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If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/371 Thanks! 1 00:00:09,440 --> 00:00:11,689 So great to have you all here 2 00:00:11,690 --> 00:00:13,999 for the last talk today, the talk 3 00:00:14,000 --> 00:00:16,319 is doing right by sources done right. 4 00:00:16,320 --> 00:00:18,619 I guess every one of you read and 5 00:00:18,620 --> 00:00:20,599 heard a thing or two in the past years 6 00:00:20,600 --> 00:00:21,829 about whistleblowers. 7 00:00:21,830 --> 00:00:24,199 And so you all also know that 8 00:00:24,200 --> 00:00:25,969 in order for whistleblowers to achieve 9 00:00:25,970 --> 00:00:27,979 their goals, namely to bring the stories 10 00:00:27,980 --> 00:00:30,049 out, they rely on journalists. 11 00:00:30,050 --> 00:00:32,209 And as these journalists responsibility 12 00:00:32,210 --> 00:00:34,459 to make sure that these sources get 13 00:00:34,460 --> 00:00:36,469 protection, which is a very complex 14 00:00:36,470 --> 00:00:38,629 matter. But we're hugely 15 00:00:38,630 --> 00:00:40,729 honored to have here tonight Sarah 16 00:00:40,730 --> 00:00:42,859 Harrison and Grace North, who are experts 17 00:00:42,860 --> 00:00:44,119 in this field and are going to explain to 18 00:00:44,120 --> 00:00:46,309 us how to do that, how to not fuck up 19 00:00:46,310 --> 00:00:47,849 and how to protect these sources. 20 00:00:47,850 --> 00:00:49,969 So please do me a favor and give a big 21 00:00:49,970 --> 00:00:51,709 round of applause for Sarah Harrison, 22 00:00:51,710 --> 00:00:53,240 Ungraceful and John. 23 00:01:05,010 --> 00:01:06,190 Got it on there again, 24 00:01:07,420 --> 00:01:10,129 sir. Yes, sir, my name is Sarah Harrison, 25 00:01:10,130 --> 00:01:11,899 I'm a journalist at WikiLeaks, but I'm 26 00:01:11,900 --> 00:01:13,669 also currently the acting director of an 27 00:01:13,670 --> 00:01:15,049 organization called the Courage 28 00:01:15,050 --> 00:01:16,339 Foundation. 29 00:01:16,340 --> 00:01:18,259 And this was launched last year as an 30 00:01:18,260 --> 00:01:20,029 international organization to protect 31 00:01:20,030 --> 00:01:21,709 truth tellers. 32 00:01:21,710 --> 00:01:23,719 Courage acts as a first line defense in 33 00:01:23,720 --> 00:01:25,789 the highest risk cases where others 34 00:01:25,790 --> 00:01:27,949 can't or won't act due to the risks and 35 00:01:27,950 --> 00:01:30,169 dangers and difficulties in association 36 00:01:30,170 --> 00:01:32,239 with helping those who've risked so much 37 00:01:32,240 --> 00:01:34,069 for our right to know. 38 00:01:34,070 --> 00:01:36,169 We currently run the Edward Snowden and 39 00:01:36,170 --> 00:01:38,689 Jeremy Hammon's defense funds 40 00:01:38,690 --> 00:01:40,549 and their support websites along with 41 00:01:40,550 --> 00:01:42,739 other projects that we started and 42 00:01:42,740 --> 00:01:43,959 are beginning more next year. 43 00:01:45,020 --> 00:01:46,489 We'll be speaking about the protections 44 00:01:46,490 --> 00:01:48,019 for truth tellers by the media and 45 00:01:48,020 --> 00:01:49,759 public, the issues where and how 46 00:01:49,760 --> 00:01:51,199 improvement can happen. 47 00:01:51,200 --> 00:01:53,269 And I'm here today with Grace, who heads 48 00:01:53,270 --> 00:01:55,639 the Jeremy Hammon's Defense Committee 49 00:01:55,640 --> 00:01:57,409 and who'll be giving a more in-depth 50 00:01:57,410 --> 00:01:59,329 example of some of the protection issues 51 00:01:59,330 --> 00:02:00,680 that Jeremy had to deal with. 52 00:02:02,290 --> 00:02:04,389 So there's currently a lot of discussion 53 00:02:04,390 --> 00:02:06,099 generally at the moment around online 54 00:02:06,100 --> 00:02:08,319 Dropbox's and how 55 00:02:08,320 --> 00:02:10,448 this handover points in the process 56 00:02:10,449 --> 00:02:12,069 can be solved online. 57 00:02:13,750 --> 00:02:15,819 However, if we actually look at the 58 00:02:15,820 --> 00:02:18,249 past, this is in fact just one area 59 00:02:18,250 --> 00:02:20,379 and has often been that of the 60 00:02:20,380 --> 00:02:21,489 last issue. 61 00:02:21,490 --> 00:02:22,959 So if we think of the big cases in the 62 00:02:22,960 --> 00:02:25,089 last year, it wasn't the handover 63 00:02:25,090 --> 00:02:26,889 of the documents that actually caused the 64 00:02:26,890 --> 00:02:28,689 legal problems for the following source. 65 00:02:28,690 --> 00:02:30,999 Alleged sources Chelsea 66 00:02:31,000 --> 00:02:33,279 Manning was identified after 67 00:02:33,280 --> 00:02:35,019 a conversation she had had with the US 68 00:02:35,020 --> 00:02:37,959 government informant that posted 69 00:02:37,960 --> 00:02:40,269 posts the alleged action. 70 00:02:40,270 --> 00:02:42,219 Another alleged source, Jeremy Hammond, 71 00:02:43,660 --> 00:02:45,489 was caught after an infiltrator was 72 00:02:45,490 --> 00:02:47,529 working with the US government turned him 73 00:02:47,530 --> 00:02:49,629 in. Edward Snowden decided to 74 00:02:49,630 --> 00:02:51,519 go public himself and then was left in 75 00:02:51,520 --> 00:02:53,259 Hong Kong by The Guardian. 76 00:02:53,260 --> 00:02:54,969 The journalist, the journalist that 77 00:02:54,970 --> 00:02:56,859 Jesselyn Radack had contacted didn't 78 00:02:56,860 --> 00:02:59,139 redact her name from the documents 79 00:02:59,140 --> 00:03:00,819 leading to the pursuit of her by US 80 00:03:00,820 --> 00:03:03,309 courts. John Kiriakou had agreements 81 00:03:03,310 --> 00:03:05,019 broken by journalists, which then 82 00:03:05,020 --> 00:03:06,459 assisted the US governments in 83 00:03:06,460 --> 00:03:08,469 persecuting him. 84 00:03:08,470 --> 00:03:10,209 All these examples have led to truth 85 00:03:10,210 --> 00:03:11,559 tellers being involved in long, 86 00:03:11,560 --> 00:03:13,689 debilitating legal cases, 87 00:03:13,690 --> 00:03:16,389 large prison sentences and indictments. 88 00:03:16,390 --> 00:03:18,279 Yet not one was the document handover 89 00:03:18,280 --> 00:03:21,159 point itself that caused the main issue. 90 00:03:21,160 --> 00:03:23,019 And yet the other parts of the full 91 00:03:23,020 --> 00:03:24,939 source protection process are not being 92 00:03:24,940 --> 00:03:25,940 much discussed. 93 00:03:26,830 --> 00:03:28,749 Total source protection is a complex 94 00:03:28,750 --> 00:03:30,999 topic can often depend very much 95 00:03:31,000 --> 00:03:32,769 on the situation where the sources in 96 00:03:32,770 --> 00:03:35,259 terms of jurisdiction job, 97 00:03:35,260 --> 00:03:36,909 their technical capabilities, the 98 00:03:36,910 --> 00:03:38,979 journalists technical capabilities, 99 00:03:38,980 --> 00:03:41,409 the type classification, format, size 100 00:03:41,410 --> 00:03:43,509 material they wish to disclose who the 101 00:03:43,510 --> 00:03:45,909 adversary is and also the political 102 00:03:45,910 --> 00:03:47,559 environment for sources in general. 103 00:03:49,860 --> 00:03:52,049 There are five areas specifically 104 00:03:52,050 --> 00:03:54,179 that I just want to go through 105 00:03:54,180 --> 00:03:56,309 briefly for each one that you should be 106 00:03:56,310 --> 00:03:57,929 thinking about if you're dealing with 107 00:03:57,930 --> 00:03:59,909 source protection issues at all. 108 00:03:59,910 --> 00:04:02,789 So there's the initial contact period, 109 00:04:02,790 --> 00:04:05,159 the hand over point publishing, 110 00:04:05,160 --> 00:04:07,199 the documents and articles, continuing 111 00:04:07,200 --> 00:04:08,849 contact and then aftercare. 112 00:04:10,320 --> 00:04:12,119 So for initial contact, a lot of people 113 00:04:12,120 --> 00:04:13,709 think that sources just sort of 114 00:04:13,710 --> 00:04:15,749 anonymously want to hand over documents 115 00:04:15,750 --> 00:04:16,799 and they'll just drop something 116 00:04:16,800 --> 00:04:19,859 somewhere. But actually and if anyone saw 117 00:04:19,860 --> 00:04:21,989 Laura and 118 00:04:21,990 --> 00:04:23,939 Julius talk yesterday, it was very clear 119 00:04:23,940 --> 00:04:26,249 that often sources are cultivated 120 00:04:26,250 --> 00:04:27,599 by journalists. 121 00:04:27,600 --> 00:04:29,189 Now, this happens a lot for official 122 00:04:29,190 --> 00:04:30,509 government, US sources. 123 00:04:30,510 --> 00:04:32,279 Now, these can often be 124 00:04:33,510 --> 00:04:35,219 given give quotes to journalists 125 00:04:35,220 --> 00:04:37,439 anonymously, I think, with the general 126 00:04:37,440 --> 00:04:38,969 hope that if they've done it anonymously 127 00:04:38,970 --> 00:04:40,409 and it's somehow secret, this will get 128 00:04:40,410 --> 00:04:42,149 some more impetus for what's basically a 129 00:04:42,150 --> 00:04:43,410 government talking points. 130 00:04:44,580 --> 00:04:46,559 In these cases, there are no 131 00:04:46,560 --> 00:04:48,329 repercussions for the media, journalists 132 00:04:48,330 --> 00:04:50,039 or source because it's just the official 133 00:04:50,040 --> 00:04:51,749 government sliding that points out in 134 00:04:51,750 --> 00:04:53,939 other ways, of course, when exactly 135 00:04:53,940 --> 00:04:56,009 the same thing happens for the public's 136 00:04:56,010 --> 00:04:58,379 right to know with an unauthorized 137 00:04:58,380 --> 00:05:00,359 government source, the repercussions are 138 00:05:00,360 --> 00:05:01,360 dire. 139 00:05:01,920 --> 00:05:03,899 So this initial contact with sources or 140 00:05:03,900 --> 00:05:06,479 potential sources, when that starts, 141 00:05:06,480 --> 00:05:07,649 there are a number of operational 142 00:05:07,650 --> 00:05:09,569 security issues to take into account. 143 00:05:09,570 --> 00:05:10,739 I know others have had a lot of more 144 00:05:10,740 --> 00:05:13,259 detailed talks about this, so I'll just 145 00:05:13,260 --> 00:05:14,819 brush over them quickly. 146 00:05:14,820 --> 00:05:16,259 So your phones, whether you're being 147 00:05:16,260 --> 00:05:18,599 followed emails and other online data 148 00:05:18,600 --> 00:05:20,759 trails, there are various methods to 149 00:05:20,760 --> 00:05:22,049 mitigate these depending on the 150 00:05:22,050 --> 00:05:23,849 circumstances and threat model. 151 00:05:23,850 --> 00:05:25,709 So that includes, obviously, encryption 152 00:05:25,710 --> 00:05:28,109 burner phone set up, not just to talk 153 00:05:28,110 --> 00:05:30,179 to not tie them to your identity, but 154 00:05:30,180 --> 00:05:32,039 you can also specifically obfuscate the 155 00:05:32,040 --> 00:05:34,559 identity that they're tied to 156 00:05:34,560 --> 00:05:36,599 pretty assigning a moving meeting, places 157 00:05:36,600 --> 00:05:38,789 that you set up in person, and then a big 158 00:05:38,790 --> 00:05:41,069 one cover if you can create 159 00:05:41,070 --> 00:05:42,629 a lot of other cover, whether it's 160 00:05:42,630 --> 00:05:45,139 traffic online or cover meetings. 161 00:05:45,140 --> 00:05:47,429 So, for example, next C.C.C. 162 00:05:47,430 --> 00:05:49,259 would be a great place to arrange to meet 163 00:05:49,260 --> 00:05:50,260 your sources 164 00:05:52,050 --> 00:05:53,729 when dealing with source protection. 165 00:05:54,900 --> 00:05:56,579 It's very important that you split up the 166 00:05:56,580 --> 00:05:58,529 investigative resources of the opponents. 167 00:05:58,530 --> 00:06:00,089 So the more different types of cover, the 168 00:06:00,090 --> 00:06:02,279 more trails that you're setting 169 00:06:02,280 --> 00:06:03,779 that they have to follow, whether these 170 00:06:03,780 --> 00:06:05,850 by the financial data 171 00:06:07,290 --> 00:06:09,809 or otherwise, the larger the anonymity 172 00:06:09,810 --> 00:06:11,999 put anonymity pool that you're creating, 173 00:06:12,000 --> 00:06:13,000 the better. 174 00:06:16,570 --> 00:06:17,979 Often when speaking to sources, 175 00:06:17,980 --> 00:06:19,089 journalists want to get a lot of 176 00:06:19,090 --> 00:06:20,110 information from them. 177 00:06:22,180 --> 00:06:24,489 This slide outlines the 178 00:06:24,490 --> 00:06:27,009 AP's standards for 179 00:06:27,010 --> 00:06:29,079 what it means for on the record, off the 180 00:06:29,080 --> 00:06:31,239 record, background and deep background. 181 00:06:31,240 --> 00:06:33,579 And as you can see, they have various 182 00:06:33,580 --> 00:06:34,870 supposed ethical 183 00:06:35,920 --> 00:06:38,109 obligations of what they what they print 184 00:06:38,110 --> 00:06:39,339 and what they don't. 185 00:06:39,340 --> 00:06:40,659 There are many cases where journalists 186 00:06:40,660 --> 00:06:42,429 don't actually describe these properly to 187 00:06:42,430 --> 00:06:44,319 sources. The impetus is always on the 188 00:06:44,320 --> 00:06:47,019 source for them to try and understand 189 00:06:47,020 --> 00:06:49,299 what's what, whether what they're saying 190 00:06:49,300 --> 00:06:50,949 will be printed and used. 191 00:06:50,950 --> 00:06:52,539 And as you can actually see here, the 192 00:06:52,540 --> 00:06:54,639 AP's this is taken straight 193 00:06:54,640 --> 00:06:55,749 from the AP's website. 194 00:06:55,750 --> 00:06:57,609 Their official policy is to try as 195 00:06:57,610 --> 00:06:59,769 vigorously as possible to try and force 196 00:06:59,770 --> 00:07:01,749 the source to put on the record 197 00:07:01,750 --> 00:07:03,639 information that they wanted to keep off 198 00:07:03,640 --> 00:07:05,919 the record in the first place. 199 00:07:05,920 --> 00:07:07,179 I think that when you're dealing with 200 00:07:07,180 --> 00:07:09,399 sources who are taking huge risks and 201 00:07:09,400 --> 00:07:11,859 have potentially dire consequences, 202 00:07:11,860 --> 00:07:13,959 bullying them into doing something that 203 00:07:13,960 --> 00:07:15,639 way, you don't necessarily understand 204 00:07:15,640 --> 00:07:17,079 their situation. And the risks they're 205 00:07:17,080 --> 00:07:19,359 facing is and isn't actually the 206 00:07:19,360 --> 00:07:21,429 the ethical way to go. 207 00:07:21,430 --> 00:07:22,959 The burden in these cases really should 208 00:07:22,960 --> 00:07:24,669 be on the journalists to be ethical and 209 00:07:24,670 --> 00:07:26,769 to explain to the source precisely 210 00:07:26,770 --> 00:07:28,119 what they're doing. 211 00:07:28,120 --> 00:07:29,829 Similarly, a journalist and media 212 00:07:29,830 --> 00:07:31,749 organizations should be very upfront 213 00:07:31,750 --> 00:07:33,519 about what protections and assistance 214 00:07:33,520 --> 00:07:35,139 will or won't be given. 215 00:07:35,140 --> 00:07:36,729 Will the journalist fight subpoenas and 216 00:07:36,730 --> 00:07:38,229 risk jail themselves to protect the 217 00:07:38,230 --> 00:07:40,749 source? Will the media organization 218 00:07:40,750 --> 00:07:42,879 pay or legal legal bills? 219 00:07:42,880 --> 00:07:44,679 There have been cases where media 220 00:07:44,680 --> 00:07:46,389 organizations tell the source that they 221 00:07:46,390 --> 00:07:48,579 will and then and then they renege 222 00:07:48,580 --> 00:07:50,559 on this promise and they think this is 223 00:07:50,560 --> 00:07:52,539 actually worse than if the source were to 224 00:07:52,540 --> 00:07:54,669 understand that these these did not 225 00:07:54,670 --> 00:07:55,930 exist in the first place. 226 00:07:57,220 --> 00:07:58,719 And it's not just the contact between the 227 00:07:58,720 --> 00:08:00,309 journalist and the source that can cause 228 00:08:00,310 --> 00:08:01,389 issues. 229 00:08:01,390 --> 00:08:03,819 There's an example of John Kiriakou 230 00:08:03,820 --> 00:08:05,919 and Matthew Cole, who's a former ABC 231 00:08:05,920 --> 00:08:06,920 News producer. 232 00:08:08,530 --> 00:08:10,599 Cole wrote to Kiriakou, who is now in 233 00:08:10,600 --> 00:08:13,839 jail for exposing CIA torture programs. 234 00:08:13,840 --> 00:08:15,819 When Cole was writing a book about a CIA 235 00:08:15,820 --> 00:08:18,039 rendition in Italy, he wrote to Kiriakou 236 00:08:18,040 --> 00:08:19,929 asking if Kiriakou knew the name of the 237 00:08:19,930 --> 00:08:21,909 CIA officer involved. 238 00:08:21,910 --> 00:08:23,349 There was a bit of an email exchange and 239 00:08:23,350 --> 00:08:24,730 eventually Kiriakou said 240 00:08:25,900 --> 00:08:28,089 that, yes, he had remembered it, 241 00:08:28,090 --> 00:08:29,679 then sent the name of the officer that 242 00:08:29,680 --> 00:08:31,689 he'd been given to a defense investigator 243 00:08:31,690 --> 00:08:33,099 at Guantanamo Bay. 244 00:08:33,100 --> 00:08:34,989 This name ended up in a classified court 245 00:08:34,990 --> 00:08:37,329 filing, caught the attention of the FBI 246 00:08:37,330 --> 00:08:39,009 and became the final piece of evidence 247 00:08:39,010 --> 00:08:41,529 that leaked the links to Kiriakou. 248 00:08:41,530 --> 00:08:42,609 So, as you can see, there are many 249 00:08:42,610 --> 00:08:45,399 examples of just while you're having 250 00:08:45,400 --> 00:08:47,319 just contact with your with your source 251 00:08:47,320 --> 00:08:49,229 of the sorts of mistakes that can be made 252 00:08:50,440 --> 00:08:52,149 to the hand over points of documents is 253 00:08:52,150 --> 00:08:53,469 the area that has gotten the most 254 00:08:53,470 --> 00:08:55,569 attention in the last year. 255 00:08:55,570 --> 00:08:57,159 A number of news organizations are 256 00:08:57,160 --> 00:08:58,719 setting up online drop boxes. 257 00:08:58,720 --> 00:09:00,669 And whilst there's grace, of course, they 258 00:09:00,670 --> 00:09:02,829 only work if the operational security on 259 00:09:02,830 --> 00:09:04,389 both sides of the source and the 260 00:09:04,390 --> 00:09:06,309 journalists have performed precisely 261 00:09:07,750 --> 00:09:10,179 as a general rule in Dropbox, 262 00:09:10,180 --> 00:09:12,009 as the source should have to think about 263 00:09:12,010 --> 00:09:14,139 as little as possible, there should be as 264 00:09:14,140 --> 00:09:16,449 little burden on the source as possible. 265 00:09:16,450 --> 00:09:18,069 The impetus really should be on the 266 00:09:18,070 --> 00:09:19,989 journalist. And having worked with quite 267 00:09:19,990 --> 00:09:21,819 a few journalists, I'm aware of how much 268 00:09:21,820 --> 00:09:23,709 training and understanding they need to 269 00:09:23,710 --> 00:09:24,970 be able to do this properly. 270 00:09:26,500 --> 00:09:27,909 The other issue I find with the current 271 00:09:27,910 --> 00:09:30,069 state where so much importance is placed 272 00:09:30,070 --> 00:09:32,259 on the Dropbox itself, is that in many 273 00:09:32,260 --> 00:09:34,269 of these cases, this just won't work a 274 00:09:34,270 --> 00:09:34,449 lot. 275 00:09:34,450 --> 00:09:36,279 Rely on Tor, which is unavailable in some 276 00:09:36,280 --> 00:09:37,749 parts of the world or people's work 277 00:09:37,750 --> 00:09:38,979 places. 278 00:09:38,980 --> 00:09:41,139 Document sets might be too big, 279 00:09:41,140 --> 00:09:43,149 too large to hand over a few notes in 280 00:09:43,150 --> 00:09:44,679 Laura's film, I'm sure many of you saw 281 00:09:44,680 --> 00:09:46,749 last night they were using 282 00:09:46,750 --> 00:09:49,389 async and then in-person handover's. 283 00:09:49,390 --> 00:09:50,979 So whilst of course the handover is an 284 00:09:50,980 --> 00:09:52,329 important part in the journalistic 285 00:09:52,330 --> 00:09:54,069 process, it should be noted that all 286 00:09:54,070 --> 00:09:56,079 other parts of the process have just as 287 00:09:56,080 --> 00:09:58,299 much security, technical 288 00:09:58,300 --> 00:10:01,479 and operational issues that can arise. 289 00:10:01,480 --> 00:10:03,399 And nor does it actually work in all 290 00:10:03,400 --> 00:10:04,539 conditions of the point. 291 00:10:04,540 --> 00:10:06,629 It's trying to solve the problem. 292 00:10:07,840 --> 00:10:10,239 So then we move on to publishing 293 00:10:10,240 --> 00:10:11,949 the next part of the sourcing processes, 294 00:10:11,950 --> 00:10:12,969 of course, publishing. 295 00:10:12,970 --> 00:10:14,739 Now, the obvious point here is do not 296 00:10:14,740 --> 00:10:16,509 publish identifying information about the 297 00:10:16,510 --> 00:10:19,089 source and certainly not their name. 298 00:10:19,090 --> 00:10:20,679 However, apparently not all journalists 299 00:10:20,680 --> 00:10:22,599 can even stick to that. 300 00:10:22,600 --> 00:10:24,459 Michael Isikoff of Newsweek reporter 301 00:10:24,460 --> 00:10:25,959 published emails he received from a 302 00:10:25,960 --> 00:10:28,239 source, Jesselyn Radack, regarding a case 303 00:10:28,240 --> 00:10:30,489 of a captured suspected Taliban member 304 00:10:30,490 --> 00:10:32,649 in Afghanistan and whether he had 305 00:10:32,650 --> 00:10:34,989 a right to an attorney or not. 306 00:10:34,990 --> 00:10:36,789 Jesselyn at the time works in the ethics 307 00:10:36,790 --> 00:10:38,859 department of the Ethics Department of 308 00:10:38,860 --> 00:10:41,139 the DOJ, and 309 00:10:41,140 --> 00:10:42,939 she was contacted and confirmed that, 310 00:10:42,940 --> 00:10:45,279 yes, he did have a right to an attorney 311 00:10:45,280 --> 00:10:46,539 under duress, though. 312 00:10:46,540 --> 00:10:48,549 Back in Afghanistan, John Walker Lindh, 313 00:10:48,550 --> 00:10:50,649 the detainee, waived his right, although 314 00:10:50,650 --> 00:10:52,509 his parents back in the US had already 315 00:10:52,510 --> 00:10:54,969 secured secured him a lawyer. 316 00:10:54,970 --> 00:10:56,829 As the case progressed, Radack was aware 317 00:10:56,830 --> 00:10:58,719 that Lynn's legal rights have been 318 00:10:58,720 --> 00:11:01,029 violated and started to take action 319 00:11:01,030 --> 00:11:03,129 initially internally when 320 00:11:03,130 --> 00:11:05,049 this resulted in retribution at work and 321 00:11:05,050 --> 00:11:07,029 files going missing about the case, she 322 00:11:07,030 --> 00:11:09,459 went to a reporter with her emails. 323 00:11:09,460 --> 00:11:10,749 The result was that he didn't take the 324 00:11:10,750 --> 00:11:11,979 name out of her emails. 325 00:11:11,980 --> 00:11:13,599 They were printed, ended up in court 326 00:11:13,600 --> 00:11:15,149 cases. She lost her job. 327 00:11:15,150 --> 00:11:17,429 Almost got disbarred and a tough legal 328 00:11:17,430 --> 00:11:18,450 case began for her 329 00:11:19,580 --> 00:11:21,299 and other important points and source 330 00:11:21,300 --> 00:11:22,799 protection at the publishing stage is the 331 00:11:22,800 --> 00:11:24,269 language that the journalists use when 332 00:11:24,270 --> 00:11:25,829 writing articles. 333 00:11:25,830 --> 00:11:28,289 One of WikiLeaks main policies is never, 334 00:11:28,290 --> 00:11:30,029 ever talk about sourcing. 335 00:11:30,030 --> 00:11:32,099 Never, ever confirm 336 00:11:32,100 --> 00:11:34,289 or deny a person or people might be your 337 00:11:34,290 --> 00:11:35,369 source. 338 00:11:35,370 --> 00:11:37,769 The issue here is it's a slippery slope. 339 00:11:37,770 --> 00:11:39,629 Even if the source wants to become public 340 00:11:39,630 --> 00:11:41,459 and you can associate certain documents 341 00:11:41,460 --> 00:11:43,229 with them. What if someone else from that 342 00:11:43,230 --> 00:11:45,089 organization comes forward afterwards 343 00:11:45,090 --> 00:11:46,799 with similar documents, but they want to 344 00:11:46,800 --> 00:11:48,059 remain anonymous? 345 00:11:48,060 --> 00:11:50,569 Now you have to publish articles 346 00:11:50,570 --> 00:11:52,799 that that would potentially 347 00:11:52,800 --> 00:11:54,629 be for the person from the person you 348 00:11:54,630 --> 00:11:55,949 were previously naming. 349 00:11:55,950 --> 00:11:57,689 But now you're not naming that person as 350 00:11:57,690 --> 00:11:58,589 a source. 351 00:11:58,590 --> 00:12:00,749 So if you don't want to attribute them, 352 00:12:00,750 --> 00:12:02,849 you're now waving a big red flag 353 00:12:02,850 --> 00:12:04,529 to the government or whoever the 354 00:12:04,530 --> 00:12:06,599 documents came from saying, hey, 355 00:12:06,600 --> 00:12:07,919 we've got someone else that you should 356 00:12:07,920 --> 00:12:09,210 start a large manhunt for 357 00:12:10,650 --> 00:12:11,939 any organization. 358 00:12:11,940 --> 00:12:13,889 Source protection policies in this way 359 00:12:13,890 --> 00:12:15,989 should be severed, severed totally 360 00:12:15,990 --> 00:12:17,909 from the publication process. 361 00:12:17,910 --> 00:12:19,589 So if you do wish to write about an 362 00:12:19,590 --> 00:12:21,449 alleged source, you should distance it 363 00:12:21,450 --> 00:12:22,859 from other stories. 364 00:12:22,860 --> 00:12:24,899 Don't start writing about speculations, 365 00:12:24,900 --> 00:12:26,969 attributions, tweeting about who 366 00:12:26,970 --> 00:12:29,009 or who might not be sources. 367 00:12:29,010 --> 00:12:30,599 Essentially, when it comes to sourcing 368 00:12:30,600 --> 00:12:32,669 and publishing, just shut the fuck up 369 00:12:34,050 --> 00:12:35,070 any and all language. 370 00:12:40,280 --> 00:12:41,789 Any and all language you use when 371 00:12:41,790 --> 00:12:43,739 publishing that is in any way related to 372 00:12:43,740 --> 00:12:46,409 sources is extremely important, mainly 373 00:12:46,410 --> 00:12:48,539 for your source, always 374 00:12:48,540 --> 00:12:50,939 used alleged use, disclosed versus 375 00:12:50,940 --> 00:12:53,279 leak we often use, for example, 376 00:12:53,280 --> 00:12:55,259 WikiLeaks obtained. 377 00:12:55,260 --> 00:12:56,729 You take the impetus away from the 378 00:12:56,730 --> 00:12:57,779 source. 379 00:12:57,780 --> 00:12:59,429 These have onward implications for any 380 00:12:59,430 --> 00:13:01,109 potential court cases for you and your 381 00:13:01,110 --> 00:13:02,039 sources. 382 00:13:02,040 --> 00:13:03,449 And when the government is out to get 383 00:13:03,450 --> 00:13:05,219 someone, they will go through every 384 00:13:05,220 --> 00:13:07,379 tweet, every article and every 385 00:13:07,380 --> 00:13:09,599 word to see if they can use it in any 386 00:13:09,600 --> 00:13:11,549 way to bolster their case. 387 00:13:11,550 --> 00:13:13,409 If you're in any doubt at all, check with 388 00:13:13,410 --> 00:13:15,629 a lawyer and not necessarily 389 00:13:15,630 --> 00:13:16,709 a media lawyer. 390 00:13:16,710 --> 00:13:18,389 They're there to protect the media 391 00:13:18,390 --> 00:13:19,889 against libel, et cetera. 392 00:13:19,890 --> 00:13:21,329 They're not specifically trying to 393 00:13:21,330 --> 00:13:23,009 protect whistleblowers. 394 00:13:23,010 --> 00:13:25,079 There are whistle lawyers around the 395 00:13:25,080 --> 00:13:26,669 world who be happy to talk about those 396 00:13:26,670 --> 00:13:28,679 issues. But if you still have any doubts 397 00:13:28,680 --> 00:13:30,720 at all, shut the fuck up. 398 00:13:31,860 --> 00:13:33,179 The only time you should talk about a 399 00:13:33,180 --> 00:13:34,889 source is if you're lying. 400 00:13:38,350 --> 00:13:39,759 And lastly, within the publishing 401 00:13:39,760 --> 00:13:41,049 elements, there are the documents 402 00:13:41,050 --> 00:13:42,909 themselves clearing anything at all that 403 00:13:42,910 --> 00:13:44,229 could identify or lead to the 404 00:13:44,230 --> 00:13:46,149 identification of a source. 405 00:13:46,150 --> 00:13:48,099 This is very varied process that depends 406 00:13:48,100 --> 00:13:49,899 on the situation. It's impossible to go 407 00:13:49,900 --> 00:13:51,669 through them all here. So just to be 408 00:13:51,670 --> 00:13:53,859 brief, peek metadata, of course, 409 00:13:53,860 --> 00:13:56,109 is reasonably well known and 410 00:13:56,110 --> 00:13:58,359 of course, in these circles as well under 411 00:13:58,360 --> 00:13:59,889 understood issue. 412 00:13:59,890 --> 00:14:01,689 But there can also be watermarking within 413 00:14:01,690 --> 00:14:02,769 the text itself. 414 00:14:04,930 --> 00:14:07,179 So when you're publishing the documents, 415 00:14:07,180 --> 00:14:08,409 the big thing that you should do in the 416 00:14:08,410 --> 00:14:10,149 process is to look at actually the 417 00:14:10,150 --> 00:14:12,009 organization itself and the workflow 418 00:14:12,010 --> 00:14:14,169 within them who definitely has access to 419 00:14:14,170 --> 00:14:16,089 exactly what copy of the documents, who 420 00:14:16,090 --> 00:14:18,249 they distributed to, who officially 421 00:14:18,250 --> 00:14:20,079 gets it. But what are the sysadmins, 422 00:14:20,080 --> 00:14:21,819 receptionists, what other people are they 423 00:14:21,820 --> 00:14:23,559 allowed to distribute to? 424 00:14:23,560 --> 00:14:25,569 And this will give you an understanding 425 00:14:25,570 --> 00:14:27,729 of exactly the type of 426 00:14:27,730 --> 00:14:29,709 exactly the copy of the document, how 427 00:14:29,710 --> 00:14:31,359 many people have access to that, and 428 00:14:31,360 --> 00:14:33,759 therefore what your anonymity pool is. 429 00:14:33,760 --> 00:14:35,499 So, for example, contracts that large 430 00:14:35,500 --> 00:14:37,239 companies, whilst they're being sent 431 00:14:37,240 --> 00:14:38,769 around like a merger contract, for 432 00:14:38,770 --> 00:14:40,959 example, for example, and worked on, 433 00:14:40,960 --> 00:14:42,669 they'll often contain tiny word of 434 00:14:42,670 --> 00:14:43,749 formatting changes. 435 00:14:43,750 --> 00:14:44,799 A comma is added. 436 00:14:44,800 --> 00:14:46,929 Double spaces put somewhere 437 00:14:46,930 --> 00:14:48,399 so that a potential source could be 438 00:14:48,400 --> 00:14:49,569 identified. 439 00:14:49,570 --> 00:14:51,039 So if you're dealing with documents like 440 00:14:51,040 --> 00:14:52,869 these, the media should be going through 441 00:14:52,870 --> 00:14:54,999 a process to standardize and remove any 442 00:14:55,000 --> 00:14:57,219 possible inconsistencies that potentially 443 00:14:57,220 --> 00:14:59,649 lead to a certain source adding plourde 444 00:14:59,650 --> 00:15:01,809 plausible deniability. 445 00:15:01,810 --> 00:15:04,479 So other examples as well in in 446 00:15:04,480 --> 00:15:06,069 prepping documents, publication for 447 00:15:06,070 --> 00:15:07,119 source protection. 448 00:15:07,120 --> 00:15:09,579 A couple of examples from WikiLeaks. 449 00:15:09,580 --> 00:15:11,919 We had a 450 00:15:11,920 --> 00:15:14,049 disclosure that came to us from a secret 451 00:15:14,050 --> 00:15:16,149 society at MIT and 452 00:15:16,150 --> 00:15:17,589 we were publishing the ritual magic 453 00:15:17,590 --> 00:15:18,879 manual of it. 454 00:15:18,880 --> 00:15:21,009 And we discovered that the sources had 455 00:15:21,010 --> 00:15:23,329 taken photos of the manual of each page. 456 00:15:23,330 --> 00:15:24,639 This is how they'd got it. 457 00:15:24,640 --> 00:15:26,949 And each manual had a number 458 00:15:26,950 --> 00:15:29,079 on the front page, which was the 459 00:15:29,080 --> 00:15:30,909 chapter of the society that it was. 460 00:15:30,910 --> 00:15:32,289 It was an identifying number for that 461 00:15:32,290 --> 00:15:33,290 chapter. 462 00:15:34,570 --> 00:15:36,459 So the source had edited this out using 463 00:15:36,460 --> 00:15:37,929 Photoshop, and they'd done that very 464 00:15:37,930 --> 00:15:39,009 well. And that was all great. 465 00:15:39,010 --> 00:15:40,719 But what we noticed is it was it was 466 00:15:40,720 --> 00:15:41,709 double sided prints. 467 00:15:41,710 --> 00:15:43,269 And when you turned over to the onto the 468 00:15:43,270 --> 00:15:45,399 other side, if you didn't 469 00:15:45,400 --> 00:15:48,069 and a very good image enhancement, 470 00:15:48,070 --> 00:15:50,079 you could still see a shadow of the next 471 00:15:50,080 --> 00:15:51,789 from the next page of the number coming 472 00:15:51,790 --> 00:15:53,739 through. So that was really checking 473 00:15:53,740 --> 00:15:55,809 very, very closely each page 474 00:15:55,810 --> 00:15:57,019 of the documents. 475 00:15:57,020 --> 00:15:58,959 There was another example where the legal 476 00:15:58,960 --> 00:16:00,850 filing number used on the documents 477 00:16:02,380 --> 00:16:04,179 was on the documents. 478 00:16:04,180 --> 00:16:06,579 This was something that was 479 00:16:08,020 --> 00:16:10,149 was allegedly from a lawyer who 480 00:16:10,150 --> 00:16:11,769 got the docs through discovery, but they 481 00:16:11,770 --> 00:16:13,839 actually came through our legit 482 00:16:13,840 --> 00:16:15,969 source was another legit 483 00:16:15,970 --> 00:16:17,349 source that was a middleman. 484 00:16:17,350 --> 00:16:19,159 And this actually often happens that the 485 00:16:19,160 --> 00:16:20,919 sources will reach out or you'll get 486 00:16:20,920 --> 00:16:23,079 documents that come via someone else. 487 00:16:23,080 --> 00:16:24,699 So if your source says, oh, yes, yes, 488 00:16:24,700 --> 00:16:26,679 that's fine, it may be fine for them, but 489 00:16:26,680 --> 00:16:28,419 is it fine for the original source? 490 00:16:28,420 --> 00:16:30,159 So you have to be independent when you're 491 00:16:30,160 --> 00:16:31,239 assessing this as well. 492 00:16:32,710 --> 00:16:34,959 And moving on to my next category, 493 00:16:34,960 --> 00:16:37,179 continuing contacts and relations. 494 00:16:37,180 --> 00:16:39,129 This is a pretty standard thing in the 495 00:16:39,130 --> 00:16:40,689 world of journalism that they will want 496 00:16:40,690 --> 00:16:42,699 to maintain contact with a source. 497 00:16:42,700 --> 00:16:44,739 Maybe they want to ask questions about 498 00:16:44,740 --> 00:16:46,989 the documents or they want to try 499 00:16:46,990 --> 00:16:49,479 and get more documents 500 00:16:49,480 --> 00:16:50,949 here. It's actually even more crucial 501 00:16:50,950 --> 00:16:53,709 that there's tight operational security 502 00:16:53,710 --> 00:16:55,539 because just because the journalist's 503 00:16:55,540 --> 00:16:57,069 story is out doesn't mean the potential 504 00:16:57,070 --> 00:16:59,109 legal issues for the source are over. 505 00:16:59,110 --> 00:17:01,599 In fact, I would say they've increased. 506 00:17:01,600 --> 00:17:03,879 It's one of the more sensitive times 507 00:17:03,880 --> 00:17:05,229 because, of course, the government or 508 00:17:05,230 --> 00:17:07,029 organization is now alerted that there's 509 00:17:07,030 --> 00:17:08,650 a leak. They're going to be on the hunt. 510 00:17:09,849 --> 00:17:11,799 Moreover, journalists can be subpoenaed 511 00:17:11,800 --> 00:17:13,779 as they are the eyewitness to the crime. 512 00:17:13,780 --> 00:17:15,549 So for everyone involved at this time, 513 00:17:15,550 --> 00:17:17,618 security is crucial. 514 00:17:17,619 --> 00:17:19,749 And speaking of subpoenas, just a little 515 00:17:19,750 --> 00:17:20,889 tidbit for C.C.C.. 516 00:17:20,890 --> 00:17:23,019 WikiLeaks will be doing more on this next 517 00:17:23,020 --> 00:17:24,489 year. But I got a really nice Christmas 518 00:17:24,490 --> 00:17:25,490 present from Google. 519 00:17:26,980 --> 00:17:29,439 Of course, no one at WikiLeaks is 520 00:17:29,440 --> 00:17:31,909 using Google services for anything except 521 00:17:31,910 --> 00:17:34,179 sensitive. But I had 522 00:17:34,180 --> 00:17:36,489 a long time ago 523 00:17:36,490 --> 00:17:38,739 done something in the past and as part 524 00:17:38,740 --> 00:17:40,839 of the US case against Julian, the 525 00:17:40,840 --> 00:17:42,249 US grand jury that's going there, 526 00:17:42,250 --> 00:17:44,589 Kristen, who is our spokesperson, 527 00:17:44,590 --> 00:17:46,539 myself and other people relating to 528 00:17:46,540 --> 00:17:48,909 Julian and WikiLeaks receives literally 529 00:17:48,910 --> 00:17:50,260 the day before Christmas. 530 00:17:51,460 --> 00:17:53,349 Oh, that was murder. 531 00:17:53,350 --> 00:17:55,419 I'm forgetting my slide sorry, 532 00:17:55,420 --> 00:17:58,029 received this lovely document 533 00:17:58,030 --> 00:18:00,519 here, so this is a now unsealed 534 00:18:00,520 --> 00:18:02,649 search warrant that was 535 00:18:02,650 --> 00:18:05,229 sent by the Google Department. 536 00:18:05,230 --> 00:18:07,359 It's related to the espionage 537 00:18:07,360 --> 00:18:09,489 case against Julian in the United 538 00:18:09,490 --> 00:18:11,589 States. The seventy nine three G is the 539 00:18:11,590 --> 00:18:14,139 legal is the legal code for that. 540 00:18:14,140 --> 00:18:16,359 So as we can see, this this case against 541 00:18:16,360 --> 00:18:18,539 Julian is still still continuing and they 542 00:18:18,540 --> 00:18:20,049 they continue to spread the net. 543 00:18:22,720 --> 00:18:24,999 So aside from subpoenas that 544 00:18:25,000 --> 00:18:26,259 they can try and get you with, 545 00:18:27,310 --> 00:18:29,349 this doesn't just apply for for the media 546 00:18:29,350 --> 00:18:30,279 who the source went to. 547 00:18:30,280 --> 00:18:31,629 The security that you need to have at 548 00:18:31,630 --> 00:18:33,999 this point, ethical journalism practices 549 00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:36,519 should be protecting all whistleblowers. 550 00:18:36,520 --> 00:18:38,649 So Scott Shane from the from The New York 551 00:18:38,650 --> 00:18:40,059 Times was writing an article on John 552 00:18:40,060 --> 00:18:40,989 Kiriakou. 553 00:18:40,990 --> 00:18:42,459 He had not been his source, 554 00:18:43,960 --> 00:18:46,029 but he was writing writing on him. 555 00:18:47,230 --> 00:18:49,419 And when he when 556 00:18:49,420 --> 00:18:51,069 Kiriakou agreed to the interview, part of 557 00:18:51,070 --> 00:18:53,079 the conditions he put was that Shane 558 00:18:53,080 --> 00:18:54,080 would run the 559 00:18:56,020 --> 00:18:57,969 quotes by Kiriakou, his legal team, just 560 00:18:57,970 --> 00:18:59,769 in case the phrase in Kiriakou was used 561 00:18:59,770 --> 00:19:01,959 was potentially legally damaging 562 00:19:01,960 --> 00:19:02,889 for him. 563 00:19:02,890 --> 00:19:05,109 Shane actually ended up reneging 564 00:19:05,110 --> 00:19:08,109 on this promise and some of the wording 565 00:19:08,110 --> 00:19:10,359 was then used in Kiriakou sentencing 566 00:19:10,360 --> 00:19:12,549 case against him assisting 567 00:19:12,550 --> 00:19:13,989 the prosecution in getting him an 568 00:19:13,990 --> 00:19:16,179 overbearing sentence. 569 00:19:16,180 --> 00:19:17,919 Journalists should definitely be aware 570 00:19:17,920 --> 00:19:20,319 that at this point it's hugely stressful 571 00:19:20,320 --> 00:19:22,119 and a lonely time for whistleblowers. 572 00:19:22,120 --> 00:19:23,709 Many have had their lives, families and 573 00:19:23,710 --> 00:19:24,879 jobs all destroyed. 574 00:19:24,880 --> 00:19:26,749 They're under a lot of pressure. 575 00:19:26,750 --> 00:19:27,969 Some will reach out to others for 576 00:19:27,970 --> 00:19:29,259 comfort. 577 00:19:29,260 --> 00:19:31,659 This can have disastrous consequences. 578 00:19:31,660 --> 00:19:33,549 A well known case of this is, of course, 579 00:19:33,550 --> 00:19:35,379 Chelsea Manning, who reached out and 580 00:19:35,380 --> 00:19:37,089 placed trust in someone she thought was a 581 00:19:37,090 --> 00:19:39,099 priest and therefore had obligations of 582 00:19:39,100 --> 00:19:40,899 confidentiality. 583 00:19:40,900 --> 00:19:43,059 Of course, Lamo had lied and instead 584 00:19:43,060 --> 00:19:44,709 turned Manning into the authorities and 585 00:19:44,710 --> 00:19:46,899 went to his mates. Poulsen at Wired, who 586 00:19:46,900 --> 00:19:48,459 wrote an article cherrypicking the 587 00:19:48,460 --> 00:19:50,229 alleged chat logs in a way that was very 588 00:19:50,230 --> 00:19:51,230 damaging for Manning. 589 00:19:52,330 --> 00:19:53,829 Now, of course, I can appreciate that in 590 00:19:53,830 --> 00:19:55,629 some instances, this for the source 591 00:19:55,630 --> 00:19:58,629 themselves, it's it's risky 592 00:19:58,630 --> 00:20:00,879 if the media have a lot of contact. 593 00:20:00,880 --> 00:20:02,409 But there are organizations there's 594 00:20:02,410 --> 00:20:04,719 actually a gentleman in the audience 595 00:20:04,720 --> 00:20:06,639 here, Gavin McFadzean, who runs an 596 00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:08,439 organization that Carriageworks with in 597 00:20:08,440 --> 00:20:10,599 the UK called Whisler, that deals 598 00:20:10,600 --> 00:20:12,729 with this precise issue is part 599 00:20:12,730 --> 00:20:15,189 of aftercare for 600 00:20:15,190 --> 00:20:16,239 for whistleblowers. 601 00:20:16,240 --> 00:20:17,889 So journalists, for example, could refer 602 00:20:17,890 --> 00:20:19,299 them to them. And anyone dealing with 603 00:20:19,300 --> 00:20:20,859 source protection or whistleblowing 604 00:20:20,860 --> 00:20:22,479 should be aware of these organizations 605 00:20:22,480 --> 00:20:23,480 around the world. 606 00:20:24,850 --> 00:20:26,859 And then finally in the aftercare stage, 607 00:20:26,860 --> 00:20:28,839 there's something that annoys me hugely. 608 00:20:28,840 --> 00:20:30,369 And this is the excuse by journalists 609 00:20:30,370 --> 00:20:32,049 that they can't assess their alleged 610 00:20:32,050 --> 00:20:33,999 source for fears of this phase of this 611 00:20:34,000 --> 00:20:35,949 story is becoming biased. 612 00:20:35,950 --> 00:20:37,749 I've seen too many cases of what I refer 613 00:20:37,750 --> 00:20:39,459 to as asset stripping, and then the 614 00:20:39,460 --> 00:20:40,899 journalists just leave. 615 00:20:40,900 --> 00:20:42,849 My stance is if you're a good journalist, 616 00:20:42,850 --> 00:20:44,979 your stories will speak for themselves 617 00:20:44,980 --> 00:20:46,629 or someone else that the organization 618 00:20:46,630 --> 00:20:48,189 could write. It doesn't mean that you 619 00:20:48,190 --> 00:20:50,679 can't write positive articles about them, 620 00:20:50,680 --> 00:20:52,869 as so many media alleged for so long 621 00:20:52,870 --> 00:20:54,759 regarding Manning, it doesn't mean you 622 00:20:54,760 --> 00:20:56,259 can't assist them when they're stuck in a 623 00:20:56,260 --> 00:20:57,939 foreign land and leave them there, as the 624 00:20:57,940 --> 00:20:59,439 Guardian did with Snowden. 625 00:20:59,440 --> 00:21:00,909 It doesn't mean you can't write to the 626 00:21:00,910 --> 00:21:03,099 judge for leniency, as most Western media 627 00:21:03,100 --> 00:21:04,659 did in the case of Jeremy Hammond, 628 00:21:04,660 --> 00:21:06,849 alleged Stratfor whistleblower. 629 00:21:06,850 --> 00:21:08,769 And here is Grace to tell us more about 630 00:21:08,770 --> 00:21:10,209 Hammond's case. 631 00:21:10,210 --> 00:21:11,589 I, uh. 632 00:21:12,790 --> 00:21:14,019 OK, so 633 00:21:15,640 --> 00:21:17,049 for those of you that might not know who 634 00:21:17,050 --> 00:21:19,119 Jeremy Hammond is, he was a member 635 00:21:19,120 --> 00:21:21,309 of Anonymous who 636 00:21:21,310 --> 00:21:23,229 hacked Stratfor, stands for Strategic 637 00:21:23,230 --> 00:21:25,689 Forecasting Inc, which is a private firm 638 00:21:25,690 --> 00:21:28,269 that does it's a private intelligence 639 00:21:28,270 --> 00:21:29,979 firm. Anybody with the money can hire 640 00:21:29,980 --> 00:21:32,529 them to investigate 641 00:21:32,530 --> 00:21:34,779 whoever they want. And Stratfor did 642 00:21:34,780 --> 00:21:36,189 a lot. 643 00:21:36,190 --> 00:21:38,379 Shapiro was hired by the US government, 644 00:21:38,380 --> 00:21:41,049 by corporations 645 00:21:41,050 --> 00:21:43,239 such as Coca-Cola, Dow Chemical, 646 00:21:43,240 --> 00:21:45,309 to spy on activists that 647 00:21:45,310 --> 00:21:46,689 they basically didn't agree with, didn't 648 00:21:46,690 --> 00:21:48,429 like what they were saying. 649 00:21:48,430 --> 00:21:51,009 And this all came out when Jeremy 650 00:21:51,010 --> 00:21:53,559 hacked their email systems and 651 00:21:53,560 --> 00:21:55,119 allegedly released them, 652 00:21:56,200 --> 00:21:58,449 allegedly release them to 653 00:21:58,450 --> 00:21:59,450 WikiLeaks. 654 00:22:01,330 --> 00:22:02,330 So end. 655 00:22:06,010 --> 00:22:08,109 Yes, so that and one 656 00:22:08,110 --> 00:22:10,359 of the major one of the major 657 00:22:10,360 --> 00:22:12,309 ways that he was caught was by an FBI 658 00:22:12,310 --> 00:22:14,589 informant named Sârbu, real name Hector 659 00:22:14,590 --> 00:22:16,779 Monsegur, who is going to figure 660 00:22:16,780 --> 00:22:17,529 in a little bit later. 661 00:22:17,530 --> 00:22:19,599 But that was one of 662 00:22:19,600 --> 00:22:21,099 the main ways that he was caught. 663 00:22:21,100 --> 00:22:23,289 Another hacker was turned state 664 00:22:23,290 --> 00:22:25,449 witness against him, which is 665 00:22:25,450 --> 00:22:27,909 another issue that it's 666 00:22:27,910 --> 00:22:29,630 OK to say have. 667 00:22:36,120 --> 00:22:38,009 All right, well, first of all, one of the 668 00:22:38,010 --> 00:22:39,359 first things that I really wanted to talk 669 00:22:39,360 --> 00:22:41,729 about was what is a whistleblower? 670 00:22:41,730 --> 00:22:43,559 What is what is what is a truth teller? 671 00:22:43,560 --> 00:22:45,929 What are our ideas around that? 672 00:22:45,930 --> 00:22:47,909 Obviously, we we think of somebody who 673 00:22:47,910 --> 00:22:50,039 may be within a system, who has 674 00:22:50,040 --> 00:22:51,749 information, who then comes forward with 675 00:22:51,750 --> 00:22:54,059 it. But I honestly think that we really 676 00:22:54,060 --> 00:22:56,219 need to expand our definition of what 677 00:22:56,220 --> 00:22:58,199 a whistleblower is, what a truth teller 678 00:22:58,200 --> 00:22:59,099 is. 679 00:22:59,100 --> 00:23:01,229 For example, I very strongly believe 680 00:23:01,230 --> 00:23:03,389 that the PayPal 14 who were 681 00:23:03,390 --> 00:23:05,609 14 individuals that were arrested 682 00:23:05,610 --> 00:23:08,009 as part of a direct attack against 683 00:23:08,010 --> 00:23:10,109 PayPal for blockading the funding 684 00:23:10,110 --> 00:23:11,819 of WikiLeaks, I very strongly believe 685 00:23:11,820 --> 00:23:14,009 that they should also be considered and 686 00:23:14,010 --> 00:23:16,679 given the same protection and 687 00:23:16,680 --> 00:23:18,779 honor as other truth tellers, as 688 00:23:18,780 --> 00:23:20,969 other whistleblowers, because they saw an 689 00:23:20,970 --> 00:23:23,189 injustice that was occurring, the 690 00:23:23,190 --> 00:23:25,589 PayPal refusal to 691 00:23:25,590 --> 00:23:27,929 process donations from WikiLeaks. 692 00:23:27,930 --> 00:23:29,279 And they did something about it. 693 00:23:29,280 --> 00:23:31,169 They called attention to it, which is 694 00:23:31,170 --> 00:23:32,670 what I think one of the main 695 00:23:34,380 --> 00:23:36,449 main acts of what a whistleblower 696 00:23:36,450 --> 00:23:38,369 does. They call it they call attention to 697 00:23:38,370 --> 00:23:40,499 something. So I think that honestly, 698 00:23:40,500 --> 00:23:43,139 we need to expand that definition 699 00:23:43,140 --> 00:23:44,969 to include people that have been 700 00:23:44,970 --> 00:23:47,039 arrested, maybe not for doing the 701 00:23:47,040 --> 00:23:48,779 traditional quote as we think of 702 00:23:48,780 --> 00:23:50,999 truthtelling activities, 703 00:23:51,000 --> 00:23:53,189 but it's really crucial because what 704 00:23:53,190 --> 00:23:55,739 happens in these cases is 705 00:23:55,740 --> 00:23:57,269 when somebody comes forward with 706 00:23:57,270 --> 00:24:00,179 something, they are punished with these 707 00:24:00,180 --> 00:24:01,739 these draconian laws, with these 708 00:24:01,740 --> 00:24:04,109 outrageous sentences, which then 709 00:24:04,110 --> 00:24:06,539 causes future truth tellers 710 00:24:06,540 --> 00:24:08,729 to maybe not want to come forward. 711 00:24:08,730 --> 00:24:10,889 So protecting your 712 00:24:10,890 --> 00:24:12,479 truth tellers and protecting your 713 00:24:12,480 --> 00:24:15,179 whistleblowers is an incredibly 714 00:24:15,180 --> 00:24:17,099 important thing, as we were learning, 715 00:24:17,100 --> 00:24:19,589 because really these 716 00:24:19,590 --> 00:24:21,359 truth tellers that are coming forward are 717 00:24:21,360 --> 00:24:23,249 being prosecuted so harshly 718 00:24:24,270 --> 00:24:25,270 and. 719 00:24:26,530 --> 00:24:28,779 If that flow 720 00:24:28,780 --> 00:24:31,029 of information is going to continue, they 721 00:24:31,030 --> 00:24:32,919 need to know that they are going to be 722 00:24:32,920 --> 00:24:35,349 protected, that 723 00:24:35,350 --> 00:24:37,299 the media and that people around them 724 00:24:37,300 --> 00:24:39,399 will not leave them high and 725 00:24:39,400 --> 00:24:42,159 dry in Hong Kong or 726 00:24:42,160 --> 00:24:44,739 whatever the case may be. 727 00:24:44,740 --> 00:24:46,089 I think it's just I think it's 728 00:24:46,090 --> 00:24:47,349 interesting as well that in most 729 00:24:47,350 --> 00:24:48,430 countries there's no 730 00:24:50,050 --> 00:24:51,549 public interest defense. 731 00:24:51,550 --> 00:24:53,319 They can't say whether they're inside or 732 00:24:53,320 --> 00:24:54,489 outside of an organization. 733 00:24:54,490 --> 00:24:55,809 While I was doing this for the public 734 00:24:55,810 --> 00:24:58,089 good, I've caused greater, greater good 735 00:24:58,090 --> 00:25:00,189 by my supposedly illegal 736 00:25:00,190 --> 00:25:02,319 action than if I hadn't done 737 00:25:02,320 --> 00:25:03,579 anything. And I think that this is 738 00:25:03,580 --> 00:25:04,959 something that should be pushed for 739 00:25:04,960 --> 00:25:06,799 change as well on that point. 740 00:25:06,800 --> 00:25:08,339 Yes, I absolutely agree with that. 741 00:25:10,510 --> 00:25:12,579 So another point that I wanted 742 00:25:12,580 --> 00:25:14,769 to make is that after 743 00:25:14,770 --> 00:25:16,779 sort of after care, that's sort of my 744 00:25:16,780 --> 00:25:18,369 specialty. Jeremy asked me to take over 745 00:25:18,370 --> 00:25:20,889 his defense fund in June 746 00:25:20,890 --> 00:25:22,779 of June or July of 2013. 747 00:25:22,780 --> 00:25:24,819 And after care is so important, these 748 00:25:24,820 --> 00:25:27,549 people have sacrificed everything to, 749 00:25:27,550 --> 00:25:29,679 you know, bring us this this 750 00:25:29,680 --> 00:25:31,629 in this information. 751 00:25:31,630 --> 00:25:33,699 And it's 752 00:25:33,700 --> 00:25:35,799 important that we show our 753 00:25:35,800 --> 00:25:38,509 respect both as people, as journalists, 754 00:25:38,510 --> 00:25:40,269 to write these articles who then build 755 00:25:40,270 --> 00:25:42,309 their career off off of it. 756 00:25:42,310 --> 00:25:44,619 I believe that respect needs to be shown 757 00:25:44,620 --> 00:25:45,620 to the source 758 00:25:46,750 --> 00:25:47,679 after. 759 00:25:47,680 --> 00:25:49,569 And that's a very important part of 760 00:25:49,570 --> 00:25:51,129 Africa, especially for those that are 761 00:25:51,130 --> 00:25:52,659 identified and arrested. 762 00:25:52,660 --> 00:25:55,059 Because, you know, John, John 763 00:25:55,060 --> 00:25:57,189 Kiriakou should not have to fundraise 764 00:25:57,190 --> 00:25:58,989 on the Internet to save his house because 765 00:25:58,990 --> 00:25:59,649 he's not there. 766 00:25:59,650 --> 00:26:01,569 You know, that should be that should be 767 00:26:01,570 --> 00:26:04,269 something that is taken care of by both, 768 00:26:04,270 --> 00:26:06,849 you know, the media that help that 769 00:26:06,850 --> 00:26:09,009 were his contact people and 770 00:26:09,010 --> 00:26:11,199 by the people that have benefited 771 00:26:11,200 --> 00:26:13,419 from the information that 772 00:26:13,420 --> 00:26:14,420 he shared. 773 00:26:15,280 --> 00:26:17,079 A strong ideal that Jeremy holds and that 774 00:26:17,080 --> 00:26:19,359 I hold as well is is 775 00:26:19,360 --> 00:26:21,459 mutual aid and saw and 776 00:26:21,460 --> 00:26:22,779 solidarity. 777 00:26:22,780 --> 00:26:24,189 And part of that means you don't leave 778 00:26:24,190 --> 00:26:25,929 your source behind. You don't leave 779 00:26:25,930 --> 00:26:27,399 somebody who has sacrificed everything. 780 00:26:27,400 --> 00:26:29,859 You don't leave them behind. 781 00:26:29,860 --> 00:26:31,449 It was interesting when we worked on for 782 00:26:31,450 --> 00:26:33,699 the with the Hammond case 783 00:26:33,700 --> 00:26:35,709 WikiLeaks put together when it came to 784 00:26:35,710 --> 00:26:37,839 the sentencing time, we 785 00:26:37,840 --> 00:26:40,359 tried to put together as large a 786 00:26:40,360 --> 00:26:42,129 signatory letter of all the media 787 00:26:42,130 --> 00:26:44,679 organizations. And we'd worked with a lot 788 00:26:44,680 --> 00:26:46,749 on the Stratfor files and 789 00:26:46,750 --> 00:26:48,459 we tried to get as many of them to sign 790 00:26:48,460 --> 00:26:50,079 just to ask for leniency in the 791 00:26:50,080 --> 00:26:51,309 sentencing case. 792 00:26:51,310 --> 00:26:52,779 And what was very interesting was a 793 00:26:52,780 --> 00:26:55,239 complete break between 794 00:26:55,240 --> 00:26:57,369 how the global south and how the West 795 00:26:57,370 --> 00:26:58,539 reacted to this. 796 00:26:58,540 --> 00:27:01,059 So the West either completely 797 00:27:01,060 --> 00:27:02,379 ignored the email. 798 00:27:02,380 --> 00:27:04,269 In general, there were two very good 799 00:27:04,270 --> 00:27:06,279 journalists who I will just name 800 00:27:06,280 --> 00:27:08,109 Stephania Moezzi from Italy. 801 00:27:08,110 --> 00:27:10,659 And John gets here in Germany 802 00:27:10,660 --> 00:27:12,219 that actually were willing to put their 803 00:27:12,220 --> 00:27:13,629 name to it. And other than that, we were 804 00:27:13,630 --> 00:27:15,279 in either entirely ignored or they 805 00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:16,179 refused. 806 00:27:16,180 --> 00:27:18,009 When it came to the global south, we had 807 00:27:18,010 --> 00:27:19,869 media organizations going, well, we'll 808 00:27:19,870 --> 00:27:22,269 sign and I'll get so-and-so in Argentina 809 00:27:22,270 --> 00:27:22,659 to sign. 810 00:27:22,660 --> 00:27:24,279 So people that it never like works on 811 00:27:24,280 --> 00:27:25,899 even the Hammond documents when we when 812 00:27:25,900 --> 00:27:29,439 we were first making making partnerships. 813 00:27:29,440 --> 00:27:31,629 So this was quite an interesting 814 00:27:31,630 --> 00:27:33,459 phenomenon that I think that the West has 815 00:27:33,460 --> 00:27:34,869 become so bad at. 816 00:27:34,870 --> 00:27:36,369 And you can see that in that example 817 00:27:36,370 --> 00:27:37,599 where you're looking at the difference 818 00:27:37,600 --> 00:27:38,979 between how the Western media are 819 00:27:38,980 --> 00:27:40,479 reacting to the global south, that it 820 00:27:40,480 --> 00:27:42,219 doesn't have to to be like that. 821 00:27:43,420 --> 00:27:45,699 And I agree completely agree. 822 00:27:45,700 --> 00:27:46,989 Do you want to talk just a bit about 823 00:27:46,990 --> 00:27:47,999 Jeremy at the moment? 824 00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:50,349 I'm sure Jeremy Jeremy is currently 825 00:27:50,350 --> 00:27:52,269 serving a 10 year federal prison sentence 826 00:27:52,270 --> 00:27:54,039 for his role in the Stratfor and another 827 00:27:54,040 --> 00:27:57,189 hacks that were all politically 828 00:27:57,190 --> 00:27:58,839 motivated. 829 00:27:58,840 --> 00:28:00,129 He's doing pretty well. 830 00:28:00,130 --> 00:28:01,629 Last time we talked was Christmas Eve. 831 00:28:01,630 --> 00:28:03,130 He says hello to everybody. 832 00:28:05,350 --> 00:28:07,659 And he right now he's it's 833 00:28:07,660 --> 00:28:09,849 prison is just a daily grind 834 00:28:09,850 --> 00:28:11,949 that you have to live every single 835 00:28:11,950 --> 00:28:13,989 day. And it's especially hard for people 836 00:28:13,990 --> 00:28:16,419 who may be antiauthoritarian like 837 00:28:16,420 --> 00:28:17,589 Jeremy is. 838 00:28:17,590 --> 00:28:18,590 Maybe you've noticed 839 00:28:20,350 --> 00:28:21,879 who spent their whole life trying to 840 00:28:21,880 --> 00:28:23,649 dismantle that system to then become 841 00:28:23,650 --> 00:28:25,239 completely controlled by it. 842 00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:26,240 So. 843 00:28:27,230 --> 00:28:29,419 Aftercare by the general public really 844 00:28:29,420 --> 00:28:31,459 helps things like writing letters, 845 00:28:31,460 --> 00:28:33,679 donating so that he has money in his 846 00:28:33,680 --> 00:28:35,419 commissary, sending books, things like 847 00:28:35,420 --> 00:28:36,809 that superimportant. 848 00:28:36,810 --> 00:28:37,909 And can you just explain so they 849 00:28:37,910 --> 00:28:39,589 understand a bit about how he keeps going 850 00:28:39,590 --> 00:28:40,739 in and out of shoe? 851 00:28:40,740 --> 00:28:42,979 And, yes, that's been 852 00:28:42,980 --> 00:28:44,739 an ongoing issue. 853 00:28:47,160 --> 00:28:49,229 Documents, it 854 00:28:49,230 --> 00:28:52,109 honestly started, oddly enough, 855 00:28:52,110 --> 00:28:54,389 when documents were dropped by 856 00:28:54,390 --> 00:28:56,609 Anonymous that were 857 00:28:56,610 --> 00:28:59,399 the unredacted Lussac warrants, 858 00:28:59,400 --> 00:29:01,499 and I got frantic calls from lawyers 859 00:29:01,500 --> 00:29:02,640 at nine 30 at night 860 00:29:04,020 --> 00:29:06,359 saying the government is very upset with 861 00:29:06,360 --> 00:29:08,909 Jeremy for this 862 00:29:08,910 --> 00:29:11,069 and. Well, well, why? 863 00:29:11,070 --> 00:29:12,029 Why are they upset with Jeremy? 864 00:29:12,030 --> 00:29:14,279 He's in jail. He didn't release them. 865 00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:16,499 Well, they think that they you know, 866 00:29:16,500 --> 00:29:18,569 they think that he gave it 867 00:29:18,570 --> 00:29:19,570 to them. 868 00:29:20,590 --> 00:29:23,019 So there are very real consequences 869 00:29:23,020 --> 00:29:25,089 for a 870 00:29:25,090 --> 00:29:27,189 mishandled, you know, a 871 00:29:27,190 --> 00:29:29,289 very, very real consequences for 872 00:29:29,290 --> 00:29:31,989 mishandled in information, 873 00:29:31,990 --> 00:29:33,939 especially when that person has already 874 00:29:33,940 --> 00:29:36,400 been identified and may be in jail. 875 00:29:38,260 --> 00:29:40,809 The government has punished Jeremy 876 00:29:40,810 --> 00:29:43,989 with overly harsh punishments 877 00:29:43,990 --> 00:29:45,789 for minor infractions. 878 00:29:45,790 --> 00:29:47,799 He keeps he's gone in and out of SHU, 879 00:29:47,800 --> 00:29:50,859 which is solitary confinement 880 00:29:50,860 --> 00:29:53,049 center, these segregated housing unit. 881 00:29:53,050 --> 00:29:54,429 He's gone in and out of there more times 882 00:29:54,430 --> 00:29:55,430 than I can count. 883 00:29:56,620 --> 00:29:59,049 And every time they put him in 884 00:29:59,050 --> 00:30:01,179 the he loses what's called his good time. 885 00:30:01,180 --> 00:30:02,319 He earns good time off 886 00:30:03,610 --> 00:30:05,229 of his sentence for every month that 887 00:30:05,230 --> 00:30:06,399 there are no infractions. 888 00:30:06,400 --> 00:30:08,769 Well, if the staff decides 889 00:30:08,770 --> 00:30:10,809 to bump up his infraction level based on 890 00:30:10,810 --> 00:30:12,729 what he did, his good time is gone. 891 00:30:12,730 --> 00:30:14,469 Like I just checked a couple weeks ago 892 00:30:14,470 --> 00:30:16,179 and found out that his release date had 893 00:30:16,180 --> 00:30:17,200 been pushed back a month 894 00:30:18,310 --> 00:30:20,829 because of a 895 00:30:20,830 --> 00:30:23,199 situation that happened where he was 896 00:30:23,200 --> 00:30:24,699 overly punished for something that should 897 00:30:24,700 --> 00:30:26,170 be his absolute right to do. 898 00:30:28,180 --> 00:30:30,309 And his release date got pushed back 899 00:30:30,310 --> 00:30:31,479 a month, which means he's not going to be 900 00:30:31,480 --> 00:30:32,799 out. He's going to have to spend another 901 00:30:32,800 --> 00:30:34,899 month in prison on top of the 902 00:30:34,900 --> 00:30:36,879 already unjust 10 years he will have 903 00:30:36,880 --> 00:30:37,880 spent. 904 00:30:39,250 --> 00:30:40,250 So 905 00:30:42,550 --> 00:30:44,949 mishandled documents and mishandled 906 00:30:44,950 --> 00:30:47,049 information and how you publish 907 00:30:47,050 --> 00:30:50,409 your sources really does matter, 908 00:30:50,410 --> 00:30:53,349 and it really does impact 909 00:30:53,350 --> 00:30:55,089 your source very strongly, 910 00:30:56,500 --> 00:30:57,699 especially like I said, if they've 911 00:30:57,700 --> 00:31:00,759 already been identified and they have 912 00:31:00,760 --> 00:31:03,039 already have that attention put on them. 913 00:31:03,040 --> 00:31:04,389 And I think it's interesting in the case 914 00:31:04,390 --> 00:31:06,999 of you just described, even though he's 915 00:31:07,000 --> 00:31:09,069 in prison already, it's 916 00:31:09,070 --> 00:31:11,289 still having an impact on how people 917 00:31:11,290 --> 00:31:13,239 in the outside world are dealing with 918 00:31:13,240 --> 00:31:15,639 information that he is seen 919 00:31:15,640 --> 00:31:18,069 to be linked to by the government. 920 00:31:18,070 --> 00:31:19,070 So, yeah, 921 00:31:21,310 --> 00:31:22,899 yeah, I can tell everybody what happened. 922 00:31:22,900 --> 00:31:25,689 He wrote a letter of leniency 923 00:31:25,690 --> 00:31:28,179 for Barry Brown, the journalist who 924 00:31:28,180 --> 00:31:31,269 was charged originally with publishing 925 00:31:31,270 --> 00:31:33,339 or I'm sorry, linking to 926 00:31:33,340 --> 00:31:35,319 the information that had been published 927 00:31:35,320 --> 00:31:36,320 from Stratfor. 928 00:31:38,440 --> 00:31:40,839 Brett Brown is was due to be sentenced 929 00:31:40,840 --> 00:31:43,209 in the beginning of December for this. 930 00:31:43,210 --> 00:31:45,279 And Jeremy wrote 931 00:31:45,280 --> 00:31:47,379 a letter of leniency, as many 932 00:31:47,380 --> 00:31:48,589 had done for Jeremy. 933 00:31:48,590 --> 00:31:50,379 He wrote a letter of leniency for Barrett 934 00:31:50,380 --> 00:31:52,479 Brown, and he sent it to 935 00:31:52,480 --> 00:31:54,759 me to give to Barrett Brown's federal 936 00:31:54,760 --> 00:31:55,760 judge. 937 00:31:56,370 --> 00:31:58,289 And he was written up for circumventing 938 00:31:58,290 --> 00:32:00,749 male monitoring procedures 939 00:32:00,750 --> 00:32:02,759 and he had his email privileges. 940 00:32:02,760 --> 00:32:04,199 I still cannot email him. 941 00:32:04,200 --> 00:32:06,329 He got his email privileges taken away 942 00:32:06,330 --> 00:32:07,330 for. 943 00:32:09,070 --> 00:32:11,379 A month, a month 944 00:32:11,380 --> 00:32:12,380 or a month and a half, 945 00:32:14,080 --> 00:32:16,479 so I mean, normally things that would not 946 00:32:16,480 --> 00:32:19,179 cause people to look twice, he gets 947 00:32:19,180 --> 00:32:21,399 slammed for every single time. 948 00:32:21,400 --> 00:32:23,409 And that's part of the government 949 00:32:23,410 --> 00:32:25,899 retaliating against him for continuing 950 00:32:25,900 --> 00:32:26,900 to speak out. 951 00:32:29,010 --> 00:32:31,079 So it's these sorts of cases 952 00:32:31,080 --> 00:32:33,299 that we we 953 00:32:33,300 --> 00:32:36,089 set up a courage for 954 00:32:36,090 --> 00:32:38,759 courage is working with grace 955 00:32:38,760 --> 00:32:41,129 and running Jeremy Hammond's defense 956 00:32:41,130 --> 00:32:43,679 fund. It was borne out of 957 00:32:43,680 --> 00:32:45,929 when we worked to get Edward Snowden 958 00:32:45,930 --> 00:32:48,029 asylum. We realized that actually 959 00:32:48,030 --> 00:32:51,269 in these sorts of high risk cases, 960 00:32:51,270 --> 00:32:53,969 there are very few organizations. 961 00:32:53,970 --> 00:32:55,619 In fact, well, in that case, there were 962 00:32:55,620 --> 00:32:57,809 no other organizations that can 963 00:32:57,810 --> 00:32:59,879 or would assist him that 964 00:32:59,880 --> 00:33:01,799 could act swiftly and securely. 965 00:33:01,800 --> 00:33:04,019 So Courage was founded 966 00:33:04,020 --> 00:33:06,119 by three trustees, Gavin, who 967 00:33:06,120 --> 00:33:08,399 I mentioned before, who's from the Center 968 00:33:08,400 --> 00:33:10,079 for Investigative Journalism in London 969 00:33:10,080 --> 00:33:11,579 and Whistler. 970 00:33:11,580 --> 00:33:14,009 He's here Barbara 971 00:33:14,010 --> 00:33:16,349 Bakowski, who's from legal director 972 00:33:16,350 --> 00:33:18,659 at Article 19 in London, and then 973 00:33:18,660 --> 00:33:20,759 Julian Assange, who's the editor 974 00:33:20,760 --> 00:33:22,799 in chief of WikiLeaks. 975 00:33:22,800 --> 00:33:25,079 And we worked to get Snowden 976 00:33:25,080 --> 00:33:27,479 asylum. And he then instigated setting 977 00:33:27,480 --> 00:33:29,549 up courage, even in the midst of 978 00:33:29,550 --> 00:33:31,649 all of his own legal issues with the 979 00:33:31,650 --> 00:33:33,909 US grand jury, as we've just seen, 980 00:33:33,910 --> 00:33:35,339 still continuing against him. 981 00:33:36,540 --> 00:33:38,939 So we began with Snowden's defense fund 982 00:33:38,940 --> 00:33:40,829 and protections for Snowden. 983 00:33:40,830 --> 00:33:42,359 We've grown we now have Hammond as a 984 00:33:42,360 --> 00:33:43,589 beneficiary. 985 00:33:43,590 --> 00:33:45,659 We run these specific defense funds along 986 00:33:45,660 --> 00:33:47,849 with their support websites, 987 00:33:47,850 --> 00:33:49,440 including the revelations 988 00:33:51,210 --> 00:33:53,449 that have been disclosed, we 989 00:33:53,450 --> 00:33:54,749 are proud to say actually have the 990 00:33:54,750 --> 00:33:57,599 largest collection of Snowden documents 991 00:33:57,600 --> 00:33:59,069 because no one else was putting them all 992 00:33:59,070 --> 00:34:00,070 in one place. 993 00:34:03,030 --> 00:34:05,099 We also this year launched a new fund 994 00:34:05,100 --> 00:34:07,529 for sources under investigation. 995 00:34:07,530 --> 00:34:09,749 This is actually we call it the Known 996 00:34:09,750 --> 00:34:11,638 Unknowns Fund, which is our little 997 00:34:11,639 --> 00:34:13,530 in-joke to Rumsfeld's quotes. 998 00:34:14,730 --> 00:34:17,099 And this is specifically for 999 00:34:17,100 --> 00:34:19,319 sources at the point when they are being 1000 00:34:19,320 --> 00:34:21,959 investigated there, an alleged source, 1001 00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:23,729 they haven't necessarily been 1002 00:34:24,750 --> 00:34:25,738 they haven't been charged. 1003 00:34:25,739 --> 00:34:27,059 They're not necessarily identified 1004 00:34:27,060 --> 00:34:29,309 publicly. So to get public 1005 00:34:29,310 --> 00:34:31,589 money to pay for legal advice is pretty 1006 00:34:31,590 --> 00:34:33,539 much impossible for them to raise public 1007 00:34:33,540 --> 00:34:34,468 donations. 1008 00:34:34,469 --> 00:34:35,849 But yet they need legal advice. 1009 00:34:35,850 --> 00:34:37,319 They have people knocking on their doors 1010 00:34:37,320 --> 00:34:38,320 and raiding them. 1011 00:34:39,150 --> 00:34:42,119 So we were actually 1012 00:34:42,120 --> 00:34:44,129 this funds. There's already one person 1013 00:34:44,130 --> 00:34:46,529 that is actually needing 1014 00:34:46,530 --> 00:34:48,599 it support at the moment, and I'm sure 1015 00:34:48,600 --> 00:34:49,919 there will be more. 1016 00:34:49,920 --> 00:34:51,599 So that's one of the other projects that 1017 00:34:51,600 --> 00:34:53,849 we set up this this year. 1018 00:34:53,850 --> 00:34:55,559 And one of the big things that we've done 1019 00:34:55,560 --> 00:34:57,239 with work from the beginning is to 1020 00:34:57,240 --> 00:34:59,609 systematized these sorts of processes 1021 00:34:59,610 --> 00:35:02,189 and these support to set up the website, 1022 00:35:02,190 --> 00:35:04,320 to set up the defense fund. 1023 00:35:05,640 --> 00:35:07,709 And for Snowden, it was sort of almost a 1024 00:35:07,710 --> 00:35:09,689 test case for us, for how we did it, what 1025 00:35:09,690 --> 00:35:10,919 the legal loopholes, et cetera. 1026 00:35:10,920 --> 00:35:13,019 Were we then, of course, set it 1027 00:35:13,020 --> 00:35:15,329 up again for Hammond and we now 1028 00:35:15,330 --> 00:35:17,639 within a day can set up a legal defense 1029 00:35:17,640 --> 00:35:19,799 fund and a support website for anyone 1030 00:35:19,800 --> 00:35:20,880 else that comes forward. 1031 00:35:21,930 --> 00:35:24,059 This is important to be able to to move 1032 00:35:24,060 --> 00:35:26,189 fast because the story is pretty much 1033 00:35:26,190 --> 00:35:28,469 set within the first week of the public 1034 00:35:28,470 --> 00:35:29,669 perception. 1035 00:35:29,670 --> 00:35:31,409 So this fast moving defense is really 1036 00:35:31,410 --> 00:35:32,789 quite crucial. 1037 00:35:32,790 --> 00:35:34,889 And we have some plans for 1038 00:35:34,890 --> 00:35:35,849 this coming year. 1039 00:35:35,850 --> 00:35:37,109 We're going to be offering advice for 1040 00:35:37,110 --> 00:35:39,089 media and journalists about how to 1041 00:35:39,090 --> 00:35:41,130 operate securely, what to think about. 1042 00:35:42,660 --> 00:35:44,429 We've also started a network of 1043 00:35:44,430 --> 00:35:46,859 specialized lawyers for 1044 00:35:46,860 --> 00:35:49,529 legal advice and logistical assistance 1045 00:35:49,530 --> 00:35:51,209 to help sources around the world, whether 1046 00:35:51,210 --> 00:35:53,819 this is legal advice or escaping 1047 00:35:53,820 --> 00:35:55,800 from Hong Kong to get asylum. 1048 00:35:57,090 --> 00:35:58,090 So, 1049 00:35:59,580 --> 00:36:01,469 yes, so we continue our work into next 1050 00:36:01,470 --> 00:36:02,579 year with these that these are more 1051 00:36:02,580 --> 00:36:05,039 projects. So all of your help is 1052 00:36:05,040 --> 00:36:06,809 is very much appreciated. 1053 00:36:06,810 --> 00:36:07,810 And that's 1054 00:36:08,880 --> 00:36:10,259 in these ways and more. 1055 00:36:10,260 --> 00:36:11,789 We're aiming to internationally give 1056 00:36:11,790 --> 00:36:13,739 complete protections for truth tellers in 1057 00:36:13,740 --> 00:36:15,719 the hardest cases and show them that 1058 00:36:15,720 --> 00:36:17,489 someone will take risks for them when 1059 00:36:17,490 --> 00:36:18,690 others can't or won't. 1060 00:36:19,710 --> 00:36:21,479 And the purpose is to maximize the 1061 00:36:21,480 --> 00:36:24,299 amounts of truth and about the society 1062 00:36:24,300 --> 00:36:26,399 we live in and the public 1063 00:36:26,400 --> 00:36:28,619 record. And to do so whilst fostering 1064 00:36:28,620 --> 00:36:30,899 civil courage, we want to set 1065 00:36:30,900 --> 00:36:33,239 a new standard and the protections 1066 00:36:33,240 --> 00:36:35,219 of truth tellers by the journalists and 1067 00:36:35,220 --> 00:36:36,659 the public alike. 1068 00:36:36,660 --> 00:36:38,219 And I hope that the public generally can 1069 00:36:38,220 --> 00:36:39,809 start to hold those that don't give 1070 00:36:39,810 --> 00:36:41,399 sources the fullest protections to 1071 00:36:41,400 --> 00:36:43,619 account, and that here in the technical 1072 00:36:43,620 --> 00:36:45,689 community, we can start to think of 1073 00:36:45,690 --> 00:36:47,879 more ways to assist in this complete 1074 00:36:47,880 --> 00:36:50,429 protection, not just the drop over points 1075 00:36:50,430 --> 00:36:52,679 so that we will 1076 00:36:52,680 --> 00:36:54,719 help all of us in our right to know by 1077 00:36:54,720 --> 00:36:56,579 helping those that so bravely come 1078 00:36:56,580 --> 00:36:58,049 forward and fight for us. 1079 00:36:58,050 --> 00:36:59,050 So thank you. 1080 00:37:12,110 --> 00:37:14,749 And then we're taking questions if anyone 1081 00:37:14,750 --> 00:37:15,949 has questions. 1082 00:37:15,950 --> 00:37:17,779 Yeah, thank you so much, Sarah and Grace. 1083 00:37:17,780 --> 00:37:18,869 Thanks for the inspiring talk. 1084 00:37:18,870 --> 00:37:20,959 So luckily, we have plenty of time for 1085 00:37:20,960 --> 00:37:22,069 questions and answers. 1086 00:37:22,070 --> 00:37:24,109 Our inspiring speaker said that they will 1087 00:37:24,110 --> 00:37:25,369 take questions. 1088 00:37:25,370 --> 00:37:27,589 We have six microphones here. 1089 00:37:27,590 --> 00:37:28,789 One, two, three, four, six. 1090 00:37:28,790 --> 00:37:31,579 Please just line up there and 1091 00:37:31,580 --> 00:37:33,319 make yourself know that if you have a 1092 00:37:33,320 --> 00:37:35,389 question, I think the guy 1093 00:37:35,390 --> 00:37:37,159 on microphone three was first, please 1094 00:37:37,160 --> 00:37:40,099 state your question while I try. 1095 00:37:40,100 --> 00:37:42,349 So not as much 1096 00:37:42,350 --> 00:37:44,449 a question, but I like to point 1097 00:37:44,450 --> 00:37:46,549 out something can get a 1098 00:37:46,550 --> 00:37:48,859 little closer to the mic. So you are in 1099 00:37:48,860 --> 00:37:51,379 Hamburg, Germany, and the problem 1100 00:37:51,380 --> 00:37:53,209 is not to protect. 1101 00:37:54,590 --> 00:37:57,259 The security affairs 1102 00:37:57,260 --> 00:37:59,719 are journalists because 1103 00:37:59,720 --> 00:38:02,149 we had a case where 1104 00:38:02,150 --> 00:38:04,249 the journalist was 1105 00:38:04,250 --> 00:38:07,059 covert police lady. 1106 00:38:07,060 --> 00:38:09,889 So these problems 1107 00:38:09,890 --> 00:38:12,230 occur at another point here. 1108 00:38:14,810 --> 00:38:16,969 I'm really sorry, but I didn't quite 1109 00:38:16,970 --> 00:38:18,859 understand what you I think because you 1110 00:38:18,860 --> 00:38:20,359 started far away from the book, there's a 1111 00:38:20,360 --> 00:38:22,599 difference issue in Germany because. 1112 00:38:22,600 --> 00:38:25,009 Yeah, yeah, we have 1113 00:38:25,010 --> 00:38:28,009 you know, media is protected by law. 1114 00:38:28,010 --> 00:38:31,129 But we had a case in Hamburg 1115 00:38:31,130 --> 00:38:33,919 where covid police person 1116 00:38:33,920 --> 00:38:36,049 was the media 1117 00:38:36,050 --> 00:38:37,050 and now. 1118 00:38:40,450 --> 00:38:42,939 OK, OK, so she was undercover, pretending 1119 00:38:42,940 --> 00:38:45,099 to be media, not 1120 00:38:45,100 --> 00:38:47,409 pretending to be media undercover 1121 00:38:47,410 --> 00:38:48,410 in media. 1122 00:38:49,590 --> 00:38:52,109 OK, to try and find sources 1123 00:38:52,110 --> 00:38:53,309 by them coming to her because they 1124 00:38:53,310 --> 00:38:55,199 thought she was media. 1125 00:38:55,200 --> 00:38:56,200 Is that the point? 1126 00:38:57,950 --> 00:39:00,049 Now, the problem is I want 1127 00:39:00,050 --> 00:39:02,719 to protect the source so 1128 00:39:02,720 --> 00:39:04,969 the source has to rely on 1129 00:39:04,970 --> 00:39:07,429 media journalist working 1130 00:39:07,430 --> 00:39:09,739 properly, protecting you 1131 00:39:09,740 --> 00:39:12,259 against those guys 1132 00:39:12,260 --> 00:39:15,829 you are disclosing. 1133 00:39:15,830 --> 00:39:18,049 So have. 1134 00:39:18,050 --> 00:39:20,239 Those guys you work for 1135 00:39:20,240 --> 00:39:22,999 are efficiently disclosing the secrets 1136 00:39:23,000 --> 00:39:24,809 are the same guys who are telling the 1137 00:39:24,810 --> 00:39:25,849 secrets to. 1138 00:39:25,850 --> 00:39:26,850 So what? 1139 00:39:28,290 --> 00:39:29,809 Well, yeah, that sounds like a terrible 1140 00:39:29,810 --> 00:39:32,059 situation. Were they working for a media 1141 00:39:32,060 --> 00:39:33,049 organization? 1142 00:39:33,050 --> 00:39:35,089 Yeah. So I think that the public should 1143 00:39:35,090 --> 00:39:36,619 have called for that media organization 1144 00:39:36,620 --> 00:39:38,149 to be shut down. 1145 00:39:38,150 --> 00:39:40,279 Nope, not media 1146 00:39:40,280 --> 00:39:42,619 organization. It was an undercover cop 1147 00:39:42,620 --> 00:39:43,699 in media. 1148 00:39:43,700 --> 00:39:46,009 So so police put something 1149 00:39:46,010 --> 00:39:47,010 into media. 1150 00:39:48,680 --> 00:39:50,389 All right, well, that since I got the 1151 00:39:50,390 --> 00:39:51,559 feeling that there is no question 1152 00:39:51,560 --> 00:39:52,879 developing out of the statement. 1153 00:39:52,880 --> 00:39:54,619 Thank you so much for the statement. 1154 00:39:54,620 --> 00:39:56,299 And let's just hope that our speakers 1155 00:39:56,300 --> 00:39:58,489 today are journalists, as they claimed 1156 00:39:58,490 --> 00:40:00,709 and not as I hope 1157 00:40:00,710 --> 00:40:02,359 this is not what you are insinuating. 1158 00:40:02,360 --> 00:40:04,609 All right. So next 1159 00:40:04,610 --> 00:40:06,769 question, microphone one, please, and 1160 00:40:06,770 --> 00:40:08,469 get us the mic. 1161 00:40:08,470 --> 00:40:09,559 Yeah, thank you very much. 1162 00:40:09,560 --> 00:40:12,139 I think it's a very important point 1163 00:40:12,140 --> 00:40:14,329 that you were making. I'm very glad to 1164 00:40:14,330 --> 00:40:16,459 hear it from also from the development 1165 00:40:16,460 --> 00:40:18,859 of the foundation last year. 1166 00:40:18,860 --> 00:40:20,690 I think it's important to look 1167 00:40:22,610 --> 00:40:24,739 like you were mentioning the wording, 1168 00:40:24,740 --> 00:40:26,269 the language and the 1169 00:40:27,320 --> 00:40:29,719 verbal OPSEC of journalism 1170 00:40:29,720 --> 00:40:30,739 in that context. 1171 00:40:30,740 --> 00:40:32,869 I do have a question for for 1172 00:40:32,870 --> 00:40:35,479 Grace, what you were mentioning about 1173 00:40:35,480 --> 00:40:36,169 PayPal. 1174 00:40:36,170 --> 00:40:38,360 I do assume that you have something like 1175 00:40:40,550 --> 00:40:42,709 a working definition or something for for 1176 00:40:42,710 --> 00:40:44,909 whistleblowers if you compare it like a 1177 00:40:44,910 --> 00:40:46,249 situation in Germany. 1178 00:40:47,360 --> 00:40:49,609 Again, the wording is super negative. 1179 00:40:49,610 --> 00:40:52,189 You do use like the word whistleblower, 1180 00:40:52,190 --> 00:40:54,599 but you also use dimensioned information. 1181 00:40:54,600 --> 00:40:57,269 So it's like extremely negative. 1182 00:40:57,270 --> 00:40:59,869 So if you say we are protecting specific 1183 00:40:59,870 --> 00:41:01,939 cases and if you said, like, 1184 00:41:01,940 --> 00:41:04,309 what's the benefit in 1185 00:41:04,310 --> 00:41:07,339 declaring, like PayPal 1186 00:41:07,340 --> 00:41:09,139 guys as as whistle blowers? 1187 00:41:09,140 --> 00:41:11,329 So you say like, that's a protection 1188 00:41:11,330 --> 00:41:12,769 as such. 1189 00:41:12,770 --> 00:41:14,090 I'm just interested in 1190 00:41:15,980 --> 00:41:17,929 like, what's your working definition from 1191 00:41:17,930 --> 00:41:19,579 from the foundation point of view and 1192 00:41:19,580 --> 00:41:21,799 what's what's the actual 1193 00:41:21,800 --> 00:41:24,259 practical how do you protect 1194 00:41:24,260 --> 00:41:24,739 people? 1195 00:41:24,740 --> 00:41:26,929 By just saying that's a whistleblower 1196 00:41:26,930 --> 00:41:28,729 by definition, you know what I mean? 1197 00:41:32,360 --> 00:41:33,500 Well, I think that 1198 00:41:35,330 --> 00:41:37,279 the definition of a whistleblower or a 1199 00:41:37,280 --> 00:41:39,019 truth teller can be someone who sees 1200 00:41:39,020 --> 00:41:41,119 someone who is doing 1201 00:41:41,120 --> 00:41:43,369 wrong or sees and or an organization 1202 00:41:43,370 --> 00:41:45,559 is doing wrong and through their actions, 1203 00:41:45,560 --> 00:41:47,869 through their politically minded actions, 1204 00:41:47,870 --> 00:41:49,459 do something does something to bring 1205 00:41:49,460 --> 00:41:51,799 attention to that, whether it's 1206 00:41:51,800 --> 00:41:54,199 dropped documents, whether it's dosser 1207 00:41:54,200 --> 00:41:56,209 website, which I very strongly feel 1208 00:41:56,210 --> 00:41:57,529 should be covered under the First 1209 00:41:57,530 --> 00:41:59,269 Amendment as a form of free speech, 1210 00:42:03,860 --> 00:42:06,169 whether it's a website, whether it's 1211 00:42:06,170 --> 00:42:08,239 dropping emails, 1212 00:42:08,240 --> 00:42:09,619 they're doing something. 1213 00:42:09,620 --> 00:42:11,839 They're they're doing an action that 1214 00:42:11,840 --> 00:42:14,629 brings attention to this great political 1215 00:42:14,630 --> 00:42:15,439 injustice. 1216 00:42:15,440 --> 00:42:17,689 And I believe that should be our 1217 00:42:17,690 --> 00:42:19,759 definition of what a whistleblower is, 1218 00:42:19,760 --> 00:42:21,979 what a truth teller is, because that's 1219 00:42:21,980 --> 00:42:24,049 what they're doing. They are 1220 00:42:24,050 --> 00:42:26,239 incurring significant personal risk 1221 00:42:26,240 --> 00:42:28,579 and they are telling the truth, 1222 00:42:28,580 --> 00:42:30,859 which is what is needed right now. 1223 00:42:30,860 --> 00:42:33,109 I stress we need a 1224 00:42:33,110 --> 00:42:35,269 complete revolution in how 1225 00:42:35,270 --> 00:42:37,219 we think about our government and how we 1226 00:42:37,220 --> 00:42:38,479 relate to our government. 1227 00:42:38,480 --> 00:42:40,489 And revolutions are never easy and 1228 00:42:40,490 --> 00:42:41,719 they're never clean and they're never 1229 00:42:41,720 --> 00:42:42,109 messy. 1230 00:42:42,110 --> 00:42:43,879 Laws will get broken and laws will have 1231 00:42:43,880 --> 00:42:46,039 to get broken in order to call 1232 00:42:46,040 --> 00:42:47,989 on justice to those laws. 1233 00:42:50,920 --> 00:42:53,439 So I believe that we need to appreciate 1234 00:42:53,440 --> 00:42:55,419 the true colors that we have because they 1235 00:42:55,420 --> 00:42:57,279 have sacrificed their everything to bring 1236 00:42:57,280 --> 00:42:59,519 us their truth and 1237 00:42:59,520 --> 00:43:01,659 and our truth and the truth is 1238 00:43:01,660 --> 00:43:03,969 what's going to enable us to 1239 00:43:03,970 --> 00:43:05,859 fight back against those that have taken 1240 00:43:05,860 --> 00:43:08,019 our freedom against those 1241 00:43:08,020 --> 00:43:09,759 that invade our privacy. 1242 00:43:09,760 --> 00:43:11,139 They're the ones that are going to change 1243 00:43:11,140 --> 00:43:12,099 the world. 1244 00:43:12,100 --> 00:43:13,689 They're the ones that are going to change 1245 00:43:13,690 --> 00:43:14,799 the world. 1246 00:43:14,800 --> 00:43:16,800 And they deserve respect as such. 1247 00:43:18,340 --> 00:43:19,839 Thank you so much. 1248 00:43:19,840 --> 00:43:21,679 Next question from the Internet. 1249 00:43:23,050 --> 00:43:25,329 Hi. So I have a question 1250 00:43:25,330 --> 00:43:27,560 from Twitter to Grace. 1251 00:43:29,080 --> 00:43:31,299 Is it possible to ask for presidential 1252 00:43:31,300 --> 00:43:33,249 grace for Jeremy Hammond? 1253 00:43:33,250 --> 00:43:35,319 And if it's possible, how can 1254 00:43:35,320 --> 00:43:37,479 the public contribute to that 1255 00:43:37,480 --> 00:43:39,549 like a petition, petition 1256 00:43:39,550 --> 00:43:40,689 or campaign? 1257 00:43:40,690 --> 00:43:43,119 I believe it would be possible to ask for 1258 00:43:43,120 --> 00:43:45,219 a presidential pardon for him right now. 1259 00:43:45,220 --> 00:43:47,229 I don't know of any specific campaign 1260 00:43:47,230 --> 00:43:49,299 that anybody's 1261 00:43:49,300 --> 00:43:51,459 planning right now, but that is 1262 00:43:51,460 --> 00:43:52,809 definitely a possibility. 1263 00:43:52,810 --> 00:43:54,969 And what the public if that campaign 1264 00:43:54,970 --> 00:43:57,219 came to fruition, it would probably 1265 00:43:57,220 --> 00:43:59,619 be in a petition form 1266 00:43:59,620 --> 00:44:01,329 the government, the people. 1267 00:44:01,330 --> 00:44:02,859 The most important thing is obviously 1268 00:44:02,860 --> 00:44:05,049 sharing that, signing it 1269 00:44:05,050 --> 00:44:07,329 in not just sort of tweeting it out, 1270 00:44:07,330 --> 00:44:08,589 but sort of going to certain people 1271 00:44:08,590 --> 00:44:10,869 saying, hey, have you signed this 1272 00:44:10,870 --> 00:44:12,579 to make sure that, yes, you can get 1273 00:44:12,580 --> 00:44:14,319 specific? Yes, I will sign this. 1274 00:44:14,320 --> 00:44:15,399 Yes, I. 1275 00:44:15,400 --> 00:44:16,509 I will sign this. 1276 00:44:16,510 --> 00:44:19,209 And trust me, if that happens, 1277 00:44:19,210 --> 00:44:21,309 I will raise holy hell to get 1278 00:44:21,310 --> 00:44:22,929 my friend pardoned and home. 1279 00:44:22,930 --> 00:44:25,089 So there you'll know 1280 00:44:25,090 --> 00:44:26,090 if it happens. 1281 00:44:27,220 --> 00:44:28,449 All right, thank you. Next question for 1282 00:44:28,450 --> 00:44:29,860 microphone for you. 1283 00:44:31,060 --> 00:44:33,699 So from what I sent you, 1284 00:44:33,700 --> 00:44:36,099 you have these facts going to help 1285 00:44:36,100 --> 00:44:38,529 people to have money, 1286 00:44:38,530 --> 00:44:40,509 to help them have legal support and 1287 00:44:40,510 --> 00:44:42,669 stuff. But what we've seen from 1288 00:44:42,670 --> 00:44:44,619 WikiLeaks is that sometimes there is 1289 00:44:44,620 --> 00:44:46,269 money which is not accessible. 1290 00:44:46,270 --> 00:44:47,829 How do you make sure that the money is 1291 00:44:47,830 --> 00:44:50,119 accessible and the time needed end 1292 00:44:50,120 --> 00:44:52,359 and it keeps being accessible when 1293 00:44:52,360 --> 00:44:53,289 it's needed? 1294 00:44:53,290 --> 00:44:54,519 Are you talking about, like, our banking 1295 00:44:54,520 --> 00:44:56,169 blockade, like how the donations are 1296 00:44:56,170 --> 00:44:56,529 stopped? 1297 00:44:56,530 --> 00:44:58,359 OK, so this is one of the things that 1298 00:44:58,360 --> 00:45:00,459 which is that because this was a big 1299 00:45:00,460 --> 00:45:02,529 concern with the setting up the 1300 00:45:02,530 --> 00:45:04,689 Snowden defense fund about this, and 1301 00:45:04,690 --> 00:45:06,909 we actually had an almost pretests 1302 00:45:06,910 --> 00:45:07,910 case for that 1303 00:45:09,100 --> 00:45:11,289 with Julian's defense fund. 1304 00:45:11,290 --> 00:45:13,089 And we actually have found kind of 1305 00:45:14,950 --> 00:45:17,229 quite a robust way in which to do this, 1306 00:45:17,230 --> 00:45:19,359 which has not yet 1307 00:45:19,360 --> 00:45:21,609 been and has not yet been shut down. 1308 00:45:21,610 --> 00:45:23,469 And Julian's at that continued through 1309 00:45:23,470 --> 00:45:24,470 the blockade. 1310 00:45:25,270 --> 00:45:27,399 And so that still stands. 1311 00:45:27,400 --> 00:45:29,859 So that was sort of the base of the 1312 00:45:29,860 --> 00:45:31,239 system that we then started. 1313 00:45:31,240 --> 00:45:34,179 We then had to make it a faster process, 1314 00:45:34,180 --> 00:45:35,799 but that was the base of the type of 1315 00:45:35,800 --> 00:45:37,299 system and the type of structure that we 1316 00:45:37,300 --> 00:45:38,409 used to set up Snowden's. 1317 00:45:38,410 --> 00:45:40,479 And we will for the other whistleblowers, 1318 00:45:40,480 --> 00:45:42,279 because this was exactly what was on the 1319 00:45:42,280 --> 00:45:44,139 main front of our mind and anybody else 1320 00:45:44,140 --> 00:45:45,729 at the time that wants to help Snowden. 1321 00:45:45,730 --> 00:45:48,189 But because of our experience 1322 00:45:48,190 --> 00:45:50,289 in this, we were we were able to 1323 00:45:50,290 --> 00:45:52,209 actually set up the sort of logistical 1324 00:45:52,210 --> 00:45:53,949 bank account when where nobody else 1325 00:45:53,950 --> 00:45:55,209 could. 1326 00:45:55,210 --> 00:45:57,309 OK, but this apparently seems to 1327 00:45:57,310 --> 00:45:59,469 be that has to remain a secret 1328 00:45:59,470 --> 00:46:01,349 or we can be able to talk more about it. 1329 00:46:02,350 --> 00:46:04,479 So it's partly the sort of the people 1330 00:46:04,480 --> 00:46:06,099 it's a mixture of sort of the people that 1331 00:46:06,100 --> 00:46:07,719 are involved and the fact that they can't 1332 00:46:07,720 --> 00:46:08,720 be backed down, 1333 00:46:10,780 --> 00:46:13,029 which I mean, when it came to the the 1334 00:46:13,030 --> 00:46:15,249 banking blockade, there were 1335 00:46:15,250 --> 00:46:17,379 a number of organizations that 1336 00:46:17,380 --> 00:46:18,429 were helping us in this. 1337 00:46:18,430 --> 00:46:20,529 There was one that was absolutely 1338 00:46:20,530 --> 00:46:22,929 wonderful in it, while Holland Stiftung, 1339 00:46:22,930 --> 00:46:25,059 who are here as well, that 1340 00:46:25,060 --> 00:46:27,309 actually stood by us, although they 1341 00:46:27,310 --> 00:46:29,110 had their charity. 1342 00:46:30,190 --> 00:46:32,859 No what do you call it, status 1343 00:46:32,860 --> 00:46:34,360 taken away here in Germany. 1344 00:46:35,740 --> 00:46:37,179 But yes. But then there were other people 1345 00:46:37,180 --> 00:46:38,589 that didn't stand up against this. 1346 00:46:38,590 --> 00:46:40,689 And so our donation routes were 1347 00:46:40,690 --> 00:46:42,069 blockaded and a lot of sense says. 1348 00:46:42,070 --> 00:46:43,899 So one thing is sort of is the people 1349 00:46:43,900 --> 00:46:45,489 that are involved. And the second is that 1350 00:46:45,490 --> 00:46:47,799 the legal structure around it. 1351 00:46:47,800 --> 00:46:49,869 And so one of the structures that we've 1352 00:46:49,870 --> 00:46:51,939 used is a trust in the U.K., of 1353 00:46:51,940 --> 00:46:53,049 all places. 1354 00:46:53,050 --> 00:46:55,059 But the trust has some quite it's a long 1355 00:46:55,060 --> 00:46:56,559 thing to go into here. But I can explain 1356 00:46:56,560 --> 00:46:57,819 about it later if you want. 1357 00:46:57,820 --> 00:46:59,889 But a trust has some some 1358 00:46:59,890 --> 00:47:01,989 things that make it reasonably robust 1359 00:47:01,990 --> 00:47:03,850 for for these sorts of situations. 1360 00:47:05,020 --> 00:47:06,549 All right. Thanks. Next question from my 1361 00:47:06,550 --> 00:47:07,689 friend. 1362 00:47:07,690 --> 00:47:10,239 Oh, hi. 1363 00:47:10,240 --> 00:47:11,709 Thanks for the talk. Of course. 1364 00:47:11,710 --> 00:47:13,749 But you mentioned something about source 1365 00:47:13,750 --> 00:47:15,879 protection that kind of piqued my 1366 00:47:15,880 --> 00:47:17,979 interest around going through the 1367 00:47:17,980 --> 00:47:19,299 actual source material in the documents 1368 00:47:19,300 --> 00:47:20,769 to ensure that there's nothing personally 1369 00:47:20,770 --> 00:47:21,699 identifiable. 1370 00:47:21,700 --> 00:47:22,869 You mentioned something about double 1371 00:47:22,870 --> 00:47:24,339 spacing and commas. 1372 00:47:24,340 --> 00:47:27,019 How do you protect against maybe 1373 00:47:27,020 --> 00:47:29,229 if we're talking about high stakes here, 1374 00:47:29,230 --> 00:47:31,869 documents that are purposely manipulated 1375 00:47:31,870 --> 00:47:33,579 with a comma, splices or special 1376 00:47:33,580 --> 00:47:35,769 punctuation that the 1377 00:47:35,770 --> 00:47:37,839 adversary would be able to 1378 00:47:37,840 --> 00:47:39,699 attribute 100 percent back to a source, 1379 00:47:39,700 --> 00:47:41,829 at what point do you say maybe we can't 1380 00:47:41,830 --> 00:47:43,299 even post screenshots of the source 1381 00:47:43,300 --> 00:47:45,219 material? Where do you draw that line or 1382 00:47:45,220 --> 00:47:47,439 how do you even assume that might come 1383 00:47:47,440 --> 00:47:48,279 into play? 1384 00:47:48,280 --> 00:47:49,959 So one of the things that you do in these 1385 00:47:49,960 --> 00:47:51,969 cases, you essentially basically what 1386 00:47:51,970 --> 00:47:53,380 you're aiming for is 1387 00:47:55,060 --> 00:47:57,129 at a high enough level of plausible 1388 00:47:57,130 --> 00:47:59,199 deniability and creating 1389 00:47:59,200 --> 00:48:00,709 a large enough anonymity pool. 1390 00:48:00,710 --> 00:48:02,919 So you're basically fudging what they can 1391 00:48:02,920 --> 00:48:05,049 specifically relate back in the sense of 1392 00:48:05,050 --> 00:48:06,579 these things. So you would go through and 1393 00:48:06,580 --> 00:48:08,439 you do things like you standardize this 1394 00:48:08,440 --> 00:48:09,789 in certain ways. 1395 00:48:09,790 --> 00:48:12,069 So this actually means going and 1396 00:48:12,070 --> 00:48:13,070 and. 1397 00:48:13,860 --> 00:48:15,989 Taking away paragraph breaks 1398 00:48:15,990 --> 00:48:17,610 or these sorts of things, 1399 00:48:18,990 --> 00:48:21,179 because, as I say, the main thing is 1400 00:48:21,180 --> 00:48:23,549 to ensure that it can't be specifically 1401 00:48:23,550 --> 00:48:25,839 led back to that one potential source. 1402 00:48:25,840 --> 00:48:27,269 If you go through and do things like 1403 00:48:27,270 --> 00:48:28,559 standardizing through the whole 1404 00:48:28,560 --> 00:48:30,659 documents, et cetera, then you take 1405 00:48:30,660 --> 00:48:32,579 the you're adding starting to add more 1406 00:48:32,580 --> 00:48:34,679 and more plausible deniability to it and 1407 00:48:34,680 --> 00:48:36,749 taking away any specific things that 1408 00:48:36,750 --> 00:48:38,909 could have been put into to 1409 00:48:38,910 --> 00:48:40,889 pinpoint a certain source. 1410 00:48:40,890 --> 00:48:42,989 So as a thought example or a thought 1411 00:48:42,990 --> 00:48:45,379 experiment, if Snowden decided 1412 00:48:45,380 --> 00:48:47,549 to remain anonymous, should 1413 00:48:47,550 --> 00:48:49,229 they have posted the screenshots of the 1414 00:48:49,230 --> 00:48:50,609 PowerPoint presentations or should have 1415 00:48:50,610 --> 00:48:52,259 been standardized a twelve point times 1416 00:48:52,260 --> 00:48:54,389 new Roman completely stripped of 1417 00:48:54,390 --> 00:48:56,199 its original format? 1418 00:48:56,200 --> 00:48:57,389 Well, this is where I was saying it 1419 00:48:57,390 --> 00:48:59,069 depends on like the workflow, etc. 1420 00:48:59,070 --> 00:49:00,359 within an organization. 1421 00:49:00,360 --> 00:49:02,419 So if you have if 1422 00:49:02,420 --> 00:49:04,199 the if the documents if there's like a 1423 00:49:04,200 --> 00:49:06,179 large repository, which a lot of people, 1424 00:49:06,180 --> 00:49:08,639 a number of people are coming accessing 1425 00:49:08,640 --> 00:49:10,259 the documents through, you have a large 1426 00:49:10,260 --> 00:49:12,659 enough anonymity pool from your baseline. 1427 00:49:12,660 --> 00:49:14,849 So therefore, you know, it's this 1428 00:49:14,850 --> 00:49:16,799 sort of thing, that particular example 1429 00:49:16,800 --> 00:49:19,139 tends to happen a lot more with 1430 00:49:19,140 --> 00:49:21,269 a smaller 1431 00:49:21,270 --> 00:49:23,309 number of people that the document is 1432 00:49:23,310 --> 00:49:25,619 being spread to within the 1433 00:49:25,620 --> 00:49:27,479 work, within the people it's meant to go 1434 00:49:27,480 --> 00:49:28,480 to. 1435 00:49:29,400 --> 00:49:31,679 That's generally 1436 00:49:31,680 --> 00:49:33,179 if it's within the same organization, 1437 00:49:33,180 --> 00:49:34,229 they don't do it so much. 1438 00:49:34,230 --> 00:49:35,459 It's generally tends to happen. 1439 00:49:35,460 --> 00:49:37,319 So, for example, in the Trans-Pacific 1440 00:49:37,320 --> 00:49:39,479 Partnership, things that documents 1441 00:49:39,480 --> 00:49:41,459 that we published where you're looking 1442 00:49:41,460 --> 00:49:43,589 from, it's although 1443 00:49:43,590 --> 00:49:45,779 it's within a reasonably 1444 00:49:45,780 --> 00:49:47,609 small agreement, it's going across 1445 00:49:47,610 --> 00:49:49,649 country and then within those countries, 1446 00:49:49,650 --> 00:49:51,149 different advisers, et cetera, are 1447 00:49:51,150 --> 00:49:52,709 looking at this. And they want to know 1448 00:49:52,710 --> 00:49:54,479 maybe which country or which particular 1449 00:49:54,480 --> 00:49:55,799 person it's come from. 1450 00:49:55,800 --> 00:49:57,749 So when the Snowden documents, it's kind 1451 00:49:57,750 --> 00:50:00,029 of it's quite a different case because 1452 00:50:00,030 --> 00:50:02,189 of the nature of who had access to those 1453 00:50:02,190 --> 00:50:03,839 documents. So it's really it's kind of a 1454 00:50:03,840 --> 00:50:05,039 case by case example. 1455 00:50:05,040 --> 00:50:06,239 They were just very specific. 1456 00:50:06,240 --> 00:50:07,949 I'm not saying you now have to worry 1457 00:50:07,950 --> 00:50:10,199 about every comma and every document. 1458 00:50:10,200 --> 00:50:11,999 This was a very sort of specific type of 1459 00:50:12,000 --> 00:50:13,559 case. Just to give an example of the 1460 00:50:13,560 --> 00:50:15,149 things one should be thinking about when 1461 00:50:15,150 --> 00:50:16,829 you're working with this documents, who 1462 00:50:16,830 --> 00:50:17,789 has access to it? 1463 00:50:17,790 --> 00:50:19,509 How does the organization operate? 1464 00:50:19,510 --> 00:50:22,049 It's not just a fact of removing 1465 00:50:22,050 --> 00:50:23,189 the headers from the email or the 1466 00:50:23,190 --> 00:50:25,079 metadata from the documents. 1467 00:50:25,080 --> 00:50:26,009 All right. Thank you. 1468 00:50:26,010 --> 00:50:27,839 Thank you for everybody entering the room 1469 00:50:27,840 --> 00:50:29,309 right now. I would like to point out that 1470 00:50:29,310 --> 00:50:30,539 we're in the middle of a very interesting 1471 00:50:30,540 --> 00:50:32,639 Q&A, so please remain super silent. 1472 00:50:32,640 --> 00:50:34,029 Thank you. Next question for microphone 1473 00:50:34,030 --> 00:50:35,030 one. 1474 00:50:36,620 --> 00:50:38,389 Thank you very much for this very 1475 00:50:38,390 --> 00:50:40,669 important talk and thank 1476 00:50:40,670 --> 00:50:42,889 you for your support of Jeremy 1477 00:50:42,890 --> 00:50:44,159 Hammond. 1478 00:50:44,160 --> 00:50:46,459 And I was wondering, 1479 00:50:46,460 --> 00:50:48,529 um, for me, it seems 1480 00:50:48,530 --> 00:50:50,689 that he's a very classical political 1481 00:50:50,690 --> 00:50:51,769 prisoner. 1482 00:50:51,770 --> 00:50:54,689 And I was wondering if the traditional 1483 00:50:54,690 --> 00:50:56,839 or classical organization 1484 00:50:56,840 --> 00:50:59,269 for human rights, like 1485 00:50:59,270 --> 00:51:01,609 Human Rights Watch or 1486 00:51:01,610 --> 00:51:03,739 Amnesty International, are also 1487 00:51:03,740 --> 00:51:06,109 engaged in supporting him 1488 00:51:06,110 --> 00:51:07,819 or their role. 1489 00:51:07,820 --> 00:51:09,949 Can you elaborate a little bit on this 1490 00:51:09,950 --> 00:51:11,059 and why not? 1491 00:51:11,060 --> 00:51:12,330 And so on. Thank you. 1492 00:51:13,760 --> 00:51:15,739 I believe that sometimes for those 1493 00:51:15,740 --> 00:51:17,179 organizations, they have to 1494 00:51:18,350 --> 00:51:20,479 sort of sometimes draw a political 1495 00:51:20,480 --> 00:51:22,489 line, what they're allowed, what they're, 1496 00:51:22,490 --> 00:51:24,049 quote, allowed to support with what 1497 00:51:24,050 --> 00:51:25,279 they're willing to support, which I think 1498 00:51:25,280 --> 00:51:27,830 is sad because 1499 00:51:29,510 --> 00:51:31,369 your ethics should you know, 1500 00:51:32,570 --> 00:51:34,789 people people deserve support and 1501 00:51:34,790 --> 00:51:36,529 that should reach across ethical. 1502 00:51:36,530 --> 00:51:38,059 I'm not saying it should reach across 1503 00:51:38,060 --> 00:51:40,219 ethical lines, but there are certain 1504 00:51:40,220 --> 00:51:42,259 things that we can all agree on that, you 1505 00:51:42,260 --> 00:51:44,419 know, that support is 1506 00:51:44,420 --> 00:51:46,699 necessary and needed and it should 1507 00:51:46,700 --> 00:51:48,979 not, you know, reflect badly 1508 00:51:48,980 --> 00:51:51,619 on a news or organization, 1509 00:51:51,620 --> 00:51:53,779 say if they sign a letter saying this 1510 00:51:53,780 --> 00:51:55,729 person deserves leniency. 1511 00:51:55,730 --> 00:51:58,099 But often in at least in America, 1512 00:51:58,100 --> 00:52:00,439 it often does look bad for them. 1513 00:52:01,820 --> 00:52:04,009 I don't know if I'm right, but 1514 00:52:04,010 --> 00:52:05,929 I'm kind of assuming it has something to 1515 00:52:05,930 --> 00:52:09,229 do with the fact that they are Western 1516 00:52:09,230 --> 00:52:11,419 political prisoners, is 1517 00:52:11,420 --> 00:52:13,399 it can it be that there is a difference 1518 00:52:13,400 --> 00:52:15,529 if they would be from some, I 1519 00:52:15,530 --> 00:52:18,169 don't know, banana republic or 1520 00:52:18,170 --> 00:52:20,449 axis of evil, then they 1521 00:52:20,450 --> 00:52:21,889 could get more support. 1522 00:52:21,890 --> 00:52:24,019 But I think because they 1523 00:52:24,020 --> 00:52:26,599 are from, well, the US, 1524 00:52:26,600 --> 00:52:27,229 I don't know. 1525 00:52:27,230 --> 00:52:29,749 I mean, human rights 1526 00:52:29,750 --> 00:52:31,969 organizations have done some amazing work 1527 00:52:31,970 --> 00:52:34,249 within the United States 1528 00:52:34,250 --> 00:52:36,409 within the past several years about 1529 00:52:36,410 --> 00:52:40,159 issues such as solitary confinement. 1530 00:52:40,160 --> 00:52:41,839 But as far as supporting specific 1531 00:52:41,840 --> 00:52:43,939 prisoners, I would agree with what 1532 00:52:43,940 --> 00:52:45,379 you're saying when it comes to specific 1533 00:52:45,380 --> 00:52:45,719 prisons. 1534 00:52:45,720 --> 00:52:47,749 Yeah, they they don't issues without 1535 00:52:47,750 --> 00:52:49,999 faces are generally far easier to 1536 00:52:50,000 --> 00:52:52,279 to to support when it comes to specific 1537 00:52:52,280 --> 00:52:54,649 people. I think the the 1538 00:52:54,650 --> 00:52:56,539 alliances that organizations think that 1539 00:52:56,540 --> 00:52:58,069 they're having, if it's the US government 1540 00:52:58,070 --> 00:52:59,299 that has cracked down on someone in 1541 00:52:59,300 --> 00:53:00,559 there, a U.S. government based 1542 00:53:00,560 --> 00:53:02,449 organization, and often these 1543 00:53:02,450 --> 00:53:04,069 organizations get their funding from the 1544 00:53:04,070 --> 00:53:05,569 US government. So the last thing they 1545 00:53:05,570 --> 00:53:07,039 want to do is say, hey, we want to 1546 00:53:07,040 --> 00:53:08,689 support that guy that, you know, last 1547 00:53:08,690 --> 00:53:09,659 week you were trying to kill. 1548 00:53:09,660 --> 00:53:10,660 So 1549 00:53:11,780 --> 00:53:13,429 I think that completely has a lot to do 1550 00:53:13,430 --> 00:53:13,739 with it. 1551 00:53:13,740 --> 00:53:15,619 Yeah, OK, thank you very much. 1552 00:53:15,620 --> 00:53:17,029 Thank you. We got another question from 1553 00:53:17,030 --> 00:53:18,030 the Internet. 1554 00:53:20,100 --> 00:53:23,039 Yes, one more from the IOC, Chad, 1555 00:53:23,040 --> 00:53:25,379 how about developing low budget methods 1556 00:53:25,380 --> 00:53:27,479 for anonymous collection of secrets, 1557 00:53:27,480 --> 00:53:29,639 like if dropping tools for everyone 1558 00:53:29,640 --> 00:53:31,709 together with tutorials, how 1559 00:53:31,710 --> 00:53:33,779 to deploy them and a S.O.P for the 1560 00:53:33,780 --> 00:53:34,979 whole process? 1561 00:53:34,980 --> 00:53:37,139 Or is there already something like this? 1562 00:53:38,730 --> 00:53:40,739 Can you can you can you repeat it? 1563 00:53:40,740 --> 00:53:42,839 How about developing low budget 1564 00:53:42,840 --> 00:53:44,909 methods for anonymous collection 1565 00:53:44,910 --> 00:53:47,189 of secrets like eavesdropping 1566 00:53:47,190 --> 00:53:48,869 tools for everyone together with 1567 00:53:48,870 --> 00:53:50,999 tutorials, how to deploy 1568 00:53:51,000 --> 00:53:53,819 them and a S.O.P for the whole process? 1569 00:53:53,820 --> 00:53:56,040 Or is there already something like this 1570 00:53:58,080 --> 00:53:59,080 gathering? 1571 00:53:59,970 --> 00:54:01,109 I think sort of. 1572 00:54:01,110 --> 00:54:02,879 I mean, it depends how I don't know of 1573 00:54:02,880 --> 00:54:05,099 anything. As I understand it, this is for 1574 00:54:05,100 --> 00:54:06,329 for collecting. 1575 00:54:06,330 --> 00:54:08,399 Yes. The collection rather than people 1576 00:54:08,400 --> 00:54:10,739 specifically going and putting them. 1577 00:54:10,740 --> 00:54:12,299 I don't know of anything that exists 1578 00:54:12,300 --> 00:54:13,679 specifically like that. 1579 00:54:13,680 --> 00:54:15,419 I think that it would probably sounds 1580 00:54:15,420 --> 00:54:17,639 like would be quite a good obfuscating 1581 00:54:17,640 --> 00:54:19,829 tool. So if someone wants 1582 00:54:19,830 --> 00:54:21,719 to make a good one of those, that sounds 1583 00:54:21,720 --> 00:54:23,159 quite good. But I don't know of anything, 1584 00:54:23,160 --> 00:54:23,969 anything like that. 1585 00:54:23,970 --> 00:54:26,459 I think any there's 1586 00:54:26,460 --> 00:54:28,559 always with these sorts of solutions, I 1587 00:54:28,560 --> 00:54:30,119 think that there's a balance between 1588 00:54:32,730 --> 00:54:35,269 investing enough time, 1589 00:54:35,270 --> 00:54:37,439 et cetera, to make a 1590 00:54:37,440 --> 00:54:39,149 particular solution good enough and then 1591 00:54:39,150 --> 00:54:41,129 also having enough other solutions so 1592 00:54:41,130 --> 00:54:43,079 that you can create enough cover 1593 00:54:43,080 --> 00:54:44,819 possibilities and traffic to try and 1594 00:54:44,820 --> 00:54:46,889 obfuscate exactly exactly what 1595 00:54:46,890 --> 00:54:47,699 is being used. 1596 00:54:47,700 --> 00:54:49,089 So there's always a balance when looking 1597 00:54:49,090 --> 00:54:50,399 at this, but I don't know anything of 1598 00:54:50,400 --> 00:54:51,759 exactly what was. 1599 00:54:51,760 --> 00:54:53,189 Thank you, newcomers. 1600 00:54:53,190 --> 00:54:54,599 Please be silent. 1601 00:54:54,600 --> 00:54:55,600 Question for Mike. 1602 00:54:56,760 --> 00:54:59,499 Hi. Thank you for everything 1603 00:54:59,500 --> 00:55:01,020 you said. You have said that 1604 00:55:02,610 --> 00:55:05,039 everybody's help is welcomed, 1605 00:55:05,040 --> 00:55:08,069 but I found that sometimes 1606 00:55:08,070 --> 00:55:10,289 in helping in a more concrete 1607 00:55:10,290 --> 00:55:12,809 way can be 1608 00:55:12,810 --> 00:55:13,859 complicated. 1609 00:55:13,860 --> 00:55:16,149 I mean, the nation are 1610 00:55:16,150 --> 00:55:18,059 useful, of course, but sometimes there is 1611 00:55:18,060 --> 00:55:20,129 also the fear, the feeling 1612 00:55:20,130 --> 00:55:22,109 of the duty to do something more. 1613 00:55:22,110 --> 00:55:24,539 So I'd like to ask if 1614 00:55:24,540 --> 00:55:27,599 there are other ways for young people 1615 00:55:27,600 --> 00:55:28,889 who are not journalists, who are not 1616 00:55:28,890 --> 00:55:31,229 lawyers, who are not anything 1617 00:55:31,230 --> 00:55:32,610 else to help. 1618 00:55:33,930 --> 00:55:35,159 Yeah, I mean, we're looking for things 1619 00:55:35,160 --> 00:55:37,139 like translators, et cetera, as well for 1620 00:55:37,140 --> 00:55:39,119 the site we actually have on. 1621 00:55:39,120 --> 00:55:41,249 If you go to the website, you can you 1622 00:55:41,250 --> 00:55:42,779 can state that you want to volunteer 1623 00:55:42,780 --> 00:55:44,879 there. So I can't remember the the 1624 00:55:44,880 --> 00:55:47,399 exact email now, but it's on the website. 1625 00:55:47,400 --> 00:55:49,019 So you could always sign up for that if 1626 00:55:49,020 --> 00:55:50,729 you want to to help. 1627 00:55:52,320 --> 00:55:53,309 OK, thank you. 1628 00:55:53,310 --> 00:55:55,639 Thank you. Question from Mike, too. 1629 00:55:55,640 --> 00:55:57,329 OK, thanks, guys, for your work, of 1630 00:55:57,330 --> 00:55:59,009 course. And for coming here to speak 1631 00:55:59,010 --> 00:56:01,079 about. It's just a question for Sara. 1632 00:56:01,080 --> 00:56:03,479 You gave a lot of examples, 1633 00:56:03,480 --> 00:56:04,679 you know, really bad examples of 1634 00:56:04,680 --> 00:56:06,479 journalists making mistakes. 1635 00:56:06,480 --> 00:56:08,699 And it almost seems 1636 00:56:08,700 --> 00:56:11,039 that you're suggesting I go speak to them 1637 00:56:11,040 --> 00:56:12,359 because it can be dangerous. 1638 00:56:12,360 --> 00:56:14,279 I was wondering, did you ever consider 1639 00:56:14,280 --> 00:56:16,529 blacklisting certain 1640 00:56:16,530 --> 00:56:18,589 news organizations and how does every 1641 00:56:18,590 --> 00:56:19,590 day 1642 00:56:21,170 --> 00:56:23,239 so you let 1643 00:56:23,240 --> 00:56:24,809 you live with them as thinking we might 1644 00:56:24,810 --> 00:56:26,159 start one of those on courage. 1645 00:56:26,160 --> 00:56:27,569 We could have like the good pile and the 1646 00:56:27,570 --> 00:56:29,729 bad file and then sources can go in. 1647 00:56:29,730 --> 00:56:31,919 Which one shall I get thinking 1648 00:56:31,920 --> 00:56:32,849 we might do that? 1649 00:56:32,850 --> 00:56:34,439 It could it could be useful for you to 1650 00:56:34,440 --> 00:56:35,579 give me good. 1651 00:56:35,580 --> 00:56:37,679 I mean, it might get you in the hands 1652 00:56:37,680 --> 00:56:39,659 of media, I guess, but you 1653 00:56:40,780 --> 00:56:42,579 literally get to remark about Google. 1654 00:56:42,580 --> 00:56:44,879 I'm talking about blacklisting, you know, 1655 00:56:44,880 --> 00:56:45,899 tools and stuff. 1656 00:56:45,900 --> 00:56:47,669 You different. 1657 00:56:47,670 --> 00:56:49,739 I mean, yeah, it's like it's 1658 00:56:49,740 --> 00:56:51,599 a search warrant. Says I'll go back if 1659 00:56:51,600 --> 00:56:52,600 you. 1660 00:56:53,710 --> 00:56:55,899 So it's basically so essentially 1661 00:56:55,900 --> 00:56:58,059 the US governments have started saying 1662 00:56:58,060 --> 00:57:00,069 or they actually sent them a while ago, 1663 00:57:00,070 --> 00:57:02,529 we just got told about them, the ones 1664 00:57:02,530 --> 00:57:04,689 that we know of so far, their search 1665 00:57:04,690 --> 00:57:07,269 warrants for any Google services 1666 00:57:07,270 --> 00:57:09,429 that we have, any that we've been using 1667 00:57:09,430 --> 00:57:10,809 ever use. 1668 00:57:10,810 --> 00:57:13,509 And me, Kristen, who is our spokesperson, 1669 00:57:13,510 --> 00:57:15,279 has one as well. 1670 00:57:15,280 --> 00:57:16,809 There's some others that have come to 1671 00:57:16,810 --> 00:57:18,999 other people that are 1672 00:57:19,000 --> 00:57:20,769 connected to Julian. 1673 00:57:20,770 --> 00:57:22,419 We got them all literally the day before 1674 00:57:22,420 --> 00:57:24,009 Christmas. So I sort of haven't had that 1675 00:57:24,010 --> 00:57:25,870 much time to to do anything with it. 1676 00:57:27,070 --> 00:57:29,109 But we it's I mean, it's definitely to do 1677 00:57:29,110 --> 00:57:31,419 with that seven nine three 1678 00:57:31,420 --> 00:57:33,489 G number that you can see. 1679 00:57:33,490 --> 00:57:36,009 These are all like the legal 1680 00:57:36,010 --> 00:57:38,259 codes that the warrant says 1681 00:57:38,260 --> 00:57:39,219 is made under. 1682 00:57:39,220 --> 00:57:41,469 Yeah, but I didn't get how, you know, 1683 00:57:41,470 --> 00:57:43,209 the US government trying to get data 1684 00:57:43,210 --> 00:57:45,489 about WikiLeaks, you know, 1685 00:57:45,490 --> 00:57:46,779 incriminates Google. 1686 00:57:46,780 --> 00:57:48,459 I mean, did they respond to this warrant 1687 00:57:48,460 --> 00:57:50,589 or I mean, it sent to 1688 00:57:50,590 --> 00:57:51,009 Google. 1689 00:57:51,010 --> 00:57:54,009 So this was the US government's 1690 00:57:54,010 --> 00:57:56,319 sent a request to Google 1691 00:57:56,320 --> 00:57:58,509 for any information that they had 1692 00:57:58,510 --> 00:57:59,919 from me. 1693 00:57:59,920 --> 00:58:01,270 For example, this one's mine. 1694 00:58:03,130 --> 00:58:05,319 So it wasn't necessarily 1695 00:58:05,320 --> 00:58:07,029 a it was more a points about the fact 1696 00:58:07,030 --> 00:58:08,769 that journalists can be subpoenaed rather 1697 00:58:08,770 --> 00:58:10,869 than specifically Google, although 1698 00:58:10,870 --> 00:58:13,029 there are many bad points about Google. 1699 00:58:13,030 --> 00:58:15,009 But I didn't go into any of them here 1700 00:58:15,010 --> 00:58:16,539 necessarily. 1701 00:58:16,540 --> 00:58:18,279 So you don't know if Google had, you 1702 00:58:18,280 --> 00:58:19,689 know, replies with information 1703 00:58:20,950 --> 00:58:23,109 they had to comply with the information 1704 00:58:23,110 --> 00:58:23,439 they've got. 1705 00:58:23,440 --> 00:58:25,149 They've complied. And in fact, they only 1706 00:58:25,150 --> 00:58:26,709 had to tell us years later. 1707 00:58:26,710 --> 00:58:28,899 So this actually has all like this was 1708 00:58:28,900 --> 00:58:30,189 given only just burn out. 1709 00:58:30,190 --> 00:58:32,049 But it was they were giving information. 1710 00:58:32,050 --> 00:58:33,309 They had a deadline to start giving 1711 00:58:33,310 --> 00:58:35,769 information, not since 2012. 1712 00:58:35,770 --> 00:58:36,999 So Google have complied. 1713 00:58:38,020 --> 00:58:40,059 All right. Thanks very last question for 1714 00:58:40,060 --> 00:58:41,889 microphone six. 1715 00:58:41,890 --> 00:58:43,869 I have a question about your broader 1716 00:58:43,870 --> 00:58:45,909 definition of whistle blowing risk, 1717 00:58:45,910 --> 00:58:48,099 because I get the feeling that 1718 00:58:48,100 --> 00:58:50,619 it might be damaging to the term. 1719 00:58:50,620 --> 00:58:53,019 And this is because currently 1720 00:58:53,020 --> 00:58:55,089 the connotation of whistleblowing is 1721 00:58:55,090 --> 00:58:57,369 using your right to free speech, 1722 00:58:57,370 --> 00:58:59,589 which is usually regarded rather 1723 00:58:59,590 --> 00:59:01,779 highly among the rights that citizens 1724 00:59:01,780 --> 00:59:04,119 have. And if you expand 1725 00:59:04,120 --> 00:59:07,059 this definition to any 1726 00:59:07,060 --> 00:59:09,189 form of activism to raise or 1727 00:59:09,190 --> 00:59:11,409 that is used to raise. 1728 00:59:13,160 --> 00:59:15,349 I don't know knowledge about the topic or 1729 00:59:15,350 --> 00:59:16,639 something. 1730 00:59:16,640 --> 00:59:18,799 How would you differentiate or where 1731 00:59:18,800 --> 00:59:21,619 to draw the line between whistleblowing 1732 00:59:21,620 --> 00:59:23,689 according to your definition and 1733 00:59:23,690 --> 00:59:24,829 vigilante justice? 1734 00:59:31,640 --> 00:59:34,149 I'm going to make a very bold statement. 1735 00:59:34,150 --> 00:59:36,639 OK, I 1736 00:59:36,640 --> 00:59:39,429 am 100 percent for vigilante 1737 00:59:39,430 --> 00:59:41,559 justice, just f why I 1738 00:59:44,830 --> 00:59:47,079 just f why we have a little kind 1739 00:59:47,080 --> 00:59:49,479 of I'm that's the punk in me maybe 1740 00:59:49,480 --> 00:59:51,639 going a little DIY there, 1741 00:59:51,640 --> 00:59:53,919 but I am one 1742 00:59:53,920 --> 00:59:56,109 hundred four people, one hundred 1743 00:59:56,110 --> 00:59:58,449 percent for people seeing injustice, 1744 00:59:58,450 --> 01:00:00,909 doing whatever they feel 1745 01:00:00,910 --> 01:00:03,069 they are able to do to 1746 01:00:03,070 --> 01:00:04,719 bring that forward. Like, like I said 1747 01:00:04,720 --> 01:00:07,179 before, revolutions are never easy 1748 01:00:07,180 --> 01:00:08,649 and they're never clean and they're never 1749 01:00:08,650 --> 01:00:10,299 neat. And the people that are breaking 1750 01:00:10,300 --> 01:00:12,309 the law are the ones that unfortunately 1751 01:00:12,310 --> 01:00:14,739 are going to enact the most change. 1752 01:00:14,740 --> 01:00:17,259 And I believe that we should support that 1753 01:00:17,260 --> 01:00:19,479 because laws are not 1754 01:00:19,480 --> 01:00:21,369 what's right is not always justice and 1755 01:00:21,370 --> 01:00:23,469 what's just is not always right. 1756 01:00:25,270 --> 01:00:27,789 Thank you. I guess that's a great closing 1757 01:00:27,790 --> 01:00:29,259 statement. Thank you so much. 1758 01:00:29,260 --> 01:00:30,579 Please give it out again for Sarah 1759 01:00:30,580 --> 01:00:32,559 Harrison. And Great Knowles was great. 1760 01:00:32,560 --> 01:00:34,839 OK, thank you so much. 1761 01:00:34,840 --> 01:00:35,840 Awesome talk.