0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/605 Thanks! 1 00:00:10,820 --> 00:00:12,739 Welcome, everybody. For the next talk, 2 00:00:12,740 --> 00:00:15,049 when algorithms fail in our personal 3 00:00:15,050 --> 00:00:17,149 lives, it is a one hour 4 00:00:17,150 --> 00:00:19,339 talk. Our lovely speaker with us today 5 00:00:19,340 --> 00:00:21,199 is Caroline Sanders. 6 00:00:21,200 --> 00:00:23,899 She's a user researcher for IBM. 7 00:00:23,900 --> 00:00:26,479 She's also an artist, a researcher 8 00:00:26,480 --> 00:00:27,949 and a video game designer. 9 00:00:27,950 --> 00:00:29,449 She's from the States. 10 00:00:29,450 --> 00:00:31,459 And I should also mention that she is a 11 00:00:31,460 --> 00:00:33,529 member of the NYC Resistor 12 00:00:33,530 --> 00:00:34,849 Hackerspace. 13 00:00:34,850 --> 00:00:36,979 And, oh, I see some fans 14 00:00:36,980 --> 00:00:37,980 over here. Cool. 15 00:00:39,770 --> 00:00:41,809 We already learned in a bunch of talks 16 00:00:41,810 --> 00:00:43,819 over the course of Congress what 17 00:00:43,820 --> 00:00:46,579 algorithms do when they fail. 18 00:00:46,580 --> 00:00:47,869 Yesterday, we learned about how 19 00:00:47,870 --> 00:00:50,149 algorithms can discriminate or not 20 00:00:50,150 --> 00:00:52,219 discriminate in the hiring process. 21 00:00:52,220 --> 00:00:54,169 And Caroline is going to tell us a little 22 00:00:54,170 --> 00:00:56,329 more about when 23 00:00:56,330 --> 00:00:58,429 it's better not use algorithms because 24 00:00:58,430 --> 00:01:00,229 there are some things that algorithm just 25 00:01:00,230 --> 00:01:02,149 can't do that humans can do. 26 00:01:02,150 --> 00:01:03,589 So please give it up for Caroline and 27 00:01:03,590 --> 00:01:04,909 enjoy the talk. Thank you very much. 28 00:01:10,510 --> 00:01:12,549 Hi, everyone, I'm Caroline Senders. 29 00:01:12,550 --> 00:01:14,439 I should probably first specify that I'm 30 00:01:14,440 --> 00:01:16,359 speaking here of my own accord and on 31 00:01:16,360 --> 00:01:17,499 behalf of IBM. 32 00:01:17,500 --> 00:01:20,559 So just FYI 33 00:01:20,560 --> 00:01:22,569 and that this is actually a presentation 34 00:01:22,570 --> 00:01:24,939 also on a very strange 35 00:01:24,940 --> 00:01:27,699 and specific art project I did 36 00:01:27,700 --> 00:01:29,409 back in late November. 37 00:01:29,410 --> 00:01:31,269 So when algorithms fail in our personal 38 00:01:31,270 --> 00:01:33,249 lives, this is probably the best way to 39 00:01:33,250 --> 00:01:34,899 describe me because I live on the 40 00:01:34,900 --> 00:01:35,900 Internet. 41 00:01:37,270 --> 00:01:38,889 I've spent the past two years studying 42 00:01:38,890 --> 00:01:40,599 online fandoms, communities, Internet 43 00:01:40,600 --> 00:01:42,819 culture and online harassment. 44 00:01:42,820 --> 00:01:44,649 And this is what I do for fun outside of 45 00:01:44,650 --> 00:01:45,650 work. 46 00:01:46,180 --> 00:01:47,619 I think a lot about language and 47 00:01:47,620 --> 00:01:50,289 conversation as identifiers, 48 00:01:50,290 --> 00:01:52,509 and I spend a lot of time reading the way 49 00:01:52,510 --> 00:01:54,579 in which conversations unfold on 50 00:01:54,580 --> 00:01:57,059 different subjects on Reddit, 4chan, 51 00:01:57,060 --> 00:01:59,499 H.A., Wikipedia, the way Wikipedia 52 00:01:59,500 --> 00:02:01,659 is used as a conversational tool not just 53 00:02:01,660 --> 00:02:03,699 to upload information and obviously 54 00:02:03,700 --> 00:02:05,529 Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and 55 00:02:05,530 --> 00:02:06,609 Instagram. 56 00:02:06,610 --> 00:02:07,929 And the one thing I've sort of learned 57 00:02:07,930 --> 00:02:09,668 from all this is that each of these 58 00:02:09,669 --> 00:02:11,349 different platforms have a very different 59 00:02:11,350 --> 00:02:12,879 identity and have a very different way in 60 00:02:12,880 --> 00:02:15,099 which conversation sort of has evolved 61 00:02:15,100 --> 00:02:16,869 linguistically to that platform. 62 00:02:16,870 --> 00:02:18,669 The way we talk on Reddit is a lot 63 00:02:18,670 --> 00:02:19,749 different than the way we talk on 64 00:02:19,750 --> 00:02:22,089 Twitter. And I think that that is due to 65 00:02:22,090 --> 00:02:24,219 the infrastructural design of 66 00:02:24,220 --> 00:02:26,289 the platform itself, as well as 67 00:02:26,290 --> 00:02:28,089 the ways in which the platform identifies 68 00:02:28,090 --> 00:02:29,069 itself to users. 69 00:02:29,070 --> 00:02:30,459 So like a code of conduct 70 00:02:32,650 --> 00:02:34,749 two years ago, I are actually like 71 00:02:34,750 --> 00:02:36,399 a year and a half ago I really started 72 00:02:36,400 --> 00:02:37,629 focusing on online harassment. 73 00:02:37,630 --> 00:02:40,629 I specifically focused on GamerGate 74 00:02:40,630 --> 00:02:41,859 as a video game designer. 75 00:02:41,860 --> 00:02:43,449 I saw GamerGate sort of affecting the 76 00:02:43,450 --> 00:02:44,439 community around me. 77 00:02:44,440 --> 00:02:46,599 I didn't necessarily I'm 78 00:02:46,600 --> 00:02:48,729 not driven to study harassment by why 79 00:02:48,730 --> 00:02:51,009 it happens, but rather how 80 00:02:51,010 --> 00:02:53,559 how does harassment unfold on different 81 00:02:53,560 --> 00:02:55,029 sorts of platforms and how do you 82 00:02:55,030 --> 00:02:56,589 platforms allow for different kinds of 83 00:02:56,590 --> 00:02:57,579 communication? 84 00:02:57,580 --> 00:02:59,589 And really, how open is the general user 85 00:02:59,590 --> 00:03:00,609 on a platform? 86 00:03:00,610 --> 00:03:02,079 How connected are they to the privacy 87 00:03:02,080 --> 00:03:04,269 policies and how aware are they 88 00:03:04,270 --> 00:03:06,519 of how exposed they are and how permeable 89 00:03:06,520 --> 00:03:07,930 their data and information is? 90 00:03:08,980 --> 00:03:11,469 So, Tildy, are I explore complex emotions 91 00:03:11,470 --> 00:03:13,179 and emotional reactions within systems 92 00:03:14,740 --> 00:03:16,029 and I'm going to briefly cover some of 93 00:03:16,030 --> 00:03:17,979 the anti harassing research I've done. 94 00:03:19,150 --> 00:03:20,589 So sometimes I write things the Internet 95 00:03:20,590 --> 00:03:21,879 doesn't like them. 96 00:03:21,880 --> 00:03:23,979 Last April, the Internet sent a 97 00:03:23,980 --> 00:03:25,599 SWAT team to my mom's house. 98 00:03:25,600 --> 00:03:26,799 If you know what swotting is, it's a very 99 00:03:26,800 --> 00:03:28,479 popular online harassment tactic that 100 00:03:28,480 --> 00:03:29,689 manifests itself. 101 00:03:29,690 --> 00:03:32,139 URL oftentimes 102 00:03:32,140 --> 00:03:34,209 a fake violent phone 103 00:03:34,210 --> 00:03:35,439 call is placed to a local police 104 00:03:35,440 --> 00:03:37,599 department. That violent phone 105 00:03:37,600 --> 00:03:39,219 call triggers the militarized police to 106 00:03:39,220 --> 00:03:41,229 be deployed. And this is what happened to 107 00:03:41,230 --> 00:03:42,230 my mom. 108 00:03:43,440 --> 00:03:45,749 Sometimes panels I'm on get canceled 109 00:03:45,750 --> 00:03:46,829 because maybe they're kind of 110 00:03:46,830 --> 00:03:48,359 controversial. 111 00:03:48,360 --> 00:03:50,039 I submitted a design panel to South by 112 00:03:50,040 --> 00:03:52,139 Southwest and it was canceled due to 113 00:03:52,140 --> 00:03:53,729 harassment and threats of violence. 114 00:03:54,780 --> 00:03:55,889 So I guess my work seems kind of 115 00:03:55,890 --> 00:03:56,909 contentious. 116 00:03:56,910 --> 00:03:58,529 I think that it's pretty straightforward. 117 00:03:58,530 --> 00:04:00,399 It's generally design. 118 00:04:00,400 --> 00:04:01,589 I don't know why anyone have a really 119 00:04:01,590 --> 00:04:03,359 massive opinion around it. 120 00:04:03,360 --> 00:04:05,219 But the thing I sort of want to talk 121 00:04:05,220 --> 00:04:07,109 about actually is and what I care about 122 00:04:07,110 --> 00:04:09,329 exploring is how do systems 123 00:04:09,330 --> 00:04:10,409 affect behavior. 124 00:04:10,410 --> 00:04:12,509 So I said earlier, I'm here now as an IBM 125 00:04:12,510 --> 00:04:14,579 representative, but 126 00:04:14,580 --> 00:04:16,499 I spend most of my day job actually at 127 00:04:16,500 --> 00:04:18,419 working on Watson, working in artificial 128 00:04:18,420 --> 00:04:20,639 intelligence as a user researcher around 129 00:04:20,640 --> 00:04:23,049 conversational analytics for chat robots. 130 00:04:23,050 --> 00:04:24,389 That's kind of a mouthful. 131 00:04:24,390 --> 00:04:25,739 So I mean by that is I spent a lot of 132 00:04:25,740 --> 00:04:27,749 time working with software that allows 133 00:04:27,750 --> 00:04:29,969 users to set up chat robots. 134 00:04:29,970 --> 00:04:31,559 So I think a lot about the ways in which 135 00:04:31,560 --> 00:04:33,539 I'm designing software to help people 136 00:04:33,540 --> 00:04:35,489 design conversations that robots have 137 00:04:35,490 --> 00:04:36,629 with people. 138 00:04:36,630 --> 00:04:38,069 So when I say I believe that systems 139 00:04:38,070 --> 00:04:40,049 affect behavior, I live that every day. 140 00:04:40,050 --> 00:04:42,119 And I think about the ways in which 141 00:04:42,120 --> 00:04:44,159 the structure of an interface actually 142 00:04:44,160 --> 00:04:46,019 will lead people to to converse and what 143 00:04:46,020 --> 00:04:47,020 that would look like. 144 00:04:48,670 --> 00:04:50,739 So in the past two years of doing 145 00:04:50,740 --> 00:04:53,349 just, I guess, broad heuristic 146 00:04:53,350 --> 00:04:55,419 ethnographic research, what I've come to 147 00:04:55,420 --> 00:04:57,519 realize is users have 148 00:04:57,520 --> 00:04:59,259 a myriad of different problems that can 149 00:04:59,260 --> 00:05:01,599 be solved in similar ways, but yield 150 00:05:01,600 --> 00:05:03,579 radically different results mean that we 151 00:05:03,580 --> 00:05:05,169 can sort of start approaching ways to 152 00:05:05,170 --> 00:05:08,559 solve problems of harassment through 153 00:05:08,560 --> 00:05:10,089 either new kinds of algorithms or a 154 00:05:10,090 --> 00:05:12,189 really flexible UI on top of 155 00:05:12,190 --> 00:05:14,259 an algorithm, i.e., what if we 156 00:05:14,260 --> 00:05:16,389 gave people more robust privacy settings 157 00:05:16,390 --> 00:05:18,039 and allowed users to start to articulate 158 00:05:18,040 --> 00:05:19,539 the ways in which they're reachable and 159 00:05:19,540 --> 00:05:21,069 how their data, really their 160 00:05:21,070 --> 00:05:22,209 conversations are read? 161 00:05:24,850 --> 00:05:26,199 And I think this because algorithms 162 00:05:26,200 --> 00:05:27,759 really aren't that smart and language 163 00:05:27,760 --> 00:05:30,129 within an algorithm is a 164 00:05:30,130 --> 00:05:32,079 it's decontextualized into data. 165 00:05:32,080 --> 00:05:34,419 We as sorry we as users, 166 00:05:34,420 --> 00:05:36,299 we provide context to language. 167 00:05:36,300 --> 00:05:37,899 Language. Language is what we make it. 168 00:05:37,900 --> 00:05:39,849 But in a system, it's not simply just 169 00:05:39,850 --> 00:05:40,850 bits of data. 170 00:05:41,950 --> 00:05:43,539 So I was driven by this thought, how can 171 00:05:43,540 --> 00:05:45,279 I make a flexible system to solve a 172 00:05:45,280 --> 00:05:46,959 variety of different problems for a 173 00:05:46,960 --> 00:05:48,489 variety of different people? 174 00:05:49,690 --> 00:05:52,029 So I did what I do best and I 175 00:05:52,030 --> 00:05:54,159 made a low res 176 00:05:54,160 --> 00:05:56,379 wireframe and 177 00:05:56,380 --> 00:05:58,149 I created sort of speculative wireframe 178 00:05:58,150 --> 00:06:00,369 to sort of focus myself on what 179 00:06:00,370 --> 00:06:01,599 I thought could be achievable. 180 00:06:01,600 --> 00:06:03,519 And then I decided to test it against 20 181 00:06:03,520 --> 00:06:05,589 different users I had interviewed had 182 00:06:05,590 --> 00:06:07,509 been affected by GamerGate, as well as a 183 00:06:07,510 --> 00:06:09,759 handful of gamer gamers themselves 184 00:06:09,760 --> 00:06:10,929 who would interact with me on Twitter. 185 00:06:10,930 --> 00:06:12,489 And I would ask them questions about the 186 00:06:12,490 --> 00:06:15,009 ways in which they organize 187 00:06:15,010 --> 00:06:16,879 themselves, the ways in which they talk 188 00:06:16,880 --> 00:06:18,849 to other people, what conversations they 189 00:06:18,850 --> 00:06:20,289 were hoping to get out of interacting 190 00:06:20,290 --> 00:06:21,459 with me on Twitter. 191 00:06:23,260 --> 00:06:25,389 And what I sort of 192 00:06:25,390 --> 00:06:27,459 started to learn is that we need to 193 00:06:27,460 --> 00:06:29,559 focus on privacy and social media 194 00:06:29,560 --> 00:06:31,689 needs to be as prevalent and as 195 00:06:31,690 --> 00:06:33,759 important as writing content itself. 196 00:06:33,760 --> 00:06:36,249 So do you see that gray box at the top 197 00:06:36,250 --> 00:06:38,559 that is a placeholder 198 00:06:38,560 --> 00:06:40,299 for a button that sends you to a redesign 199 00:06:40,300 --> 00:06:41,439 privacy page? 200 00:06:41,440 --> 00:06:43,659 So from interviewing these 20 users, I 201 00:06:43,660 --> 00:06:45,999 got a really robust sense of different 202 00:06:46,000 --> 00:06:48,189 kinds of needs and wants users wanted 203 00:06:48,190 --> 00:06:49,299 out of Twitter. 204 00:06:49,300 --> 00:06:51,399 I interviewed people that had over 100000 205 00:06:51,400 --> 00:06:53,289 followers that absolutely wanted to 206 00:06:53,290 --> 00:06:55,149 remain completely public and they want to 207 00:06:55,150 --> 00:06:56,679 be reachable at all times. 208 00:06:56,680 --> 00:06:58,899 I interviewed some users that had 3000 209 00:06:58,900 --> 00:07:00,579 followers that wanted to be completely 210 00:07:00,580 --> 00:07:01,959 hidden, but still have their tweets 211 00:07:01,960 --> 00:07:03,909 treated as media, thus shareable. 212 00:07:03,910 --> 00:07:05,919 And I read some users that wanted to not 213 00:07:05,920 --> 00:07:07,749 go private, which is a very public 214 00:07:07,750 --> 00:07:09,549 statement on Twitter to have the lock 215 00:07:09,550 --> 00:07:11,649 next to you, but wanting to have all the 216 00:07:11,650 --> 00:07:13,509 affordance of privacy. 217 00:07:13,510 --> 00:07:15,009 So what I've added is you can see is 218 00:07:15,010 --> 00:07:17,079 allow these checkmarks to 219 00:07:17,080 --> 00:07:19,059 allow a user to start to change the way 220 00:07:19,060 --> 00:07:21,339 in which their written content can 221 00:07:21,340 --> 00:07:23,619 be accessed and sort of really 222 00:07:23,620 --> 00:07:25,029 actually change the way in which the 223 00:07:25,030 --> 00:07:27,249 amount of users on Twitter could start 224 00:07:27,250 --> 00:07:28,749 to read content they're posting. 225 00:07:28,750 --> 00:07:30,040 So one of them is allow 226 00:07:31,180 --> 00:07:32,559 followers of your followers to tweet it, 227 00:07:32,560 --> 00:07:34,629 use the idea of friends of friends, 228 00:07:34,630 --> 00:07:35,769 do not allow accounts. 229 00:07:35,770 --> 00:07:38,139 One, do not allow 230 00:07:38,140 --> 00:07:40,179 accounts with less than X followers to 231 00:07:40,180 --> 00:07:42,899 follow you or don't allow accounts with 232 00:07:42,900 --> 00:07:45,009 less than X days, meaning 233 00:07:45,010 --> 00:07:46,809 new accounts are often created in moments 234 00:07:46,810 --> 00:07:47,899 of harassment campaign. 235 00:07:47,900 --> 00:07:49,959 So if an account was a week 236 00:07:49,960 --> 00:07:52,089 old with two followers, that's probably a 237 00:07:52,090 --> 00:07:53,369 troll account. 238 00:07:53,370 --> 00:07:55,059 And additionally also allows users to 239 00:07:55,060 --> 00:07:56,769 sort of say like, oh, if you know you're 240 00:07:56,770 --> 00:07:58,539 not on my level, you can't tweet at me 241 00:07:58,540 --> 00:08:00,459 not judging. That's an interaction 242 00:08:00,460 --> 00:08:01,460 someone wanted. 243 00:08:02,380 --> 00:08:04,269 And then I sort of started to think more 244 00:08:04,270 --> 00:08:06,759 about what does it mean to exist publicly 245 00:08:06,760 --> 00:08:08,889 as a person on a platform. 246 00:08:08,890 --> 00:08:10,329 Twitter is sort of this mixed identity 247 00:08:10,330 --> 00:08:11,499 and mixed emotional state. 248 00:08:11,500 --> 00:08:13,779 It's both professional and personal. 249 00:08:13,780 --> 00:08:15,669 It's used as a networking tool as well as 250 00:08:15,670 --> 00:08:17,709 a social aid and a communicative tool. 251 00:08:17,710 --> 00:08:20,109 So people either have really persistent 252 00:08:20,110 --> 00:08:21,499 aliases or avatars. 253 00:08:21,500 --> 00:08:22,689 They've they have followed them from 254 00:08:22,690 --> 00:08:23,859 platform a platform, but they're not 255 00:08:23,860 --> 00:08:25,059 using their real name. 256 00:08:25,060 --> 00:08:26,859 There's levels of pseudo anonymity on 257 00:08:26,860 --> 00:08:29,049 Twitter. In my case, I use my real name 258 00:08:29,050 --> 00:08:31,329 and I can't really undo that. 259 00:08:31,330 --> 00:08:33,788 So my needs and using Twitter, especially 260 00:08:33,789 --> 00:08:35,139 the technologist, exist in a much 261 00:08:35,140 --> 00:08:36,879 different way than, say, someone who uses 262 00:08:36,880 --> 00:08:38,349 it as a casual medium. 263 00:08:38,350 --> 00:08:39,849 And we have very different needs. 264 00:08:39,850 --> 00:08:41,079 But through these different kinds of 265 00:08:41,080 --> 00:08:43,298 dials, I feel that this serves 266 00:08:43,299 --> 00:08:44,889 my needs as well as all the users I've 267 00:08:44,890 --> 00:08:46,779 interviewed, because we're able to start 268 00:08:46,780 --> 00:08:48,849 to tailor through UI and 269 00:08:48,850 --> 00:08:50,289 sort of be able to pull from very like 270 00:08:50,290 --> 00:08:51,759 top level of information, just mainly 271 00:08:51,760 --> 00:08:53,739 around followers as to how accessible I 272 00:08:53,740 --> 00:08:55,989 am at 273 00:08:55,990 --> 00:08:57,669 other things, such as blocked accounts 274 00:08:57,670 --> 00:08:58,989 and blocked tweets. Right now you can 275 00:08:58,990 --> 00:09:00,939 only see blocked accounts. 276 00:09:00,940 --> 00:09:03,169 You can't see blocked tweets. 277 00:09:03,170 --> 00:09:04,329 What if you could? 278 00:09:04,330 --> 00:09:05,589 And I pulled from this because within 279 00:09:05,590 --> 00:09:07,599 moments of harassment, even if it's a 280 00:09:07,600 --> 00:09:09,609 sustained stalker, there's often a tweet 281 00:09:09,610 --> 00:09:11,199 that will trigger it. It's never going to 282 00:09:11,200 --> 00:09:13,299 someone's account, at least 283 00:09:13,300 --> 00:09:14,889 within a harassment campaigns. 284 00:09:14,890 --> 00:09:15,819 You're not really going to someone's 285 00:09:15,820 --> 00:09:17,109 account and saying today I'm blocking 286 00:09:17,110 --> 00:09:19,089 you. There is often an interaction, a 287 00:09:19,090 --> 00:09:20,889 tweet that will trigger that response. 288 00:09:20,890 --> 00:09:22,599 So what if you could see that, start to 289 00:09:22,600 --> 00:09:24,249 group them together and maybe send a 290 00:09:24,250 --> 00:09:25,989 report to Twitter or to yourself and sort 291 00:09:25,990 --> 00:09:27,249 of you can the user could start to 292 00:09:27,250 --> 00:09:28,509 contextualize. 293 00:09:28,510 --> 00:09:30,699 This is a way in which these 294 00:09:30,700 --> 00:09:32,319 tweets are lame. So if there's mob 295 00:09:32,320 --> 00:09:34,359 harassment campaign, a user could say, I 296 00:09:34,360 --> 00:09:35,559 think all of these are linked. 297 00:09:35,560 --> 00:09:36,849 And if Twitter is implementing any kind 298 00:09:36,850 --> 00:09:38,529 of machine learning or natural language 299 00:09:38,530 --> 00:09:40,089 processing, they'd be able to start 300 00:09:40,090 --> 00:09:42,009 batching multiple reports at once and see 301 00:09:42,010 --> 00:09:43,010 how they're all related. 302 00:09:44,050 --> 00:09:45,459 Again, what if you could group mentions 303 00:09:45,460 --> 00:09:46,460 together? 304 00:09:47,350 --> 00:09:49,529 And I did this last night. 305 00:09:49,530 --> 00:09:51,069 One thing that I sort of noticed from a 306 00:09:51,070 --> 00:09:53,349 lot of my research is that users 307 00:09:53,350 --> 00:09:55,059 don't really have an understanding as to 308 00:09:55,060 --> 00:09:57,399 how how their language 309 00:09:57,400 --> 00:09:59,409 is actually data and how accessible their 310 00:09:59,410 --> 00:10:00,339 things are. 311 00:10:00,340 --> 00:10:01,449 So I'm sure you've heard a variety of 312 00:10:01,450 --> 00:10:03,879 stories around tweets going viral. 313 00:10:03,880 --> 00:10:05,979 Someone tweets something and then months 314 00:10:05,980 --> 00:10:07,539 later it's dug up or they tweet 315 00:10:07,540 --> 00:10:09,969 something. In the case of this really 316 00:10:09,970 --> 00:10:11,889 well-known incident, this woman tweeted a 317 00:10:11,890 --> 00:10:14,089 really off color joke about AIDS, got 318 00:10:14,090 --> 00:10:15,849 on a plane 12 hours later. 319 00:10:15,850 --> 00:10:17,679 This tweet, I completely exploded. 320 00:10:17,680 --> 00:10:19,149 The background of that story is that this 321 00:10:19,150 --> 00:10:21,309 woman only had 100 followers and 322 00:10:21,310 --> 00:10:23,469 had never had her tweets interacted 323 00:10:23,470 --> 00:10:25,209 with, like, very much at all. 324 00:10:25,210 --> 00:10:27,459 Not well, not in the sense of a stranger. 325 00:10:27,460 --> 00:10:29,709 So for her, this was a complete moment 326 00:10:29,710 --> 00:10:31,960 of the system kind of breaking. 327 00:10:33,250 --> 00:10:35,169 And I wonder if there were ways to sort 328 00:10:35,170 --> 00:10:36,939 of start to articulate to users how 329 00:10:36,940 --> 00:10:38,979 accessible you are, even if you feel 330 00:10:38,980 --> 00:10:41,289 small, even if you feel like 331 00:10:41,290 --> 00:10:43,359 no one is interacting with your tweets, 332 00:10:43,360 --> 00:10:45,219 you're still actually completely open. 333 00:10:45,220 --> 00:10:47,319 And the information you sent out into the 334 00:10:47,320 --> 00:10:49,269 system is media that can be isolated. 335 00:10:49,270 --> 00:10:50,499 And shared quickly, and that's sort of 336 00:10:50,500 --> 00:10:52,959 the way in which Twitter 337 00:10:52,960 --> 00:10:55,409 functions additionally so 338 00:10:55,410 --> 00:10:57,069 so I wondered, like, what if you could 339 00:10:57,070 --> 00:10:58,719 just break something down really simply 340 00:10:58,720 --> 00:11:01,209 and just sort of say follow impressions 341 00:11:01,210 --> 00:11:02,469 and non follower impressions, sort of 342 00:11:02,470 --> 00:11:04,269 give an idea as to who's interacting with 343 00:11:04,270 --> 00:11:06,579 your tweet and who outside 344 00:11:06,580 --> 00:11:08,649 of your perceived social your 345 00:11:08,650 --> 00:11:11,249 decentralized social circle on Twitter. 346 00:11:11,250 --> 00:11:13,659 And then I started looking at Facebook. 347 00:11:13,660 --> 00:11:15,849 And one thing I also sort of learned from 348 00:11:15,850 --> 00:11:17,559 additionally, I did another round of 349 00:11:17,560 --> 00:11:19,659 interviews specifically for this 350 00:11:19,660 --> 00:11:21,459 project. I'm getting into Social Me, a 351 00:11:21,460 --> 00:11:23,589 break up coordinator where users actually 352 00:11:23,590 --> 00:11:25,599 had no idea what the privacy checkup 353 00:11:25,600 --> 00:11:27,069 meant. So I think this is a great 354 00:11:27,070 --> 00:11:29,139 addition. You add a button, you 355 00:11:29,140 --> 00:11:31,329 can say only friends can see this. 356 00:11:31,330 --> 00:11:33,129 But what if Twitter added like a pop up 357 00:11:33,130 --> 00:11:34,779 and then said, great, this content right 358 00:11:34,780 --> 00:11:36,819 here, this comment, if your friend Jane 359 00:11:36,820 --> 00:11:38,889 comments on her mom can see it sort 360 00:11:38,890 --> 00:11:40,569 of start to really show like how extended 361 00:11:40,570 --> 00:11:42,699 networks that you're unconnected to 362 00:11:42,700 --> 00:11:44,529 second and third, second and third party 363 00:11:44,530 --> 00:11:46,299 relationships can actually interact with 364 00:11:46,300 --> 00:11:49,089 your your information. 365 00:11:49,090 --> 00:11:51,249 So I'm really driven by this need and 366 00:11:51,250 --> 00:11:53,709 this idea as a designer, 367 00:11:53,710 --> 00:11:55,329 what would it look like to have a 368 00:11:55,330 --> 00:11:57,939 semiprivate space in a public network? 369 00:11:57,940 --> 00:11:59,619 And how how could I design that? 370 00:11:59,620 --> 00:12:01,179 And I think about this a lot, because our 371 00:12:01,180 --> 00:12:03,519 our our communication on the Internet 372 00:12:03,520 --> 00:12:04,389 is asynchronous. 373 00:12:04,390 --> 00:12:06,579 Right. But a lot of social 374 00:12:06,580 --> 00:12:08,299 media creates things as a timeline. 375 00:12:08,300 --> 00:12:10,509 This creates a false idea as to 376 00:12:10,510 --> 00:12:12,249 how information is actually accessed and 377 00:12:12,250 --> 00:12:13,989 how data is actually stored in that false 378 00:12:13,990 --> 00:12:16,209 information as articulated to users. 379 00:12:16,210 --> 00:12:18,309 So what feels like safer spaces, even 380 00:12:18,310 --> 00:12:19,569 if you're completely public because 381 00:12:19,570 --> 00:12:21,009 you're not interacted with, is actually a 382 00:12:21,010 --> 00:12:23,289 lie. It's a false sense of information. 383 00:12:23,290 --> 00:12:25,129 It's a false sense of safety. 384 00:12:25,130 --> 00:12:27,669 So I wonder, with all these varying 385 00:12:27,670 --> 00:12:30,039 levels of needs that we have as users 386 00:12:30,040 --> 00:12:31,659 and as we live more and more of our lives 387 00:12:31,660 --> 00:12:33,909 digitally and on social media, 388 00:12:33,910 --> 00:12:35,409 what would it look like to design a 389 00:12:35,410 --> 00:12:37,659 semiprivate space in a public network? 390 00:12:40,420 --> 00:12:42,039 And so, like the past few years have 391 00:12:42,040 --> 00:12:43,569 really hit this on home, that there's 392 00:12:43,570 --> 00:12:45,729 this nebulous ness surrounding algorithms 393 00:12:45,730 --> 00:12:47,139 and social media and the way in which our 394 00:12:47,140 --> 00:12:48,639 data is saved. 395 00:12:48,640 --> 00:12:50,709 And a lot of that happens when 396 00:12:50,710 --> 00:12:52,119 Facebook, for instance, changed their 397 00:12:52,120 --> 00:12:53,949 timeline, sort of algorithmically driven, 398 00:12:53,950 --> 00:12:55,000 based off content 399 00:12:56,290 --> 00:12:58,689 then I think it was last summer. 400 00:12:58,690 --> 00:12:59,979 There is this thing called the ice book 401 00:12:59,980 --> 00:13:01,779 Ice Bucket Challenge or two summers ago, 402 00:13:01,780 --> 00:13:04,839 and these riots in Ferguson, Missouri. 403 00:13:04,840 --> 00:13:06,009 And sort of what happened and people 404 00:13:06,010 --> 00:13:07,899 realize is the ice bucket challenge, ice 405 00:13:07,900 --> 00:13:10,929 bucket challenge posts being waited above 406 00:13:10,930 --> 00:13:12,429 these other protests. 407 00:13:12,430 --> 00:13:14,499 And the way to work around 408 00:13:14,500 --> 00:13:17,259 that was to include Ice Bucket Challenge 409 00:13:17,260 --> 00:13:18,819 when you were posting about Ferguson to 410 00:13:18,820 --> 00:13:20,859 sort of start to flip and change what 411 00:13:20,860 --> 00:13:22,269 you're seeing algorithmically in your 412 00:13:22,270 --> 00:13:23,679 timeline. 413 00:13:23,680 --> 00:13:26,499 So there's this kind of idea that 414 00:13:26,500 --> 00:13:28,749 users don't quite know what 415 00:13:28,750 --> 00:13:30,459 and why the algorithm will wait things 416 00:13:30,460 --> 00:13:31,899 over other things. So when you post 417 00:13:31,900 --> 00:13:33,909 something on Facebook, the feedback is I 418 00:13:33,910 --> 00:13:36,189 have no idea when it's accessible, 419 00:13:36,190 --> 00:13:38,469 how it's accessible and if it will 420 00:13:38,470 --> 00:13:39,470 be accessed. 421 00:13:41,530 --> 00:13:43,719 So that led me to this project that 422 00:13:43,720 --> 00:13:44,720 I created, 423 00:13:46,190 --> 00:13:48,249 I created a fake performance 424 00:13:48,250 --> 00:13:49,089 art piece. 425 00:13:49,090 --> 00:13:51,069 I mean, it's a real art piece called 426 00:13:51,070 --> 00:13:53,349 Social Media Breakup Coordinator, where 427 00:13:53,350 --> 00:13:55,509 I turned a video game art 428 00:13:55,510 --> 00:13:57,639 gallery in New York 429 00:13:57,640 --> 00:13:59,649 called Baby Castles into a doctor's 430 00:13:59,650 --> 00:14:00,549 office. 431 00:14:00,550 --> 00:14:03,759 And I held a 15 minute 432 00:14:03,760 --> 00:14:06,009 therapy consulting sessions 433 00:14:06,010 --> 00:14:07,509 on social media. 434 00:14:07,510 --> 00:14:10,149 I had users fill out a twenty two point 435 00:14:10,150 --> 00:14:12,159 very standard user quiz around why they 436 00:14:12,160 --> 00:14:13,629 were showing up. 437 00:14:13,630 --> 00:14:16,149 But then when they sat with me, I 438 00:14:16,150 --> 00:14:17,979 had them sign a terms of service 439 00:14:17,980 --> 00:14:19,179 agreement. 440 00:14:19,180 --> 00:14:20,889 I listen to them and then I started to 441 00:14:20,890 --> 00:14:22,059 write down notes. 442 00:14:22,060 --> 00:14:23,499 But before I started this project, I 443 00:14:23,500 --> 00:14:24,789 reached out to a variety of different 444 00:14:24,790 --> 00:14:26,920 people because I was sort of 445 00:14:28,120 --> 00:14:29,889 from my research, I sort of started to 446 00:14:29,890 --> 00:14:31,629 realize that there's a lot of different 447 00:14:31,630 --> 00:14:33,249 moments where there needs to be human 448 00:14:33,250 --> 00:14:35,169 intervention within algorithms, within 449 00:14:35,170 --> 00:14:36,609 social media. 450 00:14:36,610 --> 00:14:38,739 So how do you start to I 451 00:14:38,740 --> 00:14:40,959 mean, how do you start to pull away from 452 00:14:40,960 --> 00:14:42,399 different groups that you've been associated 453 00:14:42,400 --> 00:14:44,409 with? How do you start to cut ties and 454 00:14:44,410 --> 00:14:45,699 how do you start to cut ties between 455 00:14:45,700 --> 00:14:47,739 information when you cross post against 456 00:14:47,740 --> 00:14:49,239 different platforms? 457 00:14:49,240 --> 00:14:51,399 So a good example of that is what happens 458 00:14:51,400 --> 00:14:53,499 if someone in your family 459 00:14:53,500 --> 00:14:54,969 dies and that ends up in Facebook 460 00:14:54,970 --> 00:14:56,919 memories because you Instagram it. 461 00:14:56,920 --> 00:14:58,269 What does that feel like to have that 462 00:14:58,270 --> 00:15:00,189 emotional trigger or does it feel like to 463 00:15:00,190 --> 00:15:02,319 quit a job and not and 464 00:15:02,320 --> 00:15:04,449 not be sure, like if your new 465 00:15:04,450 --> 00:15:06,969 coworkers can see your old coworkers 466 00:15:06,970 --> 00:15:08,409 or if you post something negative about 467 00:15:08,410 --> 00:15:09,999 your old job, are you still connected to 468 00:15:10,000 --> 00:15:11,619 your boss and what can they see? 469 00:15:11,620 --> 00:15:12,819 And generally, there's this lack of 470 00:15:12,820 --> 00:15:14,409 understanding that I found that most 471 00:15:14,410 --> 00:15:16,659 general users, probably not most 472 00:15:16,660 --> 00:15:18,369 people in this room, have a lack of 473 00:15:18,370 --> 00:15:20,199 understanding around how much their 474 00:15:20,200 --> 00:15:22,029 information is accessed. 475 00:15:22,030 --> 00:15:24,099 So I was curious on on a bunch of 476 00:15:24,100 --> 00:15:26,589 levels if if people would actually 477 00:15:26,590 --> 00:15:28,749 pay me to give them advice, if 478 00:15:28,750 --> 00:15:30,999 they would trust me as a professional 479 00:15:31,000 --> 00:15:32,409 and if they would actually engage with my 480 00:15:32,410 --> 00:15:34,389 services. And then I was curious if I 481 00:15:34,390 --> 00:15:36,519 could actually then covertly sort 482 00:15:36,520 --> 00:15:38,589 of teach them the privacy policies of all 483 00:15:38,590 --> 00:15:39,940 the different platforms they were on. 484 00:15:42,410 --> 00:15:44,089 So when I started this project, I 485 00:15:44,090 --> 00:15:46,159 realized I need to talk to a variety of 486 00:15:46,160 --> 00:15:47,359 different professionals. 487 00:15:47,360 --> 00:15:48,889 I'm a user researcher and so my 488 00:15:48,890 --> 00:15:50,989 profession lies in talking to 489 00:15:50,990 --> 00:15:53,089 users and designing solutions for 490 00:15:53,090 --> 00:15:55,399 them. But as social media 491 00:15:55,400 --> 00:15:57,529 starts to overtake more and more 492 00:15:57,530 --> 00:15:58,969 aspects of our lives, I realize that 493 00:15:58,970 --> 00:16:00,319 there are certain things that I'm not 494 00:16:00,320 --> 00:16:01,609 equipped to handle. 495 00:16:01,610 --> 00:16:03,289 So what happens if someone has suffered 496 00:16:03,290 --> 00:16:05,299 trauma on social media as a victim of 497 00:16:05,300 --> 00:16:07,099 harassment? I still can't offer anyone 498 00:16:07,100 --> 00:16:08,539 feedback on that, and that's sort of not 499 00:16:08,540 --> 00:16:09,979 my place. 500 00:16:09,980 --> 00:16:12,889 So I spoke to a rape crisis counselor, 501 00:16:12,890 --> 00:16:15,469 an engineer, a data scientist 502 00:16:15,470 --> 00:16:17,599 and professor and a private 503 00:16:17,600 --> 00:16:19,159 therapist and a private psychiatrist. 504 00:16:19,160 --> 00:16:21,019 And the takeaway I got was mainly this. 505 00:16:21,020 --> 00:16:22,909 And this is something I'd love to impart 506 00:16:22,910 --> 00:16:25,309 on those social media engineers 507 00:16:25,310 --> 00:16:27,409 and designers is it's not my 508 00:16:27,410 --> 00:16:29,569 job to necessarily tell people what to 509 00:16:29,570 --> 00:16:29,929 do. 510 00:16:29,930 --> 00:16:31,639 It's my job to listen to what people need 511 00:16:31,640 --> 00:16:32,659 to get done. 512 00:16:32,660 --> 00:16:34,819 So an example from that is, 513 00:16:34,820 --> 00:16:36,919 let's say a user 514 00:16:36,920 --> 00:16:38,329 came to me for Social Me a break up 515 00:16:38,330 --> 00:16:40,399 coordinator and said I 516 00:16:40,400 --> 00:16:42,139 have an abusive boyfriend and he's 517 00:16:42,140 --> 00:16:44,149 horrible and we have a child together and 518 00:16:44,150 --> 00:16:46,219 I want to on Facebook friend him. 519 00:16:46,220 --> 00:16:48,589 It's not my place to necessarily say, 520 00:16:48,590 --> 00:16:50,329 OK, wait, can I know more like are you 521 00:16:50,330 --> 00:16:51,529 close to this family? Like, let's start 522 00:16:51,530 --> 00:16:52,879 to cut down all these ties. 523 00:16:52,880 --> 00:16:54,109 And the reason I would ask that is 524 00:16:54,110 --> 00:16:55,369 thinking as a designer, 525 00:16:56,660 --> 00:16:58,459 if you're Facebook friends with someone 526 00:16:58,460 --> 00:16:59,509 and then you're Facebook friends with 527 00:16:59,510 --> 00:17:01,279 their parents, and then it says on that 528 00:17:01,280 --> 00:17:03,079 person's like profile who their family 529 00:17:03,080 --> 00:17:05,838 is, the system has created more ties 530 00:17:05,839 --> 00:17:07,879 to that person. Even regardless of if you 531 00:17:07,880 --> 00:17:09,529 unfriend them, you would need to block 532 00:17:09,530 --> 00:17:11,719 them as well as unfollow all 533 00:17:11,720 --> 00:17:13,159 of these other people related to them and 534 00:17:13,160 --> 00:17:15,439 tied to their profile that to actually 535 00:17:15,440 --> 00:17:16,880 really separate 536 00:17:18,770 --> 00:17:20,269 and allow the feedback I got was. 537 00:17:22,180 --> 00:17:24,279 It's not necessarily your job to let 538 00:17:24,280 --> 00:17:26,078 to tell a user all of that, if they're 539 00:17:26,079 --> 00:17:27,519 telling you what exactly they need, you 540 00:17:27,520 --> 00:17:28,959 sort of need to listen and guide from 541 00:17:28,960 --> 00:17:30,829 there and not really get into. 542 00:17:30,830 --> 00:17:32,319 Well, why are you here? 543 00:17:32,320 --> 00:17:34,029 What are all these different, really 544 00:17:34,030 --> 00:17:36,220 specific and highly personal details? 545 00:17:38,970 --> 00:17:41,099 So why would I do this? 546 00:17:43,320 --> 00:17:45,539 I was just very interested 547 00:17:45,540 --> 00:17:46,919 in the ways in which people live their 548 00:17:46,920 --> 00:17:48,929 lives online, and I really wanted to see 549 00:17:48,930 --> 00:17:50,909 if I could also gather a lot of data from 550 00:17:50,910 --> 00:17:53,159 this project. I had 16 people fill 551 00:17:53,160 --> 00:17:55,229 out 22 different questions 552 00:17:55,230 --> 00:17:56,399 and meet with me and walk through all 553 00:17:56,400 --> 00:17:57,959 their different problems. 554 00:17:57,960 --> 00:18:00,029 And I was really curious if I could 555 00:18:00,030 --> 00:18:01,499 provide solutions the way an algorithm 556 00:18:01,500 --> 00:18:03,209 would. I outlined 10 different solutions 557 00:18:03,210 --> 00:18:05,219 that I could affix to people based off 558 00:18:05,220 --> 00:18:06,569 different questions that they answered in 559 00:18:06,570 --> 00:18:07,570 a certain order. 560 00:18:08,790 --> 00:18:10,019 And again, the covered 561 00:18:11,040 --> 00:18:12,359 point of this project was to sort of 562 00:18:12,360 --> 00:18:14,459 teach people about the permeability of 563 00:18:14,460 --> 00:18:16,409 their posts and really how privacy is 564 00:18:16,410 --> 00:18:18,119 looked at and interacted with on social 565 00:18:18,120 --> 00:18:20,549 networks and with the onset 566 00:18:20,550 --> 00:18:23,069 of all these different apps, particularly 567 00:18:23,070 --> 00:18:24,689 in America, that are offering to 568 00:18:24,690 --> 00:18:27,809 outsource emotional labor 569 00:18:27,810 --> 00:18:30,029 to a person, meaning there's all these 570 00:18:30,030 --> 00:18:31,169 new jobs have been created of. 571 00:18:31,170 --> 00:18:32,699 We'll break up with your boyfriend for 572 00:18:32,700 --> 00:18:34,529 you. I was really sort of curious to see 573 00:18:34,530 --> 00:18:36,179 if people would actually engage with me 574 00:18:36,180 --> 00:18:37,180 face to face. 575 00:18:39,960 --> 00:18:41,189 So when I launched the project, people 576 00:18:41,190 --> 00:18:42,190 thought it was real. 577 00:18:44,130 --> 00:18:45,130 And 578 00:18:46,200 --> 00:18:47,519 then the media thought it was real 579 00:18:50,820 --> 00:18:52,919 and this was really it was really hard to 580 00:18:52,920 --> 00:18:55,439 explain to, for instance, Jezebel 581 00:18:55,440 --> 00:18:57,629 that this was an art project 582 00:18:57,630 --> 00:18:59,279 because they were like, but you're 583 00:18:59,280 --> 00:19:01,469 charging people and you made them sign 584 00:19:01,470 --> 00:19:02,399 a contract. 585 00:19:02,400 --> 00:19:03,899 Is the contract legally binding? 586 00:19:03,900 --> 00:19:05,129 Yes, it is. 587 00:19:05,130 --> 00:19:06,089 So you charge the money? 588 00:19:06,090 --> 00:19:08,279 I did. Did you give them fake feedback? 589 00:19:08,280 --> 00:19:09,929 No. The feedback was all sincere. 590 00:19:09,930 --> 00:19:11,849 I really legitimately tried to help solve 591 00:19:11,850 --> 00:19:13,979 these problems, but it's 592 00:19:13,980 --> 00:19:14,980 an art project. 593 00:19:16,320 --> 00:19:17,879 And the reason it's an art project is to 594 00:19:17,880 --> 00:19:19,979 me, it's a massive comment on the sharing 595 00:19:19,980 --> 00:19:21,089 economy that's in America. 596 00:19:21,090 --> 00:19:22,949 And just this idea that I could be an 597 00:19:22,950 --> 00:19:24,659 emotional mechanical Turk and I 598 00:19:24,660 --> 00:19:26,099 completely made that by design and 599 00:19:26,100 --> 00:19:27,119 intention. 600 00:19:27,120 --> 00:19:28,559 Should people be trusting me with their 601 00:19:28,560 --> 00:19:29,729 data? 602 00:19:29,730 --> 00:19:31,769 Yes, because I am a professional and I 603 00:19:31,770 --> 00:19:34,169 made sure to very, very 604 00:19:34,170 --> 00:19:35,909 clearly articulate the ways in which I 605 00:19:35,910 --> 00:19:37,709 would use their data, how they would be 606 00:19:37,710 --> 00:19:39,809 protected, that I would not share any 607 00:19:39,810 --> 00:19:42,179 personal information about them. 608 00:19:42,180 --> 00:19:43,559 I went through all those steps, but 609 00:19:43,560 --> 00:19:45,210 that's sort of the 610 00:19:46,260 --> 00:19:47,999 negotiation. We have a social networks. 611 00:19:48,000 --> 00:19:49,650 Do we have that kind of interfacing? 612 00:19:51,660 --> 00:19:53,819 And also an even bigger comment 613 00:19:53,820 --> 00:19:56,099 was no one ever commented on price. 614 00:19:56,100 --> 00:19:58,199 I charged one dollar a minute and 615 00:19:58,200 --> 00:20:00,749 to sort of sit and listen all day 616 00:20:00,750 --> 00:20:02,519 to people and only gave them 15 minute 617 00:20:02,520 --> 00:20:05,159 blocks, it was actually incredibly taxing 618 00:20:05,160 --> 00:20:06,160 physically. 619 00:20:06,840 --> 00:20:08,849 It was an all day event where I think I 620 00:20:08,850 --> 00:20:11,039 only had I gave myself like 15 minutes 621 00:20:11,040 --> 00:20:12,359 for lunch. 622 00:20:12,360 --> 00:20:15,059 I definitely have a whole new type of 623 00:20:15,060 --> 00:20:16,949 respect for therapists that I was 624 00:20:16,950 --> 00:20:17,950 grilling. 625 00:20:18,750 --> 00:20:20,249 So I started to break down before I 626 00:20:20,250 --> 00:20:21,539 started the projects to what platforms I 627 00:20:21,540 --> 00:20:23,459 would cover. These are examples of my 628 00:20:23,460 --> 00:20:25,619 Post-it notes. I had covered resistor in 629 00:20:25,620 --> 00:20:27,419 one evening and I sort of break things 630 00:20:27,420 --> 00:20:29,309 down based off the four major platforms 631 00:20:29,310 --> 00:20:30,629 that are used in America, which is 632 00:20:30,630 --> 00:20:32,609 LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter and 633 00:20:32,610 --> 00:20:34,169 Instagram. And I started to break down by 634 00:20:34,170 --> 00:20:35,879 what I thought were the foremost broad 635 00:20:35,880 --> 00:20:37,050 and most universal 636 00:20:38,190 --> 00:20:39,219 social grouping. 637 00:20:39,220 --> 00:20:41,399 So friends, 638 00:20:41,400 --> 00:20:43,649 family, work and romantic. 639 00:20:43,650 --> 00:20:46,319 And I started to sort of think about why 640 00:20:46,320 --> 00:20:47,999 your romantic partner would friend you on 641 00:20:48,000 --> 00:20:49,859 LinkedIn, for example, or why they would 642 00:20:49,860 --> 00:20:52,139 follow you on Instagram, or why your boss 643 00:20:52,140 --> 00:20:53,429 would friend you on all of those 644 00:20:53,430 --> 00:20:54,809 platforms. 645 00:20:54,810 --> 00:20:56,459 And I started to attach different 646 00:20:56,460 --> 00:20:57,479 emotional responses. 647 00:20:57,480 --> 00:20:59,279 So should you LinkedIn connect with your 648 00:20:59,280 --> 00:21:01,199 dad? Maybe. 649 00:21:01,200 --> 00:21:02,519 Should you LinkedIn connect with your 650 00:21:02,520 --> 00:21:04,709 lover if you want to, but you 651 00:21:04,710 --> 00:21:06,119 don't have to. But then these are 652 00:21:06,120 --> 00:21:07,139 connections. 653 00:21:07,140 --> 00:21:08,999 If there are different parties, apps that 654 00:21:09,000 --> 00:21:10,859 you don't really use like that, you then 655 00:21:10,860 --> 00:21:11,789 have to break down later. 656 00:21:11,790 --> 00:21:14,279 If those if those relationships 657 00:21:14,280 --> 00:21:15,280 our. 658 00:21:16,270 --> 00:21:18,339 Ceremony said everyone thought that this 659 00:21:18,340 --> 00:21:20,379 project was real because I went through 660 00:21:20,380 --> 00:21:22,779 really great pains to also make it look 661 00:21:22,780 --> 00:21:23,829 real. 662 00:21:23,830 --> 00:21:25,269 So when people showed up, we had a 663 00:21:25,270 --> 00:21:27,339 receptionist who had coffee, there 664 00:21:27,340 --> 00:21:28,899 was a waiting room, and I had people sign 665 00:21:28,900 --> 00:21:31,179 in with the date they arrived. 666 00:21:31,180 --> 00:21:33,399 The reason and I think even the time 667 00:21:33,400 --> 00:21:35,589 and the time of their appointment, 668 00:21:35,590 --> 00:21:37,749 there was then a paper 669 00:21:37,750 --> 00:21:39,309 version of the quiz. If someone walked 670 00:21:39,310 --> 00:21:41,379 in, you know, sometimes you get walk 671 00:21:41,380 --> 00:21:43,059 ins, the doctor gets that all the time. 672 00:21:44,380 --> 00:21:45,429 This is me working. 673 00:21:45,430 --> 00:21:46,719 This is what my desk look like. 674 00:21:46,720 --> 00:21:49,659 Everyone got their own folder 675 00:21:49,660 --> 00:21:51,189 that I would write their name on. 676 00:21:51,190 --> 00:21:53,349 I would write out what 677 00:21:53,350 --> 00:21:55,239 I called a receipt. 678 00:21:55,240 --> 00:21:56,969 So it's all the advice I'm giving them 679 00:21:56,970 --> 00:21:59,109 and then I'm taking my own notes. 680 00:21:59,110 --> 00:22:00,819 We both got a copy of the terms of 681 00:22:00,820 --> 00:22:03,039 service agreement and then I would send 682 00:22:03,040 --> 00:22:05,079 them on their way. So it looked actually. 683 00:22:06,570 --> 00:22:08,789 Fairly, it looked very legit, 684 00:22:08,790 --> 00:22:10,139 you know, I mean, a falling apart 685 00:22:10,140 --> 00:22:11,999 building, but I'm giving you legitimate 686 00:22:12,000 --> 00:22:13,409 advice and you just paid me fifteen 687 00:22:13,410 --> 00:22:15,569 dollars, says our receptionist. 688 00:22:16,760 --> 00:22:18,869 Lauren, this is the waiting 689 00:22:18,870 --> 00:22:19,870 room. 690 00:22:21,480 --> 00:22:23,189 This actually wasn't posed. 691 00:22:23,190 --> 00:22:24,989 I popped my head out and saw a bunch of 692 00:22:24,990 --> 00:22:26,450 people sitting and reading, 693 00:22:27,750 --> 00:22:30,059 This is me providing advice. 694 00:22:30,060 --> 00:22:31,589 And these are some students of mine that 695 00:22:31,590 --> 00:22:33,989 showed up. I taught a class on 696 00:22:33,990 --> 00:22:35,849 visual storytelling in social media and 697 00:22:35,850 --> 00:22:37,190 they had showed up to observe. 698 00:22:38,580 --> 00:22:41,069 So then this is also what the breakdown 699 00:22:41,070 --> 00:22:42,479 of the terms of service agreement looked 700 00:22:42,480 --> 00:22:43,709 like. This is the first page. 701 00:22:43,710 --> 00:22:44,760 It's pretty standard. 702 00:22:45,930 --> 00:22:48,419 One of my favorite lines is 703 00:22:48,420 --> 00:22:50,759 my observations of this person's behavior 704 00:22:50,760 --> 00:22:53,129 and responses gives me no reason 705 00:22:53,130 --> 00:22:54,539 to believe that this person is not fully 706 00:22:54,540 --> 00:22:56,489 competent to give conformed knowing and 707 00:22:56,490 --> 00:22:57,490 willing consent. 708 00:23:00,080 --> 00:23:02,149 I should also clarify a really 709 00:23:02,150 --> 00:23:03,079 dear friend of mine who's my 710 00:23:03,080 --> 00:23:05,899 collaborator, Fred Jenning's, works for 711 00:23:05,900 --> 00:23:08,119 a law company called Tor Ekland. 712 00:23:08,120 --> 00:23:09,769 They do a lot of digital law cases. 713 00:23:09,770 --> 00:23:11,089 So he actually drafted this up 714 00:23:11,090 --> 00:23:13,069 specifically for me, for the needs of 715 00:23:13,070 --> 00:23:14,069 this project. 716 00:23:14,070 --> 00:23:16,039 I told him to keep it short and I told 717 00:23:16,040 --> 00:23:17,689 him to build certain things so users 718 00:23:17,690 --> 00:23:19,669 could really sort of see if they were 719 00:23:19,670 --> 00:23:21,089 scanning what I'm talking about. 720 00:23:21,090 --> 00:23:22,090 So as you'll see, 721 00:23:23,300 --> 00:23:24,559 various social media platforms are 722 00:23:24,560 --> 00:23:26,239 emboldened with like what I'm with what 723 00:23:26,240 --> 00:23:27,589 I'm giving. 724 00:23:27,590 --> 00:23:29,329 But then I had him outline the nature of 725 00:23:29,330 --> 00:23:31,009 services. 726 00:23:31,010 --> 00:23:32,539 And what you'll see is that 727 00:23:33,620 --> 00:23:35,689 the client acknowledges the coordinator, 728 00:23:35,690 --> 00:23:37,489 the coordinator provides neither content 729 00:23:37,490 --> 00:23:39,589 or materials included, such as 730 00:23:39,590 --> 00:23:41,689 financial advice, counseling or therapy. 731 00:23:41,690 --> 00:23:43,429 And I really wanted to highlight I am not 732 00:23:43,430 --> 00:23:45,019 a therapist. This is not a therapy 733 00:23:45,020 --> 00:23:47,269 session. If anything, I'm 734 00:23:47,270 --> 00:23:49,669 like a really weird SEO advisor 735 00:23:49,670 --> 00:23:51,709 that you've consulted to maybe talk about 736 00:23:51,710 --> 00:23:53,419 your personal life with. 737 00:23:53,420 --> 00:23:55,820 But I am definitely not a therapist. 738 00:23:57,700 --> 00:24:00,189 And what's funny is that I actually had 739 00:24:00,190 --> 00:24:02,109 so I had 12 people fill this out online 740 00:24:02,110 --> 00:24:04,269 for people do walk ins. 741 00:24:04,270 --> 00:24:06,369 And what's fascinating is I only had two 742 00:24:06,370 --> 00:24:08,739 people show up and talk to me about 743 00:24:08,740 --> 00:24:09,740 heartbreak. 744 00:24:10,540 --> 00:24:12,249 This project was not inspired by a 745 00:24:12,250 --> 00:24:14,169 breakup. It's actually about breaking up 746 00:24:14,170 --> 00:24:15,939 with social media. 747 00:24:15,940 --> 00:24:17,499 I had someone show up and ask me a lot of 748 00:24:17,500 --> 00:24:19,479 really specific questions about LinkedIn 749 00:24:19,480 --> 00:24:21,699 and her workplace and what's the proper 750 00:24:21,700 --> 00:24:24,189 way to, like, break up on LinkedIn 751 00:24:24,190 --> 00:24:25,239 with your old job. 752 00:24:25,240 --> 00:24:28,359 And I was like, you should just probably 753 00:24:28,360 --> 00:24:29,829 unfollow them. 754 00:24:29,830 --> 00:24:30,889 I'm like, do you talk to them on Facebook? 755 00:24:30,890 --> 00:24:32,349 She's like, I do. I don't do that. 756 00:24:34,630 --> 00:24:36,009 And I sort of tried to gather all this 757 00:24:36,010 --> 00:24:37,689 really fascinating information 758 00:24:37,690 --> 00:24:39,549 specifically around the ways in which my 759 00:24:39,550 --> 00:24:41,019 users were using social media. 760 00:24:41,020 --> 00:24:42,159 And this is something I actually I'm 761 00:24:42,160 --> 00:24:44,499 going to openly share 762 00:24:44,500 --> 00:24:45,969 probably post this talk if you all want 763 00:24:45,970 --> 00:24:48,039 to look at what I'm accruing. 764 00:24:48,040 --> 00:24:50,739 But different things like, you know, 765 00:24:50,740 --> 00:24:51,999 let's get a little personal. Why are you 766 00:24:52,000 --> 00:24:53,979 here? Romantic reason, work, reason, 767 00:24:53,980 --> 00:24:56,709 friend, family, general, social media. 768 00:24:56,710 --> 00:24:58,029 And maybe these questions seem really 769 00:24:58,030 --> 00:25:00,309 innocuous, but in the sense of the 770 00:25:00,310 --> 00:25:01,569 way in which I was structuring my 771 00:25:01,570 --> 00:25:03,519 personal algorithm, I had built each of 772 00:25:03,520 --> 00:25:04,869 these questions, triggered a different 773 00:25:04,870 --> 00:25:06,999 kind of answer that I could give someone 774 00:25:07,000 --> 00:25:09,189 and I could string answers together 775 00:25:09,190 --> 00:25:11,379 so I could give a combination of 776 00:25:11,380 --> 00:25:14,109 answer, a plussed 777 00:25:14,110 --> 00:25:16,179 answer D plus answered J 778 00:25:16,180 --> 00:25:17,739 to sort of give someone a highly 779 00:25:17,740 --> 00:25:19,929 personalized response 780 00:25:19,930 --> 00:25:21,009 to what they had given me. But this is 781 00:25:21,010 --> 00:25:22,029 sort of the way algorithms work. 782 00:25:22,030 --> 00:25:23,259 It's not highly personalized. 783 00:25:23,260 --> 00:25:25,659 The combination to the user just feels 784 00:25:25,660 --> 00:25:26,859 personalized. 785 00:25:26,860 --> 00:25:28,599 And on my end, that was sort of the art 786 00:25:28,600 --> 00:25:29,710 project for myself. 787 00:25:30,940 --> 00:25:32,289 And I asked a general question, do you 788 00:25:32,290 --> 00:25:33,380 feel safe online? 789 00:25:35,110 --> 00:25:37,249 I was slightly surprised. 790 00:25:37,250 --> 00:25:39,279 Only two people said no, but I was more 791 00:25:39,280 --> 00:25:41,439 surprised that actually only two people 792 00:25:41,440 --> 00:25:42,440 said no. 793 00:25:43,150 --> 00:25:44,109 I thought it would be less. 794 00:25:44,110 --> 00:25:45,429 And then at times I thought it would be 795 00:25:45,430 --> 00:25:47,709 more. Given my research and online 796 00:25:47,710 --> 00:25:50,259 harassment, I was prepared 797 00:25:50,260 --> 00:25:51,609 for someone to show up and sort of say, 798 00:25:51,610 --> 00:25:52,869 like, oh, I'm being victimized of 799 00:25:52,870 --> 00:25:54,219 harassment. And I had a whole different 800 00:25:54,220 --> 00:25:55,569 answer ready for them. 801 00:25:55,570 --> 00:25:56,889 But just the fact that most people had 802 00:25:56,890 --> 00:25:59,019 come with very general problems, I 803 00:25:59,020 --> 00:26:01,209 was actually surprised that 804 00:26:01,210 --> 00:26:04,149 in general, 16 percent of 805 00:26:04,150 --> 00:26:06,190 applicants don't feel safe online. 806 00:26:07,390 --> 00:26:08,829 So I asked, how often do you use social 807 00:26:08,830 --> 00:26:10,539 media pretty much every day, how often do 808 00:26:10,540 --> 00:26:11,889 you want to be using it? Pretty much 809 00:26:11,890 --> 00:26:13,449 every day. And then I found the most 810 00:26:13,450 --> 00:26:14,450 fascinating was 811 00:26:16,240 --> 00:26:17,919 when people described what they used it 812 00:26:17,920 --> 00:26:20,319 for. And so people about 813 00:26:20,320 --> 00:26:22,449 half half of users said they they 814 00:26:22,450 --> 00:26:23,919 used it for socializing. 815 00:26:23,920 --> 00:26:25,179 When I asked what do you want to use it 816 00:26:25,180 --> 00:26:27,369 for, they said half of users replied with 817 00:26:27,370 --> 00:26:28,869 networking. 818 00:26:28,870 --> 00:26:31,089 So there's a sort of pull to actually be 819 00:26:31,090 --> 00:26:32,350 taken off social media. 820 00:26:34,510 --> 00:26:36,339 And this is what I learned from all of 821 00:26:36,340 --> 00:26:38,499 this. A lot of advice I gave people was 822 00:26:38,500 --> 00:26:40,449 maybe you should just quit Facebook. 823 00:26:40,450 --> 00:26:43,119 And that was met with a resounding no. 824 00:26:43,120 --> 00:26:45,159 How dare you suggest that? 825 00:26:45,160 --> 00:26:46,269 And I was like, OK, great, let's pull 826 00:26:46,270 --> 00:26:48,399 back. Let me offer something else. 827 00:26:48,400 --> 00:26:49,389 Do you have a smartphone? 828 00:26:49,390 --> 00:26:50,889 Of course. 829 00:26:50,890 --> 00:26:52,329 Delete the app from your phone. 830 00:26:52,330 --> 00:26:53,929 They're like, oh, that's brilliant. 831 00:26:53,930 --> 00:26:55,180 Like, I know, right? 832 00:26:56,830 --> 00:26:57,830 Well 833 00:26:59,560 --> 00:27:00,849 well, the one thing I actually found the 834 00:27:00,850 --> 00:27:03,519 most fascinating was most people 835 00:27:03,520 --> 00:27:05,589 did not understand Facebook's privacy 836 00:27:05,590 --> 00:27:06,549 checkups. 837 00:27:06,550 --> 00:27:07,839 So whenever people talked about that, 838 00:27:07,840 --> 00:27:09,909 they wanted to socialize less and be less 839 00:27:09,910 --> 00:27:11,649 accessible. The first thing I always said 840 00:27:11,650 --> 00:27:13,779 was, well, what is your 841 00:27:13,780 --> 00:27:15,069 privacy checkup like? 842 00:27:15,070 --> 00:27:16,119 Have you done one? They're like, oh, my 843 00:27:16,120 --> 00:27:16,819 God, what's that? 844 00:27:16,820 --> 00:27:18,579 I'm like, we have a problem. 845 00:27:21,190 --> 00:27:22,389 And the one thing I actually found super 846 00:27:22,390 --> 00:27:24,279 fascinating is that most users didn't 847 00:27:24,280 --> 00:27:26,379 realize and this is actually hyper 848 00:27:26,380 --> 00:27:27,819 specific to one user that came through, 849 00:27:27,820 --> 00:27:30,279 but most users didn't realize that 850 00:27:30,280 --> 00:27:32,379 you are accessible even with 851 00:27:32,380 --> 00:27:34,959 very private settings on Facebook to 852 00:27:34,960 --> 00:27:37,299 nine Facebook friends, chat messaging 853 00:27:37,300 --> 00:27:40,059 you. And if you respond to that message, 854 00:27:40,060 --> 00:27:41,949 that chat is moved into your general 855 00:27:41,950 --> 00:27:43,269 stream of chat and it makes your 856 00:27:43,270 --> 00:27:45,489 information accessible to that person 857 00:27:45,490 --> 00:27:47,469 you have not friended. 858 00:27:47,470 --> 00:27:49,149 So I had a friend who was like, well, I 859 00:27:49,150 --> 00:27:50,139 want to be super private. 860 00:27:50,140 --> 00:27:51,549 The reason I keep my Facebook open is 861 00:27:51,550 --> 00:27:53,169 like, what if a young game developer is 862 00:27:53,170 --> 00:27:55,149 trying to reach me? And I was like, did 863 00:27:55,150 --> 00:27:56,769 you know that that chat does us? 864 00:27:56,770 --> 00:27:57,999 He's like, Oh, I had no idea. 865 00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:00,009 I was like, well, that's terrifying. 866 00:28:00,010 --> 00:28:02,619 But you could maybe use it this way 867 00:28:02,620 --> 00:28:03,999 if you're not concerned about harassment, 868 00:28:04,000 --> 00:28:05,619 but your concern about being reached 869 00:28:05,620 --> 00:28:08,079 because he was more concerned that 870 00:28:08,080 --> 00:28:10,089 friends could be exposed through his 871 00:28:10,090 --> 00:28:12,009 openness, which I was like, that's very, 872 00:28:12,010 --> 00:28:13,629 very considerate. 873 00:28:13,630 --> 00:28:15,429 Kind of the way to sort of take your 874 00:28:15,430 --> 00:28:16,430 Facebook. 875 00:28:17,530 --> 00:28:19,629 One thing I learned is that no one 876 00:28:19,630 --> 00:28:22,179 knew anything about Instagram's 877 00:28:22,180 --> 00:28:24,939 privacy policies, nor did they care. 878 00:28:24,940 --> 00:28:26,469 They're like, Instagram is fine. 879 00:28:26,470 --> 00:28:27,470 We don't care. 880 00:28:28,750 --> 00:28:30,279 Again, most people want to use social 881 00:28:30,280 --> 00:28:31,659 media as a networking tool. 882 00:28:31,660 --> 00:28:33,519 But the biggest takeaway was every single 883 00:28:33,520 --> 00:28:35,229 person that showed up. 884 00:28:35,230 --> 00:28:37,600 And I had a variety of people that were 885 00:28:38,770 --> 00:28:39,849 incredibly savvy. 886 00:28:39,850 --> 00:28:41,079 They were engineers. 887 00:28:41,080 --> 00:28:42,759 They actually thought that they did not 888 00:28:42,760 --> 00:28:44,529 understand social media as well as they 889 00:28:44,530 --> 00:28:46,539 could and that they needed someone to 890 00:28:46,540 --> 00:28:48,369 help them better understand. 891 00:28:48,370 --> 00:28:49,629 And they need someone to help them better 892 00:28:49,630 --> 00:28:51,429 understand who they paid fifteen dollars 893 00:28:51,430 --> 00:28:53,619 to and a hacker video game 894 00:28:53,620 --> 00:28:54,620 space. 895 00:28:55,330 --> 00:28:57,189 But and I want that story because it is a 896 00:28:57,190 --> 00:28:58,899 that is a joke. But I also really think 897 00:28:58,900 --> 00:29:00,759 about the fact that, like, these tools 898 00:29:00,760 --> 00:29:02,889 are so nebulous that you 899 00:29:02,890 --> 00:29:05,079 would go to a space and pay someone 900 00:29:05,080 --> 00:29:06,699 fifteen dollars that you've never met 901 00:29:06,700 --> 00:29:08,709 before. That says they're an expert to 902 00:29:08,710 --> 00:29:11,399 just handle this for you. 903 00:29:11,400 --> 00:29:13,019 And that, for me, was the sort of the 904 00:29:13,020 --> 00:29:15,149 biggest takeaway, how how 905 00:29:15,150 --> 00:29:17,249 can we make things feel more accessible 906 00:29:17,250 --> 00:29:19,259 or better yet, how do we let's let's make 907 00:29:19,260 --> 00:29:20,260 a new platform. 908 00:29:21,270 --> 00:29:22,289 I'm putting us up here because this is 909 00:29:22,290 --> 00:29:24,599 one of my biggest pet peeves. 910 00:29:24,600 --> 00:29:26,849 You would probably never explain 911 00:29:26,850 --> 00:29:28,859 how to estimate someone through 912 00:29:28,860 --> 00:29:30,689 screenshots. 913 00:29:30,690 --> 00:29:32,309 You probably say, oh, do you see that 914 00:29:32,310 --> 00:29:33,539 little thing on your phone? 915 00:29:33,540 --> 00:29:35,609 Right. The chat, open it up 916 00:29:35,610 --> 00:29:38,030 right in a no, say something. 917 00:29:39,360 --> 00:29:41,429 So I when this project launched, 918 00:29:41,430 --> 00:29:43,829 a friend wrote about me and some 919 00:29:43,830 --> 00:29:46,469 and some work I had been doing and 920 00:29:46,470 --> 00:29:48,089 one of her followers legitimately 921 00:29:48,090 --> 00:29:49,499 believed that I did not understand 922 00:29:49,500 --> 00:29:51,599 Facebook and he took it upon 923 00:29:51,600 --> 00:29:54,089 himself to try to explain Facebook 924 00:29:54,090 --> 00:29:55,090 to me. 925 00:29:55,540 --> 00:29:57,909 Which other than being kind 926 00:29:57,910 --> 00:30:00,129 of insulting because I work for a tech 927 00:30:00,130 --> 00:30:02,049 company and I have a masters in 928 00:30:02,050 --> 00:30:03,140 interactive technology. 929 00:30:04,270 --> 00:30:06,369 What I found illuminating is the 930 00:30:06,370 --> 00:30:08,919 fact that this is not a weird response. 931 00:30:08,920 --> 00:30:10,719 This is not unusual for someone to say, 932 00:30:10,720 --> 00:30:11,679 oh, right. 933 00:30:11,680 --> 00:30:13,869 Facebook is so hard to use when 934 00:30:13,870 --> 00:30:16,539 it comes to privacy and 935 00:30:16,540 --> 00:30:18,489 like creating list to post to people that 936 00:30:18,490 --> 00:30:20,499 I'm going to screenshot everything for 937 00:30:20,500 --> 00:30:22,509 you. And that is never the way in which 938 00:30:22,510 --> 00:30:24,249 you should explain a communication tool 939 00:30:24,250 --> 00:30:26,059 to someone if you have to screenshot 940 00:30:26,060 --> 00:30:27,609 something to someone you fucked up as a 941 00:30:27,610 --> 00:30:29,390 designer and. 942 00:30:35,590 --> 00:30:36,999 And those are my general thoughts on 943 00:30:37,000 --> 00:30:38,000 that. 944 00:30:39,490 --> 00:30:41,140 I can't even I just can't. 945 00:30:42,840 --> 00:30:44,679 So I guess what I impart to you and all 946 00:30:44,680 --> 00:30:45,700 of us here is 947 00:30:46,930 --> 00:30:48,359 let's make something not shitty. 948 00:30:49,750 --> 00:30:50,949 And I know the reason people use 949 00:30:50,950 --> 00:30:52,599 Facebook. And this is not a talk to get 950 00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:54,189 off Facebook. I use Facebook. 951 00:30:54,190 --> 00:30:56,259 Facebook will persist for a very 952 00:30:56,260 --> 00:30:57,969 long time. Think of all the third party 953 00:30:57,970 --> 00:30:59,859 apps that use Facebook as an automatic 954 00:30:59,860 --> 00:31:01,989 login. That is a design 955 00:31:01,990 --> 00:31:03,999 pattern that reinforces the need of 956 00:31:04,000 --> 00:31:06,279 Facebook and everyday users lives. 957 00:31:06,280 --> 00:31:08,499 But as a as a designer and technologist, 958 00:31:08,500 --> 00:31:10,149 I want to make something better, even if 959 00:31:10,150 --> 00:31:12,429 it's just for my friends. 960 00:31:12,430 --> 00:31:14,529 We could do social media that onion 961 00:31:14,530 --> 00:31:15,530 thoughts, 962 00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:17,739 and that's where the future of this 963 00:31:17,740 --> 00:31:19,479 project comes in is I'm actually working 964 00:31:19,480 --> 00:31:21,129 on a social media co-op with two 965 00:31:21,130 --> 00:31:22,689 technologists in New York, Dan Pfeiffer 966 00:31:22,690 --> 00:31:24,669 and Max Vinton, and doing another round 967 00:31:24,670 --> 00:31:26,019 of social media break up coordinator in 968 00:31:26,020 --> 00:31:27,769 Oakland in January. 969 00:31:27,770 --> 00:31:29,409 And I'm hoping to keep gathering data 970 00:31:29,410 --> 00:31:32,049 around the ways users use these platforms 971 00:31:32,050 --> 00:31:33,309 through my performance art piece, but 972 00:31:33,310 --> 00:31:35,439 also as well as covertly, 973 00:31:35,440 --> 00:31:37,119 you know, keep departing information on 974 00:31:37,120 --> 00:31:38,859 privacy and what it would be like if we 975 00:31:38,860 --> 00:31:40,419 lived our lives just a little less 976 00:31:40,420 --> 00:31:41,529 online. 977 00:31:41,530 --> 00:31:43,329 And I'm hoping to sort of eventually have 978 00:31:43,330 --> 00:31:44,859 a really robust data set that could be 979 00:31:44,860 --> 00:31:46,569 used as an actual data set and not as 980 00:31:46,570 --> 00:31:47,570 just a sampling. 981 00:31:48,710 --> 00:31:49,710 Thanks. 982 00:31:59,430 --> 00:32:01,139 Well, thanks for this inspiring talk, 983 00:32:01,140 --> 00:32:02,969 Caroline, if you have questions, please 984 00:32:02,970 --> 00:32:05,159 move to the microphones that are in 985 00:32:05,160 --> 00:32:07,739 the room and 986 00:32:07,740 --> 00:32:09,089 then you can ask your question. 987 00:32:10,630 --> 00:32:12,489 And we have the first person at 988 00:32:12,490 --> 00:32:15,249 microphone number to ask away. 989 00:32:15,250 --> 00:32:17,349 Yeah, did 990 00:32:17,350 --> 00:32:19,719 you ever raise the question why those 991 00:32:19,720 --> 00:32:22,019 people didn't understand the subject 992 00:32:22,020 --> 00:32:23,529 on Facebook, etc. 993 00:32:23,530 --> 00:32:24,579 and still used it? 994 00:32:24,580 --> 00:32:26,259 I mean, it's like walking into a gun 995 00:32:26,260 --> 00:32:28,449 shop, purchasing a firearm, and 996 00:32:28,450 --> 00:32:29,679 you have no idea what to do with it, 997 00:32:29,680 --> 00:32:30,399 right? 998 00:32:30,400 --> 00:32:32,439 I think so. 999 00:32:32,440 --> 00:32:33,789 What I said sort of like later in the 1000 00:32:33,790 --> 00:32:36,159 presentation is we have these design 1001 00:32:36,160 --> 00:32:37,989 patterns in everyday life that really 1002 00:32:37,990 --> 00:32:40,089 actually enforce this 1003 00:32:40,090 --> 00:32:40,909 use of Facebook. 1004 00:32:40,910 --> 00:32:42,969 So this 1005 00:32:42,970 --> 00:32:44,529 project is really sort of centered around 1006 00:32:44,530 --> 00:32:46,719 general users and 1007 00:32:46,720 --> 00:32:48,519 a general understanding of technology. 1008 00:32:48,520 --> 00:32:50,499 We are moving to a very highly digitally 1009 00:32:50,500 --> 00:32:52,629 literate and data literate society, but 1010 00:32:52,630 --> 00:32:54,129 we're not there yet. There's pockets of 1011 00:32:54,130 --> 00:32:56,079 literacy. This is a really good pocket of 1012 00:32:56,080 --> 00:32:57,789 literacy right here where a really 1013 00:32:57,790 --> 00:32:59,019 awesome community. 1014 00:32:59,020 --> 00:33:01,209 But one 1015 00:33:01,210 --> 00:33:02,919 thing I sort of strive is like the people 1016 00:33:02,920 --> 00:33:05,109 that are misusing or misunderstanding 1017 00:33:05,110 --> 00:33:07,509 Facebook, they're not like elderly 1018 00:33:07,510 --> 00:33:09,909 parents, their actual cohorts 1019 00:33:09,910 --> 00:33:11,769 of mine that are my age people, younger 1020 00:33:11,770 --> 00:33:13,749 and people even a few years older. 1021 00:33:13,750 --> 00:33:15,999 And I think the reason is that Facebook 1022 00:33:16,000 --> 00:33:18,159 is really easy and it's highly 1023 00:33:18,160 --> 00:33:19,719 addicting to use. 1024 00:33:19,720 --> 00:33:21,459 And it's it's like a phone book. 1025 00:33:21,460 --> 00:33:23,529 Everyone's there at stores birthdays for 1026 00:33:23,530 --> 00:33:25,809 you, which is really actually helpful. 1027 00:33:26,920 --> 00:33:29,019 It's a it's a fast way to talk 1028 00:33:29,020 --> 00:33:30,879 to people. But I think the bigger thing 1029 00:33:30,880 --> 00:33:32,919 is, too, is it's enforced on other sites. 1030 00:33:32,920 --> 00:33:34,929 So think of all the websites you go to 1031 00:33:34,930 --> 00:33:37,509 during a day and how many of them say 1032 00:33:37,510 --> 00:33:39,639 login with Facebook, sign up with 1033 00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:41,739 Facebook, like login 1034 00:33:41,740 --> 00:33:43,929 with Twitter. And those design patterns, 1035 00:33:43,930 --> 00:33:45,609 which seem really innocuous to us, 1036 00:33:45,610 --> 00:33:47,619 actually are really important. 1037 00:33:47,620 --> 00:33:49,819 They further enforce the 1038 00:33:49,820 --> 00:33:52,419 the the ubiquity of Facebook 1039 00:33:52,420 --> 00:33:54,039 because it makes it easy. 1040 00:33:54,040 --> 00:33:55,659 So then I mean, I'm shuddering. 1041 00:33:55,660 --> 00:33:57,129 Think about all the third party apps that 1042 00:33:57,130 --> 00:33:59,469 would be associated right now 1043 00:33:59,470 --> 00:34:01,089 with a Facebook login if you've done that 1044 00:34:01,090 --> 00:34:02,229 for every site. 1045 00:34:02,230 --> 00:34:04,359 But the common user does not 1046 00:34:04,360 --> 00:34:05,799 know that. 1047 00:34:05,800 --> 00:34:07,299 And that's sort of the issue, I think. 1048 00:34:08,540 --> 00:34:09,908 All right, next question from Mike 1049 00:34:09,909 --> 00:34:11,359 before, please. 1050 00:34:11,360 --> 00:34:12,709 Hi. Thank you very much for this 1051 00:34:12,710 --> 00:34:13,759 interesting talk. 1052 00:34:13,760 --> 00:34:16,158 I have basically two questions that 1053 00:34:16,159 --> 00:34:18,259 are the same, and they are on the 1054 00:34:18,260 --> 00:34:20,658 art project, part of your talk. 1055 00:34:20,659 --> 00:34:21,739 And the first one is 1056 00:34:22,909 --> 00:34:25,218 how did you make sure that people 1057 00:34:25,219 --> 00:34:27,589 would actually understand that this was a 1058 00:34:27,590 --> 00:34:28,519 piece of performance art? 1059 00:34:28,520 --> 00:34:30,319 Did you rely on the absurdity of your 1060 00:34:30,320 --> 00:34:32,149 proposition that would be recognized? 1061 00:34:32,150 --> 00:34:34,369 Because clearly people thought 1062 00:34:34,370 --> 00:34:36,468 not unlike in terms of satire, 1063 00:34:36,469 --> 00:34:38,419 there needs to be some element of 1064 00:34:38,420 --> 00:34:40,669 exaggeration or something that makes 1065 00:34:40,670 --> 00:34:42,979 it clear that this isn't 1066 00:34:42,980 --> 00:34:44,629 intended as this is intended as a piece 1067 00:34:44,630 --> 00:34:46,428 of art. So I was just wondering what you 1068 00:34:46,429 --> 00:34:48,349 thought was that in the second part was 1069 00:34:48,350 --> 00:34:50,629 where do you saw 1070 00:34:50,630 --> 00:34:52,698 the data that you get from your piece 1071 00:34:52,699 --> 00:34:55,309 of art you presented as a research 1072 00:34:55,310 --> 00:34:56,569 outcome almost. 1073 00:34:56,570 --> 00:34:58,919 So that obfuscates the kind of 1074 00:34:58,920 --> 00:35:00,979 art arsenis of your project and 1075 00:35:00,980 --> 00:35:02,509 turns it into Real-Life data. 1076 00:35:02,510 --> 00:35:04,729 And isn't that also one of the problems 1077 00:35:04,730 --> 00:35:06,949 why people are so careless with 1078 00:35:06,950 --> 00:35:09,079 Instagram? Because they see it as art 1079 00:35:09,080 --> 00:35:10,459 when they photograph their food. 1080 00:35:10,460 --> 00:35:12,529 Whether that's true or not is 1081 00:35:12,530 --> 00:35:14,839 open to debate, but they don't see it as 1082 00:35:14,840 --> 00:35:17,239 an actual act of data collection. 1083 00:35:17,240 --> 00:35:18,499 So yeah, right. 1084 00:35:18,500 --> 00:35:21,019 So I guess to sort of back up 1085 00:35:21,020 --> 00:35:23,059 the way in which I did, the way in which 1086 00:35:23,060 --> 00:35:24,829 I sort of describe myself as a 1087 00:35:24,830 --> 00:35:26,479 speculative designer and I think about 1088 00:35:26,480 --> 00:35:28,249 critical design a lot and critical making 1089 00:35:28,250 --> 00:35:29,569 and like, what is that line? 1090 00:35:29,570 --> 00:35:31,429 And oftentimes you're making something 1091 00:35:31,430 --> 00:35:33,649 real that is sort of making 1092 00:35:33,650 --> 00:35:35,779 a point in the way in which 1093 00:35:35,780 --> 00:35:37,879 I, like most people, seem to sort of 1094 00:35:37,880 --> 00:35:39,619 get that this was an art project of mine. 1095 00:35:41,150 --> 00:35:42,949 And it helped that I was in New York 1096 00:35:42,950 --> 00:35:45,229 doing this and I was doing it in an art 1097 00:35:45,230 --> 00:35:46,789 gallery. That's a video game gallery. 1098 00:35:46,790 --> 00:35:49,099 So there were arcades in the back of 1099 00:35:49,100 --> 00:35:50,659 the space. 1100 00:35:50,660 --> 00:35:53,039 But certain people, I actually realized 1101 00:35:53,040 --> 00:35:54,649 because I had a couple of people phone-in 1102 00:35:54,650 --> 00:35:56,359 that had sort of seen this and signed up 1103 00:35:56,360 --> 00:35:58,009 online and were not in New York. 1104 00:35:58,010 --> 00:35:59,869 And I realize that they didn't know that 1105 00:35:59,870 --> 00:36:01,459 this was an art piece. 1106 00:36:01,460 --> 00:36:03,529 And I kind of went 1107 00:36:03,530 --> 00:36:04,530 with it. 1108 00:36:05,390 --> 00:36:07,099 And a lot of that is they were signing a 1109 00:36:07,100 --> 00:36:08,659 series of service agreement. 1110 00:36:08,660 --> 00:36:11,179 I was I did tell them, like, this is not 1111 00:36:11,180 --> 00:36:12,409 therapeutic advice. 1112 00:36:12,410 --> 00:36:13,999 I'm not held liable for any decisions 1113 00:36:14,000 --> 00:36:15,679 that you make. And I said all that over 1114 00:36:15,680 --> 00:36:16,699 the phone to make sure that they 1115 00:36:16,700 --> 00:36:17,809 understood that. 1116 00:36:17,810 --> 00:36:18,799 And then I told them, these are just 1117 00:36:18,800 --> 00:36:20,329 suggestions and you don't have to follow 1118 00:36:20,330 --> 00:36:21,589 them and you are allowed to push back. 1119 00:36:21,590 --> 00:36:23,209 And that's what I tell every every 1120 00:36:23,210 --> 00:36:25,129 participant is I'm giving you these 1121 00:36:25,130 --> 00:36:27,649 suggestions based off my 1122 00:36:27,650 --> 00:36:29,569 best practice knowledge in this 1123 00:36:29,570 --> 00:36:31,129 algorithm. I have design that you don't 1124 00:36:31,130 --> 00:36:32,089 get to see. 1125 00:36:32,090 --> 00:36:33,769 So your questions are triggering certain 1126 00:36:33,770 --> 00:36:35,509 results. But you are also allowed to say, 1127 00:36:35,510 --> 00:36:36,949 I don't like that, and then I can tailor 1128 00:36:36,950 --> 00:36:38,419 them slightly. If you don't like the 1129 00:36:38,420 --> 00:36:39,949 result at all, you should take the quiz 1130 00:36:39,950 --> 00:36:40,950 again. 1131 00:36:41,810 --> 00:36:43,939 But the bigger thing is that it 1132 00:36:43,940 --> 00:36:46,069 walks this really weird line 1133 00:36:46,070 --> 00:36:48,139 and this is a weird antidote. 1134 00:36:48,140 --> 00:36:50,029 But I'm also a portrait photographer. 1135 00:36:50,030 --> 00:36:51,319 My background is actually in fine art 1136 00:36:51,320 --> 00:36:52,819 photography and I got a Masters 1137 00:36:52,820 --> 00:36:54,949 Interactive technology years later 1138 00:36:54,950 --> 00:36:57,019 and my work is always it was 1139 00:36:57,020 --> 00:36:59,119 my family and I recreating 1140 00:36:59,120 --> 00:37:01,159 moments post Hurricane Katrina. 1141 00:37:01,160 --> 00:37:03,169 So people always ask, or are these real 1142 00:37:03,170 --> 00:37:04,429 photographs, Caroline? 1143 00:37:04,430 --> 00:37:06,499 Well, they weren't taken on the fly. 1144 00:37:06,500 --> 00:37:08,689 I set them up, but they were real to me. 1145 00:37:08,690 --> 00:37:09,979 And they're saying something. 1146 00:37:09,980 --> 00:37:11,269 And that's the way in which I would 1147 00:37:11,270 --> 00:37:13,069 describe this project. 1148 00:37:13,070 --> 00:37:15,289 It's not real, but it was real to us 1149 00:37:15,290 --> 00:37:16,399 in the moment. 1150 00:37:16,400 --> 00:37:18,559 And it's commenting on things and also 1151 00:37:18,560 --> 00:37:20,000 providing a real solution. 1152 00:37:21,800 --> 00:37:23,509 Thank you. All right, next question from 1153 00:37:23,510 --> 00:37:25,099 Mike, number three, please. 1154 00:37:25,100 --> 00:37:25,519 Hi. 1155 00:37:25,520 --> 00:37:28,129 Do you know of some software that 1156 00:37:28,130 --> 00:37:30,589 shows how open you are to other people? 1157 00:37:30,590 --> 00:37:32,899 For example, a Facebook 1158 00:37:32,900 --> 00:37:34,999 app or something that. 1159 00:37:35,000 --> 00:37:36,979 Yeah, it's also a mirror of your 1160 00:37:36,980 --> 00:37:38,329 sinfulness. 1161 00:37:38,330 --> 00:37:40,549 I don't know of any sort of checker like 1162 00:37:40,550 --> 00:37:41,929 that. I use a variety of different 1163 00:37:41,930 --> 00:37:43,189 things. A friend of mine made a really 1164 00:37:43,190 --> 00:37:45,529 great Wi-Fi sniffer, which is 1165 00:37:45,530 --> 00:37:47,029 like at the extreme end of what you're 1166 00:37:47,030 --> 00:37:48,030 talking about. 1167 00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:51,559 I generally I 1168 00:37:51,560 --> 00:37:52,579 know that you all should do this. 1169 00:37:52,580 --> 00:37:54,649 I often will unfollow and follow 1170 00:37:54,650 --> 00:37:56,209 and unfriend and befriend people and 1171 00:37:56,210 --> 00:37:57,439 change my privacy settings. 1172 00:37:57,440 --> 00:37:59,629 And then I try to log out and get 1173 00:37:59,630 --> 00:38:00,799 someone else to log in and see if they'll 1174 00:38:00,800 --> 00:38:02,869 let me audit and then I will see what 1175 00:38:02,870 --> 00:38:05,329 I look like to other people. 1176 00:38:05,330 --> 00:38:07,039 That's a level of insanity that I don't 1177 00:38:07,040 --> 00:38:08,299 think most people in this room should 1178 00:38:08,300 --> 00:38:09,439 necessarily engage with. 1179 00:38:09,440 --> 00:38:11,299 But I don't actually know of a checker 1180 00:38:11,300 --> 00:38:13,129 that lets you sort of see that. 1181 00:38:13,130 --> 00:38:14,539 I know that there are analytics systems 1182 00:38:14,540 --> 00:38:16,399 you can download for, say, Persay with 1183 00:38:16,400 --> 00:38:18,829 Instagram to see like who's unfollowed 1184 00:38:18,830 --> 00:38:20,599 you and followed you and who's following 1185 00:38:20,600 --> 00:38:21,769 you. That follows other people that, you 1186 00:38:21,770 --> 00:38:23,389 know, which currently Instagram does not 1187 00:38:23,390 --> 00:38:25,429 have that analytic feedback for users. 1188 00:38:25,430 --> 00:38:26,659 It's a third party app you have to 1189 00:38:26,660 --> 00:38:27,859 download. 1190 00:38:27,860 --> 00:38:29,569 Twitter has started ad analytics on the 1191 00:38:29,570 --> 00:38:31,909 side to sort of give you an idea of how 1192 00:38:31,910 --> 00:38:33,409 accessible your tweets were. 1193 00:38:33,410 --> 00:38:36,049 But they'll never say like this is who 1194 00:38:36,050 --> 00:38:38,119 didn't follow you that access this tweet 1195 00:38:38,120 --> 00:38:40,339 today. But they give you a 1196 00:38:40,340 --> 00:38:42,919 more robust analytic breakdown of 1197 00:38:42,920 --> 00:38:44,869 your tweet about puppy dogs did really 1198 00:38:44,870 --> 00:38:47,060 well, but your tweet about OPSEC did not. 1199 00:38:49,360 --> 00:38:50,889 All right, make them before, please. 1200 00:38:51,900 --> 00:38:52,929 Hi. 1201 00:38:52,930 --> 00:38:55,599 I really appreciate your insights 1202 00:38:55,600 --> 00:38:57,849 on visual design and 1203 00:38:57,850 --> 00:39:01,029 the user experience of data at rest. 1204 00:39:01,030 --> 00:39:03,129 I'm really curious what your thoughts are 1205 00:39:03,130 --> 00:39:05,619 on temporal design 1206 00:39:05,620 --> 00:39:07,629 and the user experience of data in 1207 00:39:07,630 --> 00:39:09,879 motion. You know, because you mentioned 1208 00:39:09,880 --> 00:39:12,009 that one of the the the things that came 1209 00:39:12,010 --> 00:39:14,469 out of your interviews was, 1210 00:39:14,470 --> 00:39:16,539 you know, people having a sense of 1211 00:39:16,540 --> 00:39:18,429 just sort of not understanding social 1212 00:39:18,430 --> 00:39:19,779 media and feeling like they need help 1213 00:39:19,780 --> 00:39:21,120 understanding social media. 1214 00:39:22,240 --> 00:39:23,769 You know, in programing, we talk about 1215 00:39:23,770 --> 00:39:26,349 code smells, which are sort of features 1216 00:39:26,350 --> 00:39:28,419 of, you know, code and how 1217 00:39:28,420 --> 00:39:30,249 people use code that are a sign that 1218 00:39:30,250 --> 00:39:32,019 something's probably not designed right 1219 00:39:32,020 --> 00:39:33,999 here. Right. And it seems to me that, you 1220 00:39:34,000 --> 00:39:35,909 know, that sense of misunderstanding is 1221 00:39:35,910 --> 00:39:38,009 is a design smell, maybe 1222 00:39:38,010 --> 00:39:40,209 that there's just too much trying to 1223 00:39:40,210 --> 00:39:41,949 trying to consume user's attention. 1224 00:39:41,950 --> 00:39:44,259 And, you know, we need to change the rate 1225 00:39:44,260 --> 00:39:45,759 at which we're delivering it anyway. 1226 00:39:45,760 --> 00:39:47,139 That's it's an open ended question. 1227 00:39:47,140 --> 00:39:48,219 I'm just really curious what your thoughts 1228 00:39:48,220 --> 00:39:48,529 are there. 1229 00:39:48,530 --> 00:39:49,489 So I've actually thought about this a 1230 00:39:49,490 --> 00:39:51,639 lot. I actually haven't met with 1231 00:39:51,640 --> 00:39:54,009 any engineers at Facebook or Twitter. 1232 00:39:54,010 --> 00:39:55,479 But if you're here, I'd love to talk to 1233 00:39:55,480 --> 00:39:56,649 you. 1234 00:39:56,650 --> 00:39:58,179 But I met with someone that worked in 1235 00:39:58,180 --> 00:40:00,309 branding at Twitter and I asked him to 1236 00:40:00,310 --> 00:40:01,719 just sort of talk about his day job and 1237 00:40:01,720 --> 00:40:04,329 describe how the branding team 1238 00:40:04,330 --> 00:40:05,919 targeted ads, because I figured that was 1239 00:40:05,920 --> 00:40:07,929 a really good way to get a sense of how 1240 00:40:07,930 --> 00:40:09,879 the algorithm was working. 1241 00:40:09,880 --> 00:40:12,369 He started spouting a lot of buzzwords as 1242 00:40:12,370 --> 00:40:14,559 he is prone to want to do a 1243 00:40:14,560 --> 00:40:16,449 coworker of mine from a really old job. 1244 00:40:16,450 --> 00:40:17,589 But he said something was really 1245 00:40:17,590 --> 00:40:18,579 fascinating to me where he's like, well, 1246 00:40:18,580 --> 00:40:20,619 you know, Caroline, there's just so much 1247 00:40:20,620 --> 00:40:21,699 noise. 1248 00:40:21,700 --> 00:40:22,599 And he's like, you know, we have all these 1249 00:40:22,600 --> 00:40:23,579 different algorithms working. 1250 00:40:23,580 --> 00:40:24,849 He's like, there's just so much noise on 1251 00:40:24,850 --> 00:40:25,839 top of each other. And he's trying to 1252 00:40:25,840 --> 00:40:27,189 find this little signal. 1253 00:40:27,190 --> 00:40:28,899 So I know, for instance, with Twitter, 1254 00:40:28,900 --> 00:40:30,999 it's exactly that problem that they 1255 00:40:31,000 --> 00:40:32,529 infrastructurally design themselves 1256 00:40:32,530 --> 00:40:34,599 incorrectly. And to combat it, 1257 00:40:34,600 --> 00:40:36,309 you can't. They're at a point where I 1258 00:40:36,310 --> 00:40:37,959 feel like they cannot shut it down and 1259 00:40:37,960 --> 00:40:40,239 rebuild it and become minimal, like 1260 00:40:40,240 --> 00:40:41,749 with a better working code base. 1261 00:40:41,750 --> 00:40:43,669 So they're building on top of everything. 1262 00:40:43,670 --> 00:40:45,249 And the reason I also think that, too, is 1263 00:40:45,250 --> 00:40:47,049 a lot of anti harassment initiatives that 1264 00:40:47,050 --> 00:40:48,219 they have. They've been rolling out for 1265 00:40:48,220 --> 00:40:50,199 verified users and not for the common 1266 00:40:50,200 --> 00:40:52,420 user base. So if you're a verified user, 1267 00:40:54,040 --> 00:40:55,779 what the way in which they're anti 1268 00:40:55,780 --> 00:40:57,699 harassment initiatives work, it works way 1269 00:40:57,700 --> 00:40:58,989 different and way better for you. 1270 00:40:58,990 --> 00:41:01,929 So they have an algorithm working where 1271 00:41:01,930 --> 00:41:03,999 you will never see is a verified user 1272 00:41:04,000 --> 00:41:06,129 certains harassment tweets, 1273 00:41:06,130 --> 00:41:07,899 they're catching them before they come to 1274 00:41:07,900 --> 00:41:10,059 you and you can look at them later. 1275 00:41:10,060 --> 00:41:11,829 But there's all these really highly 1276 00:41:11,830 --> 00:41:14,289 specific changes. 1277 00:41:14,290 --> 00:41:16,449 And I have not yet seen a verified 1278 00:41:16,450 --> 00:41:17,889 user account. 1279 00:41:17,890 --> 00:41:19,899 No one's let me log into theirs again. 1280 00:41:19,900 --> 00:41:21,489 If you have that, let's chat. 1281 00:41:22,630 --> 00:41:24,549 But I've seen enough screenshots and read 1282 00:41:24,550 --> 00:41:26,139 enough about and talk to friends who have 1283 00:41:26,140 --> 00:41:28,329 it. And it's like it's 1284 00:41:28,330 --> 00:41:29,889 like Twitter 2.0. 1285 00:41:29,890 --> 00:41:31,839 It's just slightly better. 1286 00:41:31,840 --> 00:41:33,489 So what I think they're like the bigger 1287 00:41:33,490 --> 00:41:35,559 issue is there's so much data and 1288 00:41:35,560 --> 00:41:37,809 motion that they can only isolate it for 1289 00:41:37,810 --> 00:41:40,059 what what they are infrastructurally 1290 00:41:40,060 --> 00:41:42,129 deciding who is a power 1291 00:41:42,130 --> 00:41:43,689 user and that power user 1292 00:41:43,690 --> 00:41:45,459 infrastructurally actually becomes a 1293 00:41:45,460 --> 00:41:47,259 better power user. 1294 00:41:47,260 --> 00:41:48,759 Actually, I guess the hidden question I 1295 00:41:48,760 --> 00:41:50,979 have there is really more more 1296 00:41:50,980 --> 00:41:52,899 of, you know, is Twitter eventually 1297 00:41:52,900 --> 00:41:54,969 doomed to tear itself apart because it's 1298 00:41:54,970 --> 00:41:56,829 triggering people's system one responses 1299 00:41:56,830 --> 00:41:58,959 instead of instead of instead of 1300 00:41:58,960 --> 00:41:59,649 their reasoning? 1301 00:41:59,650 --> 00:42:02,049 Right. So I actually 1302 00:42:02,050 --> 00:42:03,399 I really don't have an answer to that 1303 00:42:03,400 --> 00:42:04,989 question because as a Twitter user who's 1304 00:42:04,990 --> 00:42:07,089 thought about quitting, but I really love 1305 00:42:07,090 --> 00:42:09,519 the community I have on Twitter, 1306 00:42:09,520 --> 00:42:10,899 it's kind of a weird emotional 1307 00:42:10,900 --> 00:42:13,059 negotiation that I have of like I don't 1308 00:42:13,060 --> 00:42:14,199 know how accessible I am. 1309 00:42:14,200 --> 00:42:16,299 And I face harassment on 1310 00:42:16,300 --> 00:42:18,579 a usually monthly basis for a variety 1311 00:42:18,580 --> 00:42:19,629 of different things. 1312 00:42:19,630 --> 00:42:21,099 And it's this weird negotiation. 1313 00:42:21,100 --> 00:42:23,409 I have a why am I still here? 1314 00:42:23,410 --> 00:42:25,479 But I actually legitimately like it. 1315 00:42:25,480 --> 00:42:26,859 And I think that that's sort of like the 1316 00:42:26,860 --> 00:42:28,509 big issue is it's like maybe it will pull 1317 00:42:28,510 --> 00:42:30,249 itself apart. 1318 00:42:30,250 --> 00:42:31,599 But harassment, while affects a lot of 1319 00:42:31,600 --> 00:42:33,849 people, it's also affecting hyper 1320 00:42:33,850 --> 00:42:35,319 specific groups of people. 1321 00:42:35,320 --> 00:42:36,999 And I think a lot of the fear around it, 1322 00:42:37,000 --> 00:42:37,899 rightly so as well. 1323 00:42:37,900 --> 00:42:39,069 If it happens to one person, it could 1324 00:42:39,070 --> 00:42:40,299 happen to you because we're 1325 00:42:40,300 --> 00:42:41,709 infrastructurally in the same place. 1326 00:42:41,710 --> 00:42:42,789 We're both equally open. 1327 00:42:43,810 --> 00:42:45,969 But I would I I guess I'm not 1328 00:42:45,970 --> 00:42:47,589 sure like I'm interested to see what 1329 00:42:47,590 --> 00:42:49,719 happens in the next two years, next two 1330 00:42:49,720 --> 00:42:51,839 or three years and see because Twitter 1331 00:42:51,840 --> 00:42:54,339 is not gaining any new followers 1332 00:42:54,340 --> 00:42:55,629 at this point. They're kind of starting 1333 00:42:55,630 --> 00:42:56,559 to plateau. 1334 00:42:56,560 --> 00:42:58,329 So they are not growing at a rate in 1335 00:42:58,330 --> 00:43:00,429 which other social media networks are 1336 00:43:00,430 --> 00:43:02,439 growing. And that's a major issue. 1337 00:43:02,440 --> 00:43:04,029 And some of that issue could be tied 1338 00:43:04,030 --> 00:43:06,549 towards bad infrastructural 1339 00:43:06,550 --> 00:43:09,010 design or really poor code of conduct. 1340 00:43:10,830 --> 00:43:12,449 All right, the next person on microphone 1341 00:43:12,450 --> 00:43:13,450 four, please. 1342 00:43:14,190 --> 00:43:16,349 Last year, my brother blocked 1343 00:43:16,350 --> 00:43:18,809 my mom on Facebook and she still vocally 1344 00:43:18,810 --> 00:43:19,949 bitter about it. 1345 00:43:19,950 --> 00:43:22,049 I mentioned this because many times 1346 00:43:22,050 --> 00:43:24,239 our online social network is 1347 00:43:24,240 --> 00:43:26,339 almost mapped all closely 1348 00:43:26,340 --> 00:43:28,679 intertwined with our offline social 1349 00:43:28,680 --> 00:43:31,589 network. So did you look into 1350 00:43:31,590 --> 00:43:33,689 making changes into this social network 1351 00:43:33,690 --> 00:43:34,619 that's online? 1352 00:43:34,620 --> 00:43:36,689 How does that affect your social network 1353 00:43:36,690 --> 00:43:38,669 offline? As much as you meet and 1354 00:43:38,670 --> 00:43:40,349 following, stop talking to your boss or 1355 00:43:40,350 --> 00:43:42,449 your former colleagues, you'll still meet 1356 00:43:42,450 --> 00:43:45,089 them at conferences and activities. 1357 00:43:45,090 --> 00:43:47,399 So how do you deal with that change 1358 00:43:47,400 --> 00:43:49,619 of this network online, which does not 1359 00:43:49,620 --> 00:43:51,809 actually give a clear picture 1360 00:43:51,810 --> 00:43:53,879 of how your social network looks like the 1361 00:43:53,880 --> 00:43:55,769 digital interaction between the offline 1362 00:43:55,770 --> 00:43:57,839 and online after 1363 00:43:57,840 --> 00:43:58,840 that change? 1364 00:43:59,820 --> 00:44:00,989 I definitely thought about that a lot. 1365 00:44:00,990 --> 00:44:02,759 So just in general, as a researcher, I've 1366 00:44:02,760 --> 00:44:04,469 always been really intrigued by societal 1367 00:44:04,470 --> 00:44:06,599 norms and propriety and like 1368 00:44:06,600 --> 00:44:08,399 what? It's polite behavior across many 1369 00:44:08,400 --> 00:44:09,359 different cultures. 1370 00:44:09,360 --> 00:44:10,979 And I'm speaking as an American, but I 1371 00:44:10,980 --> 00:44:12,959 come from a hyper specific place in the 1372 00:44:12,960 --> 00:44:14,279 United States. I come from Louisiana, 1373 00:44:14,280 --> 00:44:16,409 which is the American South, but we're 1374 00:44:16,410 --> 00:44:18,059 hyper, hyper specific culture. 1375 00:44:19,500 --> 00:44:20,669 We speak two languages. 1376 00:44:20,670 --> 00:44:22,289 It's English and then Cajun, which is an 1377 00:44:22,290 --> 00:44:23,799 oral based language. I only know a couple 1378 00:44:23,800 --> 00:44:26,039 of words, but New 1379 00:44:26,040 --> 00:44:27,059 Orleans, where I'm from, has the highest 1380 00:44:27,060 --> 00:44:27,959 rate of birth retention. 1381 00:44:27,960 --> 00:44:29,519 75 percent of people, they're born there. 1382 00:44:29,520 --> 00:44:31,199 Stay there. So the ways in which I 1383 00:44:31,200 --> 00:44:32,879 socialize is as a New Orleanian, it's 1384 00:44:32,880 --> 00:44:34,499 very different in the ways I socialize as 1385 00:44:34,500 --> 00:44:35,969 a New Yorker. 1386 00:44:35,970 --> 00:44:37,139 And that's true. And I think when you 1387 00:44:37,140 --> 00:44:39,659 get, like even more localized, 1388 00:44:39,660 --> 00:44:41,129 if you look at Americans versus Canadians 1389 00:44:41,130 --> 00:44:43,169 versus Mexicans and getting into Latin 1390 00:44:43,170 --> 00:44:43,829 America. 1391 00:44:43,830 --> 00:44:45,269 So I thought about that a lot that like 1392 00:44:45,270 --> 00:44:47,039 actually a lot of the interactions you 1393 00:44:47,040 --> 00:44:49,259 have offline definitely 1394 00:44:49,260 --> 00:44:50,969 affect and influence the interactions you 1395 00:44:50,970 --> 00:44:52,589 have online. So a lot of advice I sort of 1396 00:44:52,590 --> 00:44:54,659 gave people was also having to break 1397 00:44:54,660 --> 00:44:55,829 down, like, how often do you interface 1398 00:44:55,830 --> 00:44:56,699 with this person? 1399 00:44:56,700 --> 00:44:58,799 And let's think of the most neutral and 1400 00:44:58,800 --> 00:45:01,229 polite way to, like, break things down. 1401 00:45:01,230 --> 00:45:02,609 So, yeah, I thought about that a lot. 1402 00:45:02,610 --> 00:45:05,099 Like, I, I never 1403 00:45:05,100 --> 00:45:07,499 I it yet with the people I've 1404 00:45:07,500 --> 00:45:10,019 I've given advice to said unfriend 1405 00:45:10,020 --> 00:45:11,760 someone oftentimes 1406 00:45:13,110 --> 00:45:14,489 like unless the relationship has 1407 00:45:14,490 --> 00:45:16,499 incredibly soured, that's usually the 1408 00:45:16,500 --> 00:45:16,889 advice. 1409 00:45:16,890 --> 00:45:18,359 But if it's in the case of a boss, for 1410 00:45:18,360 --> 00:45:20,609 instance, my reaction is oftentimes 1411 00:45:20,610 --> 00:45:21,659 why don't you reach out to them if 1412 00:45:21,660 --> 00:45:22,949 they're an old boss and say like I'd love 1413 00:45:22,950 --> 00:45:24,539 to keep in touch, here's my email, but 1414 00:45:24,540 --> 00:45:26,879 like, I'm keeping my Instagram 1415 00:45:26,880 --> 00:45:28,080 just for friends only. 1416 00:45:29,840 --> 00:45:31,249 All right, next question from Mike, No 1417 00:45:31,250 --> 00:45:34,159 one from your project. 1418 00:45:34,160 --> 00:45:36,379 I'm curious to know if you think 1419 00:45:36,380 --> 00:45:38,479 that social breakup is actually 1420 00:45:38,480 --> 00:45:40,639 possible or if it's 1421 00:45:40,640 --> 00:45:42,919 not really possible because people 1422 00:45:42,920 --> 00:45:45,189 end up seeing your stuff anyway. 1423 00:45:46,460 --> 00:45:49,079 Is it bad if my response is both, 1424 00:45:49,080 --> 00:45:51,379 I think that as social media users 1425 00:45:51,380 --> 00:45:52,519 for a really long time, we've been taught 1426 00:45:52,520 --> 00:45:53,569 to interact with social media in a 1427 00:45:53,570 --> 00:45:55,429 particular way. 1428 00:45:55,430 --> 00:45:56,599 And I don't think that that way is 1429 00:45:56,600 --> 00:45:57,739 correct. 1430 00:45:57,740 --> 00:45:59,749 Facebook actively wants you to 1431 00:45:59,750 --> 00:46:01,759 postmaster's Twitter and Instagram wants 1432 00:46:01,760 --> 00:46:03,439 you to share and accumulate followers. 1433 00:46:03,440 --> 00:46:04,579 And that's the way in which these networks 1434 00:46:04,580 --> 00:46:06,229 grow. You're creating content and that 1435 00:46:06,230 --> 00:46:07,789 content is analytics and they package and 1436 00:46:07,790 --> 00:46:09,479 sell that to advertisers. 1437 00:46:09,480 --> 00:46:11,749 I'm politically agnostic on 1438 00:46:11,750 --> 00:46:14,029 that. But I have my own personal thoughts 1439 00:46:14,030 --> 00:46:15,409 as a researcher. That's just what they 1440 00:46:15,410 --> 00:46:17,599 do. But I think that that 1441 00:46:17,600 --> 00:46:19,679 push towards sharing and cross platform 1442 00:46:19,680 --> 00:46:21,799 sharing that you can crosspost 1443 00:46:21,800 --> 00:46:23,780 perhaps in terms of like 1444 00:46:24,950 --> 00:46:27,709 privacy is a horrible idea. 1445 00:46:27,710 --> 00:46:29,119 What are you saying? When are you saying 1446 00:46:29,120 --> 00:46:30,889 it? How are you saying it? Or all or all 1447 00:46:30,890 --> 00:46:32,749 identifiers? And they're all identifiers 1448 00:46:32,750 --> 00:46:34,429 that can pinpoint location and who you 1449 00:46:34,430 --> 00:46:36,229 are and who you are offline, where you 1450 00:46:36,230 --> 00:46:36,799 are. 1451 00:46:36,800 --> 00:46:38,179 And that's something I often do try to 1452 00:46:38,180 --> 00:46:40,519 impart to people is what are you saying 1453 00:46:40,520 --> 00:46:42,049 and when and does it need to be set 1454 00:46:42,050 --> 00:46:43,489 online? 1455 00:46:43,490 --> 00:46:45,439 So I personally, I always give this 1456 00:46:45,440 --> 00:46:47,179 example with people that sit with me and 1457 00:46:47,180 --> 00:46:48,709 like I personally try to not post 1458 00:46:48,710 --> 00:46:50,659 location, but I have a very specific 1459 00:46:50,660 --> 00:46:52,039 reason I can't do that. 1460 00:46:52,040 --> 00:46:53,809 And I had a lot of internal, 1461 00:46:55,250 --> 00:46:57,319 like, dialog of should I post assignments 1462 00:46:57,320 --> 00:46:59,349 at CCC? 1463 00:46:59,350 --> 00:47:00,379 What if someone's here and they want to 1464 00:47:00,380 --> 00:47:02,389 talk to me about something that I want to 1465 00:47:02,390 --> 00:47:03,379 talk about? 1466 00:47:03,380 --> 00:47:04,459 Or what if I say I'm home? 1467 00:47:04,460 --> 00:47:05,689 Like, does that make my mom more of a 1468 00:47:05,690 --> 00:47:07,699 target if someone wanted to try to swat 1469 00:47:07,700 --> 00:47:09,019 us again? 1470 00:47:09,020 --> 00:47:10,309 And those are extreme examples. 1471 00:47:10,310 --> 00:47:11,539 But it's also important to think about, 1472 00:47:11,540 --> 00:47:13,669 like, are you accidentally doxing 1473 00:47:13,670 --> 00:47:14,689 yourself? 1474 00:47:14,690 --> 00:47:16,549 You know, if you're saying I'm at the bar 1475 00:47:16,550 --> 00:47:18,349 downstairs from my apartment, let's check 1476 00:47:18,350 --> 00:47:19,939 in on Foursquare and then post that on 1477 00:47:19,940 --> 00:47:22,039 Instagram. You've pinpointed where 1478 00:47:22,040 --> 00:47:24,169 you live and that's information 1479 00:47:24,170 --> 00:47:26,989 that people don't actually need. 1480 00:47:26,990 --> 00:47:28,519 And so I always try to sort of walk this 1481 00:47:28,520 --> 00:47:30,349 line of like I think it's totally fine to 1482 00:47:30,350 --> 00:47:32,329 post pictures of food and family and 1483 00:47:32,330 --> 00:47:34,459 friends and and to do it frequently. 1484 00:47:34,460 --> 00:47:35,449 But I think it's important to sort of 1485 00:47:35,450 --> 00:47:37,099 know, like, are you highlighting where 1486 00:47:37,100 --> 00:47:38,749 you are? And like, are you highlighting 1487 00:47:38,750 --> 00:47:40,669 regular patterns in your lives? 1488 00:47:40,670 --> 00:47:43,399 And are you then amplifying 1489 00:47:43,400 --> 00:47:45,139 that to a variety of people that you 1490 00:47:45,140 --> 00:47:46,669 don't know and you have no idea how many 1491 00:47:46,670 --> 00:47:47,749 people are accessing it? 1492 00:47:49,740 --> 00:47:50,969 All right, we have another question from 1493 00:47:50,970 --> 00:47:51,970 the Internet. 1494 00:47:54,780 --> 00:47:56,159 I've got a question from the Internet. 1495 00:47:56,160 --> 00:47:58,049 Yesterday, there was a talk titled The 1496 00:47:58,050 --> 00:48:00,899 Possibility of an Army by Consonantal 1497 00:48:00,900 --> 00:48:02,999 who bought thousands of fake accounts. 1498 00:48:03,000 --> 00:48:04,530 What do you think about these actions? 1499 00:48:06,130 --> 00:48:07,759 I guess any more contacts, this person 1500 00:48:07,760 --> 00:48:10,209 bought thousands of fake accounts 1501 00:48:10,210 --> 00:48:11,210 to 1502 00:48:12,460 --> 00:48:14,229 actually I don't have any context for 1503 00:48:14,230 --> 00:48:14,949 that. 1504 00:48:14,950 --> 00:48:17,319 I mean, so I 1505 00:48:17,320 --> 00:48:19,539 in graduate school, 1506 00:48:19,540 --> 00:48:21,369 this woman, this fantastic ethnographer, 1507 00:48:21,370 --> 00:48:23,049 Tricia Wang, came to speak to us. 1508 00:48:23,050 --> 00:48:25,269 And the professor Clay Shirky 1509 00:48:25,270 --> 00:48:27,039 at the time was saying he bought her 1510 00:48:27,040 --> 00:48:29,649 50000 followers in a day. 1511 00:48:29,650 --> 00:48:31,029 And it was just I think he's paid like 1512 00:48:31,030 --> 00:48:32,169 one hundred dollars. 1513 00:48:32,170 --> 00:48:33,429 And I think it's really fascinating in 1514 00:48:33,430 --> 00:48:35,199 which the ways that that bumps you up 1515 00:48:35,200 --> 00:48:37,149 into a different sort of social strata 1516 00:48:37,150 --> 00:48:39,249 and how it made 1517 00:48:39,250 --> 00:48:41,019 her it presented her in a completely 1518 00:48:41,020 --> 00:48:42,429 different way online. That changed the 1519 00:48:42,430 --> 00:48:43,569 way in which people interacted with her 1520 00:48:43,570 --> 00:48:44,829 in the amount of followers she started to 1521 00:48:44,830 --> 00:48:47,139 accrue on a daily 1522 00:48:47,140 --> 00:48:48,140 basis. 1523 00:48:49,630 --> 00:48:51,699 I mean, I think so this 1524 00:48:51,700 --> 00:48:53,229 person created like a thousand different 1525 00:48:53,230 --> 00:48:54,789 accounts. 1526 00:48:54,790 --> 00:48:55,989 I think that that's what that question 1527 00:48:55,990 --> 00:48:58,029 movement, from what I read, that he 1528 00:48:58,030 --> 00:48:59,439 bought them. 1529 00:48:59,440 --> 00:49:00,440 Oh, he bought them. 1530 00:49:01,460 --> 00:49:03,469 I would be curious to know why, like if 1531 00:49:03,470 --> 00:49:05,059 he was looking at data or if he just 1532 00:49:05,060 --> 00:49:07,589 bought a thousand followers, 1533 00:49:07,590 --> 00:49:09,199 but I guess any more information? 1534 00:49:11,140 --> 00:49:12,789 All right, well, the person is not here, 1535 00:49:12,790 --> 00:49:14,439 so we don't know we have another question 1536 00:49:14,440 --> 00:49:16,029 from Mike number three. 1537 00:49:16,030 --> 00:49:18,099 Hi. So 1538 00:49:18,100 --> 00:49:20,439 my sister had an occasion 1539 00:49:20,440 --> 00:49:22,629 where someone who 1540 00:49:22,630 --> 00:49:24,789 she sort of 1541 00:49:24,790 --> 00:49:26,619 became a stalker and 1542 00:49:29,140 --> 00:49:31,269 didn't really know her very well, 1543 00:49:31,270 --> 00:49:33,639 but then started to send really 1544 00:49:33,640 --> 00:49:35,169 weird messages to her. 1545 00:49:35,170 --> 00:49:37,239 And it got to a point where 1546 00:49:37,240 --> 00:49:39,459 they were following her on Instagram 1547 00:49:39,460 --> 00:49:42,309 and she can't like can't really control 1548 00:49:42,310 --> 00:49:43,779 because this person knows who she is. 1549 00:49:43,780 --> 00:49:46,059 And her friends, she she couldn't control 1550 00:49:46,060 --> 00:49:47,109 her information. 1551 00:49:47,110 --> 00:49:49,239 And so this person would send stuff 1552 00:49:49,240 --> 00:49:51,459 based on, oh, we bought this blender and 1553 00:49:51,460 --> 00:49:53,649 and would deliver it to our house 1554 00:49:53,650 --> 00:49:55,329 along with letters about like 1555 00:49:56,770 --> 00:49:58,329 how they would have sex even though they 1556 00:49:58,330 --> 00:49:59,829 had never really interacted before. 1557 00:49:59,830 --> 00:50:01,839 And it got really scary and unsafe. 1558 00:50:01,840 --> 00:50:03,219 And it's sad for that person. 1559 00:50:03,220 --> 00:50:05,349 But also it became really scary for 1560 00:50:05,350 --> 00:50:07,659 my sister and she didn't know where 1561 00:50:07,660 --> 00:50:09,069 to go and what to do. 1562 00:50:09,070 --> 00:50:10,389 And when she went to the police and said, 1563 00:50:10,390 --> 00:50:12,309 I'm scared that this person might might 1564 00:50:12,310 --> 00:50:14,379 come and touch me, like when I'm 1565 00:50:14,380 --> 00:50:16,239 going home late at night, what should I 1566 00:50:16,240 --> 00:50:18,129 do? They said, well, until something 1567 00:50:18,130 --> 00:50:20,229 happens, we really can't, like, do 1568 00:50:20,230 --> 00:50:21,259 anything for you. 1569 00:50:21,260 --> 00:50:22,260 So what 1570 00:50:23,590 --> 00:50:25,789 I'm there may be resources out there for 1571 00:50:25,790 --> 00:50:27,309 for people who are facing this, but for 1572 00:50:27,310 --> 00:50:29,439 those watching this video, 1573 00:50:29,440 --> 00:50:31,569 what would you recommend them to do? 1574 00:50:31,570 --> 00:50:33,099 First of all, I want to say I'm so sorry 1575 00:50:33,100 --> 00:50:34,389 for your sister. 1576 00:50:34,390 --> 00:50:35,390 That's horrible. 1577 00:50:36,340 --> 00:50:38,259 And secondly, what I would suggest doing 1578 00:50:38,260 --> 00:50:41,169 is there are a variety of different 1579 00:50:41,170 --> 00:50:42,519 nonprofits that exist. 1580 00:50:42,520 --> 00:50:44,559 Crash override is one once you've been 1581 00:50:44,560 --> 00:50:46,179 harassed in a really specific way. 1582 00:50:46,180 --> 00:50:47,950 But what I would suggest is 1583 00:50:49,420 --> 00:50:51,729 Smart Girls Guide to Privacy has this. 1584 00:50:51,730 --> 00:50:53,139 It's this really fantastic book. 1585 00:50:53,140 --> 00:50:55,599 And they list where you can access, 1586 00:50:55,600 --> 00:50:57,969 I think, lawyers that are more digitally 1587 00:50:57,970 --> 00:51:00,039 savvy around digital crimes. 1588 00:51:00,040 --> 00:51:02,169 And my recommendation 1589 00:51:02,170 --> 00:51:03,519 in a case of that, with that kind of 1590 00:51:03,520 --> 00:51:05,649 persistence, whereas a regular person, 1591 00:51:05,650 --> 00:51:07,599 meaning a regular stalker, it's one 1592 00:51:07,600 --> 00:51:09,459 entity and they're actually starting to 1593 00:51:09,460 --> 00:51:11,349 sort of move away from social media and 1594 00:51:11,350 --> 00:51:13,539 moving into like letters, you 1595 00:51:13,540 --> 00:51:15,729 should get a lawyer and then 1596 00:51:15,730 --> 00:51:17,979 from there figure out ways to 1597 00:51:17,980 --> 00:51:18,980 assign 1598 00:51:20,980 --> 00:51:23,049 what's a space between you and the other 1599 00:51:23,050 --> 00:51:25,179 person across state lines even and figure 1600 00:51:25,180 --> 00:51:26,649 out, like, I don't know the particulars 1601 00:51:26,650 --> 00:51:28,239 of this case. If this person is in a 1602 00:51:28,240 --> 00:51:29,439 different state than your sister, that 1603 00:51:29,440 --> 00:51:30,769 gets a little bit trickier. 1604 00:51:30,770 --> 00:51:32,289 Are they in the same city? 1605 00:51:32,290 --> 00:51:33,609 So they're in the same city. 1606 00:51:33,610 --> 00:51:34,899 There's a lot more you can do. 1607 00:51:34,900 --> 00:51:37,179 My recommendation would be to immediately 1608 00:51:37,180 --> 00:51:39,519 find a lawyer who 1609 00:51:39,520 --> 00:51:41,289 is well versed in 1610 00:51:42,700 --> 00:51:43,719 online harassment. 1611 00:51:43,720 --> 00:51:45,369 But if that person is in the same city 1612 00:51:45,370 --> 00:51:46,449 and they're sending letters, I think 1613 00:51:46,450 --> 00:51:48,729 that's a pretty good reason to 1614 00:51:48,730 --> 00:51:51,069 move, like to start pressing charges 1615 00:51:51,070 --> 00:51:52,359 like that. That would be my immediate 1616 00:51:52,360 --> 00:51:53,879 reaction. 1617 00:51:53,880 --> 00:51:55,289 All right, thank you. Another question 1618 00:51:55,290 --> 00:51:56,639 from microphone number four. 1619 00:51:58,050 --> 00:51:59,789 Yes, thank you for your wonderful talk. 1620 00:51:59,790 --> 00:52:01,949 First of all, you one thing 1621 00:52:01,950 --> 00:52:04,379 I find myself personally very preoccupied 1622 00:52:04,380 --> 00:52:06,689 by is not just the question of how to 1623 00:52:06,690 --> 00:52:08,909 act on social media in the present, 1624 00:52:08,910 --> 00:52:11,729 but also how to clean up after my past. 1625 00:52:11,730 --> 00:52:13,859 Certainly things I've I've like 1626 00:52:13,860 --> 00:52:15,779 written or posted before. 1627 00:52:15,780 --> 00:52:17,879 And I actually find that the 1628 00:52:17,880 --> 00:52:19,589 obstacle towards doing that is frequently 1629 00:52:19,590 --> 00:52:21,719 infrastructural. It's really hard to 1630 00:52:21,720 --> 00:52:23,489 sort of have an oversight of everything 1631 00:52:23,490 --> 00:52:24,490 you've done in the past. 1632 00:52:25,470 --> 00:52:27,929 Do you what do you sort of see as 1633 00:52:27,930 --> 00:52:30,059 the future of design on these 1634 00:52:30,060 --> 00:52:31,889 platforms? Are they intentionally making 1635 00:52:31,890 --> 00:52:34,259 it difficult or have they coated 1636 00:52:34,260 --> 00:52:36,359 themselves into a corner and it's just 1637 00:52:36,360 --> 00:52:37,719 going to become a bigger problem? 1638 00:52:38,850 --> 00:52:41,219 I guess I would say to basing 1639 00:52:41,220 --> 00:52:43,139 off the way the design is now, I think 1640 00:52:43,140 --> 00:52:45,299 it's a mixture of having coded into 1641 00:52:45,300 --> 00:52:46,919 a corner and also trying to make design 1642 00:52:46,920 --> 00:52:49,349 minimal. So a lot of trends 1643 00:52:49,350 --> 00:52:51,509 and designer around optimization and 1644 00:52:51,510 --> 00:52:53,309 usability. But we're optimizing for speed 1645 00:52:53,310 --> 00:52:54,719 and we're making things more usable for 1646 00:52:54,720 --> 00:52:56,279 mobile. But we're not optimizing or 1647 00:52:56,280 --> 00:52:57,929 designing for safety and we're not 1648 00:52:57,930 --> 00:52:59,519 optimizing or designing for like 1649 00:52:59,520 --> 00:53:01,799 longevity of life within interacting 1650 00:53:01,800 --> 00:53:02,789 with and on these platforms. 1651 00:53:02,790 --> 00:53:05,129 So I would say it's like a misuse 1652 00:53:05,130 --> 00:53:07,229 of design priorities. 1653 00:53:07,230 --> 00:53:08,849 And I think that now there is some 1654 00:53:08,850 --> 00:53:10,199 pushback with people sort of saying, 1655 00:53:10,200 --> 00:53:11,819 like, how is this being accessed? 1656 00:53:11,820 --> 00:53:13,559 There's harassment persisting on on this 1657 00:53:13,560 --> 00:53:14,639 platform. 1658 00:53:14,640 --> 00:53:16,019 How is this happening or what's happening 1659 00:53:16,020 --> 00:53:18,329 because of these reasons, you know, etc.? 1660 00:53:19,590 --> 00:53:22,019 I would say that it's just a mis 1661 00:53:22,020 --> 00:53:24,539 alignment of priorities 1662 00:53:24,540 --> 00:53:26,669 within a design hierarchy and a coding 1663 00:53:26,670 --> 00:53:27,670 hierarchy. 1664 00:53:30,050 --> 00:53:32,500 All right, any other questions? 1665 00:53:33,980 --> 00:53:35,869 It seems like we ran out of questions or 1666 00:53:35,870 --> 00:53:38,059 we got them all cleared up for now. 1667 00:53:38,060 --> 00:53:39,589 So thank you very much for your 1668 00:53:39,590 --> 00:53:40,909 questions. Thank you very much for 1669 00:53:40,910 --> 00:53:41,869 coming. And please give it up for 1670 00:53:41,870 --> 00:53:43,789 Caroline again and for some time. 1671 00:53:43,790 --> 00:53:44,790 Thank you.