect 190 00:07:26,180 --> 00:07:28,369 sensitive measurements across 191 00:07:28,370 --> 00:07:29,539 multiple ISPs in India. 192 00:07:29,540 --> 00:07:30,949 We were able to do this across seven 193 00:07:30,950 --> 00:07:33,169 different ISPs, including the state 194 00:07:33,170 --> 00:07:36,199 run Monagle Telecom 195 00:07:36,200 --> 00:07:38,329 Ltd, which is one of the largest ISPs 196 00:07:38,330 --> 00:07:41,569 in India, and Tata Communications, again, 197 00:07:41,570 --> 00:07:43,129 one of the larger Internet service 198 00:07:43,130 --> 00:07:45,410 providers in the country and. 199 00:07:48,290 --> 00:07:50,539 We realized, well, the block orders 200 00:07:50,540 --> 00:07:52,729 said the 201 00:07:52,730 --> 00:07:54,469 specified what to block, but did not 202 00:07:54,470 --> 00:07:55,699 actually say how 203 00:07:56,750 --> 00:07:58,369 this block should be implemented, not 204 00:07:58,370 --> 00:07:59,299 surprised about that. 205 00:07:59,300 --> 00:08:01,279 And unsurprisingly, this led to different 206 00:08:01,280 --> 00:08:04,429 ISPs using various 207 00:08:04,430 --> 00:08:05,779 different techniques to 208 00:08:08,210 --> 00:08:10,429 block these who are in some 209 00:08:10,430 --> 00:08:12,769 cases the same ISP was using different 210 00:08:12,770 --> 00:08:13,770 techniques 211 00:08:15,020 --> 00:08:17,209 to implement this block, implement these 212 00:08:17,210 --> 00:08:18,210 blogs. 213 00:08:19,220 --> 00:08:21,499 And we collected 214 00:08:21,500 --> 00:08:23,870 this we collected this data 215 00:08:25,100 --> 00:08:27,290 over a period of a few days 216 00:08:28,490 --> 00:08:30,409 and realized that there were multiple 217 00:08:30,410 --> 00:08:32,029 different techniques being used. 218 00:08:32,030 --> 00:08:34,459 And the most common 219 00:08:34,460 --> 00:08:36,829 ways we found were either were 220 00:08:36,830 --> 00:08:38,569 empty and in this case was using a 221 00:08:38,570 --> 00:08:40,548 combination of DNS hijacking. 222 00:08:40,549 --> 00:08:41,600 But basically they 223 00:08:42,860 --> 00:08:45,499 and their name, a 224 00:08:45,500 --> 00:08:47,569 name resolvers just 225 00:08:47,570 --> 00:08:49,189 point you to a different IP and not the 226 00:08:49,190 --> 00:08:51,289 IP address of the actual horse that 227 00:08:51,290 --> 00:08:52,369 you're requesting. 228 00:08:52,370 --> 00:08:53,809 In some cases, they were basically 229 00:08:53,810 --> 00:08:56,029 blocking any access, any direct access 230 00:08:56,030 --> 00:08:58,009 to the IP or the host requested. 231 00:08:59,750 --> 00:09:02,149 In some scenarios, they were only 232 00:09:02,150 --> 00:09:04,249 blocking waters, 233 00:09:04,250 --> 00:09:05,899 therefore you could just access something 234 00:09:05,900 --> 00:09:08,029 that was blocked by going to the steps, 235 00:09:08,030 --> 00:09:10,489 the secure version of 236 00:09:10,490 --> 00:09:12,769 that website, the most invasive 237 00:09:12,770 --> 00:09:14,929 method that was being used 238 00:09:14,930 --> 00:09:16,699 definitely by Tata Communications and a 239 00:09:16,700 --> 00:09:18,829 few others was deep packet 240 00:09:18,830 --> 00:09:21,109 inspection, which basically, which is an 241 00:09:21,110 --> 00:09:23,809 ISP actively dissecting 242 00:09:23,810 --> 00:09:25,309 our users traffic 243 00:09:26,780 --> 00:09:27,780 and 244 00:09:30,050 --> 00:09:32,929 denying access to any unauthorized 245 00:09:32,930 --> 00:09:33,930 content. 246 00:09:34,910 --> 00:09:35,910 Hmm. 247 00:09:37,860 --> 00:09:40,229 We used a few different ways 248 00:09:40,230 --> 00:09:42,449 to try and collect this data. 249 00:09:42,450 --> 00:09:45,089 One of the ways was to use a 250 00:09:45,090 --> 00:09:46,559 popular open source 251 00:09:47,640 --> 00:09:49,409 censorship measurement tool kit called 252 00:09:50,450 --> 00:09:53,279 Open Observatory Network Interference. 253 00:09:53,280 --> 00:09:55,379 Um, and we 254 00:09:55,380 --> 00:09:57,359 also relied on a lot of friends who were 255 00:09:57,360 --> 00:09:58,499 in India. We were all in Berlin. 256 00:09:58,500 --> 00:09:59,549 We did not actually have 257 00:10:00,660 --> 00:10:02,429 we were not we did not actually have 258 00:10:02,430 --> 00:10:04,889 access to machines connected to 259 00:10:04,890 --> 00:10:06,959 networks in India. So we remember 260 00:10:06,960 --> 00:10:08,099 waking up a bunch of friends in the 261 00:10:08,100 --> 00:10:09,389 middle of the night going, hey, what's 262 00:10:09,390 --> 00:10:10,859 going on? If you try to access this, can 263 00:10:10,860 --> 00:10:12,029 you tell us what's going on? Can you try 264 00:10:12,030 --> 00:10:14,099 and run these tests for us? 265 00:10:14,100 --> 00:10:16,199 And some people actually did stay 266 00:10:16,200 --> 00:10:17,639 up really late at night in India and 267 00:10:17,640 --> 00:10:20,129 helped us to this, which was great. 268 00:10:20,130 --> 00:10:22,229 We also did well, 269 00:10:22,230 --> 00:10:23,209 actually. 270 00:10:23,210 --> 00:10:25,289 Well, I mean, I say 271 00:10:25,290 --> 00:10:27,539 with a lot of a to people 272 00:10:27,540 --> 00:10:29,379 who were very, very helpful doing this 273 00:10:29,380 --> 00:10:31,619 for a leaf rigor and Adam Gibson 274 00:10:31,620 --> 00:10:33,089 were right here in this room. 275 00:10:33,090 --> 00:10:34,949 And I didn't happen to be one of one of 276 00:10:34,950 --> 00:10:36,539 the developers of the uni project. 277 00:10:36,540 --> 00:10:37,540 And thanks. 278 00:10:45,550 --> 00:10:46,550 So. 279 00:10:48,140 --> 00:10:50,119 We document all of this in a couple of 280 00:10:50,120 --> 00:10:52,309 articles which I 281 00:10:52,310 --> 00:10:53,839 have linked to in a later slide, if you 282 00:10:53,840 --> 00:10:56,419 want to read more about the specific 283 00:10:56,420 --> 00:10:57,420 forms of 284 00:10:59,570 --> 00:11:01,879 techniques used by the ISPs and how 285 00:11:01,880 --> 00:11:03,949 we could circumvent 286 00:11:03,950 --> 00:11:06,199 these bans and, 287 00:11:06,200 --> 00:11:07,459 yeah, to circumvent them. 288 00:11:07,460 --> 00:11:09,289 Like I said, some people, some ISPs are 289 00:11:09,290 --> 00:11:10,519 only blocking SCDP 290 00:11:12,560 --> 00:11:13,729 versions of the website. 291 00:11:13,730 --> 00:11:15,879 And we just 292 00:11:15,880 --> 00:11:17,359 we were just able to get to them using 293 00:11:17,360 --> 00:11:19,579 the ETPs version. 294 00:11:19,580 --> 00:11:21,949 Irrespective of that, I highly recommend 295 00:11:21,950 --> 00:11:24,199 that everyone just use HTP as everywhere 296 00:11:24,200 --> 00:11:26,029 in their Web browsers at all times, which 297 00:11:26,030 --> 00:11:29,359 is a plugin developed by EFH 298 00:11:29,360 --> 00:11:31,699 and for a lot of websites 299 00:11:31,700 --> 00:11:33,919 will present you with an e-book version 300 00:11:33,920 --> 00:11:35,449 of the website, even if you make a 301 00:11:35,450 --> 00:11:37,549 request to the EDP version. 302 00:11:38,720 --> 00:11:41,029 DNS based DNS hijacking 303 00:11:41,030 --> 00:11:43,489 could be circumvented by just using 304 00:11:43,490 --> 00:11:45,949 a different name server. 305 00:11:45,950 --> 00:11:47,389 There's a lot of public name servers out 306 00:11:47,390 --> 00:11:50,009 there, most popular ones, a lot of 307 00:11:50,010 --> 00:11:52,279 a couple of really popular ones being 308 00:11:52,280 --> 00:11:54,379 the Google's public DNS and open 309 00:11:54,380 --> 00:11:55,380 DNS. 310 00:11:56,260 --> 00:11:58,219 There were a few others and basically any 311 00:11:58,220 --> 00:12:01,009 public DNS, so that was outside of India 312 00:12:01,010 --> 00:12:03,379 helped us circumvent 313 00:12:03,380 --> 00:12:04,819 DNS hijacking. 314 00:12:04,820 --> 00:12:06,949 We realized that at no point were 315 00:12:06,950 --> 00:12:09,529 we not able to access any of these 32 316 00:12:09,530 --> 00:12:11,929 blocked users using 317 00:12:11,930 --> 00:12:13,070 Tor and 318 00:12:14,450 --> 00:12:17,509 or most weapons 319 00:12:17,510 --> 00:12:19,789 virtual private networks that we used 320 00:12:19,790 --> 00:12:21,549 or some proxies. 321 00:12:21,550 --> 00:12:23,509 So it wasn't really very difficult to get 322 00:12:23,510 --> 00:12:25,179 around these blocks. 323 00:12:25,180 --> 00:12:26,180 And 324 00:12:28,460 --> 00:12:30,229 it's just that we had to understand how 325 00:12:30,230 --> 00:12:32,059 different ISPs were doing it and what the 326 00:12:32,060 --> 00:12:34,219 most efficient way of getting 327 00:12:34,220 --> 00:12:35,239 around it was. 328 00:12:37,070 --> 00:12:39,169 And so that's what we 329 00:12:39,170 --> 00:12:40,789 did between the first and third, and we 330 00:12:40,790 --> 00:12:43,249 wrote about it. But since then, 331 00:12:43,250 --> 00:12:45,439 we one of the things that we did was 332 00:12:45,440 --> 00:12:47,809 set up a server in India 333 00:12:47,810 --> 00:12:49,549 where we started collecting reports, 334 00:12:49,550 --> 00:12:51,590 using only and 335 00:12:52,940 --> 00:12:55,009 we've just left that running and we've 336 00:12:55,010 --> 00:12:57,319 been collecting that data 337 00:12:57,320 --> 00:12:58,339 continuously. 338 00:12:58,340 --> 00:13:00,499 And something that I've been starting 339 00:13:00,500 --> 00:13:01,500 to work on 340 00:13:02,600 --> 00:13:04,759 of late is trying to make sense 341 00:13:04,760 --> 00:13:06,529 of all the data that we've collected over 342 00:13:06,530 --> 00:13:08,809 the years and publish it in a sensible 343 00:13:08,810 --> 00:13:11,179 way and maybe visualize it in ways. 344 00:13:11,180 --> 00:13:13,279 And it's we've been 345 00:13:13,280 --> 00:13:15,499 doing this not just for the 32 euros 346 00:13:15,500 --> 00:13:17,719 that were in that censorship order, 347 00:13:17,720 --> 00:13:19,519 but using a couple of different lists, 348 00:13:19,520 --> 00:13:22,429 including those those three do, but also 349 00:13:22,430 --> 00:13:24,589 web developer in India cottagey and 350 00:13:24,590 --> 00:13:26,929 who has been compiling a list 351 00:13:26,930 --> 00:13:29,119 of euros that have 352 00:13:29,120 --> 00:13:31,399 been reported as being censored in 353 00:13:31,400 --> 00:13:32,400 India. 354 00:13:33,230 --> 00:13:35,870 We also have always 355 00:13:37,700 --> 00:13:39,889 welcomed any help that anyone wants to 356 00:13:39,890 --> 00:13:41,839 give us in terms of reporting censorship 357 00:13:41,840 --> 00:13:42,840 or 358 00:13:44,270 --> 00:13:46,099 software developers, technologists who 359 00:13:46,100 --> 00:13:48,649 want to help run 360 00:13:48,650 --> 00:13:49,789 censorship measurement, 361 00:13:50,810 --> 00:13:54,349 using only your other methods 362 00:13:54,350 --> 00:13:54,879 to help us. 363 00:13:54,880 --> 00:13:57,049 So there is an email address out there if 364 00:13:57,050 --> 00:13:59,149 which if you want to get in touch with 365 00:13:59,150 --> 00:14:01,279 us to help us continue these 366 00:14:01,280 --> 00:14:02,280 efforts. 367 00:14:02,900 --> 00:14:05,209 Another thing that I recently 368 00:14:05,210 --> 00:14:07,369 started working on is 369 00:14:07,370 --> 00:14:09,769 turning that website, KIOS LaBrot 370 00:14:09,770 --> 00:14:12,319 into something that could be 371 00:14:12,320 --> 00:14:14,689 a continued effort on measuring 372 00:14:14,690 --> 00:14:17,210 censorship in India and 373 00:14:18,780 --> 00:14:20,269 and publishing all the data there. 374 00:14:20,270 --> 00:14:22,339 So hopefully that'll happen 375 00:14:22,340 --> 00:14:24,139 at some point soon. 376 00:14:26,210 --> 00:14:28,279 Um, just to talk about 377 00:14:28,280 --> 00:14:30,139 what the ISPs could have done slightly 378 00:14:30,140 --> 00:14:32,269 differently here 379 00:14:32,270 --> 00:14:34,909 or what I should do when 380 00:14:34,910 --> 00:14:37,159 they are dealing with censorship orders 381 00:14:37,160 --> 00:14:39,739 issued to them, um, 382 00:14:39,740 --> 00:14:42,469 no ISP actually 383 00:14:42,470 --> 00:14:44,539 informed any of their customers until 384 00:14:44,540 --> 00:14:46,699 that order was leaked to 385 00:14:46,700 --> 00:14:48,779 us that they thought 386 00:14:48,780 --> 00:14:51,319 that they were asked to censor any of 387 00:14:51,320 --> 00:14:53,029 these URLs. 388 00:14:53,030 --> 00:14:55,219 I think every ISP should take this 389 00:14:55,220 --> 00:14:55,969 really seriously. 390 00:14:55,970 --> 00:14:58,069 They should be more transparent about 391 00:14:58,070 --> 00:15:00,139 censorship orders and 392 00:15:00,140 --> 00:15:02,359 and whenever possible, inform 393 00:15:02,360 --> 00:15:04,579 their customers as promptly 394 00:15:04,580 --> 00:15:07,070 as they can that they have received, 395 00:15:08,660 --> 00:15:09,660 um. 396 00:15:10,820 --> 00:15:12,919 In order to block 397 00:15:12,920 --> 00:15:14,389 access to an Internet resource, 398 00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:19,219 also there's especially 399 00:15:19,220 --> 00:15:21,199 in India, there is no law that requires 400 00:15:21,200 --> 00:15:23,450 any Internet service provider to deploy 401 00:15:25,670 --> 00:15:27,979 any kind of invasive technology, such 402 00:15:27,980 --> 00:15:28,980 as 403 00:15:30,410 --> 00:15:32,839 doing DeBacker, such as technology 404 00:15:32,840 --> 00:15:33,949 that helps them do deep packet 405 00:15:33,950 --> 00:15:36,439 inspection, among other things. 406 00:15:36,440 --> 00:15:38,869 Therefore, I would like 407 00:15:38,870 --> 00:15:40,339 all of us to appeal to our Internet 408 00:15:40,340 --> 00:15:42,529 service providers, too, and say 409 00:15:42,530 --> 00:15:43,970 don't deploy unnecessary 410 00:15:45,590 --> 00:15:46,669 invasive technology in your 411 00:15:46,670 --> 00:15:48,169 infrastructure when you don't need to. 412 00:15:48,170 --> 00:15:50,239 That just makes it a lot more 413 00:15:50,240 --> 00:15:52,369 difficult for people to vote for 414 00:15:52,370 --> 00:15:54,229 governments to actually pressure you into 415 00:15:54,230 --> 00:15:55,999 using technology like this to block 416 00:15:56,000 --> 00:15:58,399 access to the Internet and 417 00:16:00,440 --> 00:16:03,139 use legal means as an ISP to 418 00:16:03,140 --> 00:16:05,209 fight for your 419 00:16:05,210 --> 00:16:07,039 customers freedom to access of 420 00:16:07,040 --> 00:16:09,019 information and expression. 421 00:16:10,160 --> 00:16:12,409 A good example we saw earlier 422 00:16:12,410 --> 00:16:14,329 this year was when in the Netherlands, 423 00:16:14,330 --> 00:16:16,279 access for all and they go 424 00:16:17,330 --> 00:16:19,429 went to the courts, proved that a 425 00:16:19,430 --> 00:16:21,889 ban that was issued on the Pirate Bay 426 00:16:21,890 --> 00:16:23,959 two your later in 2012 427 00:16:23,960 --> 00:16:25,879 was not necessary because there was no 428 00:16:25,880 --> 00:16:28,549 proof that them banning 429 00:16:28,550 --> 00:16:30,980 the Pirate Bay actually led to. 430 00:16:32,710 --> 00:16:35,109 Fewer copyright infringement because 431 00:16:35,110 --> 00:16:36,549 people were getting around it. 432 00:16:36,550 --> 00:16:38,679 Therefore, the ISPs, the need to 433 00:16:38,680 --> 00:16:39,889 block it. 434 00:16:39,890 --> 00:16:41,949 But yeah, point here that 435 00:16:41,950 --> 00:16:43,629 they did actually use the legal measures 436 00:16:43,630 --> 00:16:46,299 to fight for the right to 437 00:16:46,300 --> 00:16:48,589 freedom of access of information 438 00:16:48,590 --> 00:16:51,120 for their customers and. 439 00:16:52,980 --> 00:16:55,289 And yeah, I think it's also important 440 00:16:55,290 --> 00:16:57,359 that as consumers, we put more pressure 441 00:16:57,360 --> 00:16:59,579 on the providers 442 00:16:59,580 --> 00:17:01,859 when you see something that is blocked 443 00:17:01,860 --> 00:17:03,689 right to your ISP or call them and say, 444 00:17:03,690 --> 00:17:05,759 hey, this is Block, why tell us 445 00:17:05,760 --> 00:17:07,979 now and 446 00:17:07,980 --> 00:17:10,078 tell us what you're doing about it. 447 00:17:10,079 --> 00:17:12,328 Also, tell them that your 448 00:17:12,329 --> 00:17:14,068 customers are unhappy, that they cannot 449 00:17:14,069 --> 00:17:15,069 access 450 00:17:16,290 --> 00:17:18,539 what they're paying you to access and 451 00:17:18,540 --> 00:17:20,039 and pass that on to the 452 00:17:21,060 --> 00:17:23,699 to the authorities who are asking you to 453 00:17:23,700 --> 00:17:25,529 block block access to these Internet 454 00:17:25,530 --> 00:17:26,530 resources. 455 00:17:27,630 --> 00:17:28,630 I'm. 456 00:17:32,760 --> 00:17:33,760 Some of the 457 00:17:36,120 --> 00:17:38,189 well, I'm 458 00:17:38,190 --> 00:17:39,809 just going to mention some things that 459 00:17:39,810 --> 00:17:41,939 that helped that that 460 00:17:41,940 --> 00:17:44,579 we recommended in the articles we wrote 461 00:17:44,580 --> 00:17:46,979 to people who 462 00:17:46,980 --> 00:17:49,559 were being affected by these blogs and 463 00:17:49,560 --> 00:17:51,389 how they could circumvented the DOT 464 00:17:51,390 --> 00:17:51,869 project. 465 00:17:51,870 --> 00:17:53,759 I think the DOT project is probably one 466 00:17:53,760 --> 00:17:55,889 of my favorite inventions 467 00:17:55,890 --> 00:17:58,289 of our times, and it's probably 468 00:17:58,290 --> 00:18:00,539 the most important tool that's working 469 00:18:00,540 --> 00:18:02,189 towards defending our Internet freedoms 470 00:18:02,190 --> 00:18:04,079 today. So, yeah, just you start all the 471 00:18:04,080 --> 00:18:05,430 time and. 472 00:18:06,790 --> 00:18:08,949 Everybody, security 473 00:18:08,950 --> 00:18:11,169 in a box is a tool kit that 474 00:18:11,170 --> 00:18:12,849 tactical take the organization I work for 475 00:18:12,850 --> 00:18:15,009 developes, which is a set 476 00:18:15,010 --> 00:18:18,399 of tactics and tools that helps users 477 00:18:18,400 --> 00:18:20,409 protect their data and their 478 00:18:20,410 --> 00:18:23,529 communications using various different 479 00:18:23,530 --> 00:18:26,109 tactics and encryption tools, and 480 00:18:26,110 --> 00:18:28,269 has a few sections on how 481 00:18:28,270 --> 00:18:30,549 you can circumvent censorship 482 00:18:30,550 --> 00:18:32,619 or use to how you can 483 00:18:32,620 --> 00:18:34,569 install and use tools such as the dart 484 00:18:34,570 --> 00:18:36,939 browser to stay 485 00:18:36,940 --> 00:18:38,109 anonymous and 486 00:18:39,640 --> 00:18:41,709 and protect your identity 487 00:18:41,710 --> 00:18:44,349 and and be able to circumvent censorship 488 00:18:44,350 --> 00:18:46,479 if you are being affected by it where you 489 00:18:46,480 --> 00:18:47,890 are. And 490 00:18:49,040 --> 00:18:51,459 and I'd like to plug 491 00:18:51,460 --> 00:18:54,189 the here Jeff, who developed 492 00:18:54,190 --> 00:18:56,239 Sleepiest Everywhere, which I mentioned 493 00:18:56,240 --> 00:18:58,749 in the talk earlier, also 494 00:18:58,750 --> 00:19:00,819 have been publishing something called the 495 00:19:00,820 --> 00:19:03,009 Self Surveillance Defense Tool Kit, 496 00:19:03,010 --> 00:19:05,200 which is similar to 497 00:19:06,310 --> 00:19:08,109 the kind of work we do, has some very 498 00:19:08,110 --> 00:19:10,509 useful guides about how you can use 499 00:19:10,510 --> 00:19:13,309 tools to protect your Internet freedoms 500 00:19:13,310 --> 00:19:15,699 are going to slowly 501 00:19:15,700 --> 00:19:18,399 move towards and wrapping this up. 502 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:21,219 These are the two articles I couldn't fit 503 00:19:21,220 --> 00:19:22,659 the whole you are in there. 504 00:19:22,660 --> 00:19:24,039 I don't know how to use 505 00:19:25,330 --> 00:19:27,429 LibreOffice and press very well. 506 00:19:27,430 --> 00:19:29,589 And so those 507 00:19:29,590 --> 00:19:31,659 are the tiny areas, these slides I will 508 00:19:31,660 --> 00:19:34,509 publish online and tweet about it. 509 00:19:34,510 --> 00:19:36,279 But I guess if you watch the video, 510 00:19:36,280 --> 00:19:37,209 you'll be able to find them too. 511 00:19:37,210 --> 00:19:39,379 But that's not to go that 512 00:19:39,380 --> 00:19:41,919 leave. And Claudio 513 00:19:41,920 --> 00:19:43,749 Glenorie and I wrote in the Huffington 514 00:19:43,750 --> 00:19:45,340 Post right after we 515 00:19:47,020 --> 00:19:48,399 did this research last year. 516 00:19:48,400 --> 00:19:50,439 And also Claudio followed up with an 517 00:19:50,440 --> 00:19:52,929 article in The Globe in Global Voices 518 00:19:52,930 --> 00:19:55,119 where he actually talks about how we 519 00:19:55,120 --> 00:19:57,549 should be asking 520 00:19:57,550 --> 00:19:59,619 our ISPs to defend our freedoms and 521 00:19:59,620 --> 00:20:01,689 what we can do as customers of 522 00:20:01,690 --> 00:20:03,789 these Internet service providers to 523 00:20:03,790 --> 00:20:05,859 make the Internet a better place for 524 00:20:05,860 --> 00:20:06,860 everybody. 525 00:20:08,260 --> 00:20:10,359 And, yeah, that's 526 00:20:10,360 --> 00:20:11,599 how you can find me. 527 00:20:11,600 --> 00:20:14,709 I'm humby on Twitter, and 528 00:20:14,710 --> 00:20:16,070 that's my email address. 529 00:20:17,470 --> 00:20:19,150 Thank you so much. 530 00:20:24,200 --> 00:20:26,539 We have some time for some questions 531 00:20:26,540 --> 00:20:29,959 there, Sunny, please, 532 00:20:29,960 --> 00:20:31,180 forward to the microphone. 533 00:20:35,910 --> 00:20:38,129 So I have a question, so you mentioned 534 00:20:38,130 --> 00:20:40,289 that TARTA can probably use 535 00:20:40,290 --> 00:20:43,109 DPI, right, and 536 00:20:44,250 --> 00:20:46,619 it sounds like they had DPI 537 00:20:46,620 --> 00:20:48,839 deployed before 538 00:20:48,840 --> 00:20:50,629 the order was given out. 539 00:20:50,630 --> 00:20:52,919 So could you speculate on why it was 540 00:20:52,920 --> 00:20:55,169 kind of deployed and maybe it might be in 541 00:20:55,170 --> 00:20:56,170 use? 542 00:20:57,060 --> 00:20:59,429 Well, it's not uncommon 543 00:20:59,430 --> 00:21:02,399 for a Espy's to get orders 544 00:21:02,400 --> 00:21:04,829 which are asking them to block specific 545 00:21:04,830 --> 00:21:07,139 Internet resources in India at all. 546 00:21:07,140 --> 00:21:08,549 In fact, when we were doing this 547 00:21:08,550 --> 00:21:10,529 research, we found a bunch of other lists 548 00:21:10,530 --> 00:21:12,569 that we could throw into the scripts we 549 00:21:12,570 --> 00:21:14,609 were using, including the only stuff. 550 00:21:14,610 --> 00:21:15,929 And we found that there was a lot of 551 00:21:15,930 --> 00:21:17,429 different kind of stuff that was being 552 00:21:17,430 --> 00:21:19,949 censored, most commonly 553 00:21:19,950 --> 00:21:22,589 file sharing websites to prevent piracy, 554 00:21:22,590 --> 00:21:25,199 but also a lot of pornography 555 00:21:25,200 --> 00:21:26,739 and a few other things. 556 00:21:26,740 --> 00:21:29,069 So and 557 00:21:29,070 --> 00:21:30,419 this is not the first time that we've 558 00:21:30,420 --> 00:21:32,639 seen something that 559 00:21:32,640 --> 00:21:34,379 is really popular being blocked in India. 560 00:21:34,380 --> 00:21:36,539 We saw a whole lot 561 00:21:36,540 --> 00:21:37,619 of groups on Yahoo! 562 00:21:37,620 --> 00:21:39,869 Dotcom go down a few years ago 563 00:21:39,870 --> 00:21:41,579 because, again, 564 00:21:42,870 --> 00:21:45,029 the Ministry of Communications and IP 565 00:21:45,030 --> 00:21:46,839 sent out an order to the ISP. 566 00:21:46,840 --> 00:21:49,259 This time not a secret order. 567 00:21:49,260 --> 00:21:50,999 Fortunately for us, therefore, we knew 568 00:21:51,000 --> 00:21:53,189 what was going on, but 569 00:21:53,190 --> 00:21:55,169 they found something that they thought 570 00:21:55,170 --> 00:21:57,180 was inciting violence 571 00:21:58,560 --> 00:22:00,749 in the country and asked every 572 00:22:00,750 --> 00:22:02,849 ISP to block it. So and it's 573 00:22:02,850 --> 00:22:04,259 something that's very common. 574 00:22:04,260 --> 00:22:06,569 The ISPs are dealing with censorship 575 00:22:06,570 --> 00:22:08,709 orders quite often in the country. 576 00:22:08,710 --> 00:22:10,799 Therefore, they have 577 00:22:10,800 --> 00:22:12,959 been investing 578 00:22:12,960 --> 00:22:15,089 in technology that 579 00:22:15,090 --> 00:22:16,090 helps them. 580 00:22:19,450 --> 00:22:22,059 Do you think that they're using DPI 581 00:22:22,060 --> 00:22:24,519 for data collection on their citizens? 582 00:22:26,030 --> 00:22:28,399 Well, I can, 583 00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:30,259 but I would only speculate if I were to 584 00:22:30,260 --> 00:22:32,059 answer that question, therefore, I would 585 00:22:32,060 --> 00:22:34,219 say I am I'm not 586 00:22:34,220 --> 00:22:35,689 certain if they are doing that and we 587 00:22:35,690 --> 00:22:37,069 have no evidence that they are actually 588 00:22:37,070 --> 00:22:38,029 doing that. 589 00:22:38,030 --> 00:22:39,199 Thanks. 590 00:22:39,200 --> 00:22:40,609 Thank you so much. 591 00:22:40,610 --> 00:22:42,949 If there's any question, please forward 592 00:22:42,950 --> 00:22:44,089 to one of the mikes. 593 00:22:47,390 --> 00:22:49,159 Um, two questions. 594 00:22:49,160 --> 00:22:52,099 The first is, does some 595 00:22:52,100 --> 00:22:54,289 national or specialized 596 00:22:54,290 --> 00:22:56,509 media ever 597 00:22:56,510 --> 00:22:59,119 wrote an article about that 598 00:22:59,120 --> 00:23:01,609 censorship happening in India 599 00:23:01,610 --> 00:23:03,049 within India? 600 00:23:03,050 --> 00:23:05,239 And the second is there were a 601 00:23:05,240 --> 00:23:07,399 spike in the usage in 602 00:23:07,400 --> 00:23:09,769 the amount of Tor users in India 603 00:23:09,770 --> 00:23:11,869 after that sense, that 604 00:23:11,870 --> 00:23:14,239 censorship order has been implemented. 605 00:23:16,520 --> 00:23:17,569 To answer the first question. 606 00:23:17,570 --> 00:23:19,459 Yeah, there was there has been there was 607 00:23:19,460 --> 00:23:22,039 massive coverage of the two 608 00:23:22,040 --> 00:23:24,189 really large incidents, one 609 00:23:24,190 --> 00:23:26,389 one of them being this and 610 00:23:26,390 --> 00:23:28,519 the other one I mentioned earlier 611 00:23:28,520 --> 00:23:29,389 when groups told Yahoo! 612 00:23:29,390 --> 00:23:30,390 Dot com 613 00:23:32,030 --> 00:23:34,190 was blocked for, I think over 614 00:23:35,210 --> 00:23:37,309 a week a few years 615 00:23:37,310 --> 00:23:38,449 ago. 616 00:23:38,450 --> 00:23:41,329 And yeah, it has been covered by 617 00:23:41,330 --> 00:23:43,579 by large news media outlets. 618 00:23:43,580 --> 00:23:45,109 It has been reported. 619 00:23:45,110 --> 00:23:48,469 This one was also reported after. 620 00:23:48,470 --> 00:23:49,470 After. 621 00:23:51,430 --> 00:23:52,749 People like us and the Center for 622 00:23:52,750 --> 00:23:54,519 Internet and Society in India made a lot 623 00:23:54,520 --> 00:23:56,559 of noise on Twitter and social media 624 00:23:56,560 --> 00:23:58,119 about these blogs. 625 00:23:59,550 --> 00:24:01,779 I'm sorry for your 626 00:24:01,780 --> 00:24:02,780 second question. 627 00:24:03,910 --> 00:24:05,260 People will ask why. 628 00:24:06,340 --> 00:24:08,499 Um, yeah, 629 00:24:08,500 --> 00:24:10,689 I think we've tried to look into 630 00:24:10,690 --> 00:24:12,969 this right after, and I don't remember 631 00:24:12,970 --> 00:24:14,319 if we saw anything that 632 00:24:15,400 --> 00:24:17,499 maybe does, but I don't think we saw 633 00:24:17,500 --> 00:24:18,199 any. 634 00:24:18,200 --> 00:24:19,929 Remember, we talked about it. 635 00:24:19,930 --> 00:24:21,669 Maybe we didn't pay a lot of attention, 636 00:24:21,670 --> 00:24:23,739 but I think that's something we probably 637 00:24:23,740 --> 00:24:25,239 should actively monitor every time 638 00:24:25,240 --> 00:24:26,199 something like this happens. 639 00:24:26,200 --> 00:24:28,599 And I put that put that 640 00:24:28,600 --> 00:24:30,759 on my checklist to. 641 00:24:34,100 --> 00:24:36,619 There is also a question from 642 00:24:36,620 --> 00:24:37,819 someone from the Internet. 643 00:24:38,960 --> 00:24:40,549 OK, the question is, did the Indian 644 00:24:40,550 --> 00:24:42,889 government or the ISP have any advice 645 00:24:42,890 --> 00:24:44,929 or assistance from external, for example, 646 00:24:44,930 --> 00:24:47,059 meaning foreign companies or agencies 647 00:24:47,060 --> 00:24:48,409 to implement these blocks? 648 00:24:48,410 --> 00:24:50,479 So like the hacking team or 649 00:24:50,480 --> 00:24:51,480 three letter agencies, 650 00:24:52,880 --> 00:24:55,249 we did find evidence of 651 00:24:56,660 --> 00:24:58,999 some invasive deep packet inspection 652 00:24:59,000 --> 00:25:01,069 technology that was so that 653 00:25:01,070 --> 00:25:04,189 was being used by data 654 00:25:04,190 --> 00:25:06,379 by a company called Sify 655 00:25:06,380 --> 00:25:07,129 Connect. 656 00:25:07,130 --> 00:25:09,229 I cannot remember where they were from, 657 00:25:09,230 --> 00:25:10,939 but I am pretty certain that they were 658 00:25:10,940 --> 00:25:12,410 not Indian. 659 00:25:14,360 --> 00:25:16,999 And actually, if you read the 660 00:25:17,000 --> 00:25:18,499 Huffington Post article that I linked to 661 00:25:18,500 --> 00:25:20,719 earlier, we have all the 662 00:25:20,720 --> 00:25:22,819 different blog pages that we 663 00:25:22,820 --> 00:25:24,259 saw across different ISPs and they 664 00:25:24,260 --> 00:25:26,689 varied. And one of them is 665 00:25:26,690 --> 00:25:28,999 actually a big advertisement for 666 00:25:29,000 --> 00:25:31,249 the company that was selling 667 00:25:31,250 --> 00:25:33,409 technology to the 668 00:25:33,410 --> 00:25:36,079 ISP that was using, 669 00:25:36,080 --> 00:25:38,179 using, using their tech 670 00:25:38,180 --> 00:25:39,739 to connect this block. 671 00:25:43,490 --> 00:25:45,469 And the second question is about which 672 00:25:45,470 --> 00:25:47,779 private networks are there any little 673 00:25:47,780 --> 00:25:49,549 private networks provided that, uh, 674 00:25:49,550 --> 00:25:51,739 providers that were not affected by these 675 00:25:51,740 --> 00:25:52,740 requests? 676 00:25:53,550 --> 00:25:55,679 So we weren't 677 00:25:55,680 --> 00:25:57,929 able to do a lot of testing 678 00:25:57,930 --> 00:25:59,890 with virtual private networks in India. 679 00:26:01,590 --> 00:26:03,069 We. 680 00:26:03,070 --> 00:26:05,139 Did you ever notice so 681 00:26:05,140 --> 00:26:06,669 yeah, I don't know the answer to that 682 00:26:06,670 --> 00:26:08,739 question is I am I don't 683 00:26:08,740 --> 00:26:10,479 know. I'm not certain. 684 00:26:10,480 --> 00:26:12,789 We did, however, notice that the 685 00:26:12,790 --> 00:26:15,279 blogs very extremely inconsistent. 686 00:26:15,280 --> 00:26:17,739 We were able to access certain things 687 00:26:17,740 --> 00:26:20,589 on specific ISPs at times, 688 00:26:20,590 --> 00:26:22,689 which subsequently were 689 00:26:22,690 --> 00:26:25,329 blocked using the same network connection 690 00:26:25,330 --> 00:26:27,669 at some ISP. 691 00:26:27,670 --> 00:26:29,559 We're not blocking all 32 items. 692 00:26:29,560 --> 00:26:31,659 We were able to access a 693 00:26:31,660 --> 00:26:33,879 specific set of those 32 euro zone, some 694 00:26:33,880 --> 00:26:35,319 ISPs at all times 695 00:26:36,880 --> 00:26:38,229 with no interruptions. 696 00:26:39,490 --> 00:26:41,919 So, yeah, but 697 00:26:41,920 --> 00:26:44,469 we did not actually get around to testing 698 00:26:44,470 --> 00:26:46,329 using weapons in India. 699 00:26:51,330 --> 00:26:52,379 We have a question. 700 00:26:52,380 --> 00:26:53,639 I was wondering, in the light of your 701 00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:55,289 talk, when you're thinking of the latest 702 00:26:55,290 --> 00:26:58,889 revelations with the free basics, 703 00:26:58,890 --> 00:27:00,329 yeah, you're probably expecting this. 704 00:27:02,520 --> 00:27:03,959 What am I expecting? 705 00:27:03,960 --> 00:27:05,819 No, no, no. I thought you expected a 706 00:27:05,820 --> 00:27:07,199 question about OK. 707 00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:09,599 I was just wondering what I think about 708 00:27:09,600 --> 00:27:10,919 what's happening with. 709 00:27:10,920 --> 00:27:12,149 So this is something that we've been 710 00:27:12,150 --> 00:27:14,219 fighting with 711 00:27:14,220 --> 00:27:17,339 the government and the Telecom 712 00:27:17,340 --> 00:27:19,589 Regulatory Authority of India with for 713 00:27:19,590 --> 00:27:21,959 a little while now. For over a year. 714 00:27:21,960 --> 00:27:24,389 They put out a 715 00:27:24,390 --> 00:27:26,609 basically a consultation call 716 00:27:26,610 --> 00:27:29,039 about a year ago asking people 717 00:27:29,040 --> 00:27:29,639 to respond. 718 00:27:29,640 --> 00:27:31,530 And as an 719 00:27:32,760 --> 00:27:34,709 organization, civil society organizations 720 00:27:34,710 --> 00:27:36,359 in India, among others, actually 721 00:27:36,360 --> 00:27:38,549 responded, saying, no, we do not want 722 00:27:39,630 --> 00:27:42,569 Internet dot org, as it was known then 723 00:27:42,570 --> 00:27:44,789 adopted by any ISP in India. 724 00:27:44,790 --> 00:27:46,979 And and now there is a second call 725 00:27:46,980 --> 00:27:48,420 by the PRC, which 726 00:27:49,680 --> 00:27:51,929 is a follow up to that first consultation 727 00:27:51,930 --> 00:27:52,930 call, where 728 00:27:55,020 --> 00:27:56,549 it's pretty much the same thing. 729 00:27:56,550 --> 00:27:58,799 Basically, there is 730 00:27:58,800 --> 00:28:00,449 there was something that there was a 731 00:28:00,450 --> 00:28:02,639 judgment like a week ago 732 00:28:02,640 --> 00:28:04,889 which basically asks Reliance 733 00:28:04,890 --> 00:28:06,059 Communications, which is actually the 734 00:28:06,060 --> 00:28:08,129 only only telecom service provider 735 00:28:08,130 --> 00:28:10,679 which has partnered with Facebook 736 00:28:10,680 --> 00:28:12,899 to provide free basics in India and ask 737 00:28:12,900 --> 00:28:15,329 them to temporarily 738 00:28:15,330 --> 00:28:16,829 suspend the 739 00:28:18,180 --> 00:28:20,549 suspend the service to all their users. 740 00:28:20,550 --> 00:28:21,779 So that is a good sign. 741 00:28:21,780 --> 00:28:23,909 And we will hopefully 742 00:28:23,910 --> 00:28:26,489 have some good news 743 00:28:26,490 --> 00:28:28,559 at the end of this process after this 744 00:28:28,560 --> 00:28:29,560 consultation 745 00:28:31,410 --> 00:28:34,229 comes to, well, a conclusion 746 00:28:34,230 --> 00:28:35,230 from the. 747 00:28:37,630 --> 00:28:38,709 Thank you so much. 748 00:28:38,710 --> 00:28:40,779 I think if there is no further 749 00:28:40,780 --> 00:28:42,909 questions, we will conclude this 750 00:28:42,910 --> 00:28:44,529 very interesting talk. 751 00:28:44,530 --> 00:28:45,700 Thank you. Thank you again.