0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/392 Thanks! 1 00:00:10,920 --> 00:00:13,469 Hi, so my name is Ben Dalton 2 00:00:13,470 --> 00:00:15,689 and I what I want to talk 3 00:00:15,690 --> 00:00:17,819 about is a project that 4 00:00:17,820 --> 00:00:19,979 I've already built, which 5 00:00:19,980 --> 00:00:22,199 was really trying to allow a room 6 00:00:22,200 --> 00:00:24,329 of strangers to share their 7 00:00:24,330 --> 00:00:26,639 free mobile minutes with 8 00:00:26,640 --> 00:00:28,739 someone. So through the power of 9 00:00:28,740 --> 00:00:30,239 a phone box. 10 00:00:30,240 --> 00:00:32,368 But in putting together this talk, what 11 00:00:32,369 --> 00:00:34,679 I found is that I was looking at 12 00:00:34,680 --> 00:00:36,389 what the phone box means to us 13 00:00:36,390 --> 00:00:37,559 culturally. 14 00:00:37,560 --> 00:00:39,539 And I want to make a case for trying to 15 00:00:39,540 --> 00:00:41,759 keep the phone box going as 16 00:00:41,760 --> 00:00:43,439 something that we can rely on. 17 00:00:43,440 --> 00:00:45,689 So this talk ended 18 00:00:45,690 --> 00:00:47,789 up being about what a phone box 19 00:00:47,790 --> 00:00:51,179 is. And it's sort of this space, 20 00:00:51,180 --> 00:00:53,559 a quieter space with semi 21 00:00:53,560 --> 00:00:54,899 privacy. 22 00:00:54,900 --> 00:00:57,599 It encompasses something of of anonymity 23 00:00:57,600 --> 00:00:59,399 in terms of communication. 24 00:00:59,400 --> 00:01:01,109 You can dial a number without having to 25 00:01:01,110 --> 00:01:03,539 verify your identity. 26 00:01:03,540 --> 00:01:05,789 And then also in the process 27 00:01:05,790 --> 00:01:07,499 of creating a new phone box that's 28 00:01:07,500 --> 00:01:09,659 sustained by a room full of strangers by 29 00:01:09,660 --> 00:01:11,279 a community. 30 00:01:11,280 --> 00:01:12,839 I was interested in this idea of the 31 00:01:12,840 --> 00:01:15,149 phone box in a public space 32 00:01:15,150 --> 00:01:17,099 and what the effect of placing something 33 00:01:17,100 --> 00:01:18,839 into a public space and having that 34 00:01:18,840 --> 00:01:20,939 public sustain the common 35 00:01:20,940 --> 00:01:21,869 good. 36 00:01:21,870 --> 00:01:24,019 What that does to the to the phone box. 37 00:01:25,410 --> 00:01:27,029 I'm a researcher at the Royal College of 38 00:01:27,030 --> 00:01:29,159 Art and also principal 39 00:01:29,160 --> 00:01:31,649 lecturer at Leeds University in the U.K. 40 00:01:31,650 --> 00:01:33,599 And my main research at the moment is 41 00:01:33,600 --> 00:01:34,589 Pseudonymity. 42 00:01:34,590 --> 00:01:36,119 And I'm interested in designing for 43 00:01:36,120 --> 00:01:38,249 Pseudonymity and the phone 44 00:01:38,250 --> 00:01:40,349 books featured only very 45 00:01:40,350 --> 00:01:42,689 briefly in the kind of history 46 00:01:42,690 --> 00:01:44,939 of Superman as a place to change from one 47 00:01:44,940 --> 00:01:46,559 pseudonym to another. 48 00:01:46,560 --> 00:01:48,389 But I think the fact that it very quickly 49 00:01:48,390 --> 00:01:50,519 stuck in people's heads as the 50 00:01:50,520 --> 00:01:52,589 place that Superman transitions 51 00:01:52,590 --> 00:01:54,689 privately from one pseudonym to 52 00:01:54,690 --> 00:01:56,369 another isn't a mistake. 53 00:01:56,370 --> 00:01:57,689 I think that's actually kind of a key 54 00:01:57,690 --> 00:01:59,939 feature of what phone boxes mean to 55 00:01:59,940 --> 00:02:01,500 us as a culture. 56 00:02:03,430 --> 00:02:05,499 And there's another thing that 57 00:02:05,500 --> 00:02:07,089 I've been struggling with a little bit, 58 00:02:07,090 --> 00:02:09,159 and it's the tension 59 00:02:09,160 --> 00:02:11,169 when talking about phone boxes between 60 00:02:11,170 --> 00:02:13,819 wanting to own them as a subculture. 61 00:02:13,820 --> 00:02:16,029 So I think within this 62 00:02:16,030 --> 00:02:18,369 context, some culturally we 63 00:02:18,370 --> 00:02:20,049 have a kind of great affinity to the 64 00:02:20,050 --> 00:02:22,059 phone box. It sort of represents 65 00:02:22,060 --> 00:02:24,459 something special 66 00:02:24,460 --> 00:02:26,349 to hacker culture. 67 00:02:26,350 --> 00:02:28,689 But if you want to try and build 68 00:02:28,690 --> 00:02:31,479 kind of rich, robust, usable, sustainable 69 00:02:31,480 --> 00:02:33,579 pseudonym tools or 70 00:02:33,580 --> 00:02:35,289 tools for anonymity in terms of 71 00:02:35,290 --> 00:02:37,419 communication, if you're constantly 72 00:02:37,420 --> 00:02:40,029 invoking this subcultural narrative 73 00:02:40,030 --> 00:02:42,159 around phone boxes as being 74 00:02:42,160 --> 00:02:44,259 for hackers, then you're kind of 75 00:02:44,260 --> 00:02:46,269 pushing aside a larger community of 76 00:02:46,270 --> 00:02:48,429 users. And so the other argument 77 00:02:48,430 --> 00:02:51,189 I want to make in this talk is about 78 00:02:51,190 --> 00:02:53,259 designing for the mundane, sort of 79 00:02:53,260 --> 00:02:54,999 presenting things in a language of 80 00:02:55,000 --> 00:02:57,099 everyday use rather than this kind of 81 00:02:57,100 --> 00:02:59,169 more exciting pirate kind of 82 00:02:59,170 --> 00:03:00,170 hacker culture. 83 00:03:01,690 --> 00:03:03,399 And I'm sort of illustrating my talk for 84 00:03:03,400 --> 00:03:06,039 a large part with clips 85 00:03:06,040 --> 00:03:08,499 of phone boxes featuring in 86 00:03:08,500 --> 00:03:09,639 in popular media. 87 00:03:09,640 --> 00:03:11,529 And that, again, I think shows our 88 00:03:11,530 --> 00:03:13,989 affinity with this kind of representation 89 00:03:13,990 --> 00:03:16,239 of communication in and anonymous 90 00:03:16,240 --> 00:03:18,579 in a private form, but in a public space, 91 00:03:18,580 --> 00:03:20,079 your own view when you're using a phone 92 00:03:20,080 --> 00:03:22,979 box, but you're also kind of hidden away. 93 00:03:22,980 --> 00:03:24,339 So a little bit of background to the 94 00:03:24,340 --> 00:03:25,359 project. 95 00:03:25,360 --> 00:03:27,549 I was invited by Drew Hemmat 96 00:03:27,550 --> 00:03:29,379 and the feature Everything team to submit 97 00:03:29,380 --> 00:03:31,629 an idea to their City Fictions 98 00:03:33,100 --> 00:03:35,199 exhibition. They run an annual event, The 99 00:03:35,200 --> 00:03:37,449 Future Everything Festival 100 00:03:37,450 --> 00:03:39,969 in Manchester, in the UK 101 00:03:39,970 --> 00:03:41,799 and The City Fictions was about a 102 00:03:41,800 --> 00:03:44,139 speculative but also 103 00:03:44,140 --> 00:03:46,929 functioning future city. 104 00:03:46,930 --> 00:03:49,239 And I'd previously worked 105 00:03:49,240 --> 00:03:51,459 with Feature Everything in the 106 00:03:51,460 --> 00:03:53,319 year before to create a project called 107 00:03:53,320 --> 00:03:55,809 Chata, which was a public, a physical 108 00:03:55,810 --> 00:03:58,659 public space, a cafe with privacy, 109 00:03:58,660 --> 00:03:59,660 violating 110 00:04:00,970 --> 00:04:02,649 properties, a lot like Facebook and 111 00:04:02,650 --> 00:04:04,749 Twitter in terms of their privacy 112 00:04:04,750 --> 00:04:06,549 policy and branding. 113 00:04:06,550 --> 00:04:08,110 We used guinea pigs to 114 00:04:09,310 --> 00:04:11,139 draw people into sharing more than they 115 00:04:11,140 --> 00:04:13,959 normally would publicly and online. 116 00:04:13,960 --> 00:04:16,059 So the space in 117 00:04:16,060 --> 00:04:18,338 Manchester for the city 118 00:04:18,339 --> 00:04:20,679 fiction was an 119 00:04:20,680 --> 00:04:22,329 empty building 120 00:04:23,650 --> 00:04:25,839 and I proposed 121 00:04:25,840 --> 00:04:28,119 to create the telecom system for this 122 00:04:28,120 --> 00:04:30,069 city of the future. 123 00:04:30,070 --> 00:04:32,229 And what I wanted to do was 124 00:04:32,230 --> 00:04:34,449 to try and engage 125 00:04:34,450 --> 00:04:36,519 people to create 126 00:04:36,520 --> 00:04:37,909 a resource between themselves. 127 00:04:37,910 --> 00:04:40,059 So by pooling the resources, these 128 00:04:40,060 --> 00:04:42,159 minutes that you get free with your 129 00:04:42,160 --> 00:04:44,439 phone plan into a common resource, 130 00:04:44,440 --> 00:04:46,779 we can offer a free phone service 131 00:04:46,780 --> 00:04:48,219 to anyone who needs to make a call. 132 00:04:48,220 --> 00:04:50,439 That was the idea, the proposal 133 00:04:50,440 --> 00:04:52,299 to feature everything. 134 00:04:52,300 --> 00:04:54,809 And here is a photo that sort of 135 00:04:54,810 --> 00:04:57,489 encapsulates the entire working system, 136 00:04:57,490 --> 00:04:59,409 the experience of using that system and 137 00:04:59,410 --> 00:05:01,749 condensed into one image. 138 00:05:01,750 --> 00:05:04,149 So this guy is using 139 00:05:04,150 --> 00:05:07,499 the handset of the free phone box 140 00:05:07,500 --> 00:05:09,369 to make a call. 141 00:05:09,370 --> 00:05:11,649 He's making a call to just 142 00:05:11,650 --> 00:05:13,719 a random stranger somewhere. 143 00:05:13,720 --> 00:05:15,999 Any low pay phone numbers 144 00:05:16,000 --> 00:05:18,129 or a landline or a mobile phone in the 145 00:05:18,130 --> 00:05:19,089 UK? 146 00:05:19,090 --> 00:05:20,589 In this case, it's someone in the same 147 00:05:20,590 --> 00:05:22,239 room. But that phone number could be 148 00:05:22,240 --> 00:05:23,349 anyone. 149 00:05:23,350 --> 00:05:25,989 And he's doing it by borrowing 150 00:05:25,990 --> 00:05:28,089 minutes from this guy's mobile 151 00:05:28,090 --> 00:05:30,639 phone. So this guy has 152 00:05:30,640 --> 00:05:32,829 chosen to allow the system 153 00:05:32,830 --> 00:05:35,679 to borrow call time from him. 154 00:05:35,680 --> 00:05:37,419 How does that work? 155 00:05:37,420 --> 00:05:39,609 What I did was to ask people when 156 00:05:39,610 --> 00:05:41,439 they came and sat in the cafe if they 157 00:05:41,440 --> 00:05:43,779 wanted to, to connect their mobile 158 00:05:43,780 --> 00:05:45,939 phones to the system over 159 00:05:45,940 --> 00:05:49,119 Bluetooth using the handsfree 160 00:05:49,120 --> 00:05:50,049 profile. 161 00:05:50,050 --> 00:05:51,050 So 162 00:05:52,120 --> 00:05:54,339 on your phone, the system just looks like 163 00:05:54,340 --> 00:05:57,069 a headset or an in car stereo system 164 00:05:57,070 --> 00:05:58,689 and you're just able to select it and 165 00:05:58,690 --> 00:05:59,799 pair with it. 166 00:05:59,800 --> 00:06:02,199 And then the system chooses 167 00:06:02,200 --> 00:06:04,149 one of the phones in the room to make the 168 00:06:04,150 --> 00:06:05,150 call. 169 00:06:06,010 --> 00:06:08,769 As you can see here, the phone box 170 00:06:08,770 --> 00:06:09,699 is virtual. 171 00:06:09,700 --> 00:06:12,729 It's created with tape very quickly. 172 00:06:12,730 --> 00:06:14,589 And the whole project for me has a 173 00:06:14,590 --> 00:06:16,509 certain kind of feeling to it of the fat 174 00:06:16,510 --> 00:06:18,879 labs around buttholes, speed 175 00:06:18,880 --> 00:06:21,489 projects in that each kind of component 176 00:06:21,490 --> 00:06:23,799 was sort of attempted in quite a small 177 00:06:23,800 --> 00:06:25,449 amount of time. The phone box was 178 00:06:25,450 --> 00:06:27,219 certainly assembled in less than eight 179 00:06:27,220 --> 00:06:28,179 hours. 180 00:06:28,180 --> 00:06:30,159 But as a project, overall, it doesn't 181 00:06:30,160 --> 00:06:32,589 deserve this speed project approved stamp 182 00:06:32,590 --> 00:06:34,779 because things took longer than that. 183 00:06:36,280 --> 00:06:38,139 So how did it work? 184 00:06:38,140 --> 00:06:40,089 As I said before, I was relying on this 185 00:06:40,090 --> 00:06:42,279 handsfree profile, which is part 186 00:06:42,280 --> 00:06:45,249 of the Bluetooth specification. 187 00:06:45,250 --> 00:06:47,649 This beautiful diagram is in the official 188 00:06:47,650 --> 00:06:50,019 documentation and shows 189 00:06:50,020 --> 00:06:52,089 that your phone using handsfree 190 00:06:52,090 --> 00:06:54,219 can connect to a headset, but also 191 00:06:54,220 --> 00:06:55,389 to a car. 192 00:06:55,390 --> 00:06:57,069 And the difference between the handsfree 193 00:06:57,070 --> 00:06:58,479 profile of the bottom and Blackfire and 194 00:06:58,480 --> 00:07:00,429 the one above it, the headset profile is 195 00:07:00,430 --> 00:07:01,759 handsfree allows you to. 196 00:07:01,760 --> 00:07:03,559 I'll numbers as well, which is what you 197 00:07:03,560 --> 00:07:05,719 want to do. We want our 198 00:07:05,720 --> 00:07:07,519 phone booth to be able to connect to a 199 00:07:07,520 --> 00:07:09,919 phone and dial the number and have it 200 00:07:09,920 --> 00:07:11,119 passed through the audio in both 201 00:07:11,120 --> 00:07:12,409 directions. 202 00:07:12,410 --> 00:07:14,869 There's another profile, the same access, 203 00:07:14,870 --> 00:07:16,579 and that allows a much more control, 204 00:07:16,580 --> 00:07:18,829 access to phone books, control 205 00:07:18,830 --> 00:07:20,749 over the phone, and that's used in cars 206 00:07:20,750 --> 00:07:22,639 as well. But I steered clear of that one. 207 00:07:22,640 --> 00:07:23,689 It was slightly more complex. 208 00:07:23,690 --> 00:07:25,369 And I also worried about the security 209 00:07:25,370 --> 00:07:27,439 implications of kind of people handing 210 00:07:27,440 --> 00:07:29,569 over more control of their SIM to 211 00:07:29,570 --> 00:07:31,729 this computer in a public 212 00:07:31,730 --> 00:07:33,139 space. 213 00:07:33,140 --> 00:07:35,419 How did I build the system? 214 00:07:35,420 --> 00:07:37,609 Well, I used a Debian 215 00:07:37,610 --> 00:07:39,829 installed on a sort of generic 216 00:07:39,830 --> 00:07:41,419 PC. 217 00:07:41,420 --> 00:07:43,849 I used the stable wizzy 218 00:07:43,850 --> 00:07:45,829 that was available at the time, and that 219 00:07:45,830 --> 00:07:47,989 dictated you sing blues, 220 00:07:47,990 --> 00:07:50,149 which is the Bluetooth stack, 221 00:07:50,150 --> 00:07:52,249 and that dictated using 222 00:07:52,250 --> 00:07:54,709 Debussy's as a communication 223 00:07:54,710 --> 00:07:55,849 channel. 224 00:07:55,850 --> 00:07:58,099 Between that and any other software that 225 00:07:58,100 --> 00:08:00,259 I was trying to control the handsfree 226 00:08:00,260 --> 00:08:01,260 profile with. 227 00:08:02,330 --> 00:08:04,459 I found blues 228 00:08:04,460 --> 00:08:05,749 to be horribly documented. 229 00:08:05,750 --> 00:08:07,399 They delete their documentation when they 230 00:08:07,400 --> 00:08:08,299 move forward. 231 00:08:08,300 --> 00:08:10,789 And since they moved on from this version 232 00:08:10,790 --> 00:08:12,889 in there to their latest one, it was very 233 00:08:12,890 --> 00:08:15,019 difficult to actually discover how to 234 00:08:15,020 --> 00:08:16,519 change settings reliably. 235 00:08:16,520 --> 00:08:18,259 All of the things that people had written 236 00:08:18,260 --> 00:08:20,359 online before just weren't up to date 237 00:08:20,360 --> 00:08:23,149 enough. And so it's difficult to actually 238 00:08:23,150 --> 00:08:25,249 have the system respond 239 00:08:25,250 --> 00:08:27,019 in the way that it was documented online. 240 00:08:28,220 --> 00:08:29,629 Luckily, someone 241 00:08:30,830 --> 00:08:33,349 some Ravich 242 00:08:33,350 --> 00:08:35,658 had created a few years ago, 243 00:08:35,659 --> 00:08:37,788 this implementation of the 244 00:08:37,789 --> 00:08:39,949 handsfree profile server for 245 00:08:39,950 --> 00:08:42,379 Linux could no hands. 246 00:08:42,380 --> 00:08:44,929 When you read about this online, 247 00:08:44,930 --> 00:08:47,089 the project at the time is 248 00:08:47,090 --> 00:08:48,379 quite well documented. 249 00:08:48,380 --> 00:08:50,449 It has a back end and then a front end 250 00:08:50,450 --> 00:08:52,639 and a number of test programs to to 251 00:08:52,640 --> 00:08:55,069 try it out. But over time, it's kind of 252 00:08:55,070 --> 00:08:57,020 fallen out of use and maintenance. 253 00:08:58,400 --> 00:09:01,219 And there's a lot of frustration in 254 00:09:01,220 --> 00:09:03,409 sort of CA modding forums, 255 00:09:03,410 --> 00:09:05,659 trying to get this program to work 256 00:09:05,660 --> 00:09:06,660 again. 257 00:09:07,580 --> 00:09:09,709 There's been an attempt to fork it onto 258 00:09:09,710 --> 00:09:11,809 GitHub by a 259 00:09:11,810 --> 00:09:13,969 number of people started by 260 00:09:13,970 --> 00:09:15,289 Thomas Zimmerman. 261 00:09:15,290 --> 00:09:17,240 And that's the version that I 262 00:09:18,500 --> 00:09:20,899 started to play with. 263 00:09:20,900 --> 00:09:23,029 And even that I 264 00:09:23,030 --> 00:09:24,859 was finding, I could get the program to 265 00:09:24,860 --> 00:09:27,169 run, but it was unable to actually make 266 00:09:27,170 --> 00:09:29,539 the connection reliably. 267 00:09:29,540 --> 00:09:31,339 I was able to make simpler Bluetooth 268 00:09:31,340 --> 00:09:33,199 connections like streaming audio in one 269 00:09:33,200 --> 00:09:35,119 direction. But actually creating this 270 00:09:36,410 --> 00:09:38,479 handsfree profile seemed a bit 271 00:09:38,480 --> 00:09:40,609 more complicated, thanks 272 00:09:40,610 --> 00:09:42,619 to additional notes from John Tapsell. 273 00:09:42,620 --> 00:09:44,959 I was able to actually find some settings 274 00:09:44,960 --> 00:09:47,329 and and by going 275 00:09:47,330 --> 00:09:49,429 through several Bluetooth dongles, I was 276 00:09:49,430 --> 00:09:51,559 able to find one that did actually work 277 00:09:51,560 --> 00:09:54,469 reliably with a number of phones 278 00:09:54,470 --> 00:09:55,470 over Bluetooth. 279 00:09:56,900 --> 00:09:59,239 The hardware, like I said, was a generic 280 00:09:59,240 --> 00:10:00,369 PC. 281 00:10:00,370 --> 00:10:02,449 I used a 282 00:10:02,450 --> 00:10:04,819 simple USB phone 283 00:10:04,820 --> 00:10:06,949 as the audio input and 284 00:10:06,950 --> 00:10:08,509 output and also the keypad. 285 00:10:09,980 --> 00:10:11,359 As you can see, again, everything's kind 286 00:10:11,360 --> 00:10:12,529 of stuck together with tape. 287 00:10:12,530 --> 00:10:14,539 And that's a running theme throughout the 288 00:10:14,540 --> 00:10:15,540 project. 289 00:10:16,340 --> 00:10:18,439 For the software, so the 290 00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:20,629 PC has 291 00:10:20,630 --> 00:10:22,699 the no hands 292 00:10:22,700 --> 00:10:24,829 software running, and that's 293 00:10:24,830 --> 00:10:27,079 controlling access to phones 294 00:10:27,080 --> 00:10:28,999 over device, that's where the commands 295 00:10:29,000 --> 00:10:30,439 are being passed backwards and forwards 296 00:10:30,440 --> 00:10:31,849 to blues. 297 00:10:31,850 --> 00:10:34,129 And so I wrote three Python scripts 298 00:10:34,130 --> 00:10:36,289 that also sit on on 299 00:10:36,290 --> 00:10:38,419 DBAs and allow 300 00:10:38,420 --> 00:10:40,129 no hands to do most of the heavy lifting 301 00:10:40,130 --> 00:10:41,809 and then just throw commands in 302 00:10:41,810 --> 00:10:43,999 occasionally to do things like 303 00:10:44,000 --> 00:10:46,579 pairing with phones as they appear 304 00:10:46,580 --> 00:10:48,649 in the vicinity of the Bluetooth 305 00:10:48,650 --> 00:10:50,959 dongle and also 306 00:10:50,960 --> 00:10:53,569 to find the key presses 307 00:10:53,570 --> 00:10:55,659 and work out what calls 308 00:10:55,660 --> 00:10:56,839 to make. 309 00:10:56,840 --> 00:10:58,909 And the resource of all the phone numbers 310 00:10:58,910 --> 00:11:01,039 is built from the phones in the 311 00:11:01,040 --> 00:11:03,769 neighboring area in the Cafe of 312 00:11:03,770 --> 00:11:05,149 Feature Everything. 313 00:11:05,150 --> 00:11:07,879 I also found just to mention briefly, 314 00:11:07,880 --> 00:11:10,549 this app Bluetooth Eskow 315 00:11:10,550 --> 00:11:12,769 tests to be quite useful in 316 00:11:12,770 --> 00:11:15,769 actually trying to fine tune the settings 317 00:11:15,770 --> 00:11:18,019 to get the audio to reliably play 318 00:11:18,020 --> 00:11:20,419 in both directions on 319 00:11:20,420 --> 00:11:21,420 the on the phone. 320 00:11:23,120 --> 00:11:25,279 I'm not going to show you much 321 00:11:25,280 --> 00:11:26,899 in the way of the script because it's 322 00:11:26,900 --> 00:11:28,699 just some sort of, again, held together 323 00:11:28,700 --> 00:11:30,949 with tape pieces of code to kind of 324 00:11:30,950 --> 00:11:33,199 pass certain instructions over 325 00:11:33,200 --> 00:11:35,269 Debussy's to blues and to no 326 00:11:35,270 --> 00:11:36,270 hands. 327 00:11:36,710 --> 00:11:37,939 Just two things to mention here. 328 00:11:37,940 --> 00:11:40,309 The big list of the beginnings of mobile 329 00:11:40,310 --> 00:11:41,899 phone numbers in the UK. 330 00:11:41,900 --> 00:11:43,309 It turns out that most 331 00:11:44,390 --> 00:11:46,489 free numbers or low cost numbers on 332 00:11:46,490 --> 00:11:48,649 people's phone call plans 333 00:11:48,650 --> 00:11:50,899 are easy to 334 00:11:50,900 --> 00:11:53,059 select. By the first two digits, 335 00:11:53,060 --> 00:11:55,759 only one or two 03 and 07. 336 00:11:55,760 --> 00:11:57,859 But there is a subset 337 00:11:57,860 --> 00:11:59,869 of numbers that look like no more mobile 338 00:11:59,870 --> 00:12:02,449 phone numbers, but are on various islands 339 00:12:02,450 --> 00:12:04,759 that are affiliated with the UK Guernsey, 340 00:12:04,760 --> 00:12:06,529 Guernsey and the Isle of Man and some 341 00:12:06,530 --> 00:12:08,539 call forwarding services that are premium 342 00:12:08,540 --> 00:12:10,309 rate but just look like normal numbers. 343 00:12:10,310 --> 00:12:11,689 And so what I'm doing there is just 344 00:12:11,690 --> 00:12:13,789 building a white less than 345 00:12:13,790 --> 00:12:15,919 a blacklist of numbers to 346 00:12:15,920 --> 00:12:18,589 filter any calls that are dialed. 347 00:12:18,590 --> 00:12:20,899 So I'm not passing expensive calls on 348 00:12:20,900 --> 00:12:23,059 to the donors who have offered 349 00:12:23,060 --> 00:12:24,409 up their free minutes. 350 00:12:24,410 --> 00:12:26,809 I basically only want free to 351 00:12:26,810 --> 00:12:29,389 mobile users calls to go through. 352 00:12:29,390 --> 00:12:30,589 The other thing I'm doing there at the 353 00:12:30,590 --> 00:12:32,719 top is connecting to the 354 00:12:32,720 --> 00:12:33,619 USB handset. 355 00:12:33,620 --> 00:12:36,049 It turns out that wasn't supported 356 00:12:36,050 --> 00:12:38,119 a standard on the version of Linux 357 00:12:38,120 --> 00:12:39,079 that I was using. 358 00:12:39,080 --> 00:12:40,580 And so I'm just using the 359 00:12:43,880 --> 00:12:46,159 human interface device rule 360 00:12:47,330 --> 00:12:49,429 access to pull out the 361 00:12:49,430 --> 00:12:51,559 key presses and translate them into the 362 00:12:51,560 --> 00:12:52,849 numbers that are being dialed and the 363 00:12:52,850 --> 00:12:54,799 call button that's being pressed. 364 00:12:54,800 --> 00:12:55,800 So this is just 365 00:12:56,960 --> 00:12:59,029 storing in the dialed numbers and 366 00:12:59,030 --> 00:13:01,159 then filtering them and passing 367 00:13:01,160 --> 00:13:03,379 them on to the the whichever mobile 368 00:13:03,380 --> 00:13:05,029 phone has been selected to make the call. 369 00:13:06,140 --> 00:13:07,729 So what we have here then is a 370 00:13:07,730 --> 00:13:08,730 functioning 371 00:13:09,980 --> 00:13:12,169 phone box that allows strangers 372 00:13:12,170 --> 00:13:14,419 to walk into a space dial, a phone 373 00:13:14,420 --> 00:13:16,579 number, which in itself is a little 374 00:13:16,580 --> 00:13:17,749 bit strange. 375 00:13:17,750 --> 00:13:19,849 If you grew up with phone boxes, 376 00:13:19,850 --> 00:13:22,309 you probably that feels quite normal. 377 00:13:22,310 --> 00:13:24,649 But now sort of a new 378 00:13:24,650 --> 00:13:26,899 generation of people aren't used to 379 00:13:26,900 --> 00:13:28,309 accessing people through numbers, but 380 00:13:28,310 --> 00:13:30,649 rather through address books and faces 381 00:13:30,650 --> 00:13:32,449 and IDs. 382 00:13:32,450 --> 00:13:34,079 But what's interesting to me is that the 383 00:13:34,080 --> 00:13:36,319 system is sustained by a social 384 00:13:36,320 --> 00:13:37,879 group in the same space. 385 00:13:37,880 --> 00:13:40,009 So Bluetooth has a like a range, 386 00:13:40,010 --> 00:13:42,199 which is roughly room size, which means 387 00:13:42,200 --> 00:13:44,359 that if this phone is to stay free and 388 00:13:44,360 --> 00:13:46,519 usable, there has to be a community and 389 00:13:46,520 --> 00:13:48,769 active community of people willing 390 00:13:48,770 --> 00:13:50,299 to donate minutes to it. 391 00:13:50,300 --> 00:13:52,549 Now, I don't think the donation seems 392 00:13:52,550 --> 00:13:53,959 like much of a problem. Most people have 393 00:13:53,960 --> 00:13:55,489 more minutes that they can use. 394 00:13:55,490 --> 00:13:57,229 It seems part of the mobile phone 395 00:13:57,230 --> 00:13:58,969 contract to sort of law under these 396 00:13:58,970 --> 00:14:00,769 minutes and you never really use them up. 397 00:14:00,770 --> 00:14:02,539 So most people seem quite happy with 398 00:14:02,540 --> 00:14:03,540 that. 399 00:14:03,920 --> 00:14:06,139 But, you know, maybe there's some other 400 00:14:06,140 --> 00:14:08,509 implications around 401 00:14:08,510 --> 00:14:10,849 being a donor or being a 402 00:14:10,850 --> 00:14:12,709 phone call phone box user. 403 00:14:12,710 --> 00:14:14,359 And I want to investigate those a little 404 00:14:14,360 --> 00:14:15,360 bit more. 405 00:14:15,860 --> 00:14:18,079 So one issue that I thought about 406 00:14:18,080 --> 00:14:20,089 a bit is this kind of issue of power. 407 00:14:20,090 --> 00:14:22,459 So the people who might 408 00:14:22,460 --> 00:14:24,199 sort of choose to donate minutes and the 409 00:14:24,200 --> 00:14:25,699 people who might choose to use a free 410 00:14:25,700 --> 00:14:28,129 phone box may fall into different groups. 411 00:14:28,130 --> 00:14:30,109 And that might be because it's like a pay 412 00:14:30,110 --> 00:14:32,599 as you go contract versus a a contract 413 00:14:32,600 --> 00:14:34,609 that gives you free minutes. 414 00:14:34,610 --> 00:14:36,739 It might be because you have no phone. 415 00:14:36,740 --> 00:14:38,389 Homeless people might find the service 416 00:14:38,390 --> 00:14:40,909 particularly useful to use as callers 417 00:14:40,910 --> 00:14:42,799 travelers. Again, maybe their phone 418 00:14:42,800 --> 00:14:44,359 doesn't work in another country. 419 00:14:44,360 --> 00:14:46,039 So you start to see this kind of weird 420 00:14:46,040 --> 00:14:48,319 separation between donors and users. 421 00:14:48,320 --> 00:14:50,419 And I was worried a little bit about 422 00:14:50,420 --> 00:14:52,759 that, especially since phone boxes tend 423 00:14:52,760 --> 00:14:54,769 to put you on display. 424 00:14:54,770 --> 00:14:56,689 If you haven't seen this for a film like 425 00:14:56,690 --> 00:14:58,339 Sabena, all of the references are down 426 00:14:58,340 --> 00:14:59,929 the bottom and the slides are online. 427 00:14:59,930 --> 00:15:01,759 It's about a man who gets trapped in a 428 00:15:01,760 --> 00:15:02,760 phone box. 429 00:15:04,190 --> 00:15:06,289 So what are the benefits to a caller to 430 00:15:06,290 --> 00:15:08,449 coming in and using this this free 431 00:15:08,450 --> 00:15:09,799 phone service? Well, obviously, it's 432 00:15:09,800 --> 00:15:11,689 free, but there's another benefit as 433 00:15:11,690 --> 00:15:14,029 well, which is that it offers you some 434 00:15:14,030 --> 00:15:15,139 anonymity. 435 00:15:15,140 --> 00:15:17,119 If you place a call through your home 436 00:15:17,120 --> 00:15:20,179 phone or through your mobile phone, 437 00:15:20,180 --> 00:15:22,759 you kind of have your identity 438 00:15:22,760 --> 00:15:24,589 tied to placing that call. 439 00:15:24,590 --> 00:15:27,169 If you go and use a payphone, 440 00:15:27,170 --> 00:15:29,389 you have a slight anonymity 441 00:15:29,390 --> 00:15:31,549 in the communication. 442 00:15:31,550 --> 00:15:33,679 The record is still made of where 443 00:15:33,680 --> 00:15:35,929 that call is directed to. 444 00:15:35,930 --> 00:15:38,359 But you're kind of reasonably anonymous, 445 00:15:38,360 --> 00:15:39,769 although, of course, you know, phone 446 00:15:39,770 --> 00:15:41,539 boxes are in public spaces and can be 447 00:15:41,540 --> 00:15:43,489 observed. But there is some degree of 448 00:15:43,490 --> 00:15:44,899 anonymity there. 449 00:15:44,900 --> 00:15:47,599 And certainly that feature reoccurs 450 00:15:47,600 --> 00:15:49,969 is a theme in films as a way of 451 00:15:49,970 --> 00:15:52,189 delivering tip offs and hacking 452 00:15:52,190 --> 00:15:53,190 and everything else. 453 00:15:53,960 --> 00:15:55,729 And so there's an exchange there between 454 00:15:55,730 --> 00:15:57,889 some anonymity and public presence in 455 00:15:57,890 --> 00:15:59,959 this social space of a small 456 00:15:59,960 --> 00:16:01,579 group of people, which I think is 457 00:16:01,580 --> 00:16:02,809 interesting. 458 00:16:02,810 --> 00:16:04,969 So in a way, this free phone 459 00:16:04,970 --> 00:16:07,549 box is using is sort of 460 00:16:07,550 --> 00:16:10,069 mirroring the function of 461 00:16:10,070 --> 00:16:12,319 a mixed network node. 462 00:16:12,320 --> 00:16:14,839 So in a mixed network, the computer 463 00:16:14,840 --> 00:16:16,759 is taking email and forwarding it on and 464 00:16:16,760 --> 00:16:18,139 stripping the identity. 465 00:16:18,140 --> 00:16:20,449 And in our system, the free phone box 466 00:16:20,450 --> 00:16:22,669 is allowing you to take the things 467 00:16:22,670 --> 00:16:23,929 you're saying and pass them through 468 00:16:23,930 --> 00:16:25,819 somebody else's phone and sort of strip 469 00:16:25,820 --> 00:16:26,820 the idea away. 470 00:16:27,800 --> 00:16:29,899 So in a way, it functions sort of like 471 00:16:29,900 --> 00:16:31,939 that. And so then we start to think, 472 00:16:31,940 --> 00:16:34,159 well, what's the benefit for the donor 473 00:16:34,160 --> 00:16:35,959 if they're starting to serve this 474 00:16:35,960 --> 00:16:38,239 purpose, the purpose of providing 475 00:16:38,240 --> 00:16:40,549 some anonymity, they're not worried 476 00:16:40,550 --> 00:16:43,489 about the implications of of offering 477 00:16:43,490 --> 00:16:45,589 an anonymizing service to strangers. 478 00:16:45,590 --> 00:16:46,849 Is that kind of something that they might 479 00:16:46,850 --> 00:16:47,809 be worried about? 480 00:16:47,810 --> 00:16:49,820 Well, what are the benefits to donors? 481 00:16:51,110 --> 00:16:53,239 One of the benefits, I think, for me is 482 00:16:53,240 --> 00:16:55,429 that if you fail 483 00:16:55,430 --> 00:16:57,649 your phone record with the phone 484 00:16:57,650 --> 00:16:59,719 calls of strangers, what you start 485 00:16:59,720 --> 00:17:01,999 to do is to decouple the phone 486 00:17:02,000 --> 00:17:04,608 record from the your identity. 487 00:17:04,609 --> 00:17:06,889 So the mobile phone, I think gradually 488 00:17:06,890 --> 00:17:09,068 over time has become a symbol 489 00:17:09,069 --> 00:17:11,809 and authentication tool for identifying 490 00:17:11,810 --> 00:17:12,799 people. 491 00:17:12,800 --> 00:17:14,598 And if you can start to insert other 492 00:17:14,599 --> 00:17:16,459 people's phone calls into your record, 493 00:17:16,460 --> 00:17:17,689 then what you're doing is start to 494 00:17:17,690 --> 00:17:19,759 decouple that relationship 495 00:17:19,760 --> 00:17:21,828 between you and your phone and your phone 496 00:17:21,829 --> 00:17:22,759 record. And I think there's an 497 00:17:22,760 --> 00:17:25,009 interesting property there that we should 498 00:17:25,010 --> 00:17:26,539 look at a little bit further. 499 00:17:26,540 --> 00:17:29,099 This is a brief period, 500 00:17:29,100 --> 00:17:31,369 a fad called phone box stuffing 501 00:17:31,370 --> 00:17:33,470 in the 1950s. 502 00:17:35,530 --> 00:17:36,530 It lasted a year, 503 00:17:38,530 --> 00:17:40,779 and so to me, this is reminiscent 504 00:17:40,780 --> 00:17:43,659 of the idea of chaffe so chaffe, 505 00:17:43,660 --> 00:17:45,999 it was called window in the UK 506 00:17:46,000 --> 00:17:48,099 during the war, and people in 507 00:17:48,100 --> 00:17:50,199 Germany, both countries invented at 508 00:17:50,200 --> 00:17:51,789 the same time and didn't use it for 509 00:17:51,790 --> 00:17:53,199 several years for the fear that the other 510 00:17:53,200 --> 00:17:54,999 one might copy them. 511 00:17:55,000 --> 00:17:56,529 And the idea is that you're flying your 512 00:17:56,530 --> 00:17:59,109 plane, you drop a big cloud 513 00:17:59,110 --> 00:18:01,329 of small pieces of metal, little 514 00:18:01,330 --> 00:18:02,919 strips of metal, and as they sort of 515 00:18:02,920 --> 00:18:04,629 flicker through the air, they reflect 516 00:18:04,630 --> 00:18:07,689 radar. And you have this effect in the 517 00:18:07,690 --> 00:18:09,729 in the radar system where you're unable 518 00:18:09,730 --> 00:18:11,589 to see the plane because there's all this 519 00:18:11,590 --> 00:18:13,689 reflection, this kind of small pieces 520 00:18:13,690 --> 00:18:15,880 of of a distracting material. 521 00:18:16,930 --> 00:18:18,219 And what we're talking about when we're 522 00:18:18,220 --> 00:18:20,499 inserting stranger's phone calls 523 00:18:20,500 --> 00:18:23,169 into our own personal identity record 524 00:18:23,170 --> 00:18:25,389 is we're inserting data chaff 525 00:18:25,390 --> 00:18:27,279 into our record and therefore kind of 526 00:18:27,280 --> 00:18:29,499 obfuscating the sort 527 00:18:29,500 --> 00:18:31,299 of form of our identity a little bit. 528 00:18:31,300 --> 00:18:33,039 And so this, I think, is an interesting 529 00:18:33,040 --> 00:18:35,349 idea in terms of controlling how 530 00:18:35,350 --> 00:18:37,419 your identity is is monitored by 531 00:18:37,420 --> 00:18:39,190 other people or stored by other people. 532 00:18:40,330 --> 00:18:42,519 So I want to talk about Chaffe a little 533 00:18:42,520 --> 00:18:44,019 bit more. 534 00:18:44,020 --> 00:18:46,299 One approach to Chaffe that I've seen 535 00:18:46,300 --> 00:18:47,349 come up a couple of times. 536 00:18:47,350 --> 00:18:49,659 This is the first time that I saw it 537 00:18:49,660 --> 00:18:52,119 kind of presented effectively. 538 00:18:52,120 --> 00:18:54,639 This is a super villain either 539 00:18:54,640 --> 00:18:57,669 by any arrest in 2002. 540 00:18:57,670 --> 00:18:59,799 And what this did was to 541 00:18:59,800 --> 00:19:02,109 create fake email 542 00:19:02,110 --> 00:19:03,909 characters who would have email 543 00:19:03,910 --> 00:19:06,249 conversations late at night 544 00:19:06,250 --> 00:19:08,409 using keywords, you know, 545 00:19:08,410 --> 00:19:10,629 about bombs and nuclear 546 00:19:10,630 --> 00:19:13,419 material and biological agents and 547 00:19:13,420 --> 00:19:15,549 assassinations of presidents and subways 548 00:19:15,550 --> 00:19:16,550 and all those things. 549 00:19:17,500 --> 00:19:19,209 And because those keyword terms were 550 00:19:19,210 --> 00:19:20,979 passing backwards and forwards through 551 00:19:20,980 --> 00:19:22,599 this email system, they were sort of 552 00:19:22,600 --> 00:19:25,569 inserting this this chaff into the system 553 00:19:25,570 --> 00:19:28,179 to kind of slow down the automatic 554 00:19:28,180 --> 00:19:30,339 monitoring and kind of complicate 555 00:19:30,340 --> 00:19:32,709 the monitoring technology. 556 00:19:32,710 --> 00:19:34,959 But one thought 557 00:19:34,960 --> 00:19:37,269 I had about algorithmic chat chaff 558 00:19:37,270 --> 00:19:39,249 is that if you're creating it through 559 00:19:39,250 --> 00:19:41,859 some sort of program pattern, 560 00:19:41,860 --> 00:19:43,449 it may be that it's just as easy to 561 00:19:43,450 --> 00:19:44,469 remove it again. 562 00:19:44,470 --> 00:19:47,199 So if you're kind of creating this thing 563 00:19:47,200 --> 00:19:49,269 just through sort of simple 564 00:19:49,270 --> 00:19:51,139 patterns, then maybe it's easy to filter 565 00:19:51,140 --> 00:19:52,869 it back out again. 566 00:19:52,870 --> 00:19:55,269 So the alternative perhaps is to create 567 00:19:55,270 --> 00:19:56,949 social data chaff. 568 00:19:56,950 --> 00:19:59,019 That's chaff that's kind of created 569 00:19:59,020 --> 00:20:01,089 by human activity and therefore 570 00:20:01,090 --> 00:20:03,339 much harder to predict. 571 00:20:03,340 --> 00:20:06,129 And my favorite example of that is 572 00:20:06,130 --> 00:20:07,989 the A.K. 573 00:20:07,990 --> 00:20:10,869 Extreme Computing Festival in 2002 574 00:20:10,870 --> 00:20:12,969 where they invited people to 575 00:20:12,970 --> 00:20:14,379 swap loyalty cards. 576 00:20:14,380 --> 00:20:16,449 There was a big box in the conference and 577 00:20:16,450 --> 00:20:18,399 everyone who arrived put their shopping 578 00:20:18,400 --> 00:20:19,929 loyalty cards into the box. 579 00:20:19,930 --> 00:20:21,219 And then as they left, at the end of the 580 00:20:21,220 --> 00:20:22,539 day, they took another one. 581 00:20:22,540 --> 00:20:24,519 And on their press release, they said, 582 00:20:24,520 --> 00:20:26,739 imagine the data processors bafflement 583 00:20:26,740 --> 00:20:28,869 when a healthy eating family 584 00:20:28,870 --> 00:20:31,299 of four suddenly turns into a single 33 585 00:20:31,300 --> 00:20:33,219 year old male consumes nothing but 586 00:20:33,220 --> 00:20:34,869 satsumas and ready meals. 587 00:20:34,870 --> 00:20:36,969 So, again, you know, there's this idea of 588 00:20:36,970 --> 00:20:39,069 by inserting a stranger's 589 00:20:39,070 --> 00:20:41,139 life into your own, you're 590 00:20:41,140 --> 00:20:43,509 able to complicate the the 591 00:20:43,510 --> 00:20:44,949 records that people are keeping. 592 00:20:46,300 --> 00:20:48,039 But, you know, by doing it in a social 593 00:20:48,040 --> 00:20:49,869 way, I think you kind of introduce this 594 00:20:49,870 --> 00:20:52,149 extra level of complexity. 595 00:20:52,150 --> 00:20:54,279 And I think that's what the free 596 00:20:54,280 --> 00:20:56,349 payphone is doing in a way, is it's 597 00:20:56,350 --> 00:20:58,489 offering social data 598 00:20:58,490 --> 00:21:01,149 so these strangers will 599 00:21:01,150 --> 00:21:03,189 make arbitrary calls to places that you 600 00:21:03,190 --> 00:21:04,389 weren't expecting. 601 00:21:04,390 --> 00:21:06,159 And that starts to insert this kind of 602 00:21:06,160 --> 00:21:08,349 level of deniability. 603 00:21:08,350 --> 00:21:10,839 Now, the deniability isn't perfect. 604 00:21:10,840 --> 00:21:13,269 So you are definitely in the room 605 00:21:13,270 --> 00:21:15,339 alongside this thing that offers 606 00:21:15,340 --> 00:21:18,789 this certain level of chaff. 607 00:21:18,790 --> 00:21:20,829 So people could easily point to the other 608 00:21:20,830 --> 00:21:22,149 phone calls that you made at the same 609 00:21:22,150 --> 00:21:23,259 time and say, well, those are probably 610 00:21:23,260 --> 00:21:24,879 you and these were probably strangers. 611 00:21:24,880 --> 00:21:27,069 But if you repeated this phone box 612 00:21:27,070 --> 00:21:29,409 in a number of locations and you 613 00:21:29,410 --> 00:21:31,359 put it places that you frequented often 614 00:21:31,360 --> 00:21:34,209 cafes, libraries, workplaces 615 00:21:34,210 --> 00:21:36,309 across from your home, you know, in the 616 00:21:36,310 --> 00:21:38,529 park, you can start to see 617 00:21:38,530 --> 00:21:40,599 that you could build up a regular kind 618 00:21:40,600 --> 00:21:42,759 of influx of of confusing data 619 00:21:42,760 --> 00:21:43,899 into your phone records. 620 00:21:43,900 --> 00:21:45,519 And that might have interesting 621 00:21:45,520 --> 00:21:47,679 consequences for the way that identity is 622 00:21:47,680 --> 00:21:48,680 measured. 623 00:21:51,270 --> 00:21:53,369 Critics of this, of wanting 624 00:21:53,370 --> 00:21:54,839 to do this, I've presented these two 625 00:21:54,840 --> 00:21:56,999 things, kind of some anonymity and 626 00:21:57,000 --> 00:21:59,249 some deniability is a relatively 627 00:21:59,250 --> 00:22:01,049 good things. But I think a lot of people 628 00:22:01,050 --> 00:22:03,209 would say if you have nothing to hide, 629 00:22:03,210 --> 00:22:05,489 why would you seek these things out? 630 00:22:05,490 --> 00:22:07,649 The sort of normal narrative and what 631 00:22:07,650 --> 00:22:09,179 I'd like to do next is to just sort of 632 00:22:09,180 --> 00:22:10,200 make a case for 633 00:22:11,550 --> 00:22:14,279 having deniability and having anonymity 634 00:22:14,280 --> 00:22:16,349 as being very normal historically. 635 00:22:16,350 --> 00:22:18,299 So it's not something that we're seeking 636 00:22:18,300 --> 00:22:19,649 out that's new, but something that's 637 00:22:19,650 --> 00:22:21,539 always been there that is just being 638 00:22:21,540 --> 00:22:22,679 whittled away at the moment. 639 00:22:22,680 --> 00:22:24,749 That sort of slow death of the phone 640 00:22:24,750 --> 00:22:26,939 box as it's replaced by mobile phones, 641 00:22:26,940 --> 00:22:28,589 I think demonstrates that we're moving 642 00:22:28,590 --> 00:22:30,659 away from systems of like 643 00:22:30,660 --> 00:22:34,079 everyday anonymity and communication. 644 00:22:34,080 --> 00:22:36,179 Another great example, like the phone box 645 00:22:36,180 --> 00:22:37,499 is the post box. 646 00:22:37,500 --> 00:22:40,049 So the post box is just a hole 647 00:22:40,050 --> 00:22:42,149 somewhere out in the world. 648 00:22:42,150 --> 00:22:43,349 And there's lots of them. And you can 649 00:22:43,350 --> 00:22:45,599 choose anyone and you just walk past 650 00:22:45,600 --> 00:22:47,369 it and casually slip something in. 651 00:22:47,370 --> 00:22:49,709 And there's almost no record of you doing 652 00:22:49,710 --> 00:22:51,929 that. So it creates a very similar kind 653 00:22:51,930 --> 00:22:54,059 of anonymity to the free 654 00:22:54,060 --> 00:22:55,259 payphone. 655 00:22:55,260 --> 00:22:57,329 When you post a letter, the address 656 00:22:57,330 --> 00:22:59,789 of the receiver is known in the system, 657 00:22:59,790 --> 00:23:01,919 but the identity and the address of 658 00:23:01,920 --> 00:23:03,449 the sender is a little bit more 659 00:23:03,450 --> 00:23:05,369 ambiguous. You could watch every 660 00:23:05,370 --> 00:23:07,109 post-box. You could look for writing 661 00:23:07,110 --> 00:23:08,999 style and those things that came later. 662 00:23:09,000 --> 00:23:11,069 But when postboxes started, they 663 00:23:11,070 --> 00:23:13,439 were definitely a system of anonymous 664 00:23:13,440 --> 00:23:14,249 communication. 665 00:23:14,250 --> 00:23:15,839 This one directional, anonymous 666 00:23:15,840 --> 00:23:17,429 communication. 667 00:23:17,430 --> 00:23:18,959 What effect did that have? 668 00:23:18,960 --> 00:23:21,179 Well, in the eighteen hundreds, 669 00:23:21,180 --> 00:23:23,489 there was a boom in pseudonymous. 670 00:23:23,490 --> 00:23:25,799 It was used a lot by authors, 671 00:23:25,800 --> 00:23:28,109 writing books and a number 672 00:23:28,110 --> 00:23:30,749 of different, really inventive ways. 673 00:23:30,750 --> 00:23:32,939 So the Bronte sisters 674 00:23:32,940 --> 00:23:35,219 used the postal system 675 00:23:35,220 --> 00:23:37,619 to hack the male dominated 676 00:23:37,620 --> 00:23:40,649 publishing world and publish incredibly 677 00:23:40,650 --> 00:23:43,379 inventive and creative texts 678 00:23:43,380 --> 00:23:44,759 through that system. 679 00:23:44,760 --> 00:23:46,409 And when they finally went to visit their 680 00:23:46,410 --> 00:23:48,449 publishers after they'd become a success 681 00:23:48,450 --> 00:23:50,399 and revealed the kind of big reveal that 682 00:23:50,400 --> 00:23:52,529 they were these sort of timid 683 00:23:52,530 --> 00:23:55,979 looking women authors, 684 00:23:55,980 --> 00:23:57,779 there was, of course, that kind of 685 00:23:57,780 --> 00:23:59,639 surprise in the reveal. 686 00:23:59,640 --> 00:24:01,169 And they were then able to change the 687 00:24:01,170 --> 00:24:03,029 system and build that change more 688 00:24:03,030 --> 00:24:05,549 permanently into into publishing. 689 00:24:05,550 --> 00:24:07,949 Similarly, in America, 690 00:24:07,950 --> 00:24:10,769 newspaper writers, this is Charles 691 00:24:10,770 --> 00:24:13,529 Brown who created this character, Artemus 692 00:24:13,530 --> 00:24:15,899 Ward, and he wrote newspaper articles 693 00:24:15,900 --> 00:24:17,909 under the character and really sparked 694 00:24:17,910 --> 00:24:20,249 the whole kind of era in the eighteen 695 00:24:20,250 --> 00:24:22,379 hundreds of pseudonymous 696 00:24:22,380 --> 00:24:24,509 newspaper writing that was used 697 00:24:24,510 --> 00:24:26,309 a lot for entertainment. 698 00:24:26,310 --> 00:24:28,499 Mark Twain was another pseudonym 699 00:24:28,500 --> 00:24:30,629 inspired by Artemus 700 00:24:30,630 --> 00:24:31,829 Ward. 701 00:24:31,830 --> 00:24:33,959 But the pseudonymity, as well as being 702 00:24:33,960 --> 00:24:36,869 a form of entertainment, also allowed 703 00:24:36,870 --> 00:24:39,239 political critique, critique, 704 00:24:39,240 --> 00:24:41,309 whistle blowing, all of the things 705 00:24:41,310 --> 00:24:43,889 that we associate with functioning 706 00:24:43,890 --> 00:24:46,079 anonymity and pseudonymity 707 00:24:46,080 --> 00:24:47,080 today. 708 00:24:48,930 --> 00:24:50,639 Just to give you another couple of quick 709 00:24:50,640 --> 00:24:52,650 examples, this is 710 00:24:54,870 --> 00:24:56,369 more actually 711 00:24:57,510 --> 00:24:59,939 pseudonym for Edward 712 00:24:59,940 --> 00:25:02,759 Decker, who is Dutch 713 00:25:02,760 --> 00:25:04,919 author, who used a pseudonym and 714 00:25:04,920 --> 00:25:06,929 used these kind of systems of anonymous 715 00:25:06,930 --> 00:25:09,659 communications through postage 716 00:25:09,660 --> 00:25:11,879 and passing off to 717 00:25:11,880 --> 00:25:13,349 friends. 718 00:25:13,350 --> 00:25:15,839 He created incredibly, incredibly 719 00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:18,149 cutting critique of Dutch 720 00:25:18,150 --> 00:25:20,279 colonialism that really shifted the 721 00:25:20,280 --> 00:25:22,079 conversation forward dramatically at the 722 00:25:22,080 --> 00:25:24,389 time, again, in the 723 00:25:24,390 --> 00:25:25,529 kind of late. 724 00:25:25,530 --> 00:25:26,530 Eighteen hundreds. 725 00:25:27,960 --> 00:25:28,960 But this. 726 00:25:31,370 --> 00:25:33,139 Tool of the anonymous communication 727 00:25:33,140 --> 00:25:35,809 system in the post-box also allowed 728 00:25:35,810 --> 00:25:37,909 for great creativity. 729 00:25:37,910 --> 00:25:39,889 So this is Nicolas Bourbaki. 730 00:25:39,890 --> 00:25:41,779 This is a group of mathematicians who 731 00:25:41,780 --> 00:25:44,539 came together, created a single identity 732 00:25:44,540 --> 00:25:46,639 and wrote quite a creative approach 733 00:25:46,640 --> 00:25:49,099 to set theory and mathematics, 734 00:25:49,100 --> 00:25:51,799 using, again, the anonymous communication 735 00:25:51,800 --> 00:25:53,719 afforded to them sort of a guarantee of 736 00:25:53,720 --> 00:25:56,239 anonymity to over a number of years, 737 00:25:56,240 --> 00:25:59,089 publish a series of mathematical texts 738 00:25:59,090 --> 00:26:01,729 that changed perspectives on mathematics 739 00:26:01,730 --> 00:26:04,069 at the time quite dramatically by 740 00:26:04,070 --> 00:26:05,389 kind of pooling their efforts and 741 00:26:05,390 --> 00:26:07,819 publishing under a single name. 742 00:26:07,820 --> 00:26:10,009 So the case I'm making in those 743 00:26:10,010 --> 00:26:12,079 couple of slides is that pseudonymity, 744 00:26:12,080 --> 00:26:13,999 an anonymous communication of sorts, is 745 00:26:14,000 --> 00:26:16,639 very common. And I think perhaps 746 00:26:16,640 --> 00:26:19,789 given its multitude of uses, 747 00:26:19,790 --> 00:26:21,109 I probably don't need to persuade you 748 00:26:21,110 --> 00:26:23,329 much in this room. But elsewhere, we may 749 00:26:23,330 --> 00:26:24,949 need to keep having that conversation 750 00:26:24,950 --> 00:26:27,169 about why that is a useful thing 751 00:26:27,170 --> 00:26:28,760 to keep sustaining, 752 00:26:29,870 --> 00:26:31,489 and I think that it is difficult to 753 00:26:31,490 --> 00:26:32,389 sustain it. 754 00:26:32,390 --> 00:26:34,519 This is the response to the 755 00:26:34,520 --> 00:26:37,339 now deleted tweet, which revealed 756 00:26:37,340 --> 00:26:39,169 the pseudonym that J.K. 757 00:26:39,170 --> 00:26:42,049 Rowling was using at the time 758 00:26:42,050 --> 00:26:43,939 to write crime fiction. 759 00:26:43,940 --> 00:26:46,699 And so the kind of effects of storage 760 00:26:46,700 --> 00:26:49,579 and processing and networking 761 00:26:49,580 --> 00:26:51,739 are changing the ways that pseudonyms 762 00:26:51,740 --> 00:26:53,929 can work. And so I think it's important 763 00:26:53,930 --> 00:26:55,999 for us to keep investigating as the 764 00:26:56,000 --> 00:26:58,039 talks in the last two days have started 765 00:26:58,040 --> 00:27:00,169 to pull apart, how 766 00:27:00,170 --> 00:27:02,989 we can maintain levels of anonymity 767 00:27:02,990 --> 00:27:05,389 in terms of communication, in social 768 00:27:05,390 --> 00:27:07,489 context to keep the 769 00:27:07,490 --> 00:27:09,559 possibilities of of doing this 770 00:27:09,560 --> 00:27:10,549 open. 771 00:27:10,550 --> 00:27:12,169 Why do we need that? 772 00:27:12,170 --> 00:27:13,819 Well, the case doesn't really need to be 773 00:27:13,820 --> 00:27:15,919 made, but clearly, 774 00:27:15,920 --> 00:27:18,199 anonymity and pseudonymity player, 775 00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:20,299 a continuous role in 776 00:27:20,300 --> 00:27:21,889 the kind of powerful work of 777 00:27:21,890 --> 00:27:23,389 whistleblowing, particularly 778 00:27:23,390 --> 00:27:25,609 whistleblowing, is primary evidence like 779 00:27:25,610 --> 00:27:27,679 the evidence of of 780 00:27:27,680 --> 00:27:29,720 torture in Abu Ghraib. 781 00:27:31,310 --> 00:27:32,310 And 782 00:27:33,830 --> 00:27:36,109 the role 783 00:27:36,110 --> 00:27:38,269 of these tools in the kind of work 784 00:27:38,270 --> 00:27:40,429 of superheroes is is important for 785 00:27:40,430 --> 00:27:42,559 us to be celebrating and thinking about 786 00:27:42,560 --> 00:27:44,869 what we do next in terms of the technical 787 00:27:44,870 --> 00:27:46,699 tools, but also the culture that 788 00:27:46,700 --> 00:27:48,079 surrounds the tool, the way that we 789 00:27:48,080 --> 00:27:49,279 present it to people. 790 00:27:49,280 --> 00:27:50,449 And that's what I want to talk about 791 00:27:50,450 --> 00:27:51,450 next. 792 00:27:52,070 --> 00:27:54,589 So this is the advice published 793 00:27:54,590 --> 00:27:56,719 a couple of years ago in Wired of how 794 00:27:56,720 --> 00:27:58,069 to leaked to the press. 795 00:27:58,070 --> 00:27:59,659 And the piece that I want to point to in 796 00:27:59,660 --> 00:28:01,759 the middle is when you go to 797 00:28:01,760 --> 00:28:04,189 a coffee shop that has open Wi-Fi 798 00:28:04,190 --> 00:28:06,289 and then you set up an email account 799 00:28:06,290 --> 00:28:08,749 and do your leaking 800 00:28:08,750 --> 00:28:10,859 now coffee shops with open Wi-Fi, 801 00:28:10,860 --> 00:28:12,559 the other things that turn up quite often 802 00:28:12,560 --> 00:28:15,859 are libraries with public access, 803 00:28:15,860 --> 00:28:18,619 free Wi-Fi, civic Wi-Fi, 804 00:28:18,620 --> 00:28:19,759 campus Wi-Fi. 805 00:28:19,760 --> 00:28:21,709 Sometimes those things get discussed as 806 00:28:21,710 --> 00:28:24,289 the ways that you can do 807 00:28:24,290 --> 00:28:26,149 what you used to do with a phone box, go 808 00:28:26,150 --> 00:28:28,339 and tip off a journalist or 809 00:28:29,570 --> 00:28:31,249 the police about something you want to 810 00:28:31,250 --> 00:28:33,049 tell them about without necessarily 811 00:28:33,050 --> 00:28:34,099 identifying yourself. 812 00:28:34,100 --> 00:28:36,019 The narrative is now around these places 813 00:28:36,020 --> 00:28:37,879 that have free Wi-Fi. 814 00:28:37,880 --> 00:28:40,309 But over time, what I'm seeing is a shift 815 00:28:40,310 --> 00:28:42,769 in the control of 816 00:28:42,770 --> 00:28:45,649 identity around connecting to the web 817 00:28:45,650 --> 00:28:47,719 in the UK, the library 818 00:28:47,720 --> 00:28:50,029 log in, the campus log in, and more 819 00:28:50,030 --> 00:28:52,519 and more obligation on businesses 820 00:28:52,520 --> 00:28:55,399 and private owners of of Wi-Fi 821 00:28:55,400 --> 00:28:57,619 are that you need to check identity 822 00:28:57,620 --> 00:28:59,569 before you allow someone to connect. 823 00:28:59,570 --> 00:29:01,789 And so the conversation 824 00:29:01,790 --> 00:29:04,489 about the public benefit of free Wi-Fi 825 00:29:04,490 --> 00:29:05,720 versus this kind of 826 00:29:08,450 --> 00:29:10,879 shifting of responsibility and closing 827 00:29:10,880 --> 00:29:13,549 down of access to anonymous 828 00:29:13,550 --> 00:29:15,739 connectivity seems to be kind 829 00:29:15,740 --> 00:29:19,219 of shifting in favor of of no anonymity, 830 00:29:19,220 --> 00:29:21,409 which is problematic are public 831 00:29:21,410 --> 00:29:24,499 spaces are sort of being stripped of 832 00:29:24,500 --> 00:29:26,689 the kind of messiness that allows 833 00:29:26,690 --> 00:29:28,069 all of those things we've just talked 834 00:29:28,070 --> 00:29:30,589 about in terms of creativity and critique 835 00:29:30,590 --> 00:29:32,839 to happen by kind of locking down 836 00:29:32,840 --> 00:29:35,149 identity to every kind of access 837 00:29:35,150 --> 00:29:37,219 point to this kind of immense, 838 00:29:37,220 --> 00:29:38,689 interesting space that we call the 839 00:29:38,690 --> 00:29:39,690 Internet and the Web. 840 00:29:41,070 --> 00:29:43,199 And so what I would say is 841 00:29:43,200 --> 00:29:45,629 that this demonization of 842 00:29:45,630 --> 00:29:48,779 of anonymity when it works is 843 00:29:48,780 --> 00:29:50,249 is always going to happen. 844 00:29:50,250 --> 00:29:52,589 So the problem 845 00:29:52,590 --> 00:29:54,899 is that any functioning pseudonymity 846 00:29:54,900 --> 00:29:57,179 tool can always 847 00:29:57,180 --> 00:29:59,369 be used as a threat against 848 00:29:59,370 --> 00:30:01,169 powerful corporations and governments 849 00:30:01,170 --> 00:30:02,729 that know they're doing wrong, those that 850 00:30:02,730 --> 00:30:05,009 are. And so there will always 851 00:30:05,010 --> 00:30:07,109 be a conscious and subconscious attempt 852 00:30:07,110 --> 00:30:09,329 to demonize those technologies, whatever 853 00:30:09,330 --> 00:30:10,889 they are originally designed for. 854 00:30:10,890 --> 00:30:12,629 And so there's this constant kind of 855 00:30:12,630 --> 00:30:14,789 issue about the way that you 856 00:30:14,790 --> 00:30:17,609 describe and present the pseudonymous 857 00:30:17,610 --> 00:30:19,649 and anonymous tools that you're making 858 00:30:19,650 --> 00:30:21,929 for communication in terms of trying 859 00:30:21,930 --> 00:30:23,849 to present them in ways that won't be 860 00:30:23,850 --> 00:30:24,850 demonized. 861 00:30:26,770 --> 00:30:28,909 And so, really, for me, that comes 862 00:30:28,910 --> 00:30:30,579 this idea of how do you design for 863 00:30:30,580 --> 00:30:33,159 pseudonymity sort of alongside 864 00:30:33,160 --> 00:30:35,619 the idea of creating technical tools 865 00:30:35,620 --> 00:30:37,959 through cryptography that allow 866 00:30:37,960 --> 00:30:40,029 for anonymous communication. 867 00:30:40,030 --> 00:30:41,769 How do you design the sort of culture 868 00:30:41,770 --> 00:30:43,839 around it, the cafe of people who are 869 00:30:43,840 --> 00:30:45,849 sharing their phone minutes to allow 870 00:30:45,850 --> 00:30:47,199 anonymity to happen? 871 00:30:47,200 --> 00:30:49,299 How do you make that space acceptable to 872 00:30:49,300 --> 00:30:51,489 people so it can be sustained and 873 00:30:51,490 --> 00:30:53,109 be ongoing? 874 00:30:53,110 --> 00:30:55,239 And I don't think the superhero 875 00:30:55,240 --> 00:30:56,709 analogy that I've pitched at the 876 00:30:56,710 --> 00:30:58,719 beginning of this talk and through it is 877 00:30:58,720 --> 00:31:00,429 really the one to draw on, because that's 878 00:31:00,430 --> 00:31:02,499 just the other extreme to the 879 00:31:02,500 --> 00:31:03,999 terrorists and the pedophiles. 880 00:31:04,000 --> 00:31:05,829 It's just kind of we sort of end up 881 00:31:05,830 --> 00:31:07,659 having this debate at either end of the 882 00:31:07,660 --> 00:31:09,549 spectrum. And really, we should be in the 883 00:31:09,550 --> 00:31:11,619 middle somewhere around all of those 884 00:31:11,620 --> 00:31:13,719 issues from the past, around sort of 885 00:31:13,720 --> 00:31:15,939 everyday use the just kind of general 886 00:31:15,940 --> 00:31:18,099 dependance on these tools as something 887 00:31:18,100 --> 00:31:20,199 that's a useful part of our society. 888 00:31:22,030 --> 00:31:24,129 And that, as someone mentioned, I 889 00:31:24,130 --> 00:31:26,259 think it was Nadia Henninger 890 00:31:26,260 --> 00:31:28,809 yesterday, she said we need to normalize 891 00:31:28,810 --> 00:31:29,799 burner phones. 892 00:31:29,800 --> 00:31:31,419 And, you know, even the term burner 893 00:31:31,420 --> 00:31:32,919 phones is sort of appealing to the 894 00:31:32,920 --> 00:31:35,379 subcultures of the conversations 895 00:31:35,380 --> 00:31:36,999 we have here, rather than kind of 896 00:31:37,000 --> 00:31:38,709 thinking about how it would fit into 897 00:31:38,710 --> 00:31:39,779 everyday use. 898 00:31:39,780 --> 00:31:41,919 But the idea of normalizing, I think, is 899 00:31:41,920 --> 00:31:42,969 an interesting one. 900 00:31:42,970 --> 00:31:45,429 One way to do that is to be playful. 901 00:31:45,430 --> 00:31:47,559 But then place play can also be 902 00:31:47,560 --> 00:31:49,119 sort of pushed to the sidelines. 903 00:31:49,120 --> 00:31:51,639 And so the kind of hacker narrative 904 00:31:51,640 --> 00:31:53,289 can be quite playful. 905 00:31:53,290 --> 00:31:55,419 The art narrative that I used to present 906 00:31:55,420 --> 00:31:57,189 this idea originally also sort of 907 00:31:57,190 --> 00:31:58,689 struggles a little bit from that. 908 00:31:58,690 --> 00:32:00,549 You know, people can sign a sideline. 909 00:32:00,550 --> 00:32:01,689 It is just art. 910 00:32:01,690 --> 00:32:03,579 And really the question is how do we put 911 00:32:03,580 --> 00:32:05,439 it into the everyday? 912 00:32:05,440 --> 00:32:07,659 So first of all, what do we love 913 00:32:07,660 --> 00:32:09,669 about phone boxes? 914 00:32:09,670 --> 00:32:11,469 The thing that I think phone boxes 915 00:32:11,470 --> 00:32:13,719 represent to us is, is it is a 916 00:32:13,720 --> 00:32:16,329 space to escape momentarily. 917 00:32:16,330 --> 00:32:18,189 You're still part of the public space. 918 00:32:18,190 --> 00:32:20,409 It's not a dark box, kind of sealed 919 00:32:20,410 --> 00:32:21,339 away entirely. 920 00:32:21,340 --> 00:32:23,709 You can see what's going on around you, 921 00:32:23,710 --> 00:32:25,989 but you also have some privacy 922 00:32:25,990 --> 00:32:26,990 for a moment. 923 00:32:27,880 --> 00:32:29,619 There often feature in films as a 924 00:32:29,620 --> 00:32:30,969 connection to a loved one, 925 00:32:32,200 --> 00:32:33,519 something you use when you've just 926 00:32:33,520 --> 00:32:35,739 arrived somewhere new, a connection back 927 00:32:35,740 --> 00:32:37,959 to the known there, a sort 928 00:32:37,960 --> 00:32:40,269 of universally familiar. 929 00:32:40,270 --> 00:32:42,819 And a lot of countries have sustained 930 00:32:42,820 --> 00:32:45,429 that by having policies that enforce 931 00:32:45,430 --> 00:32:47,409 phone boxes being in all parts of the 932 00:32:47,410 --> 00:32:49,989 country. So it's sort of a common good 933 00:32:49,990 --> 00:32:51,160 almost by design. 934 00:32:52,450 --> 00:32:54,549 And they're also, you 935 00:32:54,550 --> 00:32:56,229 know, actually reasonably private. 936 00:32:56,230 --> 00:32:58,629 So, you know, there is some sound leakage 937 00:32:58,630 --> 00:33:00,909 and technology in terms of spying 938 00:33:00,910 --> 00:33:02,769 might change our relationship to those 939 00:33:02,770 --> 00:33:03,759 physical spaces. 940 00:33:03,760 --> 00:33:06,309 But historically, they were a relatively 941 00:33:06,310 --> 00:33:08,409 private space, a door you can close, 942 00:33:08,410 --> 00:33:09,819 a space that you make your own. 943 00:33:11,900 --> 00:33:13,869 I want to represent both sides to what we 944 00:33:13,870 --> 00:33:15,549 dislike about phone boxes. 945 00:33:15,550 --> 00:33:18,219 Well, I think one issue is 946 00:33:18,220 --> 00:33:20,349 that they are often broken 947 00:33:20,350 --> 00:33:22,959 and so they're so undependable 948 00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:24,519 resources. 949 00:33:24,520 --> 00:33:26,859 Another one is that they 950 00:33:26,860 --> 00:33:28,599 might contain sex adverts. 951 00:33:28,600 --> 00:33:30,759 If you go to London, the phone box 952 00:33:30,760 --> 00:33:32,079 is in the center of town near the 953 00:33:32,080 --> 00:33:34,269 business district to sort of smid with 954 00:33:34,270 --> 00:33:36,489 the glue of many years of adverts 955 00:33:36,490 --> 00:33:38,439 for phone sex. 956 00:33:38,440 --> 00:33:41,139 And they're also 957 00:33:41,140 --> 00:33:43,299 sometimes they smell of urine, 958 00:33:43,300 --> 00:33:45,069 which, you know, to begin with seems like 959 00:33:45,070 --> 00:33:47,139 a terrible feature, but perhaps sort 960 00:33:47,140 --> 00:33:49,059 of suggests that people find them private 961 00:33:49,060 --> 00:33:50,619 enough that you can do that private 962 00:33:50,620 --> 00:33:51,939 thing. 963 00:33:51,940 --> 00:33:53,379 So, you know, maybe that's a feature in 964 00:33:53,380 --> 00:33:54,380 disguise. 965 00:33:55,420 --> 00:33:57,129 And also, historically, occasionally 966 00:33:57,130 --> 00:33:59,349 they've been linked to bomb threats. 967 00:33:59,350 --> 00:34:01,209 You know, the anonymous tip off can also 968 00:34:01,210 --> 00:34:03,069 be the anonymous bomb threat, which, 969 00:34:03,070 --> 00:34:04,989 again, we can think in the analogy to the 970 00:34:04,990 --> 00:34:07,149 remailer reason that a number 971 00:34:07,150 --> 00:34:09,249 of matters were shut down was through 972 00:34:09,250 --> 00:34:10,869 this kind of connection to bomb threats. 973 00:34:10,870 --> 00:34:12,339 And so we have to struggle with this 974 00:34:12,340 --> 00:34:14,979 relationship with how technologies 975 00:34:14,980 --> 00:34:16,570 and systems are presented. 976 00:34:18,310 --> 00:34:19,988 And the direction that I think we should 977 00:34:19,989 --> 00:34:22,209 go is to 978 00:34:22,210 --> 00:34:24,609 think about this in terms of social 979 00:34:24,610 --> 00:34:26,409 use and public space. 980 00:34:27,670 --> 00:34:29,769 So one thing that 981 00:34:29,770 --> 00:34:32,049 I like about the idea of rather 982 00:34:32,050 --> 00:34:34,269 than talking about free Wi-Fi, and 983 00:34:34,270 --> 00:34:36,488 there've been a number of very admirable 984 00:34:36,489 --> 00:34:38,529 and in some ways, you know, reasonably 985 00:34:38,530 --> 00:34:40,509 successful projects over the years to 986 00:34:40,510 --> 00:34:41,979 open up Wi-Fi network. 987 00:34:41,980 --> 00:34:43,959 That's one that was launched this year or 988 00:34:43,960 --> 00:34:46,059 last year. That, again, is attempting to 989 00:34:46,060 --> 00:34:48,129 make home networks a 990 00:34:48,130 --> 00:34:50,979 free, open Wi-Fi system. 991 00:34:50,980 --> 00:34:52,658 And I you know, I think that's the 992 00:34:52,659 --> 00:34:54,189 direction we should be going. 993 00:34:54,190 --> 00:34:56,619 But to have that conversation with people 994 00:34:56,620 --> 00:34:59,559 who are just coming to Wi-Fi as a concept 995 00:34:59,560 --> 00:35:01,869 through the the use of their 996 00:35:01,870 --> 00:35:04,179 iPhone for the first time, 997 00:35:04,180 --> 00:35:06,159 I'm talking about free Wi-Fi. 998 00:35:06,160 --> 00:35:08,409 The the the fear that a stranger 999 00:35:08,410 --> 00:35:10,629 will hide outside your house and 1000 00:35:10,630 --> 00:35:12,789 use it for nefarious 1001 00:35:12,790 --> 00:35:14,949 means is always going to outweigh 1002 00:35:14,950 --> 00:35:17,019 outweigh the altruism of 1003 00:35:17,020 --> 00:35:19,299 of wanting to to do some sort of public 1004 00:35:19,300 --> 00:35:21,369 good. But if we talk about phone 1005 00:35:21,370 --> 00:35:23,769 calls rather than data, 1006 00:35:23,770 --> 00:35:25,059 should we talk about lending? 1007 00:35:25,060 --> 00:35:27,399 A stranger, your phone, that is 1008 00:35:27,400 --> 00:35:29,649 still a reasonably socially acceptable 1009 00:35:29,650 --> 00:35:31,749 thing to do if someone comes 1010 00:35:31,750 --> 00:35:34,329 up to you and asks, you know, I'm stuck 1011 00:35:34,330 --> 00:35:36,729 and I need to contact home, lending 1012 00:35:36,730 --> 00:35:38,859 them your phone seems reasonable. 1013 00:35:38,860 --> 00:35:40,539 It's still a thing that socially we 1014 00:35:40,540 --> 00:35:41,559 accept as a group. 1015 00:35:41,560 --> 00:35:43,239 And so we can play with the fact that 1016 00:35:43,240 --> 00:35:45,759 although phone calls are now just data 1017 00:35:45,760 --> 00:35:48,129 like any other kind of data, 1018 00:35:48,130 --> 00:35:50,349 the fact that we socially hold those in 1019 00:35:50,350 --> 00:35:51,999 higher regard than we do the other kinds 1020 00:35:52,000 --> 00:35:54,519 of data in terms of lending and giving 1021 00:35:54,520 --> 00:35:56,829 and altruism, I think allows 1022 00:35:56,830 --> 00:35:57,939 us to have a different kind of 1023 00:35:57,940 --> 00:35:59,799 conversation. But I think something like 1024 00:35:59,800 --> 00:36:02,169 this free phone by phone box project 1025 00:36:02,170 --> 00:36:04,269 does is allow us to to go in 1026 00:36:04,270 --> 00:36:05,270 that direction 1027 00:36:06,730 --> 00:36:07,730 and. 1028 00:36:10,900 --> 00:36:12,999 The other thing that I think 1029 00:36:13,000 --> 00:36:15,249 the phone example does 1030 00:36:15,250 --> 00:36:17,229 is it raises in our minds this idea of 1031 00:36:17,230 --> 00:36:18,699 digital possessions. 1032 00:36:18,700 --> 00:36:20,979 So advertising and 1033 00:36:20,980 --> 00:36:23,679 contract packages 1034 00:36:23,680 --> 00:36:25,989 by mobile phones over the last 1035 00:36:25,990 --> 00:36:28,839 few years have focused heavily on 1036 00:36:28,840 --> 00:36:31,119 giving you free minutes, like free 1037 00:36:31,120 --> 00:36:33,639 minutes and free texts being part 1038 00:36:33,640 --> 00:36:35,829 of what you're getting for paying 1039 00:36:35,830 --> 00:36:37,149 this monthly fee. 1040 00:36:37,150 --> 00:36:39,279 And what's that? What that has done is 1041 00:36:39,280 --> 00:36:41,559 emphasized the idea that this kind 1042 00:36:41,560 --> 00:36:43,749 of abstract sort of 1043 00:36:43,750 --> 00:36:45,939 digital. No, you know, because 1044 00:36:45,940 --> 00:36:48,159 basically providing text, for example, 1045 00:36:48,160 --> 00:36:49,599 is very cheap for the network, but 1046 00:36:49,600 --> 00:36:51,819 they've kind of sort of 1047 00:36:51,820 --> 00:36:53,889 walled it off and created a piece 1048 00:36:53,890 --> 00:36:55,509 of property that they've then given to 1049 00:36:55,510 --> 00:36:56,510 you. 1050 00:36:56,830 --> 00:36:58,509 And possession's, I think, is a much 1051 00:36:58,510 --> 00:36:59,719 better word than property. 1052 00:36:59,720 --> 00:37:01,779 So the intellectual property debate is 1053 00:37:01,780 --> 00:37:03,879 bound up in control systems 1054 00:37:03,880 --> 00:37:07,029 of corporate control 1055 00:37:07,030 --> 00:37:09,159 on everyday use. 1056 00:37:09,160 --> 00:37:11,049 But possessions are much more personal. 1057 00:37:11,050 --> 00:37:12,759 And we have this conversation about your 1058 00:37:12,760 --> 00:37:14,409 possessions, your free minutes and what 1059 00:37:14,410 --> 00:37:15,519 you want to do with them. 1060 00:37:15,520 --> 00:37:16,899 I think we start to have a quite an 1061 00:37:16,900 --> 00:37:19,089 interesting conversation about kind 1062 00:37:19,090 --> 00:37:21,429 of control and use of technology 1063 00:37:21,430 --> 00:37:23,289 now, I'm sure buried in many 1064 00:37:24,310 --> 00:37:26,499 phone contracts, if not now, than if this 1065 00:37:26,500 --> 00:37:28,629 free payphone idea caught on would be 1066 00:37:28,630 --> 00:37:31,149 this clause that said you can't just give 1067 00:37:31,150 --> 00:37:33,219 your free minutes over to 1068 00:37:33,220 --> 00:37:34,899 a system that gives them to someone else 1069 00:37:34,900 --> 00:37:36,639 because they're not actually yours in the 1070 00:37:36,640 --> 00:37:37,839 minds of a phone company. 1071 00:37:37,840 --> 00:37:39,459 They're just a kind of a law. 1072 00:37:39,460 --> 00:37:41,799 But they still they feel very much 1073 00:37:41,800 --> 00:37:43,929 like yours, like your possessions, 1074 00:37:43,930 --> 00:37:45,519 and they do to a lot of people. 1075 00:37:45,520 --> 00:37:47,079 So I think there's an interesting kind of 1076 00:37:47,080 --> 00:37:49,239 tool there to enter this debate 1077 00:37:49,240 --> 00:37:51,339 around control of 1078 00:37:51,340 --> 00:37:53,019 digital technology. 1079 00:37:53,020 --> 00:37:55,569 That kind of narrative, I think extends 1080 00:37:55,570 --> 00:37:56,699 quite nicely. 1081 00:37:56,700 --> 00:37:59,619 Now, the phone lending, 1082 00:37:59,620 --> 00:38:01,089 there's definitely a higher level of 1083 00:38:01,090 --> 00:38:03,789 altruism, but people also have 1084 00:38:03,790 --> 00:38:06,249 fears about phone lending 1085 00:38:06,250 --> 00:38:08,319 and the kind of standard fare, I 1086 00:38:08,320 --> 00:38:10,599 think, which is probably quite 1087 00:38:10,600 --> 00:38:12,459 right in this kind of context, is if you 1088 00:38:12,460 --> 00:38:14,289 hand someone your phone, you're handing 1089 00:38:14,290 --> 00:38:15,999 them all of your personal data. 1090 00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:18,309 And so I think, again, 1091 00:38:18,310 --> 00:38:20,379 this idea of a pay phone 1092 00:38:20,380 --> 00:38:22,509 that arbitrates in that process, you're 1093 00:38:22,510 --> 00:38:24,639 lending someone your phone without 1094 00:38:24,640 --> 00:38:27,279 handing over the physical artifact 1095 00:38:27,280 --> 00:38:29,349 and an access to your personal 1096 00:38:29,350 --> 00:38:30,639 information. 1097 00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:31,929 I'm sorry, this is running a little bit 1098 00:38:31,930 --> 00:38:34,059 slow, I think sort of 1099 00:38:34,060 --> 00:38:36,339 detracts a little bit from 1100 00:38:36,340 --> 00:38:38,109 from the experience. 1101 00:38:39,160 --> 00:38:41,139 But I think we can 1102 00:38:42,460 --> 00:38:44,529 use the the 1103 00:38:44,530 --> 00:38:46,749 strong sort of feeling 1104 00:38:46,750 --> 00:38:49,359 of people's perspectives on 1105 00:38:49,360 --> 00:38:51,459 phone lending to outweigh these kind 1106 00:38:51,460 --> 00:38:53,859 of niggling fears to a certain extent. 1107 00:38:56,440 --> 00:38:58,659 And so the questions really that 1108 00:38:58,660 --> 00:39:00,070 we come to is 1109 00:39:01,540 --> 00:39:03,579 creating a free phone box that's 1110 00:39:03,580 --> 00:39:06,219 sustained by a room full of people 1111 00:39:06,220 --> 00:39:08,589 opens up a conversation about digital 1112 00:39:08,590 --> 00:39:11,139 access and communication that includes 1113 00:39:11,140 --> 00:39:12,669 these elements of anonymity and 1114 00:39:12,670 --> 00:39:14,889 deniability with 1115 00:39:14,890 --> 00:39:16,839 a much larger community of people. 1116 00:39:16,840 --> 00:39:18,519 If you install the phone in the right 1117 00:39:18,520 --> 00:39:20,799 place in a in a in 1118 00:39:20,800 --> 00:39:23,439 a popular use park 1119 00:39:23,440 --> 00:39:26,829 or cafe or library, 1120 00:39:26,830 --> 00:39:29,049 the benefits of providing 1121 00:39:29,050 --> 00:39:31,479 free phone calls and have a community 1122 00:39:31,480 --> 00:39:33,579 sustaining a resource together, 1123 00:39:33,580 --> 00:39:35,979 I think quite easily outweigh in people's 1124 00:39:35,980 --> 00:39:38,560 minds the kind of niggling fears. 1125 00:39:39,760 --> 00:39:41,439 What I'm interested in proposing this 1126 00:39:41,440 --> 00:39:43,719 project here today is how people might 1127 00:39:43,720 --> 00:39:46,299 counter that, how this kind of inevitable 1128 00:39:46,300 --> 00:39:47,949 demonization might happen. 1129 00:39:47,950 --> 00:39:50,049 I'm kind of interested in studying how 1130 00:39:50,050 --> 00:39:51,579 that conversation will go. 1131 00:39:51,580 --> 00:39:53,079 The direction that I've thought about 1132 00:39:53,080 --> 00:39:54,639 already is the obvious one. 1133 00:39:54,640 --> 00:39:57,879 Someone walks into this space, 1134 00:39:57,880 --> 00:40:00,009 uses the free payphone to place 1135 00:40:00,010 --> 00:40:02,079 a bomb scare, and that starts 1136 00:40:02,080 --> 00:40:04,419 to kind of cut away at this idea 1137 00:40:04,420 --> 00:40:05,709 that we're just creating this common 1138 00:40:05,710 --> 00:40:07,869 good. But I think there's an interesting 1139 00:40:07,870 --> 00:40:09,969 balance in the fact that Bluetooth 1140 00:40:09,970 --> 00:40:12,159 has the short range, which 1141 00:40:12,160 --> 00:40:14,499 means that it becomes a sort of social 1142 00:40:14,500 --> 00:40:15,729 negotiation. 1143 00:40:15,730 --> 00:40:17,799 So just like using a payphone on a street 1144 00:40:17,800 --> 00:40:19,989 corner, although you're anonymous, you're 1145 00:40:19,990 --> 00:40:21,129 also on view. 1146 00:40:21,130 --> 00:40:23,019 And so there's kind of a form of 1147 00:40:23,020 --> 00:40:25,329 anonymity that's not absolute. 1148 00:40:25,330 --> 00:40:27,459 Often when we think about 1149 00:40:27,460 --> 00:40:30,009 cryptography, it's it's very binary. 1150 00:40:30,010 --> 00:40:32,469 It either works or it's totally broken. 1151 00:40:32,470 --> 00:40:34,719 And I think by placing these tools 1152 00:40:34,720 --> 00:40:36,939 back into a social negotiation, 1153 00:40:36,940 --> 00:40:39,099 something interesting happens that 1154 00:40:39,100 --> 00:40:40,599 I'd be interested to try and see whether 1155 00:40:40,600 --> 00:40:42,849 we could map that to other 1156 00:40:42,850 --> 00:40:44,919 sort of environments and communication 1157 00:40:44,920 --> 00:40:45,920 systems. 1158 00:40:47,590 --> 00:40:49,659 The kind of two other ideas that sort of 1159 00:40:49,660 --> 00:40:51,999 sprung to mind for me from 1160 00:40:52,000 --> 00:40:54,159 this idea of altruism 1161 00:40:54,160 --> 00:40:56,379 is taking that idea of charitable giving 1162 00:40:56,380 --> 00:40:58,779 further. So in terms 1163 00:40:58,780 --> 00:41:00,849 of kind of deconstructing the way 1164 00:41:00,850 --> 00:41:02,859 that digital identity seems to be more 1165 00:41:02,860 --> 00:41:04,989 and more sort of stuck 1166 00:41:04,990 --> 00:41:07,329 into these kind of network systems 1167 00:41:07,330 --> 00:41:09,549 and archives, one 1168 00:41:09,550 --> 00:41:11,649 of them is to ask the question, what 1169 00:41:11,650 --> 00:41:13,779 does anonymous charitable giving look 1170 00:41:13,780 --> 00:41:16,599 like? So if if you 1171 00:41:16,600 --> 00:41:18,699 want to, as people do now and 1172 00:41:18,700 --> 00:41:20,799 have for hundreds of years, donate to 1173 00:41:20,800 --> 00:41:22,929 a cause without saying who you 1174 00:41:22,930 --> 00:41:25,359 are, you have to strip away your identity 1175 00:41:25,360 --> 00:41:27,909 from that financial transaction. 1176 00:41:27,910 --> 00:41:29,559 And all of the records that have been put 1177 00:41:29,560 --> 00:41:31,090 in place to track 1178 00:41:32,560 --> 00:41:34,779 money start to 1179 00:41:34,780 --> 00:41:36,459 kind of come up against this sort of 1180 00:41:36,460 --> 00:41:37,839 tradition of charitable giving. 1181 00:41:37,840 --> 00:41:39,249 And I think it's a good case where you 1182 00:41:39,250 --> 00:41:41,469 could take the upper hand by asking 1183 00:41:41,470 --> 00:41:43,779 how do we still give anonymously 1184 00:41:43,780 --> 00:41:45,339 to charities? 1185 00:41:45,340 --> 00:41:47,529 The other question I want to leave us 1186 00:41:47,530 --> 00:41:49,839 with is 1187 00:41:49,840 --> 00:41:51,519 how do you give to people who have 1188 00:41:51,520 --> 00:41:53,649 nothing, including any form 1189 00:41:53,650 --> 00:41:55,209 of authentication? 1190 00:41:55,210 --> 00:41:57,429 So at the moment, giving things to people 1191 00:41:57,430 --> 00:41:59,739 who live on the streets or have lost 1192 00:41:59,740 --> 00:42:01,839 everything is quite easy 1193 00:42:01,840 --> 00:42:03,489 because you can just give them physical 1194 00:42:03,490 --> 00:42:05,049 things. You could give them money. 1195 00:42:05,050 --> 00:42:06,639 That's an anonymous currency that they 1196 00:42:06,640 --> 00:42:07,989 can spend somewhere else. 1197 00:42:07,990 --> 00:42:10,179 But if we bind money 1198 00:42:10,180 --> 00:42:12,939 and resources and access to 1199 00:42:12,940 --> 00:42:15,459 welfare and benefits into identity 1200 00:42:15,460 --> 00:42:17,709 systems, how do we maintain giving 1201 00:42:17,710 --> 00:42:19,869 to people who've lost access to those? 1202 00:42:19,870 --> 00:42:21,249 We can talk about biometric 1203 00:42:21,250 --> 00:42:23,229 fingerprinting, but I think that 1204 00:42:23,230 --> 00:42:25,359 conversation, again, provides the upper 1205 00:42:25,360 --> 00:42:25,689 hand. 1206 00:42:25,690 --> 00:42:27,819 And for me, this talk has 1207 00:42:27,820 --> 00:42:30,129 been about learning about 1208 00:42:30,130 --> 00:42:32,229 what kind of social context could 1209 00:42:32,230 --> 00:42:35,439 you create in order to 1210 00:42:35,440 --> 00:42:36,819 talk about the things that we're talking 1211 00:42:36,820 --> 00:42:38,589 about every day and these kind of 1212 00:42:38,590 --> 00:42:40,299 contacts and these kind of conferences 1213 00:42:40,300 --> 00:42:42,729 about anonymity and about pseudonymity 1214 00:42:42,730 --> 00:42:44,859 working well, but placing them into 1215 00:42:44,860 --> 00:42:46,389 a social context. 1216 00:42:46,390 --> 00:42:47,390 Thank you very much. 1217 00:42:54,570 --> 00:42:56,669 So thank you very much 1218 00:42:56,670 --> 00:42:58,500 and I have to say something. 1219 00:42:59,550 --> 00:43:01,169 The Irish Sea and the Internet and 1220 00:43:01,170 --> 00:43:03,269 Twitter want to say a 1221 00:43:03,270 --> 00:43:05,519 big thank you to you and to tell you this 1222 00:43:05,520 --> 00:43:07,139 talk was awesome. 1223 00:43:07,140 --> 00:43:09,190 So one thing. 1224 00:43:12,400 --> 00:43:14,709 The thing that was often 1225 00:43:14,710 --> 00:43:17,039 noticed, your T-shirt is awesome, 1226 00:43:18,730 --> 00:43:19,989 thanks, I see. 1227 00:43:19,990 --> 00:43:23,379 So for our Q&A, we have 1228 00:43:23,380 --> 00:43:25,449 a lot of questions from the Internet 1229 00:43:25,450 --> 00:43:27,699 and maybe we have some questions from 1230 00:43:27,700 --> 00:43:30,099 here. So line up behind the microphones 1231 00:43:30,100 --> 00:43:31,389 where we stop off some Internet 1232 00:43:31,390 --> 00:43:32,390 questions. 1233 00:43:34,260 --> 00:43:36,999 Hello again from the IOC. 1234 00:43:37,000 --> 00:43:38,919 Besides being an awesome talk, there are 1235 00:43:38,920 --> 00:43:41,199 many, many questions on all 1236 00:43:41,200 --> 00:43:43,269 levels, like practical questions 1237 00:43:43,270 --> 00:43:45,429 on how it does work, but also on law 1238 00:43:45,430 --> 00:43:47,829 and like politics behind it. 1239 00:43:47,830 --> 00:43:50,889 So I start with the more technical ones 1240 00:43:50,890 --> 00:43:52,989 and maybe just 1241 00:43:52,990 --> 00:43:55,089 some summing them up so you can 1242 00:43:55,090 --> 00:43:57,399 just explain the technology behind 1243 00:43:57,400 --> 00:44:00,129 it a little bit together. 1244 00:44:00,130 --> 00:44:02,289 Like they ask whether it's 1245 00:44:02,290 --> 00:44:04,359 possible to always not 1246 00:44:04,360 --> 00:44:06,489 send the caller ID 1247 00:44:06,490 --> 00:44:08,619 from the person who bought the 1248 00:44:08,620 --> 00:44:10,959 phone or the phone minutes. 1249 00:44:10,960 --> 00:44:12,819 Whether it's possible to also share 1250 00:44:12,820 --> 00:44:14,919 international calls of the 1251 00:44:14,920 --> 00:44:17,139 contracts, allow it, 1252 00:44:17,140 --> 00:44:19,989 whether there's a limit for the minutes 1253 00:44:19,990 --> 00:44:22,359 somebody wants to share and 1254 00:44:22,360 --> 00:44:24,609 whether they have to activate it every 1255 00:44:24,610 --> 00:44:25,749 time. 1256 00:44:25,750 --> 00:44:27,039 Yeah, that's. 1257 00:44:27,040 --> 00:44:28,290 Yeah. Okay. So 1258 00:44:29,470 --> 00:44:31,539 the perring, what 1259 00:44:31,540 --> 00:44:33,940 I did with the Python scripts was to 1260 00:44:35,650 --> 00:44:38,109 when I recognized a new phone entering 1261 00:44:38,110 --> 00:44:40,809 the Bluetooth range, was to immediately 1262 00:44:40,810 --> 00:44:42,879 identify it as trusted and to 1263 00:44:42,880 --> 00:44:45,069 give it the same pin for everyone. 1264 00:44:45,070 --> 00:44:47,469 And so the effect for people entering 1265 00:44:47,470 --> 00:44:49,539 the room, entering the cafe was very 1266 00:44:49,540 --> 00:44:52,059 much like pairing with a cheap 1267 00:44:52,060 --> 00:44:54,639 headset. It just had a default pin 1268 00:44:54,640 --> 00:44:56,289 and you just choose it from the menu and 1269 00:44:56,290 --> 00:44:58,369 pair it and then that pairing lasts. 1270 00:44:58,370 --> 00:45:01,239 So Bluetooth has a sustained identity 1271 00:45:01,240 --> 00:45:03,549 and I maintained 1272 00:45:03,550 --> 00:45:04,509 a list. 1273 00:45:04,510 --> 00:45:06,939 I wondered about whether the system 1274 00:45:06,940 --> 00:45:08,829 should maintain a list of donor phone 1275 00:45:08,830 --> 00:45:10,719 numbers over time or whether it should 1276 00:45:10,720 --> 00:45:12,369 have some sort of purging system. 1277 00:45:12,370 --> 00:45:14,079 I think I would urge on the side of 1278 00:45:14,080 --> 00:45:16,089 purging, given that one of its sort of 1279 00:45:16,090 --> 00:45:17,829 properties is this kind of property of 1280 00:45:17,830 --> 00:45:19,329 anonymity. 1281 00:45:19,330 --> 00:45:20,289 But there's some balance. 1282 00:45:20,290 --> 00:45:23,559 There may be kind of over a 1283 00:45:23,560 --> 00:45:25,239 some period you would choose to delete. 1284 00:45:26,410 --> 00:45:28,479 International calls are not in the 1285 00:45:28,480 --> 00:45:31,239 UK. Seen many free minute 1286 00:45:31,240 --> 00:45:33,399 plans that include international calling. 1287 00:45:33,400 --> 00:45:35,049 But I think with the shift in EU 1288 00:45:35,050 --> 00:45:37,659 regulation around cheaper international 1289 00:45:37,660 --> 00:45:39,759 calls within the EU, maybe there'll 1290 00:45:39,760 --> 00:45:42,039 be some motivation for that to change. 1291 00:45:43,060 --> 00:45:44,889 I've also seen a lot of plans recently 1292 00:45:44,890 --> 00:45:47,049 that have shifted from some free 1293 00:45:47,050 --> 00:45:49,059 minutes to unlimited minutes. 1294 00:45:49,060 --> 00:45:50,319 And I think there's an interesting 1295 00:45:50,320 --> 00:45:52,749 dynamic there for a few years 1296 00:45:52,750 --> 00:45:54,969 before we entirely shift over to 1297 00:45:54,970 --> 00:45:57,219 what's happened and the other 1298 00:45:57,220 --> 00:45:59,319 kind of calling systems to 1299 00:45:59,320 --> 00:46:01,959 kind of play with those free minutes 1300 00:46:01,960 --> 00:46:03,159 in interesting ways. 1301 00:46:04,270 --> 00:46:06,459 The final point 1302 00:46:06,460 --> 00:46:08,110 about caller ID, 1303 00:46:09,700 --> 00:46:11,919 I thought about trying to 1304 00:46:11,920 --> 00:46:13,839 find I think that the problem is that 1305 00:46:13,840 --> 00:46:15,969 each mobile phone company has different 1306 00:46:15,970 --> 00:46:18,159 protocols for how you turn on 1307 00:46:18,160 --> 00:46:20,259 kind of anonymizing the outgoing 1308 00:46:20,260 --> 00:46:22,479 call. And so I didn't come up with a 1309 00:46:22,480 --> 00:46:24,639 kind of simple, easy way to do that. 1310 00:46:26,110 --> 00:46:28,839 I thought about putting up instructions 1311 00:46:28,840 --> 00:46:30,189 for people to do it themselves. 1312 00:46:30,190 --> 00:46:31,689 But in the end, I just kind of put a note 1313 00:46:31,690 --> 00:46:33,819 to say that these kind of IDs would 1314 00:46:33,820 --> 00:46:34,869 be passing through. 1315 00:46:34,870 --> 00:46:36,940 The other idea I had was to run a system 1316 00:46:38,500 --> 00:46:40,599 like Asterix that 1317 00:46:40,600 --> 00:46:42,699 would when you placed a call mentioned 1318 00:46:42,700 --> 00:46:44,499 to the person before the call was put 1319 00:46:44,500 --> 00:46:46,659 through, that this kind of exchange was 1320 00:46:46,660 --> 00:46:47,049 happening. 1321 00:46:47,050 --> 00:46:48,639 So you kind of frame it in a context. 1322 00:46:48,640 --> 00:46:49,899 But again, I think that sort of 1323 00:46:49,900 --> 00:46:50,900 overcomplicated it. 1324 00:46:52,980 --> 00:46:53,980 OK, 1325 00:46:55,050 --> 00:46:57,209 we have two people at the microphones 1326 00:46:57,210 --> 00:46:59,549 and we have a lot of more questions 1327 00:46:59,550 --> 00:47:01,079 from the Internet, and I think I will 1328 00:47:01,080 --> 00:47:03,269 just start with you, Mike one, 1329 00:47:03,270 --> 00:47:05,579 because I don't want to see you standing 1330 00:47:05,580 --> 00:47:06,829 there much longer. 1331 00:47:09,190 --> 00:47:11,279 I have actually two 1332 00:47:11,280 --> 00:47:13,349 questions, but they are short 1333 00:47:13,350 --> 00:47:15,869 of first question is 1334 00:47:15,870 --> 00:47:18,209 what kind of information 1335 00:47:18,210 --> 00:47:20,399 is on 1336 00:47:20,400 --> 00:47:22,469 the telephone of 1337 00:47:22,470 --> 00:47:24,779 the person who is giving 1338 00:47:24,780 --> 00:47:25,780 the minutes? 1339 00:47:26,760 --> 00:47:27,809 Three minutes. 1340 00:47:27,810 --> 00:47:30,089 And the second question 1341 00:47:30,090 --> 00:47:32,789 is actually tied to the first question. 1342 00:47:33,900 --> 00:47:36,269 Have you do know 1343 00:47:36,270 --> 00:47:38,489 what kind of legal issues 1344 00:47:38,490 --> 00:47:41,309 a person that is giving 1345 00:47:41,310 --> 00:47:43,799 their minutes may have 1346 00:47:43,800 --> 00:47:46,079 if their minutes 1347 00:47:46,080 --> 00:47:48,899 are used to 1348 00:47:48,900 --> 00:47:51,059 journalists or somebody 1349 00:47:51,060 --> 00:47:52,589 like that? 1350 00:47:52,590 --> 00:47:54,689 I don't know the legal implications 1351 00:47:54,690 --> 00:47:56,909 of of a phone being used in 1352 00:47:56,910 --> 00:47:57,910 a number of ways. 1353 00:47:58,710 --> 00:48:00,869 I think in the U.K., the one kind of 1354 00:48:00,870 --> 00:48:03,119 hard and fast rule is that if 1355 00:48:03,120 --> 00:48:05,309 your phone service and someone tells you 1356 00:48:05,310 --> 00:48:07,049 about a bomb plot, you have to 1357 00:48:07,050 --> 00:48:08,369 immediately report it. 1358 00:48:08,370 --> 00:48:10,289 But because you don't have access to the 1359 00:48:10,290 --> 00:48:12,509 call as a donor, I think there's 1360 00:48:12,510 --> 00:48:14,039 kind of an interesting gray area that 1361 00:48:14,040 --> 00:48:17,279 probably hasn't been fully investigated. 1362 00:48:17,280 --> 00:48:19,379 The first question about your 1363 00:48:19,380 --> 00:48:21,659 control and the record of the call 1364 00:48:21,660 --> 00:48:22,829 passing through your phone, 1365 00:48:24,870 --> 00:48:27,179 you can, of course, just turn off the 1366 00:48:27,180 --> 00:48:29,349 Bluetooth connection at any time you want 1367 00:48:29,350 --> 00:48:31,649 so you can disrupt a call on most 1368 00:48:31,650 --> 00:48:33,239 phones. When I watched it happening in 1369 00:48:33,240 --> 00:48:35,479 the cafe, that 1370 00:48:35,480 --> 00:48:37,289 the phone wouldn't necessarily even 1371 00:48:37,290 --> 00:48:39,239 switch on when it was reaching the call 1372 00:48:39,240 --> 00:48:41,099 because it's used to being sort of in 1373 00:48:41,100 --> 00:48:43,079 this mode where it's in the car, you 1374 00:48:43,080 --> 00:48:45,449 know, and you're using the hands free 1375 00:48:45,450 --> 00:48:46,499 kit or something. 1376 00:48:46,500 --> 00:48:48,539 So actually the phones tended to stay 1377 00:48:48,540 --> 00:48:50,699 quite kind of mute screen off, no 1378 00:48:50,700 --> 00:48:52,169 vibration or anything when the call was 1379 00:48:52,170 --> 00:48:53,789 in progress. 1380 00:48:53,790 --> 00:48:55,469 I suppose, you know, on some phones, you 1381 00:48:55,470 --> 00:48:56,969 might be able to turn on speaker phone 1382 00:48:56,970 --> 00:48:59,399 and it would kind of mirror the call 1383 00:48:59,400 --> 00:49:01,139 because you're constrained by the range 1384 00:49:01,140 --> 00:49:02,639 of Bluetooth. 1385 00:49:02,640 --> 00:49:04,499 You know, you'd be in the same room as 1386 00:49:04,500 --> 00:49:06,149 the person making the call in the phone 1387 00:49:06,150 --> 00:49:08,489 box. So it could be awkward. 1388 00:49:08,490 --> 00:49:10,769 So there's some kind of 1389 00:49:10,770 --> 00:49:12,179 sort of constraint in that in that 1390 00:49:12,180 --> 00:49:13,180 direction. 1391 00:49:14,160 --> 00:49:16,499 OK, so for another 1392 00:49:16,500 --> 00:49:18,719 question from the Internet, yes, it's 1393 00:49:18,720 --> 00:49:20,939 also related to that, it's 1394 00:49:20,940 --> 00:49:23,429 in terms of our lawful intercept 1395 00:49:23,430 --> 00:49:25,739 and how that impacted your 1396 00:49:25,740 --> 00:49:28,379 phone books at phone box idea, 1397 00:49:28,380 --> 00:49:30,659 like like do you think about 1398 00:49:30,660 --> 00:49:32,970 that or does anybody from 1399 00:49:34,230 --> 00:49:36,449 interception teams already contradict 1400 00:49:36,450 --> 00:49:38,579 you or does it at all 1401 00:49:38,580 --> 00:49:40,049 influence you? 1402 00:49:40,050 --> 00:49:41,909 I don't know too much about lawful 1403 00:49:41,910 --> 00:49:43,439 intercept. 1404 00:49:43,440 --> 00:49:45,599 I guess the idea is that you pick 1405 00:49:45,600 --> 00:49:47,879 up a phone to target 1406 00:49:47,880 --> 00:49:50,039 and you ask permission to target that 1407 00:49:50,040 --> 00:49:52,379 phone. It's a system that's shuffling 1408 00:49:52,380 --> 00:49:54,299 your calls out to strangers, would do 1409 00:49:54,300 --> 00:49:56,369 interesting things to 1410 00:49:56,370 --> 00:49:57,809 trying to track one person's 1411 00:49:57,810 --> 00:49:59,399 conversations. 1412 00:49:59,400 --> 00:50:01,739 I imagined originally 1413 00:50:01,740 --> 00:50:03,839 that perhaps rather than a 1414 00:50:03,840 --> 00:50:05,909 phone box in a physical location, 1415 00:50:05,910 --> 00:50:07,829 you could build this into a phone. 1416 00:50:07,830 --> 00:50:09,749 So there would be an app that would allow 1417 00:50:09,750 --> 00:50:11,999 your phone to be the 1418 00:50:12,000 --> 00:50:14,249 the headset and another 1419 00:50:14,250 --> 00:50:15,179 phone to be a downer. 1420 00:50:15,180 --> 00:50:17,159 And you could run the same kind of system 1421 00:50:17,160 --> 00:50:19,109 just on a on a train by turning your 1422 00:50:19,110 --> 00:50:21,029 phone into a certain mode. 1423 00:50:21,030 --> 00:50:23,009 And then you could see this proliferate 1424 00:50:23,010 --> 00:50:25,079 into lots of different social 1425 00:50:26,250 --> 00:50:28,829 spaces and conventions. 1426 00:50:28,830 --> 00:50:30,729 But the sort of Bluetooth programing for 1427 00:50:30,730 --> 00:50:32,819 you to get that to work is 1428 00:50:32,820 --> 00:50:34,779 kind of beyond my grasp at present. 1429 00:50:34,780 --> 00:50:35,780 Yeah. 1430 00:50:36,760 --> 00:50:39,279 OK, OK, Mike, 1431 00:50:39,280 --> 00:50:41,349 to say 1432 00:50:41,350 --> 00:50:43,079 once again, really nice idea. 1433 00:50:43,080 --> 00:50:45,219 I really like that aspect of mixing 1434 00:50:45,220 --> 00:50:47,019 connections between people socially, 1435 00:50:49,000 --> 00:50:51,099 probably of what I see as 1436 00:50:51,100 --> 00:50:52,899 a problem from the usability part is that 1437 00:50:52,900 --> 00:50:55,089 I need to go out and use 1438 00:50:55,090 --> 00:50:57,639 and basically no 1439 00:50:57,640 --> 00:50:59,049 use the number myself. 1440 00:50:59,050 --> 00:51:00,579 And you have the numbers in the UK, for 1441 00:51:00,580 --> 00:51:02,709 example, just if 1442 00:51:02,710 --> 00:51:04,779 you thought about the way to make it 1443 00:51:04,780 --> 00:51:07,389 easier, maybe use to Bluetooth devices 1444 00:51:07,390 --> 00:51:09,519 and they can use the one, 1445 00:51:09,520 --> 00:51:11,109 as I had said, but actually it's using 1446 00:51:11,110 --> 00:51:13,059 the other one which goes to another phone 1447 00:51:13,060 --> 00:51:14,349 or something like this. 1448 00:51:14,350 --> 00:51:15,369 Yeah, I thought about it. 1449 00:51:15,370 --> 00:51:16,899 I think it would be quite easy to do. 1450 00:51:16,900 --> 00:51:18,609 You would just kind of need to Bluetooth 1451 00:51:18,610 --> 00:51:19,689 dongles. 1452 00:51:19,690 --> 00:51:22,119 So one person's using their mobile 1453 00:51:22,120 --> 00:51:24,219 phone as the handset 1454 00:51:24,220 --> 00:51:26,109 and another person's using their mobile 1455 00:51:26,110 --> 00:51:27,309 phone as the donor. 1456 00:51:27,310 --> 00:51:29,139 And there's kind of things just creating 1457 00:51:29,140 --> 00:51:30,489 the intermediary. 1458 00:51:30,490 --> 00:51:32,619 Although this talk 1459 00:51:32,620 --> 00:51:34,689 was a love letter to phone boxes and I 1460 00:51:34,690 --> 00:51:36,369 quite like the physical aspects as well 1461 00:51:36,370 --> 00:51:38,859 as having to go stand up and stand 1462 00:51:38,860 --> 00:51:41,049 in a space and kind of use 1463 00:51:41,050 --> 00:51:43,269 the handset. But yeah, no, I think that 1464 00:51:43,270 --> 00:51:45,849 idea has more longevity 1465 00:51:45,850 --> 00:51:46,739 in it. 1466 00:51:46,740 --> 00:51:48,459 But remember, a single phone number 1467 00:51:48,460 --> 00:51:50,529 nowadays than years ago used to me 1468 00:51:50,530 --> 00:51:50,889 too. 1469 00:51:50,890 --> 00:51:52,809 And people would get their mobiles out to 1470 00:51:52,810 --> 00:51:54,849 like copy out the phone number into the 1471 00:51:54,850 --> 00:51:56,169 handset just to try it out. 1472 00:51:56,170 --> 00:51:58,899 So clearly that's not going to function. 1473 00:51:58,900 --> 00:52:00,639 But then I also like this idea that 1474 00:52:00,640 --> 00:52:02,919 you're not having to rely on a digital 1475 00:52:02,920 --> 00:52:04,479 trail. You know, if you went back to 1476 00:52:04,480 --> 00:52:06,639 remembering some key numbers, you could 1477 00:52:06,640 --> 00:52:08,229 go to the service with nothing, you know, 1478 00:52:08,230 --> 00:52:10,089 just your memory or a piece of paper. 1479 00:52:10,090 --> 00:52:11,439 And there's something nice about that 1480 00:52:11,440 --> 00:52:14,019 dynamic as well. So I'm kind of torn 1481 00:52:14,020 --> 00:52:14,459 because. 1482 00:52:14,460 --> 00:52:15,730 Yeah, thanks. 1483 00:52:17,430 --> 00:52:19,949 OK, the Internet 1484 00:52:19,950 --> 00:52:20,669 again. 1485 00:52:20,670 --> 00:52:23,099 Yes, so we have another question 1486 00:52:23,100 --> 00:52:25,259 that goes more into the anonymity 1487 00:52:25,260 --> 00:52:28,439 part of it and also about like, 1488 00:52:28,440 --> 00:52:31,199 yeah, law enforcement, maybe 1489 00:52:31,200 --> 00:52:33,589 because Jacob Appelbaum, 1490 00:52:33,590 --> 00:52:36,089 he's a security person, 1491 00:52:36,090 --> 00:52:37,319 like you all know him. 1492 00:52:37,320 --> 00:52:38,320 I don't have to explain. 1493 00:52:39,930 --> 00:52:41,849 He believes that every phone call is 1494 00:52:41,850 --> 00:52:44,039 being voiced, fingerprinted, and at 1495 00:52:44,040 --> 00:52:45,479 least in Spain. 1496 00:52:45,480 --> 00:52:47,729 And probably if you look at all 1497 00:52:47,730 --> 00:52:49,979 the other interception methods, maybe 1498 00:52:49,980 --> 00:52:51,449 else on the rest of the world. 1499 00:52:51,450 --> 00:52:54,299 So there's a video online 1500 00:52:54,300 --> 00:52:56,939 of a talk that you gave last year in 1501 00:52:56,940 --> 00:52:59,039 Berlin and Zubaz where he 1502 00:52:59,040 --> 00:53:00,989 mentioned that this is possible, that you 1503 00:53:00,990 --> 00:53:03,389 can just hear a voice 1504 00:53:03,390 --> 00:53:05,609 and then just say which person it is. 1505 00:53:05,610 --> 00:53:08,369 So interception would be even more 1506 00:53:08,370 --> 00:53:10,979 possible. How does this. 1507 00:53:10,980 --> 00:53:13,169 Yeah. Interfere with your project or 1508 00:53:13,170 --> 00:53:14,279 what do you think about that? 1509 00:53:14,280 --> 00:53:15,659 Yeah, I think so. 1510 00:53:15,660 --> 00:53:18,419 Voice fingerprinting, of course, totally 1511 00:53:18,420 --> 00:53:20,999 breaks the kind of 1512 00:53:21,000 --> 00:53:23,129 promise of anonymity 1513 00:53:23,130 --> 00:53:26,339 using voice as a form of communication 1514 00:53:26,340 --> 00:53:27,340 if it's your own voice. 1515 00:53:30,060 --> 00:53:32,579 I wonder about the success of 1516 00:53:32,580 --> 00:53:33,599 voice fingerprinting. 1517 00:53:33,600 --> 00:53:35,579 I think it will be a partial success, 1518 00:53:35,580 --> 00:53:38,159 even in well-funded government 1519 00:53:38,160 --> 00:53:41,399 systems, because of the ambiguities 1520 00:53:41,400 --> 00:53:43,109 of the way that the voice works. 1521 00:53:43,110 --> 00:53:44,849 At the moment. You can hear suffering 1522 00:53:44,850 --> 00:53:46,619 from a cold. And I think that does things 1523 00:53:46,620 --> 00:53:48,869 to the dynamics of of tone, 1524 00:53:48,870 --> 00:53:49,980 maybe, maybe not 1525 00:53:52,080 --> 00:53:53,159 in the longer term. 1526 00:53:53,160 --> 00:53:54,659 I've been thinking about other ways of 1527 00:53:54,660 --> 00:53:56,249 designing for Pseudonymity. 1528 00:53:56,250 --> 00:53:58,409 And for me, the Bourbaki Group Nicolas 1529 00:53:58,410 --> 00:54:00,689 Bourbaki, created by that group 1530 00:54:00,690 --> 00:54:02,939 of mathematicians is an interesting group 1531 00:54:02,940 --> 00:54:05,249 to think they were many 1532 00:54:05,250 --> 00:54:07,709 people performing a single character. 1533 00:54:07,710 --> 00:54:10,049 And when you mix many people into 1534 00:54:10,050 --> 00:54:12,209 one identity, 1535 00:54:12,210 --> 00:54:14,729 what you get is a mix of different 1536 00:54:14,730 --> 00:54:15,749 fingerprints. 1537 00:54:15,750 --> 00:54:17,759 And that sort of blurring of fingerprints 1538 00:54:17,760 --> 00:54:19,859 together is not chaffe, but 1539 00:54:19,860 --> 00:54:22,019 this kind of other sort of layering 1540 00:54:22,020 --> 00:54:24,419 up of of multiple identities. 1541 00:54:24,420 --> 00:54:26,099 And I wonder whether that starts to mess 1542 00:54:26,100 --> 00:54:27,419 with fingerprints. I don't know. 1543 00:54:27,420 --> 00:54:29,819 I have a way of doing that with voice 1544 00:54:29,820 --> 00:54:31,319 on its own. But it's something a 1545 00:54:31,320 --> 00:54:32,789 direction that I've been thinking in for 1546 00:54:32,790 --> 00:54:35,069 other forms of communication, like 1547 00:54:35,070 --> 00:54:36,509 writing. 1548 00:54:36,510 --> 00:54:38,219 I mean, that's a big problem also for 1549 00:54:38,220 --> 00:54:39,599 browsers and everything. 1550 00:54:39,600 --> 00:54:41,639 So, yeah, one thought I've had is that 1551 00:54:41,640 --> 00:54:44,549 they're just directly correlated 1552 00:54:44,550 --> 00:54:47,249 between how much identity, 1553 00:54:47,250 --> 00:54:49,229 you know, sort of uniqueness you can have 1554 00:54:49,230 --> 00:54:50,729 and how anonymous you can be. 1555 00:54:50,730 --> 00:54:52,709 So you can either say something with 1556 00:54:52,710 --> 00:54:54,839 meaning or, you 1557 00:54:54,840 --> 00:54:55,799 know, you can be anonymous. 1558 00:54:55,800 --> 00:54:57,389 Maybe there's just you know, you can only 1559 00:54:57,390 --> 00:54:58,589 have one or the other. You can just say 1560 00:54:58,590 --> 00:55:00,689 arbitrary things and no one will 1561 00:55:00,690 --> 00:55:02,729 know who you are or you can make a point, 1562 00:55:02,730 --> 00:55:04,559 but then something will give you a way. 1563 00:55:04,560 --> 00:55:06,239 Maybe you're just kind of tied. 1564 00:55:06,240 --> 00:55:07,949 You can have one or the other, which 1565 00:55:07,950 --> 00:55:08,609 would be sad. 1566 00:55:08,610 --> 00:55:10,679 But perhaps I mean, as 1567 00:55:10,680 --> 00:55:12,479 always, it's also depending on the threat 1568 00:55:12,480 --> 00:55:13,829 level you face. 1569 00:55:13,830 --> 00:55:16,059 So I still 1570 00:55:16,060 --> 00:55:18,239 questions. So one is a weapon. 1571 00:55:18,240 --> 00:55:19,260 We buy the T-shirt. 1572 00:55:21,270 --> 00:55:22,379 It's a beautiful T-shirt. 1573 00:55:22,380 --> 00:55:25,169 So this is from 1574 00:55:25,170 --> 00:55:27,349 David Wiley 1575 00:55:27,350 --> 00:55:28,589 remembering names. But I think that's 1576 00:55:28,590 --> 00:55:28,949 right. 1577 00:55:28,950 --> 00:55:31,649 He's the animator who 1578 00:55:31,650 --> 00:55:33,089 has made a number of very beautiful 1579 00:55:33,090 --> 00:55:34,379 animations that you should seek out 1580 00:55:34,380 --> 00:55:36,659 online. And he has a T-shirt 1581 00:55:36,660 --> 00:55:38,099 store called Something Like 1582 00:55:39,180 --> 00:55:40,889 Stupid Things, or 1583 00:55:42,580 --> 00:55:45,509 I'll put a link up on the talk page. 1584 00:55:45,510 --> 00:55:46,919 But yeah, they're all beautiful. 1585 00:55:46,920 --> 00:55:48,089 They're all badly drawn. 1586 00:55:48,090 --> 00:55:50,279 This one's called mouse character, which 1587 00:55:50,280 --> 00:55:51,299 is lovely. 1588 00:55:51,300 --> 00:55:53,879 On another level are some things. 1589 00:55:53,880 --> 00:55:55,979 I just posted the last question and then 1590 00:55:55,980 --> 00:55:57,479 we can close with the room. 1591 00:55:57,480 --> 00:55:58,619 OK, great. 1592 00:55:58,620 --> 00:56:00,719 So it's a more technical question again 1593 00:56:00,720 --> 00:56:02,849 or more mobile phone carrier 1594 00:56:02,850 --> 00:56:05,009 question because I mean, it's 1595 00:56:05,010 --> 00:56:07,109 forbidden for many 1596 00:56:07,110 --> 00:56:09,179 people to share their Internet 1597 00:56:09,180 --> 00:56:11,129 connection, but gathering from the phone 1598 00:56:11,130 --> 00:56:12,599 to the computer or to other people 1599 00:56:12,600 --> 00:56:15,779 computers, are there any 1600 00:56:15,780 --> 00:56:18,569 similar things for minutes? 1601 00:56:18,570 --> 00:56:20,279 And do you have any feedback from 1602 00:56:20,280 --> 00:56:22,409 carriers or from people talking to 1603 00:56:22,410 --> 00:56:23,379 you about that? 1604 00:56:23,380 --> 00:56:25,019 No, I have not had feedback. 1605 00:56:25,020 --> 00:56:26,519 I don't think anyone thought about it. 1606 00:56:26,520 --> 00:56:27,899 So at the moment, I imagine the 1607 00:56:27,900 --> 00:56:30,329 restrictions aren't there in most cases. 1608 00:56:30,330 --> 00:56:32,099 Some people may in some carriers may 1609 00:56:32,100 --> 00:56:34,139 argue that some other restriction could 1610 00:56:34,140 --> 00:56:35,249 apply in this case. 1611 00:56:35,250 --> 00:56:38,009 But I think because the weight of 1612 00:56:38,010 --> 00:56:40,409 the phone lending idea is quite strong, 1613 00:56:40,410 --> 00:56:42,539 I think perhaps if if it were to 1614 00:56:42,540 --> 00:56:45,299 catch on, there would be this interesting 1615 00:56:45,300 --> 00:56:48,029 kind of dynamic that you don't get with 1616 00:56:48,030 --> 00:56:49,030 the 1617 00:56:50,310 --> 00:56:52,319 data sharing where it's really only 1618 00:56:52,320 --> 00:56:53,459 something that the people in these 1619 00:56:53,460 --> 00:56:54,779 countries might, you know, sort of 1620 00:56:54,780 --> 00:56:56,939 understand the conversation 1621 00:56:56,940 --> 00:56:59,129 about. Can I lend my phone to a stranger 1622 00:56:59,130 --> 00:57:01,319 is one that I know 1623 00:57:01,320 --> 00:57:02,609 lots of people who don't care about 1624 00:57:02,610 --> 00:57:05,429 technology would be willing to fight for. 1625 00:57:05,430 --> 00:57:07,139 So I think there's an interesting dynamic 1626 00:57:07,140 --> 00:57:08,829 there, though. One more question there. 1627 00:57:08,830 --> 00:57:11,040 So, yeah, thanks 1628 00:57:12,720 --> 00:57:14,909 to me, your product looks like 1629 00:57:14,910 --> 00:57:17,009 a Tor to a degree. 1630 00:57:17,010 --> 00:57:19,259 Yeah, so first 1631 00:57:19,260 --> 00:57:22,349 thing, did you ever consider 1632 00:57:22,350 --> 00:57:24,779 creating a mash like toward 1633 00:57:24,780 --> 00:57:28,139 it and second thing is 1634 00:57:28,140 --> 00:57:30,239 this, you think, well, can you 1635 00:57:30,240 --> 00:57:32,429 explain it to me, how you protect 1636 00:57:32,430 --> 00:57:34,799 yourself from a, well, 1637 00:57:36,570 --> 00:57:38,819 a person that's a donor 1638 00:57:38,820 --> 00:57:41,069 and wants to to create 1639 00:57:41,070 --> 00:57:43,349 some statistics about your calls 1640 00:57:43,350 --> 00:57:44,549 or whatever. 1641 00:57:45,750 --> 00:57:46,949 So, yeah. 1642 00:57:46,950 --> 00:57:49,649 So it's it is a mixed network like Tor. 1643 00:57:49,650 --> 00:57:51,389 It's only one node though, and I think 1644 00:57:51,390 --> 00:57:53,699 kind of chaining them up is 1645 00:57:53,700 --> 00:57:56,009 cumbersome and also, 1646 00:57:56,010 --> 00:57:57,839 you know, might as well just be done 1647 00:57:57,840 --> 00:58:00,179 through kind of talk like why 1648 00:58:00,180 --> 00:58:02,129 do it through physical systems when you 1649 00:58:02,130 --> 00:58:04,259 could just kind of reach it through to 1650 00:58:04,260 --> 00:58:05,729 maybe there's a reason to do it through 1651 00:58:05,730 --> 00:58:06,449 physical systems. 1652 00:58:06,450 --> 00:58:07,450 But I don't know 1653 00:58:09,240 --> 00:58:10,799 in terms of protecting yourself from 1654 00:58:10,800 --> 00:58:13,139 malicious donors, one property 1655 00:58:13,140 --> 00:58:15,569 of the system is that it's selecting 1656 00:58:15,570 --> 00:58:17,729 people at random from the social 1657 00:58:17,730 --> 00:58:18,959 space that you're in. 1658 00:58:18,960 --> 00:58:21,089 And so, you know, 1659 00:58:21,090 --> 00:58:22,889 if your strategy was to make lots of 1660 00:58:22,890 --> 00:58:24,899 calls, then you're kind of spreading your 1661 00:58:24,900 --> 00:58:26,999 bets a little bit in terms of analysis, 1662 00:58:27,000 --> 00:58:29,789 traffic analysis and the like, 1663 00:58:29,790 --> 00:58:31,859 TOR and other mixed networks. 1664 00:58:31,860 --> 00:58:34,379 If someone were to fill your cafe 1665 00:58:34,380 --> 00:58:36,209 with at least 50 percent, you know, 1666 00:58:36,210 --> 00:58:38,309 malicious donors, 1667 00:58:38,310 --> 00:58:40,499 then they would be able to to traffic 1668 00:58:40,500 --> 00:58:42,419 analyze you. But then you'd have a pretty 1669 00:58:42,420 --> 00:58:43,589 boring cafe. 1670 00:58:43,590 --> 00:58:45,659 So, you know, whatever. 1671 00:58:45,660 --> 00:58:46,919 Yeah. Thank you. 1672 00:58:46,920 --> 00:58:48,209 OK, thanks a lot. 1673 00:58:48,210 --> 00:58:50,279 OK, we have time for 1674 00:58:50,280 --> 00:58:52,749 one or maybe two more questions. 1675 00:58:52,750 --> 00:58:55,169 So on Mike two are 1676 00:58:55,170 --> 00:58:57,359 could you speak about 1677 00:58:57,360 --> 00:58:58,949 what happens with incoming calls and 1678 00:58:58,950 --> 00:59:01,050 hazmats messages on donor phones 1679 00:59:02,310 --> 00:59:03,310 so that the 1680 00:59:04,620 --> 00:59:06,749 the way that I handled it for the 1681 00:59:06,750 --> 00:59:09,509 for the exhibition, the 1682 00:59:09,510 --> 00:59:11,759 certifications was just to deny 1683 00:59:11,760 --> 00:59:13,529 them when they came in? 1684 00:59:13,530 --> 00:59:15,689 So what what that means is that people 1685 00:59:15,690 --> 00:59:17,759 would be missing calls on 1686 00:59:17,760 --> 00:59:19,439 their phones and then they would see the 1687 00:59:19,440 --> 00:59:21,149 call in the log and could just ring back 1688 00:59:21,150 --> 00:59:22,949 later. But it didn't call through the 1689 00:59:22,950 --> 00:59:25,319 handset. So there was no way that 1690 00:59:25,320 --> 00:59:28,259 things would come back to the 1691 00:59:28,260 --> 00:59:30,129 the phone box. 1692 00:59:30,130 --> 00:59:32,249 The SMS is just arrive as normal. 1693 00:59:32,250 --> 00:59:34,439 They're not passed on to the headset. 1694 00:59:34,440 --> 00:59:36,809 If you are using the same access profile, 1695 00:59:36,810 --> 00:59:38,819 then there would be this kind of transfer 1696 00:59:38,820 --> 00:59:41,339 of data. But with the 1697 00:59:41,340 --> 00:59:43,199 handsfree profile, it's just the calls 1698 00:59:43,200 --> 00:59:44,219 that get passed through. 1699 00:59:45,420 --> 00:59:47,339 That's not ideal for people to lose 1700 00:59:47,340 --> 00:59:48,959 incoming calls. 1701 00:59:48,960 --> 00:59:50,609 And it's also slightly confusing for 1702 00:59:50,610 --> 00:59:52,709 someone who gets called through the 1703 00:59:52,710 --> 00:59:55,079 system and rings back 1704 00:59:55,080 --> 00:59:57,119 immediately because they see this unusual 1705 00:59:57,120 --> 00:59:58,919 number. So there's some kind of 1706 00:59:58,920 --> 01:00:01,109 interesting dynamic there, which, again, 1707 01:00:01,110 --> 01:00:02,789 I was thinking about trying to solve with 1708 01:00:02,790 --> 01:00:04,859 the server that would leave a message 1709 01:00:04,860 --> 01:00:06,749 saying, hey, you've just been rung by 1710 01:00:06,750 --> 01:00:09,269 this person using a donor phone, 1711 01:00:09,270 --> 01:00:10,619 you know, a stranger's phone, you might 1712 01:00:10,620 --> 01:00:11,939 call it. 1713 01:00:11,940 --> 01:00:13,559 They you know, they couldn't reach you. 1714 01:00:13,560 --> 01:00:16,169 They'll try again later or something. 1715 01:00:16,170 --> 01:00:19,049 But yeah, well, for me, it would be not 1716 01:00:19,050 --> 01:00:20,969 I would not hand over control over 1717 01:00:20,970 --> 01:00:23,279 incoming calls to a system 1718 01:00:23,280 --> 01:00:25,199 that's unknown to me. 1719 01:00:25,200 --> 01:00:27,389 So, yes, yeah, there's a lot of issues 1720 01:00:27,390 --> 01:00:30,209 with with trust, 1721 01:00:30,210 --> 01:00:31,619 but it turns out that there's a lot of 1722 01:00:31,620 --> 01:00:33,029 issues with trust in Bluetooth. 1723 01:00:33,030 --> 01:00:35,369 More generally, I think 1724 01:00:36,390 --> 01:00:38,939 the strategy would be to 1725 01:00:38,940 --> 01:00:41,099 to make this phone box 1726 01:00:41,100 --> 01:00:42,899 a shared resource in terms of 1727 01:00:42,900 --> 01:00:44,729 maintenance. So you would need to open 1728 01:00:44,730 --> 01:00:46,469 the project. But, of course, you know, 1729 01:00:46,470 --> 01:00:48,539 how do you guarantee the software and the 1730 01:00:48,540 --> 01:00:51,719 hardware is just the eternal question 1731 01:00:51,720 --> 01:00:53,099 in conferences like this? 1732 01:00:53,100 --> 01:00:55,559 But yes, pairing with a headset 1733 01:00:55,560 --> 01:00:58,109 seems reasonably benign 1734 01:00:58,110 --> 01:01:00,059 in comparison to, like, simpering. 1735 01:01:00,060 --> 01:01:02,339 And you can see on on modern phones 1736 01:01:02,340 --> 01:01:03,989 which kind of pairing feature you're 1737 01:01:03,990 --> 01:01:04,919 opting for. 1738 01:01:04,920 --> 01:01:06,989 And you can 1739 01:01:06,990 --> 01:01:09,239 therefore choose how much control 1740 01:01:09,240 --> 01:01:10,919 you're giving. But, yeah, you know, a 1741 01:01:10,920 --> 01:01:12,719 malicious version of this payphone could 1742 01:01:12,720 --> 01:01:14,759 just ring premium rate numbers, you know, 1743 01:01:14,760 --> 01:01:16,949 as fast as it can go through 1744 01:01:16,950 --> 01:01:18,479 all of the donor phones at once or 1745 01:01:18,480 --> 01:01:20,700 something, you know, but yeah, I think. 1746 01:01:21,790 --> 01:01:23,949 OK, we have 1747 01:01:23,950 --> 01:01:25,899 have do we have more Internet questions 1748 01:01:25,900 --> 01:01:28,089 or no, we don't 1749 01:01:28,090 --> 01:01:30,159 have any more Internet questions, but 1750 01:01:30,160 --> 01:01:32,589 just just came to my mind, I was recently 1751 01:01:32,590 --> 01:01:34,929 in Cairo and Egypt and there's 1752 01:01:34,930 --> 01:01:37,209 the traditional the use 1753 01:01:37,210 --> 01:01:39,639 of using of strangers 1754 01:01:39,640 --> 01:01:40,569 phones all the time. 1755 01:01:40,570 --> 01:01:42,939 Like like everybody just ask you, can I 1756 01:01:42,940 --> 01:01:44,299 borrow your phone for a minute? 1757 01:01:44,300 --> 01:01:45,369 I have to call somebody. 1758 01:01:45,370 --> 01:01:48,609 So father's quite relatable. 1759 01:01:48,610 --> 01:01:50,379 Yeah, great. I think it's a it's got a 1760 01:01:50,380 --> 01:01:53,079 long history in lots of places, so 1761 01:01:53,080 --> 01:01:54,639 hopefully that lends some kind of 1762 01:01:54,640 --> 01:01:57,309 momentum to to using it as a lever 1763 01:01:57,310 --> 01:01:58,869 back into the conversation of other 1764 01:01:58,870 --> 01:02:00,309 things like Wi-Fi as well. 1765 01:02:00,310 --> 01:02:01,310 Yeah. 1766 01:02:01,740 --> 01:02:03,269 So thank you so much. 1767 01:02:03,270 --> 01:02:05,309 Also from the Internet, again, thanks a 1768 01:02:05,310 --> 01:02:06,310 lot.