1 00:00:09,559 --> 00:00:13,359 Herald: So now, the next talk that we have here for one hour from 8:30 2 00:00:13,359 --> 00:00:17,689 ’til 9:30 PM is “The Tor Network – we’re living in interesting times”. 3 00:00:17,689 --> 00:00:21,499 I don’t know how many of you are familiar with the works of Terry Pratchett. 4 00:00:21,499 --> 00:00:26,680 But anyways, in the novels of Terry Pratchett there is the saying: 5 00:00:26,680 --> 00:00:30,509 “And may you live in interesting times!” that is actually a curse 6 00:00:30,509 --> 00:00:33,780 for someone that you especially dislike; because it usually means 7 00:00:33,780 --> 00:00:36,700 that you’re in a lot of trouble. So I guess we’re all very excited 8 00:00:36,700 --> 00:00:40,610 for this year’s ‘Tor Talk’ by the everlasting Dream Team: 9 00:00:40,610 --> 00:00:44,210 Jacob Appelbaum and Roger Dingledine! There you go! 10 00:00:44,210 --> 00:00:46,969 *cheers and applause* Give it up! 11 00:00:46,969 --> 00:00:54,659 *huge applause* 12 00:00:54,659 --> 00:00:58,320 Jacob Appelbaum: So, thanks very much to the guy who brought me a Mate. 13 00:00:58,320 --> 00:01:00,979 I learned his name is Alexander. It’s never a good idea to take drugs 14 00:01:00,979 --> 00:01:04,589 from strangers, so I introduced myself before I drank it. Thank you. 15 00:01:04,589 --> 00:01:07,370 *laughter* 16 00:01:07,370 --> 00:01:11,010 First I wanted to say that following up after Glenn Greenwald is a great honor 17 00:01:11,010 --> 00:01:15,250 and a really difficult thing to do, that’s a really tough act to follow, and 18 00:01:15,250 --> 00:01:18,860 he’s pretty much one of, I think, our heroes. So, it’s 19 00:01:18,860 --> 00:01:22,729 really great to be able to share the stage with him, even for just a brief moment. 20 00:01:22,729 --> 00:01:25,500 And I wanted to do something a little unconventional when we started 21 00:01:25,500 --> 00:01:28,660 and Roger agreed. Which is that we want people who have questions 22 00:01:28,660 --> 00:01:32,439 – since I suspect some things happened this year that arouse a lot of questions 23 00:01:32,439 --> 00:01:37,000 in people – we’d like you to write those questions down, pass them to an Angel 24 00:01:37,000 --> 00:01:40,940 or to just bring them to the front of the stage as soon as possible 25 00:01:40,940 --> 00:01:44,870 during the talk, so that we can answer as many of your questions as is possible. 26 00:01:44,870 --> 00:01:47,939 This is a lot of stuff that happened, there’s a lot of confusion, and we wanna 27 00:01:47,939 --> 00:01:51,689 make sure that people feel like we are actually answering 28 00:01:51,689 --> 00:01:55,620 those questions in a useful way. And if you wanna do that, it’d be great, 29 00:01:55,620 --> 00:01:59,100 and otherwise, we’re gonna try to have the second half of our talk be mostly 30 00:01:59,100 --> 00:02:03,429 space for questioning. So with that, here is Roger. 31 00:02:03,429 --> 00:02:06,659 Roger Dingledine: Okay, so, a lot of things have happened over this past year, 32 00:02:06,659 --> 00:02:09,220 and we’re gonna try to cover as many of them as we can. 33 00:02:09,220 --> 00:02:12,600 Here’s a great quote from either NSA or GCHQ, 34 00:02:12,600 --> 00:02:14,930 I’m actually not sure which one it is. 35 00:02:14,930 --> 00:02:17,600 But we’re gonna start a little bit earlier in the process than this 36 00:02:17,600 --> 00:02:20,840 and work our way up to that. So, we’re in a war, 37 00:02:20,840 --> 00:02:23,530 or rather, conflict of perception here. 38 00:02:23,530 --> 00:02:26,080 There are a lot – I mean, you saw Glenn’s talk earlier 39 00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:29,040 – there are a lot of large media organizations out there 40 00:02:29,040 --> 00:02:32,500 that are trying to present Tor in lots of different ways, 41 00:02:32,500 --> 00:02:35,500 and we all here understand the value that Tor provides 42 00:02:35,500 --> 00:02:38,520 to the world, but there are a growing number of people around the world 43 00:02:38,520 --> 00:02:41,520 who are learning about Tor not from our website, or from 44 00:02:41,520 --> 00:02:44,780 seeing one of these talks or from learning it from somebody who uses it 45 00:02:44,780 --> 00:02:48,890 and teaches them how to use it. But they read the Time Magazine 46 00:02:48,890 --> 00:02:52,690 or Economist or whatever the mainstream newspapers are, 47 00:02:52,690 --> 00:02:57,140 and part of our challenge is how do we help you, and help the rest of the world 48 00:02:57,140 --> 00:03:01,370 do outreach and education, so that people can understand what Tor is for 49 00:03:01,370 --> 00:03:05,280 and how it works and what sorts of people actually use it. 50 00:03:05,280 --> 00:03:09,370 So, e.g. GCHQ has been given instructions 51 00:03:09,370 --> 00:03:13,230 to try to kill Tor by, I mean, who knows, maybe they thought of it on their own, 52 00:03:13,230 --> 00:03:17,590 maybe we can imagine some nearby governments asked them to do it. 53 00:03:17,590 --> 00:03:21,150 And part of the challenge… they say: “we have to kill it 54 00:03:21,150 --> 00:03:24,780 because of child porn”. And it turns out that we actually do know 55 00:03:24,780 --> 00:03:29,150 that some people around the world are using Tor for child porn. 56 00:03:29,150 --> 00:03:33,080 E.g. we have talked to a lot of federal agencies 57 00:03:33,080 --> 00:03:35,550 who use Tor to fetch child porn. *subdued laughter* 58 00:03:35,550 --> 00:03:37,970 I talked to people in the FBI who use Tor every day 59 00:03:37,970 --> 00:03:42,660 to safely reach the websites that they want to investigate. 60 00:03:42,660 --> 00:03:46,740 The most crazy example of this is actually the Internet Watch Foundation. 61 00:03:46,740 --> 00:03:49,770 How many people here have heard of the Internet Watch Foundation? 62 00:03:49,770 --> 00:03:53,560 I see a very small number of hands. They are the censorship wing 63 00:03:53,560 --> 00:03:57,580 of the British Government. They are the sort of quasi-government organization 64 00:03:57,580 --> 00:04:02,510 who is tasked with coming up with the blacklist for the internet for England. 65 00:04:02,510 --> 00:04:07,310 And, we got email from them a few years ago, saying – not what you’d expect, 66 00:04:07,310 --> 00:04:10,650 you’d expect “Hey, can you please shut this thing down, can you turn it off, 67 00:04:10,650 --> 00:04:13,880 it’s a big hassle for us!” – the question they asked me was: 68 00:04:13,880 --> 00:04:17,740 “How can we make Tor faster?” *laughter, applause* 69 00:04:17,740 --> 00:04:21,149 It turns out that they need Tor, because people report URLs to them, 70 00:04:21,149 --> 00:04:24,980 they need to fetch them somehow. It turns out that when you go the URL 71 00:04:24,980 --> 00:04:27,790 with the allegedly bad stuff on it and you’re coming from 72 00:04:27,790 --> 00:04:32,270 the Internet Watch Foundation’s IP address, they give you kittens! 73 00:04:32,270 --> 00:04:35,730 *laughter* Who would have known? 74 00:04:35,730 --> 00:04:40,050 *laughter, applause* 75 00:04:40,050 --> 00:04:44,700 So it turns out that these censors need an anonymity system 76 00:04:44,700 --> 00:04:50,320 in order to censor their internet. *laughter* Fun times. 77 00:04:52,890 --> 00:04:56,670 So another challenge here: at the same point, one of my side hobbies 78 00:04:56,670 --> 00:05:01,220 is teaching law enforcement how the internet works, and how security works 79 00:05:01,220 --> 00:05:05,530 and how Tor works. So, yeah, their job does suck, but it’s actually not our fault 80 00:05:05,530 --> 00:05:09,610 that their job sucks. There are a lot of different challenges to successfully 81 00:05:09,610 --> 00:05:13,210 being a good, honest law enforcement person these days. 82 00:05:13,210 --> 00:05:17,120 So, e.g. I went to Amsterdam and Brussels 83 00:05:17,120 --> 00:05:21,120 in January of this past year to try to teach various law enforcement groups. 84 00:05:21,120 --> 00:05:24,790 And I ended up having a four-hour debate with the Dutch regional Police, 85 00:05:24,790 --> 00:05:28,860 and then another four-hour debate with a Belgian cybercrime unit, 86 00:05:28,860 --> 00:05:32,180 and then another four-hour debate with the Dutch national Police. 87 00:05:32,180 --> 00:05:36,500 And there are a lot of good-meaning, smart people in each of these organizations, 88 00:05:36,500 --> 00:05:41,400 but they end up, as a group, doing sometimes quite bad things. 89 00:05:41,400 --> 00:05:45,160 So part of our challenge is: how do we teach them that Tor is not the enemy 90 00:05:45,160 --> 00:05:50,840 for them? And there are a couple of stories that I’ve been trying to refine 91 00:05:50,840 --> 00:05:55,870 using on them. One of them they always pull out, the “But what about child porn? 92 00:05:55,870 --> 00:06:00,280 What about bad people? What about some creep using Tor to do bad things?”. 93 00:06:00,280 --> 00:06:04,510 And one of the arguments that I tried on them was, “Okay, so on the one hand 94 00:06:04,510 --> 00:06:08,370 we have a girl in Syria who is alive right now 95 00:06:08,370 --> 00:06:12,650 because of Tor. Because her family was able to communicate safely 96 00:06:12,650 --> 00:06:17,010 and the Syrian military didn’t break in and murder all of them. 97 00:06:17,010 --> 00:06:19,950 On the other hand, we have a girl in America who is getting hassled 98 00:06:19,950 --> 00:06:24,310 by some creep on the internet who is stalking her over Tor.” 99 00:06:24,310 --> 00:06:29,370 So the question is, how do we balance, how do we value these things? 100 00:06:29,370 --> 00:06:31,400 How do we assign a value to the girl in Syria? 101 00:06:31,400 --> 00:06:33,570 How do we assign a value to the girl in America 102 00:06:33,570 --> 00:06:36,700 so that we can decide which one of these is more important? 103 00:06:36,700 --> 00:06:40,060 And actually the answer is, you don’t get to make that choice, 104 00:06:40,060 --> 00:06:43,260 that’s not the right question to ask. Because if we take Tor away 105 00:06:43,260 --> 00:06:46,850 from the girl in Syria, she’s going to die. If we take Tor away 106 00:06:46,850 --> 00:06:51,300 from the creep in America, he’s got a lot of other options for how he can be a creep 107 00:06:51,300 --> 00:06:54,620 and start stalking people. So if you’re a bad person, 108 00:06:54,620 --> 00:06:58,240 for various definitions of ‘bad person’, and you’re willing to break laws 109 00:06:58,240 --> 00:07:01,860 or go around social norms, you’ve got a lot of other options 110 00:07:01,860 --> 00:07:06,309 besides what Tor provides. Whereas there are very few tools out there like Tor 111 00:07:06,309 --> 00:07:11,000 for honest, I’d like to say law-abiding, 112 00:07:11,000 --> 00:07:15,700 but let’s go with civilization-abiding citizens out there. 113 00:07:15,700 --> 00:07:21,110 *applause* 114 00:07:21,110 --> 00:07:24,940 Jacob: And it’s important to understand that this hypothetical thing is actually 115 00:07:24,940 --> 00:07:28,410 also true for certain values. So at our Tor developer meeting 116 00:07:28,410 --> 00:07:33,790 that we had in Munich recently, that Syrian woman came to us, 117 00:07:33,790 --> 00:07:38,100 and thanked us for Tor. She said: “I’m from a city called Homs. 118 00:07:38,100 --> 00:07:41,940 You might have heard about it, it’s not a city anymore. I used Tor. 119 00:07:41,940 --> 00:07:45,150 My family used Tor. We were able to keep ourselves safe on the internet 120 00:07:45,150 --> 00:07:49,480 thanks to Tor. So I wanted to come here to Munich to tell you this. 121 00:07:49,480 --> 00:07:52,550 Thank you for the work that you’re doing.” And for people who 122 00:07:52,550 --> 00:07:56,040 – this was their first dev meeting – they were completely blown away 123 00:07:56,040 --> 00:07:58,810 to meet this person. “Wow, the stuff that we’re working on, 124 00:07:58,810 --> 00:08:02,590 it really does matter, there are real people behind it”. 125 00:08:02,590 --> 00:08:06,260 And we were all, I think, very touched by it, and all of us know someone 126 00:08:06,260 --> 00:08:10,420 who has been on the receiving end of people being jerks on the internet. 127 00:08:10,420 --> 00:08:12,880 So this is a real thing where there are real people involved, and 128 00:08:12,880 --> 00:08:16,440 it’s really important to understand that if you remove the option 129 00:08:16,440 --> 00:08:20,130 for that woman in Syria – or you here in Germany, now that we know 130 00:08:20,130 --> 00:08:23,430 what Edward Snowden has told the world… 131 00:08:23,430 --> 00:08:27,090 Those bad guys, those jerks – for different values of that – 132 00:08:27,090 --> 00:08:31,210 they always have options. But very rarely do all of us have options 133 00:08:31,210 --> 00:08:35,349 that will actually keep us safe. And Tor is certainly not the only one, 134 00:08:35,349 --> 00:08:38,850 but right now, and we hope in this talk you’ll see that we’re making 135 00:08:38,850 --> 00:08:41,580 the right trade-off by working on Tor. 136 00:08:41,580 --> 00:08:45,449 Roger: One of the other talks that I give to them, one of the other stories 137 00:08:45,449 --> 00:08:49,970 that I give to them, one of the big questions they always ask me is: 138 00:08:49,970 --> 00:08:53,690 “But what about terrorists? Aren’t you helping terrorists?” 139 00:08:53,690 --> 00:08:58,160 And we can and we should talk about “What do you mean by terrorists?” 140 00:08:58,160 --> 00:09:00,689 because in China they have a very different definition of terrorists 141 00:09:00,689 --> 00:09:04,290 and in Gaza they have a very different definition of terrorists, and 142 00:09:04,290 --> 00:09:07,040 in America, they are always thinking of a small number of people 143 00:09:07,040 --> 00:09:11,009 in some Middle-Eastern country who are trying to blow up buildings or something – 144 00:09:11,009 --> 00:09:12,709 Jacob: Mohammed Badguy, I think is his name. 145 00:09:12,709 --> 00:09:15,600 Roger: Yes, that – Jacob: In the NSA slides. 146 00:09:15,600 --> 00:09:19,770 Roger: Yes. So, scenario 1: 147 00:09:19,770 --> 00:09:23,490 I want to build a tool that works for millions of people, 148 00:09:23,490 --> 00:09:26,759 it will work for the next year, and I can tell you how it works, 149 00:09:26,759 --> 00:09:30,489 so you can help me evaluate it. That’s Tor’s problem. 150 00:09:30,489 --> 00:09:34,769 Scenario 2: I want to build a tool that will work for the next 2 weeks, 151 00:09:34,769 --> 00:09:38,480 it will work for 20 people and I’m not going to tell you about it. 152 00:09:38,480 --> 00:09:41,740 There are so many more ways of solving scenario 2 153 00:09:41,740 --> 00:09:45,220 than solving scenario 1. The bad guys – for all sorts of definitions – 154 00:09:45,220 --> 00:09:49,509 the bad guys have a lot more options on how they can keep safe. 155 00:09:49,509 --> 00:09:52,329 They don’t have to scale, it doesn’t have to last forever, 156 00:09:52,329 --> 00:09:55,170 they don’t want peer review, they don’t want anybody to even know 157 00:09:55,170 --> 00:09:58,690 that it’s happening. So the challenge that Tor has is 158 00:09:58,690 --> 00:10:02,920 we wanna build something that works for everybody and that everybody can analyze 159 00:10:02,920 --> 00:10:07,090 and learn about. That’s a much harder problem, there are far fewer ways 160 00:10:07,090 --> 00:10:12,000 of solving that. So, the terrorists, they got a lot of options. 161 00:10:12,000 --> 00:10:15,809 That sucks. We need to build tools that can keep the rest of the world safe. 162 00:10:15,809 --> 00:10:19,339 Jacob: And it’s important, really, to try to have some good rhetorical arguments, 163 00:10:19,339 --> 00:10:23,209 I think. I mean, we sort of put a few facts up here. 164 00:10:23,209 --> 00:10:26,829 One interesting point to mention is that people who really 165 00:10:26,829 --> 00:10:29,740 don’t want anonymity to exist in a practical sense, maybe 166 00:10:29,740 --> 00:10:32,839 not even in a theoretical, Human Rights sense either, but definitely 167 00:10:32,839 --> 00:10:36,879 in a practical sense, they’re not really having honest conversations about it. 168 00:10:36,879 --> 00:10:40,440 E.g. this DoJ study – the Department of Justice in the United States – they 169 00:10:40,440 --> 00:10:44,300 actually started to do a study where they classified traffic leaving Tor exit nodes. 170 00:10:44,300 --> 00:10:47,700 Which… it’s interesting that they were basically probably wiretapping 171 00:10:47,700 --> 00:10:50,709 an exit node to do that study. And I wonder how they went about that – but 172 00:10:50,709 --> 00:10:54,680 nonetheless, they came up with the number 3% of the traffic being bad. 173 00:10:54,680 --> 00:10:58,089 And then they aborted the study because they received many DMCA takedown notices. 174 00:10:58,089 --> 00:10:59,899 *laughter* Roger: Yes, they – 175 00:10:59,899 --> 00:11:03,000 Jacob: Apparently even the DMCA is a problem to finding out answers! 176 00:11:03,000 --> 00:11:04,130 That plague of society! (?) 177 00:11:04,130 --> 00:11:05,689 Roger: *interrupts* They asked a university to run the Tor exit for them 178 00:11:05,689 --> 00:11:08,429 and they were just starting out doing their study, and then 179 00:11:08,429 --> 00:11:11,980 the university started getting DMCA takedowns and said: 180 00:11:11,980 --> 00:11:14,759 “Well, we have to stop, the lawyers told us to stop!”, 181 00:11:14,759 --> 00:11:18,579 and the Department of Justice said: “We’re the Department of Justice, 182 00:11:18,579 --> 00:11:21,100 keep doing it”, and then they turned it off. *laughter* 183 00:11:21,100 --> 00:11:25,060 So, not sure how the balance of power goes there, but the initial results 184 00:11:25,060 --> 00:11:28,100 they were looking towards were about 3% of the traffic 185 00:11:28,100 --> 00:11:31,470 coming out of that Tor exit node was bad, 186 00:11:31,470 --> 00:11:35,409 but I haven’t figured out what they mean by ‘bad’. But I’ll take it if it’s 3%. 187 00:11:35,409 --> 00:11:41,019 Jacob: And I personally don’t like to use the word ‘war’ 188 00:11:41,019 --> 00:11:45,739 when talking about the internet. And I particularly dislike 189 00:11:45,739 --> 00:11:48,709 when we talk about actual issues of terrorism. 190 00:11:48,709 --> 00:11:51,920 And I think that we should talk about it in terms of perception and conflict. 191 00:11:51,920 --> 00:11:55,169 And one of the most frustrating things is: the BBC 192 00:11:55,169 --> 00:11:58,430 actually has articles on their website instructing people 193 00:11:58,430 --> 00:12:02,119 how to use the Silk Road and Tor together to buy drugs. 194 00:12:02,119 --> 00:12:07,189 We very, very seriously do not ever advocate that, 195 00:12:07,189 --> 00:12:10,009 for a bunch of reasons… Not the least of which is that even though 196 00:12:10,009 --> 00:12:13,240 Bitcoin is amazing, it’s not an anonymous currency. 197 00:12:13,240 --> 00:12:16,250 And it isn’t the case that these websites are necessarily a good idea and… 198 00:12:16,250 --> 00:12:19,949 but it won’t be Tor, I think, that will be the weakest link. But the fact that 199 00:12:19,949 --> 00:12:24,949 the BBC promotes that – it’s because they generally have “A man bites dog”. 200 00:12:24,949 --> 00:12:28,920 You could say that that’s their entire Tor related ecosystem. 201 00:12:28,920 --> 00:12:31,500 Anything that could be just kind of a little bit interesting, 202 00:12:31,500 --> 00:12:33,870 they’ll run with it. So they have something to say about it. 203 00:12:33,870 --> 00:12:37,320 And in this case they literally were promoting and pushing for people 204 00:12:37,320 --> 00:12:41,750 to buy drugs. Which is crazy to me, to imagine that. And that really impacts 205 00:12:41,750 --> 00:12:45,540 the way that people perceive the Tor Project and the Tor Network. 206 00:12:45,540 --> 00:12:48,160 And what we’re trying to do is not that particular thing. 207 00:12:48,160 --> 00:12:51,699 That is a sort of side effect that occurs. What we want is for every person 208 00:12:51,699 --> 00:12:55,959 to have the right to speak freely and the right to read anonymously on the internet. 209 00:12:55,959 --> 00:12:59,740 Roger: And we also need to keep in mind the different incentive structures 210 00:12:59,740 --> 00:13:04,519 that they have. So BBC posted their first article about Silk Road and Tor. 211 00:13:04,519 --> 00:13:07,800 And the comment section was packed with “Oh, wow, thanks! 212 00:13:07,800 --> 00:13:11,200 Oh, this is great! Oh, I don’t have to go to the street corner and getting shot! 213 00:13:11,200 --> 00:13:14,659 Oh! Wow! Thanks! This is great!” Just comment after comment, of people saying: 214 00:13:14,659 --> 00:13:18,239 “Thank you for telling me about this!” And then a week later they posted 215 00:13:18,239 --> 00:13:23,000 a follow-up article saying “And we bought some, and it was really good!” 216 00:13:23,000 --> 00:13:25,870 *laughter and applause* 217 00:13:25,870 --> 00:13:29,820 So what motivation are they doing here? 218 00:13:29,820 --> 00:13:33,179 So their goal in this case is: “Let’s get more clicks. Doesn’t matter what it takes, 219 00:13:33,179 --> 00:13:35,920 doesn’t matter what we destroy while we’re doing it.” 220 00:13:35,920 --> 00:13:39,870 Jacob: So that has some serious problems, obviously. Because then there are 221 00:13:39,870 --> 00:13:44,199 different structures that exist to attack – as part of the War on Some Drugs – 222 00:13:44,199 --> 00:13:47,970 and they want to show that their mission is of course impacted by Tor. 223 00:13:47,970 --> 00:13:50,459 They want to have an enemy that they can paint a target on. They want 224 00:13:50,459 --> 00:13:55,150 something sexy that they can get funding for. So here’s a little funny story 225 00:13:55,150 --> 00:13:59,049 about an agent, as it says in the last point, who showed this massive drop 226 00:13:59,049 --> 00:14:02,000 in the Tor Network load after Silk Road was busted. Right? Because 227 00:14:02,000 --> 00:14:04,950 everybody realizes of course that all of the anonymity traffic in the world 228 00:14:04,950 --> 00:14:06,260 must be for elicit (?) things. 229 00:14:06,260 --> 00:14:08,010 Roger: So this was at a particular meeting 230 00:14:08,010 --> 00:14:11,551 where they were trying to get more funding for this. This is a US Government person 231 00:14:11,551 --> 00:14:15,620 who basically said: “I evaluated the Tor Network load 232 00:14:15,620 --> 00:14:19,820 during the Silk Road bust. And I saw 50% network load drop 233 00:14:19,820 --> 00:14:23,599 when the Silk Road bust happened.” So I started out with him 234 00:14:23,599 --> 00:14:27,639 arguing: “Actually, you know, when there’s a huge amount of publicity about 235 00:14:27,639 --> 00:14:30,969 – I don’t know – if Tor is broken, we can understand, that would be reasonable, 236 00:14:30,969 --> 00:14:34,540 that some Tor people would stop using Tor for a little while, in order to wait 237 00:14:34,540 --> 00:14:37,979 for more facts to come out and then will be more prepared for it.” But then 238 00:14:37,979 --> 00:14:41,579 I thought: “You know, wait a minute, we got the Tor Metrics database. We have 239 00:14:41,579 --> 00:14:45,120 all of this data of load on the network.” 240 00:14:45,120 --> 00:14:48,759 So then I went: “Let’s go actually see if there was a 50% drop on 241 00:14:48,759 --> 00:14:52,579 the Tor Network!” So the green line here is the capacity 242 00:14:52,579 --> 00:14:56,739 of the Tor Network over time. So the amount of bytes that relays can push 243 00:14:56,739 --> 00:15:00,119 if we were loading it down completely. And the purple line is 244 00:15:00,119 --> 00:15:04,050 the number of bytes that are actually handled on the network over time. 245 00:15:04,050 --> 00:15:08,590 Jacob: Can you guess? If you don’t look at the date at the bottom, 246 00:15:08,590 --> 00:15:12,150 can you show what that agent was talking about? 247 00:15:12,150 --> 00:15:16,060 Or is the agent totally full of shit? *laughter* 248 00:15:16,060 --> 00:15:21,529 Just a… hypothetical question, but if you have a theo… anyone? Shout it out! Yeah! 249 00:15:21,529 --> 00:15:23,379 [unintelligible from audience] 250 00:15:23,379 --> 00:15:29,580 Oh that’s right! It didn’t go down by 50%! *laughter* 251 00:15:29,580 --> 00:15:33,559 Wow! He was completely wrong! 252 00:15:33,559 --> 00:15:37,410 But just for the record, that’s where he said there was a drop! 253 00:15:37,410 --> 00:15:45,509 *laughter and applause* 254 00:15:45,509 --> 00:15:48,690 Roger: And while we’ve talked you had to read these graphs. Here is a graph 255 00:15:48,690 --> 00:15:52,459 of the overall network growth over the past 3 or 4 years. 256 00:15:52,459 --> 00:15:56,369 So the green line, again, is the amount of capacity. And we’ve seen a bunch of people 257 00:15:56,369 --> 00:16:00,239 adding fast relays recently, after the Snowden issues. 258 00:16:00,239 --> 00:16:03,800 And we’ll talk a little bit later about what other reasons people are running 259 00:16:03,800 --> 00:16:10,240 more capacity lately, as the load on the network goes up. 260 00:16:10,240 --> 00:16:14,349 Okay. And then there is the ‘Dark Web’. Or the ‘Deep Web’. 261 00:16:14,349 --> 00:16:17,770 Or the Whatever-else-the-hell-you-call-it Web. And again, 262 00:16:17,770 --> 00:16:22,470 this comes back to media trying to produce as many articles as they can. 263 00:16:22,470 --> 00:16:27,119 So here’s the basic… I’ll give you the primer on this ‘Dark Web’ thing. 264 00:16:27,119 --> 00:16:32,910 Statement 1: “The Dark Web is every web page out there that Google can’t index.” 265 00:16:32,910 --> 00:16:36,710 That’s the definition of the Dark Web. *laughter and applause* 266 00:16:36,710 --> 00:16:40,209 *applause* 267 00:16:40,209 --> 00:16:45,120 So every Corporate database, every Government database, 268 00:16:45,120 --> 00:16:48,869 everything that you access with a web browser at work or whatever, 269 00:16:48,869 --> 00:16:52,439 all those things that Google can’t get to, that is the Dark Web. That’s statement 1. 270 00:16:52,439 --> 00:16:57,799 Statement 2: “90+X% of web pages are in the Dark Web.” 271 00:16:57,799 --> 00:17:01,090 So these were both well-known facts a year ago. 272 00:17:01,090 --> 00:17:04,770 Statement 3, that the media has added this year: “The only way 273 00:17:04,770 --> 00:17:10,500 to access the Dark Web is through Tor.” *laughter, some applause* 274 00:17:10,500 --> 00:17:13,930 These 3 statements together sell more and more articles 275 00:17:13,930 --> 00:17:16,730 because it’s great, people buy them, they’re all shocked: “Oh my god, 276 00:17:16,730 --> 00:17:20,009 the web is bigger than I thought, and it’s all because of Tor”. 277 00:17:20,009 --> 00:17:25,429 *laughter and applause* 278 00:17:25,429 --> 00:17:30,340 Jacob: So, really… the reality of this is that it’s not actually the case. 279 00:17:30,340 --> 00:17:33,810 Obviously that’s a completely laughable thing. And for everyone that’s here – 280 00:17:33,810 --> 00:17:37,059 not necessarily people watching on the video stream – but for everyone here, 281 00:17:37,059 --> 00:17:40,780 I think, you realize how ridiculous that is. That entire setup 282 00:17:40,780 --> 00:17:45,080 is obviously a kind of ‘clickbait’, if you would call it something like that. 283 00:17:45,080 --> 00:17:48,550 There are a few high-profile Hidden Services. And actually, this is 284 00:17:48,550 --> 00:17:51,540 a show of hands: raise your hand if you run a Tor Hidden Service! 285 00:17:51,540 --> 00:17:53,250 *few hands go up* 286 00:17:53,250 --> 00:17:57,230 Right. So, no one’s ever heard of your Tor Hidden Service. Almost certainly. 287 00:17:57,230 --> 00:18:01,250 And these are the ones that people have heard of. And this is something which is 288 00:18:01,250 --> 00:18:06,229 kind of a fascinating reality which is that these 4 sites, 289 00:18:06,229 --> 00:18:10,190 or these 4 entities have produced most of the stories 290 00:18:10,190 --> 00:18:13,801 related to the deep gaping whatever web, that 291 00:18:13,801 --> 00:18:18,710 if you wanna call it the Dark Web. And, in fact, for the most part, it’s been… 292 00:18:18,710 --> 00:18:22,240 I would say the Top one e.g., with Wikileaks, 293 00:18:22,240 --> 00:18:26,040 it’s a positive example. And, in fact, with GlobaLeaks, 294 00:18:26,040 --> 00:18:29,380 which is something that Arturo Filastò and a number of other really great 295 00:18:29,380 --> 00:18:33,409 Italian hackers here have been working on, GlobaLeaks, they’re deploying 296 00:18:33,409 --> 00:18:36,350 more and more Hidden Services that you also haven’t heard about. For localized 297 00:18:36,350 --> 00:18:40,410 corruption, reporting and whistleblowing. But the news doesn’t report about 298 00:18:40,410 --> 00:18:43,790 Arturo’s great work. The news reports are on The Farmer’s Market, 299 00:18:43,790 --> 00:18:48,370 on Freedom Hosting and on Silk Road. And those things 300 00:18:48,370 --> 00:18:51,640 also bring out a disproportionate amount of incredible negative attention. 301 00:18:51,640 --> 00:18:55,090 In the case of freedom hosting, we have a developer, Mike Perry, who’s 302 00:18:55,090 --> 00:18:58,430 kind of the most incredible evil genius alive today. 303 00:18:58,430 --> 00:19:02,700 I think he’s probably at about 2 Mike Perrys right now. That’ll be my guess. 304 00:19:02,700 --> 00:19:06,460 And he was relentlessly attacked. 305 00:19:06,460 --> 00:19:10,429 Because he happened to have a registration for a company 306 00:19:10,429 --> 00:19:14,690 which had an F and an H in the name. 307 00:19:14,690 --> 00:19:18,140 Wasn’t actually even close to what’s up there now. 308 00:19:18,140 --> 00:19:21,889 And he was relentlessly attacked because the topics that the other sites have 309 00:19:21,889 --> 00:19:25,770 as part of their customer base or as part of the things that they’re pushing online, 310 00:19:25,770 --> 00:19:29,400 they really pull on people’s hearts in a big way. 311 00:19:29,400 --> 00:19:32,500 And that sort of created a lot of stress. I mean, 312 00:19:32,500 --> 00:19:35,470 the first issue, Wikileaks, created a lot of stress for people working on Tor 313 00:19:35,470 --> 00:19:38,960 in various different ways. But for Mike Perry, he was personally targeted, 314 00:19:38,960 --> 00:19:42,840 in sort of Co-Intel-Pro style harassment. And really sad, 315 00:19:42,840 --> 00:19:46,690 in a really sad series of events. And of course, the news 316 00:19:46,690 --> 00:19:50,250 also picked up on that, in some negative ways. And they really, really 317 00:19:50,250 --> 00:19:52,740 picked up on that. And that’s a really big part of I think you could call it 318 00:19:52,740 --> 00:19:57,130 a kind of cultural conflict that we’re in, right now. 319 00:19:57,130 --> 00:19:59,440 The farmer’s market has also quite an interesting story. 320 00:19:59,440 --> 00:20:00,880 Which I think you wanted to tell. 321 00:20:00,880 --> 00:20:05,230 Roger: Yeah, so, I actually heard from a DEA person who was involved 322 00:20:05,230 --> 00:20:09,149 in the eventual bust of the Farmer’s Market story. 323 00:20:09,149 --> 00:20:12,880 Long ago there was a website on the internet, and they sold drugs. 324 00:20:12,880 --> 00:20:16,629 Oh my god. And there were people who bought drugs from this website 325 00:20:16,629 --> 00:20:21,280 and Tor was nowhere in the story. It was some website in South East Asia. 326 00:20:21,280 --> 00:20:24,590 And the DEA wanted to take it down. So they learned… 327 00:20:24,590 --> 00:20:28,139 I mean the website was public. It was a public web server. So they sent 328 00:20:28,139 --> 00:20:31,779 some sort of letter to the country that it was in. And the country that it was in 329 00:20:31,779 --> 00:20:35,189 said: “Screw you!”. And then they said: “Okay, well, I guess we can’t take down 330 00:20:35,189 --> 00:20:39,479 the web server”. So then they started to try to investigate the people behind it. 331 00:20:39,479 --> 00:20:42,789 And it turns out the people behind it used Hushmail. 332 00:20:42,789 --> 00:20:46,820 So they were happily communicating with each other very safely. 333 00:20:46,820 --> 00:20:50,380 So the folks in the US sent a letter to Canada. 334 00:20:50,380 --> 00:20:53,470 And then Canada made Hushmail basically give them the entire database 335 00:20:53,470 --> 00:20:58,290 of all the emails that these people had sent. And then, a year or 2 later, 336 00:20:58,290 --> 00:21:01,320 these people discovered Tor. And they’re like: “Hey we should switch our website 337 00:21:01,320 --> 00:21:05,169 over to Tor and then it will be safe. That sounds good!”. The DEA people 338 00:21:05,169 --> 00:21:08,580 were watching them the whole time looking for a good time to bust them. 339 00:21:08,580 --> 00:21:11,389 And then they switched over to Tor, and then 6 months later it was a good time 340 00:21:11,389 --> 00:21:15,349 to bust them. So then there were all these newspaper articles about how 341 00:21:15,349 --> 00:21:18,880 Tor Hidden Services are obviously broken. And 342 00:21:18,880 --> 00:21:21,870 the first time I heard the story I was thinking in myself: 343 00:21:21,870 --> 00:21:25,869 “Idiot drug sellers use Paypal – get busted – end of story”. 344 00:21:25,869 --> 00:21:26,829 *laughing* 345 00:21:26,829 --> 00:21:30,320 But they were actually using Paypal correctly. They had innocent people 346 00:21:30,320 --> 00:21:33,720 around the world who were receiving Paypal payments and turning it into some 347 00:21:33,720 --> 00:21:38,120 Panama based e-currency or something. So the better lesson 348 00:21:38,120 --> 00:21:42,330 of the story is: “Idiot drug sellers use Hushmail – get busted”. 349 00:21:42,330 --> 00:21:45,010 So there are a lot of different pieces of all of these. 350 00:21:45,010 --> 00:21:48,069 Jacob: Don’t use Hushmail! *laughter* 351 00:21:48,069 --> 00:21:51,959 Seriously! It’s a bad idea! And don’t use things where they have 352 00:21:51,960 --> 00:21:55,269 a habit of backdooring their service or cooperating 353 00:21:55,269 --> 00:21:57,860 with so called ‘lawful interception orders’. Because it tells you that 354 00:21:57,860 --> 00:22:03,410 their system is not secure. And it’s clear that Hushmail falls into that category. 355 00:22:03,410 --> 00:22:07,220 They fundamentally have chosen that that is what they would like to do. 356 00:22:07,220 --> 00:22:10,679 And they should have that reputation. And we should respect them exactly 357 00:22:10,679 --> 00:22:14,040 as much as they deserve for that. So don’t use their service. If you can. 358 00:22:14,040 --> 00:22:17,229 Especially if you’re gonna do this kind of stuff. *laughter* 359 00:22:17,229 --> 00:22:20,260 Or maybe what I mean is: guys, do that – use Hushmail. 360 00:22:20,260 --> 00:22:25,620 But everybody else, protect yourself! *laughter* 361 00:22:25,620 --> 00:22:29,860 So, the thing is that not every single person 362 00:22:29,860 --> 00:22:33,350 is actually stupid enough to use Hushmail. 363 00:22:33,350 --> 00:22:36,690 So as a result, we had started to see some pretty crazy stuff happen. 364 00:22:36,690 --> 00:22:39,940 Which we of course knew would happen and we always understood that this would be 365 00:22:39,940 --> 00:22:44,389 a vector. So, in this case, this year we saw, 366 00:22:44,389 --> 00:22:48,659 I think, one of the probably not the most interesting exploits 367 00:22:48,659 --> 00:22:52,480 that we’ve ever seen. But one of the most interesting exploits 368 00:22:52,480 --> 00:22:56,400 we’ve ever seen deployed against a broad scale of users. 369 00:22:56,400 --> 00:23:00,149 And we’re not exactly sure who was behind it. Though 370 00:23:00,149 --> 00:23:04,250 there was an FBI person who went to court in Ireland and did in fact 371 00:23:04,250 --> 00:23:08,250 claim that they were behind it. The IP space that the exploit connected back to 372 00:23:08,250 --> 00:23:13,789 was either SAIC or NSA. And I had an exchange 373 00:23:13,789 --> 00:23:18,200 with one of the guys behind the VUPEN exploit company. And he has 374 00:23:18,200 --> 00:23:21,980 on a couple of occasions mentioned writing exploits for Tor Browser. 375 00:23:21,980 --> 00:23:25,480 And what he really means is Firefox. And 376 00:23:25,480 --> 00:23:28,390 this is a serious problem of course. If they want to target a person, though, 377 00:23:28,390 --> 00:23:33,240 the first they have to actually find them. So traditionally, if you’re not using Tor, 378 00:23:33,240 --> 00:23:36,960 they go to your house, they plug in some gear. They go to the ISP upstream, 379 00:23:36,960 --> 00:23:39,619 and they plug in some gear. Or they do some interception with an IMSI catcher, 380 00:23:39,619 --> 00:23:43,339 and things like that. Most of these techniques, I’ll talk about on Monday 381 00:23:43,340 --> 00:23:48,310 with Claudio. If you’re interested. But basically it’s the same. 382 00:23:48,310 --> 00:23:51,380 They find out who you are, then they begin to target you, 383 00:23:51,380 --> 00:23:54,559 then they serve you an exploit. This year one of the differences is 384 00:23:54,559 --> 00:23:58,759 that they had actually taken over a Tor Hidden Service. And started to serve up 385 00:23:58,759 --> 00:24:02,329 an exploit from that. Just trying to exploit every single person 386 00:24:02,330 --> 00:24:04,980 that visited the Hidden Service. So there was a period of time when you could 387 00:24:04,980 --> 00:24:08,669 really badly troll all of your friends by just putting a link up where 388 00:24:08,669 --> 00:24:12,799 it would load in an iFrame and they would have been exploited. If they were running 389 00:24:12,799 --> 00:24:16,409 an old version of Firefox. And an old version of Tor Browser. 390 00:24:16,409 --> 00:24:19,529 Which was an interesting twist. They didn’t actually, as far as we know, 391 00:24:19,529 --> 00:24:24,549 use that exploit against anyone while it was a fresh Zeroday. 392 00:24:24,549 --> 00:24:27,539 But they did write it. And they did serve it out. And they gave 393 00:24:27,539 --> 00:24:31,909 the rest of the world the payload to use against whoever they’d like. 394 00:24:31,909 --> 00:24:36,240 So, when the FBI did this, they basically gave an exploit against Firefox 395 00:24:36,240 --> 00:24:40,139 and Tor Browser to the Syrian Electronic Army who couldn’t have written one, 396 00:24:40,139 --> 00:24:43,779 even if they wanted to. This is a really interesting difference 397 00:24:43,779 --> 00:24:47,919 between other ways that the FBI might try to bust you, where they can localize 398 00:24:47,919 --> 00:24:52,530 the damage of hitting untargeted people who are otherwise innocent, 399 00:24:52,530 --> 00:24:56,570 especially. But we’ve asked Firefox to try to integrate 400 00:24:56,570 --> 00:24:59,559 some of these privacy-related things that we’ve done. We’d like to be able to be 401 00:24:59,559 --> 00:25:03,600 more up-to-speed with Firefox and they generally seem premili, too (?) 402 00:25:03,600 --> 00:25:08,419 and I think that’s a fair thing to say. But we have a de-synchronisation. 403 00:25:08,419 --> 00:25:12,480 But even with that de-synchronisation we were still ahead of what they were doing 404 00:25:12,480 --> 00:25:16,329 as far as we can tell. But they are actually at the point where 405 00:25:16,329 --> 00:25:20,730 they have hired probably some people from this community – fuck you – 406 00:25:20,730 --> 00:25:25,100 and they write those exploits. *applause* 407 00:25:25,100 --> 00:25:28,290 And serve them up. And so that is a new turn. 408 00:25:28,290 --> 00:25:32,309 We had not seen that before this year. And that’s a really serious change. 409 00:25:32,309 --> 00:25:34,700 As a result we’ve obviously been looking into Chrome, which has 410 00:25:34,700 --> 00:25:38,059 a very different architecture. And in some cases it’s significantly harder to exploit 411 00:25:38,059 --> 00:25:41,550 than Firefox. Even with just very straight-forward bugs which should be 412 00:25:41,550 --> 00:25:44,790 very easy to exploit the Chrome team has done a good job. We want to have 413 00:25:44,790 --> 00:25:47,990 a lot of diversity in the different browsers. But we have a very strict 414 00:25:47,990 --> 00:25:50,970 set of requirements for protecting Privacy with Tor Browser. 415 00:25:50,970 --> 00:25:54,260 And there’s a whole design document out there. So just adding Tor 416 00:25:54,260 --> 00:25:58,770 and a web browser together is not quite enough. You need some actual thoughts. 417 00:25:58,770 --> 00:26:03,059 That have been – mostly by Mike Perry and Aron Clark (?) – have been elucidated 418 00:26:03,059 --> 00:26:06,690 in the Tor Browser design document. So we’re hoping to work on that. 419 00:26:06,690 --> 00:26:09,450 If anyone here would like to work on that: that’s really something where we really 420 00:26:09,450 --> 00:26:13,570 need some help. Because there is really only one Mike Perry. Literately 421 00:26:13,570 --> 00:26:16,019 and figuratively. 422 00:26:16,019 --> 00:26:19,780 Roger: Okay. Another exciting topic people have been talking about lately 423 00:26:19,780 --> 00:26:24,910 is the diversity of funding. A lot of our funding comes from governments. 424 00:26:24,910 --> 00:26:28,489 US mostly but some other ones as well. Because they have things 425 00:26:28,489 --> 00:26:32,939 that they want us to work on. So once upon a time when I was looking at fundraising 426 00:26:32,940 --> 00:26:36,980 and how to get money I would go to places and I would say: “We’ve got 10 things 427 00:26:36,980 --> 00:26:41,220 we want to work on. If you want to fund one of these 10, 428 00:26:41,220 --> 00:26:45,170 you can help us set our priorities. We really want to work on 429 00:26:45,170 --> 00:26:48,240 circumventing censorship, we really want to work on anonymity, we really want 430 00:26:48,240 --> 00:26:52,990 to work on Tor Browser safety. So if you have funding for one of these 431 00:26:52,990 --> 00:26:56,559 then we’ll focus on the one that you’re most interested in”. 432 00:26:56,559 --> 00:27:00,160 So there’s some trade-offs here. On the one hand government funding is good 433 00:27:00,160 --> 00:27:04,119 because we can do more things. That’s great. A lot of the stuff that you’ve seen 434 00:27:04,119 --> 00:27:08,049 from Tor over the past couple of years comes from people who are paid full-time 435 00:27:08,049 --> 00:27:12,090 to be able to work on Tor and focus on it and not have to worry about 436 00:27:12,090 --> 00:27:15,480 where they’re gonna pay their rent or where they’re gonna get food. 437 00:27:15,480 --> 00:27:19,540 On the other hand it’s bad because funders can influence our priorities. 438 00:27:19,540 --> 00:27:23,359 Now, there’s no conspiracy. It’s not that people come to us and say: 439 00:27:23,359 --> 00:27:27,320 “Here’s money, do a backdoor, etc.” We’re never gonna put any backdoors 440 00:27:27,320 --> 00:27:28,880 in Tor, ever. 441 00:27:28,880 --> 00:27:29,840 Jacob: Maybe you could tell the story 442 00:27:29,840 --> 00:27:33,100 about that really high-pitched lady who tried to get you, to tell you that 443 00:27:33,100 --> 00:27:36,250 that was your duty and then you explained… 444 00:27:36,250 --> 00:27:39,659 Roger: Give me a few more details! *laughter* 445 00:27:39,659 --> 00:27:42,190 Jacob: People have approached us, obviously, in order to try to get us 446 00:27:42,190 --> 00:27:45,220 to do these types of things. And this is a serious commitment 447 00:27:45,220 --> 00:27:48,710 that the whole Tor community gets behind. Which is that we will never ever 448 00:27:48,710 --> 00:27:53,309 put in a backdoor. And any time that we can tell that something has gone wrong 449 00:27:53,309 --> 00:27:56,480 we try to fix it as soon as is possible regardless 450 00:27:56,480 --> 00:28:00,309 – actually I would say for myself – of any other consequences. That our commitment 451 00:28:00,309 --> 00:28:03,740 to protecting anonymity of our user base extends 452 00:28:03,740 --> 00:28:08,159 beyond any reasonable commitment, actually. And we really believe 453 00:28:08,159 --> 00:28:11,139 that commitment. And there are people that have tried to get us to change that. 454 00:28:11,139 --> 00:28:15,340 Tried to tell us that “oh, it’s only because you’re living in the free world, 455 00:28:15,340 --> 00:28:17,759 and you’re able to have a company that (?) and make a profit 456 00:28:17,759 --> 00:28:21,290 that you can even right the supper (?). So come on! Do your duty!” And of course 457 00:28:21,290 --> 00:28:24,080 when we tell them we’re non-profit and that we’re not gonna do it, 458 00:28:24,080 --> 00:28:27,009 they’re completely dumbfounded. For example. 459 00:28:27,009 --> 00:28:29,740 Roger: Now I remember that discussion, yes! Jacob: Yeah! 460 00:28:29,740 --> 00:28:34,310 *applause* 461 00:28:34,310 --> 00:28:38,669 Roger: This was a discussion with a US Department of Justice person 462 00:28:38,669 --> 00:28:43,029 who basically said: “It’s your… the Congress has given us, 463 00:28:43,029 --> 00:28:47,180 the Department of Justice, the right to backdoor everything, 464 00:28:47,180 --> 00:28:51,269 and you have a tool that you haven’t made 465 00:28:51,269 --> 00:28:55,199 easy for us to backdoor. So it’s your responsibility to fix it 466 00:28:55,200 --> 00:28:59,460 so that we can use the privileges and rights given us by Congress 467 00:28:59,460 --> 00:29:03,769 on surveilling everybody. And you are taking advantage 468 00:29:03,769 --> 00:29:07,120 of the situation that we’ve given you in America where you’ve got good 469 00:29:07,120 --> 00:29:11,020 freedom of speech and you got other freedoms etc. You’re stealing 470 00:29:11,020 --> 00:29:15,009 from the country. You’re cheating on the process by not giving us the backdoor 471 00:29:15,009 --> 00:29:19,070 that Congress said we should have”. And then I said: “Actually we’re a non-profit. 472 00:29:19,070 --> 00:29:22,949 We work for the public good”. And then the conversation basically ended. 473 00:29:22,949 --> 00:29:32,709 She had no further thing to say. *applause* 474 00:29:32,710 --> 00:29:36,440 So part of what we need to do is continue to make tools that are actually safe 475 00:29:36,440 --> 00:29:41,770 as tools. Rather than a lot of the other systems out there. On the other hand, 476 00:29:41,770 --> 00:29:45,499 every funder we’ve talked to lately has interesting priorities: 477 00:29:45,499 --> 00:29:49,279 they wanna pay for censorship-resistance, they wanna pay for outreach, education, 478 00:29:49,279 --> 00:29:52,649 training etc. We don’t have any funders right now who want to pay 479 00:29:52,649 --> 00:29:57,370 for better anonymity. And it’s really important for some of the people 480 00:29:57,370 --> 00:30:00,910 we heard about in the last talk that they have really good anonymity 481 00:30:00,910 --> 00:30:04,480 against really large adversaries. And I’m not just talking about 482 00:30:04,480 --> 00:30:07,580 American Intelligence Agencies. There are a lot of Intelligence Agencies 483 00:30:07,580 --> 00:30:12,820 around the world who are trying to learn how to surveil everything. 484 00:30:12,820 --> 00:30:16,350 So what should Tor’s role be here? 485 00:30:16,350 --> 00:30:19,750 There are a lot of people in the Tor development community who say: 486 00:30:19,750 --> 00:30:23,260 “What we really need to do is focus on writing good code, 487 00:30:23,260 --> 00:30:26,720 and we’ll let the rest of the world take care of itself.” There is also 488 00:30:26,720 --> 00:30:30,010 a trade-off from some of the funders we have right now. 489 00:30:30,010 --> 00:30:32,760 Where I could go up and I could say 490 00:30:32,760 --> 00:30:36,639 a lot of really outrageous things that I agree with 491 00:30:36,639 --> 00:30:40,730 and that you agree with. But some of our funders might wonder 492 00:30:40,730 --> 00:30:45,120 if they should keep funding us after that. So part of what we need to do 493 00:30:45,120 --> 00:30:49,450 is get some funders who are more comfortable with the messages 494 00:30:49,450 --> 00:30:53,559 that everybody here would like the world to hear. So if you know anybody 495 00:30:53,559 --> 00:30:59,110 who wants to help provide actual freedom we’d love to hear from you. 496 00:30:59,110 --> 00:31:03,380 Jacob: And it’s important to understand that we sort of have an interesting place 497 00:31:03,380 --> 00:31:07,090 in the world at the moment where it’s easy to say 498 00:31:07,090 --> 00:31:11,650 that we shouldn’t be political. And that in general, there shouldn’t be politics 499 00:31:11,650 --> 00:31:14,740 in what we’re doing. And it’s also easy to understand 500 00:31:14,740 --> 00:31:19,430 that that’s crazy when someone says that to an extent. Because 501 00:31:19,430 --> 00:31:23,350 the idea of having free speech, having the right to read, having the ability 502 00:31:23,350 --> 00:31:27,530 to reach a website that is beyond of the power of the state 503 00:31:27,530 --> 00:31:31,929 – that is a very political thing for many people. And it is often the privilege 504 00:31:31,929 --> 00:31:35,419 of some, where they don’t even realize that’s a political statement. 505 00:31:35,419 --> 00:31:37,940 *applause* And they suggest… 506 00:31:37,940 --> 00:31:41,720 and that they suggest that we don’t need to be political. We need to recognize the 507 00:31:41,720 --> 00:31:45,779 political context that we exist in. And especially after the summer of Snowden, 508 00:31:45,779 --> 00:31:50,159 understanding that there are almost no tools 509 00:31:50,159 --> 00:31:53,880 that can resist the NSA and GCHQ. Almost none. 510 00:31:53,880 --> 00:31:56,710 We did not survive completely in the summer of Snowden. 511 00:31:56,710 --> 00:32:01,509 They were able to get some Tor users. But they couldn’t get all Tor users! 512 00:32:01,509 --> 00:32:05,099 That’s really important. We change the economic game for them. 513 00:32:05,099 --> 00:32:08,530 And that, fundamentally, is a political issue! 514 00:32:08,530 --> 00:32:18,259 *applause* 515 00:32:18,259 --> 00:32:21,860 But please note that the solution is not a Partisan solution. 516 00:32:21,860 --> 00:32:25,760 Where we say: well, some people are good and some are bad. 517 00:32:25,760 --> 00:32:29,250 You guys over there, on the left or on the right, you don’t deserve 518 00:32:29,250 --> 00:32:32,809 to have freedom of speech. You don’t have the right to read. 519 00:32:32,809 --> 00:32:36,219 We aren’t saying that. We’re saying that the common good of everyone having 520 00:32:36,219 --> 00:32:39,940 these fundamental rights protected in a practical way 521 00:32:39,940 --> 00:32:43,460 is an important thing for us to build and for all of us to contribute to, 522 00:32:43,460 --> 00:32:47,139 and for every person to have. That is, I think, 523 00:32:47,139 --> 00:32:50,040 the best kind of political solution we can come up with. 524 00:32:50,040 --> 00:32:54,110 Though it is a very controversial one in some ways. I think that 525 00:32:54,110 --> 00:32:57,890 we can’t actually do it unless everyone really starts to agree with us. 526 00:32:57,890 --> 00:33:01,920 And we are making a lot of positive change in this. As we saw with the network graph. 527 00:33:01,920 --> 00:33:05,590 But this comes from Mutual Aid and Solidarity. 528 00:33:05,590 --> 00:33:09,019 Which most of the people in this room provide. 529 00:33:09,019 --> 00:33:12,809 Roger: And that diversity of users is actually technically 530 00:33:12,809 --> 00:33:16,289 what makes Tor safe. You need to have 531 00:33:16,289 --> 00:33:20,549 activists in various countries, and folks in Russia right now, 532 00:33:20,549 --> 00:33:24,019 and law enforcement around the world. You need to have them all 533 00:33:24,019 --> 00:33:27,580 in the same network. Otherwise if I see that you’re using Tor, 534 00:33:27,580 --> 00:33:31,330 I can start guessing why you’re using Tor. So we need that diversity 535 00:33:31,330 --> 00:33:35,109 of users. Not just for a perception perspective 536 00:33:35,109 --> 00:33:39,180 but for an actual technical perspective. We need to have all the different 537 00:33:39,180 --> 00:33:42,350 types of users out there blending into the same system 538 00:33:42,350 --> 00:33:46,569 so that they can keep each other safe. So part of the hobbies 539 00:33:46,569 --> 00:33:50,370 that each Tor person has, we’re all getting better 540 00:33:50,370 --> 00:33:54,049 at outreach to various communities. So, I mentioned earlier 541 00:33:54,049 --> 00:33:58,100 that I talked to law enforcement to try to teach them how these things work. 542 00:33:58,100 --> 00:34:00,730 Turns out that having Jake talk to law enforcement is not actually 543 00:34:00,730 --> 00:34:02,759 the most effective way to convince them of things 544 00:34:02,759 --> 00:34:03,759 *laughter* so… 545 00:34:03,759 --> 00:34:07,670 Jacob: I’m, I’m, I’m, eh, you know, my lawyer gave me some great advice 546 00:34:07,670 --> 00:34:11,119 which I can tell you without breaking the privilege of our other communications. 547 00:34:11,119 --> 00:34:14,129 Which he says: “never miss the chance to shut the fuck up!” 548 00:34:14,129 --> 00:34:17,480 *laughter* And that I think really really underscores 549 00:34:17,480 --> 00:34:20,280 why I should not talk to the Police about why they also need 550 00:34:20,280 --> 00:34:24,070 traffic analysis resistance, reachability, network security, privacy and anonymity. 551 00:34:24,070 --> 00:34:27,250 Roger’s much much more diplomatic. 552 00:34:27,250 --> 00:34:31,310 Roger: So at the same time we have people talking to domestic violence 553 00:34:31,310 --> 00:34:34,789 and abuse groups and teaching them how to be safe. And at the same time 554 00:34:34,789 --> 00:34:38,280 we have folks at corporations learning how to be safe online. 555 00:34:38,280 --> 00:34:42,389 We hear from large companies who are saying: “I want to 556 00:34:42,389 --> 00:34:46,510 put the entire corporate traffic over Tor 557 00:34:46,510 --> 00:34:50,230 because we actually do have adversaries and they actually are spying on us 558 00:34:50,230 --> 00:34:53,530 and they do want to learn what we’re doing. So how do we become safe 559 00:34:53,530 --> 00:34:57,370 from these situations?” So part of what we need is help from all of you 560 00:34:57,370 --> 00:35:00,790 to become outreach for all of your communities. And get better 561 00:35:00,790 --> 00:35:04,410 at teaching people about why privacy is important for the communities 562 00:35:04,410 --> 00:35:08,690 that you’re talking to and learn how to use their language and convince them 563 00:35:08,690 --> 00:35:11,480 that these things are important. And at the same time teach them 564 00:35:11,480 --> 00:35:15,460 about the other groups out there who care. So that they can understand 565 00:35:15,460 --> 00:35:20,730 that it’s a bigger issue than just whatever they’re most focused on. 566 00:35:20,730 --> 00:35:25,890 Okay, so, a while ago I wrote up a list of 3 ways to destroy Tor. 567 00:35:25,890 --> 00:35:29,210 The first way – we have a handle on it for a while. 568 00:35:29,210 --> 00:35:33,710 The first way is: change the laws or the policies or the cultures 569 00:35:33,710 --> 00:35:37,080 so that anonymity is outlawed. And we’re pretty good 570 00:35:37,080 --> 00:35:40,820 at fighting back in governments and policy and culture etc. 571 00:35:40,820 --> 00:35:44,820 and saying: “No, there are good uses of these things, you can’t take them away 572 00:35:44,820 --> 00:35:50,470 from the world”. The second way: Make ISPs hate hosting exit relays. 573 00:35:50,470 --> 00:35:54,210 And if more and more ISPs say: “No, I’m not gonna do that” 574 00:35:54,210 --> 00:35:57,340 then eventually the Tor Network shrinks reducing the anonymity 575 00:35:57,340 --> 00:36:00,820 it can provide because there’s not as much diversity of where you might 576 00:36:00,820 --> 00:36:04,480 pop out of the Tor Network to go to the websites. So I think we’re doing 577 00:36:04,480 --> 00:36:07,690 pretty well fighting that fight. We’ve known about it for a while. 578 00:36:07,690 --> 00:36:11,060 It’s one we’ve been focusing on for a long time. Torservers.net 579 00:36:11,060 --> 00:36:14,620 and a lot of other groups are doing great work at building and maintaining 580 00:36:14,620 --> 00:36:19,250 relationships with ISPs. But the third one is one that we haven’t focused on 581 00:36:19,250 --> 00:36:23,490 as much as we should. Which is: make websites hate Tor users. 582 00:36:23,490 --> 00:36:27,390 So a growing number of places are just refusing 583 00:36:27,390 --> 00:36:30,820 to hear from Tor users at all. Wikipedia did it 584 00:36:30,820 --> 00:36:33,910 a long time ago. Google gives you a captcha if you’re lucky… 585 00:36:33,910 --> 00:36:38,480 Jacob: That’s the best question, ever! If you like, that’s a good setup! 586 00:36:38,480 --> 00:36:42,510 Roger: I’ll cover this one next. So, 587 00:36:42,510 --> 00:36:46,940 Skype is another interesting example here. If you run a Tor exit relay 588 00:36:46,940 --> 00:36:50,340 and you try to skype with somebody Microsoft hangs up on you. 589 00:36:50,340 --> 00:36:53,350 And the reason for that is not that they say: “Oh my god, Tor people 590 00:36:53,350 --> 00:36:57,500 are abusing Skype!” – Microsoft pays some commercial company out there 591 00:36:57,500 --> 00:37:00,950 to give them a blacklist, they don’t even know what’s on it, and the company 592 00:37:00,950 --> 00:37:04,770 puts Tor exit IPs on it. And now Microsoft blacklists all the 593 00:37:04,770 --> 00:37:08,300 Tor exit relays. And they don’t even know they’re doing it. They don’t even care. 594 00:37:08,300 --> 00:37:12,510 So as more and more of these blacklisting companies exist 595 00:37:12,510 --> 00:37:16,960 we’re more and more screwed. So we need help trying to 596 00:37:16,960 --> 00:37:20,300 learn how to teach all of these companies how to accept 597 00:37:20,300 --> 00:37:24,950 users without thinking that IP addresses are the right way to identify people. 598 00:37:24,950 --> 00:37:29,120 Jacob: There might also be, on point 3, a relationship here 599 00:37:29,120 --> 00:37:32,320 with some of the other points here. E.g. point 4. 600 00:37:32,320 --> 00:37:35,870 Which is to say that when a company does not want to 601 00:37:35,870 --> 00:37:39,860 give you location anonymity maybe there’s a reason for that. 602 00:37:39,860 --> 00:37:44,300 I mean, I personally think that Wikipedia is great, I don’t feel so great 603 00:37:44,300 --> 00:37:48,480 about yelp and about Google, most of the time. And I definitely don’t feel good 604 00:37:48,480 --> 00:37:51,860 about Skype. Given what we’ve learned it makes sense 605 00:37:51,860 --> 00:37:56,930 that they would demonstrate that they do not respect you as users. 606 00:37:56,930 --> 00:38:01,680 And the Tor Network as a way to protect users from them, actually. 607 00:38:01,680 --> 00:38:05,620 And some of these places will say that it's basically only being 608 00:38:05,620 --> 00:38:10,120 used for abuse. Often they won’t have metrics for it. And they will refuse 609 00:38:10,120 --> 00:38:14,350 to work with us to come up with inventive solutions, like e.g. something 610 00:38:14,350 --> 00:38:18,150 where you have to use a nym system of some kind, 611 00:38:18,150 --> 00:38:22,010 in the case of Wikipedia, or something where you solve a captcha, something 612 00:38:22,010 --> 00:38:24,800 where you have to have an account, something where you’re pseudononymous. 613 00:38:24,800 --> 00:38:29,190 But you get to retain location privacy. And actually, in a few cases, 614 00:38:29,190 --> 00:38:32,591 it’s probably better that Tor is blocked because they don’t even 615 00:38:32,591 --> 00:38:36,040 provide secure logins when you’re not using Tor. So it’s not necessarily 616 00:38:36,040 --> 00:38:40,540 always a good thing to use the services, anyway. So in a sort of funny sense 617 00:38:40,540 --> 00:38:43,780 it could be helpful that they’re blocking Tor. But we would like to improve 618 00:38:43,780 --> 00:38:48,400 those things. And one thing is to show that we need to build 619 00:38:48,400 --> 00:38:52,500 some systems to get these properties. And we need to show that it is the best thing 620 00:38:52,500 --> 00:38:56,700 right now that we all can use. And we need people that are working 621 00:38:56,700 --> 00:38:59,790 with these companies, with these communities, to actually help us 622 00:38:59,790 --> 00:39:04,980 to understand how we can better serve Tor community, 623 00:39:04,980 --> 00:39:08,870 but also the Tor community that overlaps with their community. 624 00:39:08,870 --> 00:39:12,910 Especially Wikipedia. For me personally, it kills me that the way that I get 625 00:39:12,910 --> 00:39:16,130 to edit the Wikipedia, should I edit it, is that I have to send an email 626 00:39:16,130 --> 00:39:19,780 to someone, tell them an account I already have, ask them to set a special flag 627 00:39:19,780 --> 00:39:25,270 in the Wikipedia database, and then I can log in and edit. 628 00:39:25,270 --> 00:39:28,840 That’s not really the ideal solution, I think. If I’m not being abusive 629 00:39:28,840 --> 00:39:32,540 on Wikipedia I should be able to have a pseudononymous way to edit. 630 00:39:32,540 --> 00:39:35,310 I should be able to anonymously connect. And I should be able to do that 631 00:39:35,310 --> 00:39:38,190 from anywhere in the world, especially when the local network is censoring me 632 00:39:38,190 --> 00:39:43,340 and my only way to get to the Wikipedia is to, in fact, use Tor 633 00:39:43,340 --> 00:39:52,530 or something like it. *applause* 634 00:39:52,530 --> 00:39:57,310 So, the last point on that is this one: I obviously joked the church man (?) 635 00:39:57,310 --> 00:40:01,660 Roger: Yeah, so I was showing this to an anonymity researcher and he started 636 00:40:01,660 --> 00:40:05,800 yelling: “IPO, IPO, IPO, IPO…” as soon as he saw this graph of Tor users 637 00:40:05,800 --> 00:40:10,650 over time. So in the course of a week or so we added about 4 or 5 million 638 00:40:10,651 --> 00:40:14,980 Tor clients to the network. And you’d think: “Oh wow, 639 00:40:14,980 --> 00:40:19,280 this Snowden thing worked, it’s great!” But actually, 640 00:40:19,280 --> 00:40:24,020 some jerk in the Ukraine signed up his 5 million node botnet. 641 00:40:24,020 --> 00:40:26,890 Jacob: I mean, one of the good things about this is that we learned that 642 00:40:26,890 --> 00:40:30,940 the Tor Network scales to more than 5 million users. 643 00:40:30,940 --> 00:40:33,510 Roger: We’ve been working on scalability: it works! 644 00:40:33,510 --> 00:40:36,930 *applause* 645 00:40:36,930 --> 00:40:41,900 Jacob: We had to make some changes. There’s e.g. the NTor handshaking 646 00:40:41,900 --> 00:40:46,180 which is using elliptic curves. That is something which really helps to reduce 647 00:40:46,180 --> 00:40:51,680 the load on the relays. This is a pretty big change. But there’s a lot of work 648 00:40:51,680 --> 00:40:54,750 that Mike Perry has done with load balancing, lots of work by Nick Mathewson. 649 00:40:54,750 --> 00:40:58,770 Lots of changes in the Tor Network for scalability. But if this had been 650 00:40:58,770 --> 00:41:01,670 like a real attacker, or if the botnet had been turned against the Tor Network, 651 00:41:01,670 --> 00:41:05,580 it probably would have been fatal, I think. A really interesting detail is 652 00:41:05,580 --> 00:41:09,900 that this was a botnet for Windows. And Microsoft has the ability to remove 653 00:41:09,900 --> 00:41:14,160 things that they flag as malicious. And so they were going around 654 00:41:14,160 --> 00:41:18,430 and removing Tor clients from Microsoft Windows users 655 00:41:18,430 --> 00:41:22,030 that were part of this botnet. Now when we talked to them, my understanding is that 656 00:41:22,030 --> 00:41:25,050 they only removed it when they were certain that is was a Tor that came 657 00:41:25,050 --> 00:41:29,270 from this botnet. That’s a lot of power that Microsoft has there, though! 658 00:41:29,270 --> 00:41:33,620 If you’re using Windows, trying to be anonymous, with the device. Bad idea. 659 00:41:33,620 --> 00:41:36,520 Roger: They actually removed the bot and left the Tor client because 660 00:41:36,520 --> 00:41:39,470 they weren’t sure whether they should remove it. So actually 661 00:41:39,470 --> 00:41:42,650 all those 5 millions are still running Tor clients. 662 00:41:42,650 --> 00:41:47,520 Jacob: Whhoops! So, interesting point here, summer of Snowden. 663 00:41:47,520 --> 00:41:51,840 It’s hard to tell. There’s some piece of information 664 00:41:51,840 --> 00:41:55,260 that we’re really missing here. Due to the botnet happening at the same time 665 00:41:55,260 --> 00:41:59,510 it’s really difficult to understand the public response to the revelations 666 00:41:59,510 --> 00:42:03,060 about NSA and spying. Especially now. I mean: 667 00:42:03,060 --> 00:42:06,590 we think that most of that is botnet traffic. Over a million. 668 00:42:06,590 --> 00:42:10,990 Over a million, where it goes up. Over almost a 6 million. 669 00:42:10,990 --> 00:42:14,910 So that’s a serious amount of traffic, from that botnet. 670 00:42:14,910 --> 00:42:18,830 And that is a really serious threat to the Tor Network. It can be (?) 671 00:42:18,830 --> 00:42:22,500 a couple of different ways. One of these things, I mentioned before, 672 00:42:22,500 --> 00:42:25,740 NTor handshake. But another thing is: if every person in this room 673 00:42:25,740 --> 00:42:29,350 were to run a Tor relay, even a middle relay not an exit relay, 674 00:42:29,350 --> 00:42:32,510 it would make it significantly harder to melt the Tor Network. 675 00:42:32,510 --> 00:42:33,510 I actually think 676 00:42:33,510 --> 00:42:35,240 that would be incredible if you guys would all do that. 677 00:42:35,240 --> 00:42:36,490 I don’t think that all of you will. 678 00:42:36,490 --> 00:42:38,780 But if you did that would make it so that we could survive 679 00:42:38,780 --> 00:42:42,240 other events like this in the future. 680 00:42:42,240 --> 00:42:49,760 *applause* 681 00:42:49,760 --> 00:42:53,220 So someone sent a question which we’re just gonna go ahead and answer now. 682 00:42:53,220 --> 00:42:56,900 “When talking of funding for better anonymity, what do you think, 683 00:42:56,900 --> 00:42:59,060 in terms of money, how much could you need?” 684 00:42:59,060 --> 00:43:01,540 Well here’s a thing: 685 00:43:01,540 --> 00:43:03,430 if you were willing to fund us we would really like you. 686 00:43:03,430 --> 00:43:04,810 Or I would really like it 687 00:43:04,810 --> 00:43:07,850 especially, since I’m probably the one that threatens the US Government funding 688 00:43:07,850 --> 00:43:11,730 of Tor, more than any person in this room. 689 00:43:11,730 --> 00:43:15,380 I think that it would be great if you could match the Dollar-to-Dollar 690 00:43:15,380 --> 00:43:17,830 that Government funders bring to the table. 691 00:43:17,830 --> 00:43:18,900 We would really like that. 692 00:43:18,900 --> 00:43:21,800 It would be amazing if that was possible. 693 00:43:21,800 --> 00:43:22,950 So there’s actually a hard number 694 00:43:22,950 --> 00:43:24,250 on the website. 695 00:43:24,250 --> 00:43:26,850 Or if you wanted to – as much money as you have. 696 00:43:26,850 --> 00:43:28,050 *laughter* Feel free! 697 00:43:28,050 --> 00:43:29,050 Either way – 698 00:43:29,050 --> 00:43:32,860 Roger: To give you a sense of scale: right now our 2014 budget 699 00:43:32,860 --> 00:43:37,000 is looking like it will be somewhere between 2 Mio US and 3 Mio US, 700 00:43:37,000 --> 00:43:40,850 which is great except we’re trying to do so many different things at once. 701 00:43:40,850 --> 00:43:45,160 If it ends up on the 2 Mio US side we basically have no funding 702 00:43:45,160 --> 00:43:46,660 for making anonymity better. 703 00:43:46,660 --> 00:43:48,940 If it ends up more than that then 704 00:43:48,940 --> 00:43:51,650 we’re in better shape and we can make people more safe. 705 00:43:51,650 --> 00:43:54,770 Jacob: And part of the thing is that we have to build all sorts of tools that are 706 00:43:54,770 --> 00:43:56,650 not directly related to Tor. 707 00:43:56,650 --> 00:43:58,090 In many cases. 708 00:43:58,090 --> 00:43:59,550 Especially because of the funding. 709 00:43:59,550 --> 00:44:03,350 But because we want users to be able to actually use the software 710 00:44:03,350 --> 00:44:04,390 with something else. 711 00:44:04,390 --> 00:44:06,440 It’s not nearly enough to have a Tor. 712 00:44:06,440 --> 00:44:07,440 You need to be able 713 00:44:07,440 --> 00:44:08,440 to do something with the Tor. 714 00:44:08,440 --> 00:44:09,440 You know? 715 00:44:09,440 --> 00:44:11,310 And that’s a really difficult part. 716 00:44:11,310 --> 00:44:15,410 But if there’s specific things we would also be open to alternate funding models 717 00:44:15,410 --> 00:44:19,340 where we fund very specific tasks e.g. that would be a really great thing. 718 00:44:19,340 --> 00:44:21,300 We haven’t really experimented with that. 719 00:44:21,300 --> 00:44:24,170 But on that note I wanted to talk about classified information. 720 00:44:24,170 --> 00:44:26,730 Everybody ready? It’s not classified any more, 721 00:44:26,730 --> 00:44:30,810 it’s on the internet? I’m not sure. So, 722 00:44:30,810 --> 00:44:33,620 this is probably the hot topic I would say. 723 00:44:33,620 --> 00:44:35,750 Probably the one everyone wanted to know about. 724 00:44:35,750 --> 00:44:38,200 So the NSA and GCHQ 725 00:44:38,200 --> 00:44:41,790 have decided that they don’t like anonymity, 726 00:44:41,790 --> 00:44:44,880 and they’re doing everything that they possibly can to attack it. 727 00:44:44,880 --> 00:44:47,020 With a few exceptions. 728 00:44:47,020 --> 00:44:48,640 So there’re a few different programs 729 00:44:48,640 --> 00:44:50,786 – I’m gonna talk a lot about this on Monday. So I don’t wanna go 730 00:44:50,786 --> 00:44:55,470 into too much detail about the non-Tor aspects of it. But 731 00:44:55,470 --> 00:45:01,220 for the Tor side of it – Quick Ant is what’s called a question-filled data set. 732 00:45:01,220 --> 00:45:02,530 This is a QFD. 733 00:45:02,530 --> 00:45:05,910 What that means is it’s TLS related sessions, as I understand it. 734 00:45:05,910 --> 00:45:11,860 And it is recording data, i.e. Data Retention about TLS sessions. 735 00:45:11,860 --> 00:45:14,720 It’s pulled from a larger thing – Flying Pig. 736 00:45:14,720 --> 00:45:17,900 Which was revealed on I think, a Brazilian Television clip, or someone 737 00:45:17,900 --> 00:45:22,310 photographed a moving picture of Glenn’s screen. 738 00:45:22,310 --> 00:45:25,930 That program is kind of scary. But not too scary. 739 00:45:25,930 --> 00:45:28,930 Just looks like after the fact (?) Data Retention. 740 00:45:28,930 --> 00:45:29,930 Quantum Insert 741 00:45:29,930 --> 00:45:34,540 on the other hand is a pretty straightforward man-on-the-side-attack. 742 00:45:34,540 --> 00:45:38,230 Foxacid, which is another thing which we know that’s used against Tor users, 743 00:45:38,230 --> 00:45:42,270 is basically just the ‘Tailored Access and Operations’ web server farm 744 00:45:42,270 --> 00:45:43,470 where they serve out malware. 745 00:45:43,470 --> 00:45:45,560 Sort of like a watering hole attack. Except 746 00:45:45,560 --> 00:45:48,330 in this case they also combine it with Quantum Insert. 747 00:45:48,330 --> 00:45:49,330 So that when you visit 748 00:45:49,330 --> 00:45:53,600 your Yahoo mail – NSA and GCHQ love Yahoo – 749 00:45:53,600 --> 00:45:57,520 even when you use Tor they basically redirect you 750 00:45:57,520 --> 00:46:01,210 by just tagging a little bit of data into the TCP connection. And 751 00:46:01,210 --> 00:46:03,570 of course Tor does its job, it flows all the way back to you. 752 00:46:03,570 --> 00:46:04,980 Your web browser then loads it. 753 00:46:04,980 --> 00:46:06,150 You’re now connected to their server. 754 00:46:06,150 --> 00:46:09,130 Their server delivers malicious code. 755 00:46:09,130 --> 00:46:12,390 And the use it is to pop somebody. 756 00:46:12,390 --> 00:46:17,040 From what I understand it took them 8 months to hit one guy. 757 00:46:17,040 --> 00:46:21,850 That’s fucking great, I think, that we went from ‘everybody all the time 758 00:46:21,850 --> 00:46:24,230 *applause* being compromisable’ to ‘they have to 759 00:46:24,230 --> 00:46:29,180 very carefully pick one person and work for a long time’. 760 00:46:29,180 --> 00:46:31,120 They really believe that that’s the right target. 761 00:46:31,120 --> 00:46:32,430 They really understand that 762 00:46:32,430 --> 00:46:36,250 that is someone that they want to go after. And 763 00:46:36,250 --> 00:46:38,630 if that person were to keep their browser up-to-date they probably would have been 764 00:46:38,630 --> 00:46:40,970 ahead of the game. Not exactly sure. 765 00:46:40,970 --> 00:46:43,250 But there are some other things that are really dangerous. 766 00:46:43,250 --> 00:46:45,580 Which is Quantum Cookie, e.g. Quantum Cookie 767 00:46:45,580 --> 00:46:49,240 is a program where basically they’re able to elicit 768 00:46:49,240 --> 00:46:53,190 from a connection other connections from your web browser 769 00:46:53,190 --> 00:46:55,760 which will get you to leak cookie information. 770 00:46:55,760 --> 00:46:58,180 So let’s say you happen to log-in to a Yahoo account. 771 00:46:58,180 --> 00:47:00,750 And that was a known selector for surveillance. 772 00:47:00,750 --> 00:47:03,920 And then they thought you might also have a Gmail cookie that wasn’t marked secure 773 00:47:03,920 --> 00:47:07,970 and you might also have another search engine; or you might have 774 00:47:07,970 --> 00:47:08,970 some other cookies. 775 00:47:08,970 --> 00:47:10,870 Then they would basically insert things that your browser 776 00:47:10,870 --> 00:47:14,530 will then request insecurely over the same connection, to (?) tie them together, 777 00:47:14,530 --> 00:47:15,680 correlate that. 778 00:47:15,680 --> 00:47:17,910 And then they will extract it and they’ll be able to tell that 779 00:47:17,910 --> 00:47:20,000 this selector is linked to these other selectors. 780 00:47:20,000 --> 00:47:22,370 ’Cause they basically been able to actively probe. 781 00:47:22,370 --> 00:47:25,650 A solution to that is ‘Https Everywhere’ which we already ship 782 00:47:25,650 --> 00:47:29,480 in the Tor Browser Bundle but also to be aware about 783 00:47:29,480 --> 00:47:33,090 session isolation to maybe even if you’re using things 784 00:47:33,090 --> 00:47:36,940 where you’re trying to it as securely as possible – not every site will offer TLS 785 00:47:36,940 --> 00:47:40,690 to actually make sure that the Tor browser only has the exact 786 00:47:40,690 --> 00:47:43,980 set of credentials you need for the thing you’re doing at that time. 787 00:47:43,980 --> 00:47:46,240 So that’s 788 00:47:46,240 --> 00:47:48,220 incredibly straight-forward stuff. 789 00:47:48,220 --> 00:47:49,790 In terms of the hacker community this is like 790 00:47:49,790 --> 00:47:52,410 not even really interesting, actually. 791 00:47:52,410 --> 00:47:53,800 The thing that makes it interesting is 792 00:47:53,800 --> 00:47:55,920 that they do it at internet scale. 793 00:47:55,920 --> 00:47:57,100 And that they’re trying to watch 794 00:47:57,100 --> 00:47:59,610 the entire internet all the time. 795 00:47:59,610 --> 00:48:01,110 Another interesting fact about this is 796 00:48:01,110 --> 00:48:04,520 that you would imagine that not routing through Five Eyes countries 797 00:48:04,520 --> 00:48:06,350 would make you safer in some way. 798 00:48:06,350 --> 00:48:08,650 I don’t think that’s actually true. 799 00:48:08,650 --> 00:48:12,480 From what I can tell they actually have some restrictions, if you route 800 00:48:12,480 --> 00:48:13,980 through the Five Eyes countries. 801 00:48:13,980 --> 00:48:16,050 And if you are not in a Five Eyes country, 802 00:48:16,050 --> 00:48:20,230 like Germany, they have no restrictions. 803 00:48:20,230 --> 00:48:24,000 So if you behave differently we know from an anonymity perspective 804 00:48:24,000 --> 00:48:25,580 that that’s worse for you. 805 00:48:25,580 --> 00:48:28,410 And if you behave differently in this particular way 806 00:48:28,410 --> 00:48:31,960 then there are legal answers that show that you shouldn’t break out 807 00:48:31,960 --> 00:48:35,990 from the regular way that Tor users and Tor clients behave. 808 00:48:35,990 --> 00:48:39,460 But the key point to take home is that every single person here 809 00:48:39,460 --> 00:48:43,790 has the same set of problems if they’re not using Tor. 810 00:48:43,790 --> 00:48:46,490 And it is easier for them. 811 00:48:46,490 --> 00:48:48,090 So that’s a huge, huge difference. 812 00:48:48,090 --> 00:48:53,240 And the last point, I think is a key one which Roger has a great story for. 813 00:48:53,240 --> 00:48:57,350 Roger: Yeah, so they… the story here is they look at Tor traffic 814 00:48:57,350 --> 00:48:59,010 coming out of Tor exit relays. 815 00:48:59,010 --> 00:49:00,740 They don’t know who the person is. And they have 816 00:49:00,740 --> 00:49:04,110 to make a decision there: do I try the Quantum Insert and the Foxacid, 817 00:49:04,110 --> 00:49:06,750 do I try to break into their browser? Or do I leave them alone. 818 00:49:06,750 --> 00:49:10,210 And when they see the Tor flow they don’t know who it is. 819 00:49:10,210 --> 00:49:11,830 So on the one hand, that’s great. 820 00:49:11,830 --> 00:49:13,770 They can’t do target attacks. 821 00:49:13,770 --> 00:49:15,460 They have to do broad attacks and then 822 00:49:15,460 --> 00:49:19,130 check/wait (?) later to see whether they broke into the right person. 823 00:49:19,130 --> 00:49:22,520 But as soon as the Guardian articles went up about this, 824 00:49:22,520 --> 00:49:26,530 DNI – the something National Intelligence – put out a press release, saying: 825 00:49:26,530 --> 00:49:32,200 “We’d like to assure everybody that we never attack Americans”. 826 00:49:32,200 --> 00:49:36,360 Jacob: So first of all – on behalf of the American people and the US Government 827 00:49:36,360 --> 00:49:40,380 which I do not represent: I’m so sorry that 828 00:49:40,380 --> 00:49:43,700 my country keeps embarrassing the rest of the reasonable Americans, of which 829 00:49:43,700 --> 00:49:48,250 there are plenty, many of us that are not James Clapper, that total fucking asshole. 830 00:49:48,250 --> 00:49:54,550 *applause* 831 00:49:54,550 --> 00:49:55,540 *to Roger:* We have 5 minutes. 832 00:49:55,540 --> 00:49:57,430 *applause* 833 00:49:57,430 --> 00:50:01,560 Roger: So the reason why that story is particularly interesting is that: I talked 834 00:50:01,560 --> 00:50:05,000 to an actual NSA person a couple of weeks ago… and I’m like: “Wait, you never attack 835 00:50:05,000 --> 00:50:09,050 Americans but you have to blank-and-attack everybody and then find out who it was”. 836 00:50:09,050 --> 00:50:12,690 And he said: “Oh no no no no, we watch them log into Facebook and if they log in 837 00:50:12,690 --> 00:50:14,790 as the user we’re trying to attack then we attack them. 838 00:50:14,790 --> 00:50:15,790 No problem.” 839 00:50:15,790 --> 00:50:19,230 Jacob: And they do the blanket dragnet surveillance. So, 840 00:50:19,230 --> 00:50:22,330 an interesting point of course is that we always heard… 841 00:50:22,330 --> 00:50:23,570 I once met someone 842 00:50:23,570 --> 00:50:26,500 who explained to me: “The NSA obviously runs lots of Tor nodes like they were 843 00:50:26,500 --> 00:50:28,850 like 90.000 Tor nodes”, I think was the number. 844 00:50:28,850 --> 00:50:31,860 I wish we had 90.000 Tor nodes. That’d be incredible. 845 00:50:31,860 --> 00:50:34,880 You know we’re like, what, at about 4..5000 846 00:50:34,880 --> 00:50:38,440 at any given point in time, that are stable, of which are 1/3 are exit relays. 847 00:50:38,440 --> 00:50:39,440 Right. 848 00:50:39,440 --> 00:50:43,280 So it turns out when the NSA did run some, they ran half a dozen.. a dozen? 849 00:50:43,280 --> 00:50:44,740 Roger: They ran about 10. 850 00:50:44,740 --> 00:50:45,740 And they were small. 851 00:50:45,740 --> 00:50:46,740 And short-lived. 852 00:50:46,740 --> 00:50:48,920 On EC2. 853 00:50:48,920 --> 00:50:51,400 But that should not make you happy. 854 00:50:51,400 --> 00:50:52,450 It doesn’t matter 855 00:50:52,450 --> 00:50:54,880 whether the NSA runs Tor relays. 856 00:50:54,880 --> 00:50:57,610 They can watch your Tor relays. 857 00:50:57,610 --> 00:51:01,490 If you run a Tor relay at a great place anywhere in the US 858 00:51:01,490 --> 00:51:05,600 or Germany or wherever they’re good at spying on they watch the upstream 859 00:51:05,600 --> 00:51:08,660 of your relay and they get almost what they would get from running 860 00:51:08,660 --> 00:51:09,910 their own relay. 861 00:51:09,910 --> 00:51:12,140 So what we should be worried about – we should not be worried 862 00:51:12,140 --> 00:51:13,750 that they’re running relays. 863 00:51:13,750 --> 00:51:16,830 It’s a concern, but the bigger concern is 864 00:51:16,830 --> 00:51:18,360 that they’re watching the whole internet. 865 00:51:18,360 --> 00:51:20,730 And the internet is much more centralized 866 00:51:20,730 --> 00:51:22,010 than we think it is. 867 00:51:22,010 --> 00:51:24,320 There are a lot more bottle-necks where if you watch them 868 00:51:24,320 --> 00:51:26,850 you get to see a lot of different Tor traffic. 869 00:51:26,850 --> 00:51:29,510 So the problem is not so much 870 00:51:29,510 --> 00:51:33,400 “Are they running relays?” as “How many normal relays can they watch?” 871 00:51:33,400 --> 00:51:37,400 And if you’re thinking about a large adversary like NSA: the answer could be: 872 00:51:37,400 --> 00:51:39,840 “A third?”, “Half?”. 873 00:51:39,840 --> 00:51:42,020 We don’t know how many deals they have. 874 00:51:42,020 --> 00:51:46,740 Jacob: So, an interesting point here is that one-hop-proxies are… or VPN 875 00:51:46,740 --> 00:51:49,970 – who here uses a VPN to some kind of commercial VPN service? 876 00:51:49,970 --> 00:51:51,770 *about 1/4 raised hands* Right. 877 00:51:51,770 --> 00:51:54,620 So this is a pretty big problem, 878 00:51:54,620 --> 00:51:55,620 I think. 879 00:51:55,620 --> 00:51:57,920 Which is that you end up with the hide-my-ass problem. 880 00:51:57,920 --> 00:51:58,920 Which is that – 881 00:51:58,920 --> 00:52:00,550 first of all that company, it’s a problem. 882 00:52:00,550 --> 00:52:01,990 Second of all, what they do to their users 883 00:52:01,990 --> 00:52:03,090 is also a problem. 884 00:52:03,090 --> 00:52:05,480 Which is that they basically promote their service 885 00:52:05,480 --> 00:52:09,130 for revolution in Egypt, e.g. but when someone used it because they disagreed 886 00:52:09,130 --> 00:52:13,370 with the policies of the UK then they turned them over. 887 00:52:13,370 --> 00:52:14,370 Interesting point. 888 00:52:14,370 --> 00:52:17,810 We need to build decentralized systems where they can’t make that choice. 889 00:52:17,810 --> 00:52:20,520 We need to make sure that that isn’t actually happening. 890 00:52:20,520 --> 00:52:21,520 And one of the things 891 00:52:21,520 --> 00:52:25,900 that we’re trying to drive home is that – and I really think it’s important 892 00:52:25,900 --> 00:52:29,920 to take this to heart – one-hop-proxies or VPNs, 893 00:52:29,920 --> 00:52:33,700 as we have said for more that a decade, are not safe. Especially 894 00:52:33,700 --> 00:52:37,740 if you think about when they from the QuickANT and from the Flying Pig software, 895 00:52:37,740 --> 00:52:40,800 they’re recording traffic information about connections. 896 00:52:40,800 --> 00:52:41,800 And in some cases 897 00:52:41,800 --> 00:52:44,850 we know – thanks to Laura Poitras and James Risen – that they have 898 00:52:44,850 --> 00:52:48,490 Data Retention which is something like – what is it, 10..15 years, 899 00:52:48,490 --> 00:52:51,350 5 years online, 10 years offline, is that right? 900 00:52:51,350 --> 00:52:54,230 Right. Okay. That’s bad news. 901 00:52:54,230 --> 00:52:58,710 We know that the math for VPNs is not in your favor. 902 00:52:58,710 --> 00:53:03,340 So that said: What happens with this stuff? 903 00:53:03,340 --> 00:53:04,340 Right? 904 00:53:04,340 --> 00:53:08,020 What happens is what happened e.g. with the Silk Road fellow. 905 00:53:08,020 --> 00:53:10,240 Or maybe not. It’s not clear. 906 00:53:10,240 --> 00:53:11,930 It could be that the guy used a VPN. 907 00:53:11,930 --> 00:53:15,380 Which is braindead. But it could also be that 908 00:53:15,380 --> 00:53:19,430 the NSA has this data and tried to pull off a retractive attack 909 00:53:19,430 --> 00:53:23,630 once they already had him from other things like auguring fake IDs. 910 00:53:23,630 --> 00:53:26,300 We don’t know which in the case of Silk Road. 911 00:53:26,300 --> 00:53:27,410 But we can tell you 912 00:53:27,410 --> 00:53:30,970 that it’s pretty clearly a bad idea to do it if you’re going to 913 00:53:30,970 --> 00:53:31,970 do something interesting. 914 00:53:31,970 --> 00:53:34,720 It’s probably also a bad idea to do it just generally 915 00:53:34,720 --> 00:53:39,030 because you don’t even know what ’interesting’ is in 5 or 10 years. So 916 00:53:39,030 --> 00:53:43,470 parallel construction is a really serious problem, and we think, 917 00:53:43,470 --> 00:53:46,270 probably, if we could expand the Tor Network, we would make it 918 00:53:46,270 --> 00:53:47,700 significantly harder to do this. 919 00:53:47,700 --> 00:53:49,200 It would make it significantly harder for them 920 00:53:49,200 --> 00:53:51,660 to do it, especially if you replace your VPN with Tor. 921 00:53:51,660 --> 00:53:52,660 There are some trade-offs 922 00:53:52,660 --> 00:53:53,970 with that, though. 923 00:53:53,970 --> 00:53:55,760 So the real question is what your threat model is. 924 00:53:55,760 --> 00:53:57,240 And you really have to think about it. 925 00:53:57,240 --> 00:53:58,760 And then also understand that we live in a world now 926 00:53:58,760 --> 00:54:02,800 where Law Enforcement and Intelligence Services, they seem to be 927 00:54:02,800 --> 00:54:04,680 blending together. 928 00:54:04,680 --> 00:54:07,390 And they seem to be blending together across the whole planet 929 00:54:07,390 --> 00:54:08,390 in secret. 930 00:54:08,390 --> 00:54:10,420 Which is a serious problem for the threat model of Tor. 931 00:54:10,420 --> 00:54:13,130 Roger: So I actually talked to some FBI people and I said: 932 00:54:13,130 --> 00:54:15,050 So which one of these is it? 933 00:54:15,050 --> 00:54:17,610 And they said: Well, we never get tips from the NSA. 934 00:54:17,610 --> 00:54:21,060 We’re good, honest Law enforcement, they’re doing something bad, 935 00:54:21,060 --> 00:54:22,760 but why should that affect us? 936 00:54:22,760 --> 00:54:25,790 And my response was: “Well, NSA says they told you! 937 00:54:25,790 --> 00:54:29,520 So, are you lying to me or are they lying to you? 938 00:54:29,520 --> 00:54:31,450 Or what’s going on here?” 939 00:54:31,450 --> 00:54:34,260 And I don’t actually know the right solution here. 940 00:54:34,260 --> 00:54:38,540 So scenario 1: The NSA anonymously tips the FBI 941 00:54:38,540 --> 00:54:40,850 and they go check something out and they say: “Well I need to build a case 942 00:54:40,850 --> 00:54:41,850 that they do”. 943 00:54:41,850 --> 00:54:44,730 Scenario 2: Some anonymous whistleblower tips off the FBI 944 00:54:44,730 --> 00:54:46,060 and they go build a case. 945 00:54:46,060 --> 00:54:47,720 From the FBI’s perspective these are the same: 946 00:54:47,720 --> 00:54:50,050 “I got a tip, I build a case. 947 00:54:50,050 --> 00:54:52,260 Why should I care where it came from?” And 948 00:54:52,260 --> 00:54:56,060 so should we build a Know-your-customer Law so that the FBI has to know 949 00:54:56,060 --> 00:54:58,790 their informers or whistleblowers? 950 00:54:58,790 --> 00:55:00,770 Should we rely on the NSA 951 00:55:00,770 --> 00:55:01,770 to regulate itself? 952 00:55:01,770 --> 00:55:05,220 Should we rely on the Congress to regulate NSA? 953 00:55:05,220 --> 00:55:07,460 None of these are good answers. 954 00:55:07,460 --> 00:55:09,250 Jacob: So, we have a very limited amount of time. 955 00:55:09,250 --> 00:55:10,250 And in order to be able 956 00:55:10,250 --> 00:55:14,390 to address some questions we will probably skip a few things 957 00:55:14,390 --> 00:55:15,690 and we’ll put these slides online. 958 00:55:15,690 --> 00:55:18,150 But short/quick 959 00:55:18,150 --> 00:55:20,930 summaries for a few of these slides, then we’re gonna address some questions. 960 00:55:20,930 --> 00:55:22,970 One of them is that we want to improve Hidden Services. 961 00:55:22,970 --> 00:55:23,970 Even though they 962 00:55:23,970 --> 00:55:26,040 haven’t been broken as far as we understand from any of the documents 963 00:55:26,040 --> 00:55:27,590 that have been released. 964 00:55:27,590 --> 00:55:29,230 We still want to make them stronger, 965 00:55:29,230 --> 00:55:30,760 because we wanna be ahead of the game. 966 00:55:30,760 --> 00:55:31,760 We don’t want to play Catch-Up. 967 00:55:31,760 --> 00:55:35,440 Roger: We especially need to improve the usability and performance of them. 968 00:55:35,440 --> 00:55:38,990 Because right now they’re a toy that only really dedicated people 969 00:55:38,990 --> 00:55:40,160 get working. 970 00:55:40,160 --> 00:55:42,510 And the more mainstream we could make them 971 00:55:42,510 --> 00:55:44,550 the more broad uses we are going to see. 972 00:55:44,550 --> 00:55:46,040 The reason why people keep hearing 973 00:55:46,040 --> 00:55:50,180 about high-profile bad Hidden Services is that we don’t have enough 974 00:55:50,180 --> 00:55:54,500 good use cases in action yet that lots of people are experiencing. 975 00:55:54,500 --> 00:55:58,740 Jacob: The most important thing for all of the – let’s say – Cypherpunks movement 976 00:55:58,740 --> 00:56:02,400 to understand is that when you have usable crypto 977 00:56:02,400 --> 00:56:04,420 you are doing the right thing. 978 00:56:04,420 --> 00:56:06,330 When you have strong peer-reviewed 979 00:56:06,330 --> 00:56:10,150 Free Software to implement that, and it’s built on a platform where you can 980 00:56:10,150 --> 00:56:13,650 look at the whole stack you’re really ahead of the game. 981 00:56:13,650 --> 00:56:15,370 There’s a lot to be done in that. 982 00:56:15,370 --> 00:56:17,670 And if we do that for Hidden Services 983 00:56:17,670 --> 00:56:22,490 I think we’ll have similar returns that you’ll see with other crypto projects. 984 00:56:22,490 --> 00:56:25,950 Roger: So one of the other great things in the Tor world is the number of researchers 985 00:56:25,950 --> 00:56:30,820 who are doing great work at evaluating and improving Tor’s anonymity. 986 00:56:30,820 --> 00:56:34,740 So there are a couple of papers that were out over the past year talking about 987 00:56:34,740 --> 00:56:39,380 how we didn’t actually choose the right guard rotation parameters. 988 00:56:39,380 --> 00:56:42,810 I’m not going to get into that in detail in our last couple of minutes. 989 00:56:42,810 --> 00:56:46,490 But the very brief version is: 990 00:56:46,490 --> 00:56:51,109 if you can attack both sides of the network and they run 10% of the network 991 00:56:51,109 --> 00:56:54,930 – they, the adversary run 10% of the network – the chance over time, 992 00:56:54,930 --> 00:56:59,280 the blue line is the current situation, where you choose 3 first hops, 993 00:56:59,280 --> 00:57:02,310 3 entry guards and you rotate every couple of months – over time 994 00:57:02,310 --> 00:57:05,930 the chance that you get screwed by an adversary who runs 10% of the network 995 00:57:05,930 --> 00:57:07,120 is pretty high. 996 00:57:07,120 --> 00:57:10,160 But if we change it to 1 guard and you don’t rotate 997 00:57:10,160 --> 00:57:13,770 then we’re at the green line which is a lot better against an adversary 998 00:57:13,770 --> 00:57:15,300 who’s really quite large. 999 00:57:15,300 --> 00:57:17,750 This is an adversary larger than torservers.net 1000 00:57:17,750 --> 00:57:19,750 e.g. So A... 1001 00:57:19,750 --> 00:57:21,440 Jacob: Arts (?) is no adversary, right? 1002 00:57:21,440 --> 00:57:26,510 Roger: So a pretty large attacker we need to move it from the blue line 1003 00:57:26,510 --> 00:57:27,760 down to the green line. 1004 00:57:27,760 --> 00:57:30,510 And that’s an example of the anonymity work 1005 00:57:30,510 --> 00:57:31,510 that we need to do. 1006 00:57:31,510 --> 00:57:33,130 -- So, what’s next? 1007 00:57:33,130 --> 00:57:35,420 Tor, endorsed by Egyptian activists, 1008 00:57:35,420 --> 00:57:40,070 Wikileaks, NSA, GCHQ, Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden… 1009 00:57:40,070 --> 00:57:42,870 Different communities like Tor for different reasons. 1010 00:57:42,870 --> 00:57:46,060 Some of our funders we go to them with that sentence – basically everybody 1011 00:57:46,060 --> 00:57:47,120 we go to with that sentence. 1012 00:57:47,120 --> 00:57:50,050 It’s like: “I like those 3 examples but I don’t like 1013 00:57:50,050 --> 00:57:51,670 those 2 examples”. 1014 00:57:51,670 --> 00:57:55,650 So part of what we need to do is help them to understand 1015 00:57:55,650 --> 00:58:02,030 why all of these different examples matter. 1016 00:58:02,030 --> 00:58:04,940 Jacob: That said, I tend to believe that we need to be engaged 1017 00:58:04,940 --> 00:58:09,090 in a pretty big way and thanks to the people of Ecuador, 1018 00:58:09,090 --> 00:58:12,800 especially the people running the Minga-tec community events, they have actually 1019 00:58:12,800 --> 00:58:17,120 put together a real model which should be emulated probably 1020 00:58:17,120 --> 00:58:20,960 by the rest of the world where they really engage with civil society, and they’re 1021 00:58:20,960 --> 00:58:24,450 actually able to arrange for meetings with e.g. the Foreign Minister 1022 00:58:24,450 --> 00:58:27,530 or with various other people involved in the National Assembly. 1023 00:58:27,530 --> 00:58:28,530 And as a result 1024 00:58:28,530 --> 00:58:31,570 they had Article 474, which they proposed, which was basically 1025 00:58:31,570 --> 00:58:33,500 the worst Data Retention Law you can imagine. 1026 00:58:33,500 --> 00:58:35,050 It included video taping 1027 00:58:35,050 --> 00:58:39,810 in Internet Cafés, 6 months dragnet surveillance, all sorts of awful stuff. 1028 00:58:39,810 --> 00:58:43,320 And they were able to, in the course of, I would say 3..6 months, 1029 00:58:43,320 --> 00:58:46,210 this is mostly the FLOK Society, actually. 1030 00:58:46,210 --> 00:58:47,210 They were able to organize 1031 00:58:47,210 --> 00:58:49,190 a real discussion about this. 1032 00:58:49,190 --> 00:58:50,880 And we were able to get this proposed part 1033 00:58:50,880 --> 00:58:53,010 of the penal code completely removed. 1034 00:58:53,010 --> 00:58:54,540 At the end of November of last year… 1035 00:58:54,540 --> 00:58:56,580 early December… of this year. 1036 00:58:56,580 --> 00:58:58,290 So just about a month ago. 1037 00:58:58,290 --> 00:59:01,620 So if we really work together across the spectrum, 1038 00:59:01,620 --> 00:59:06,030 we see, right now, in Ecuador e.g. changing (?) away 1039 00:59:06,030 --> 00:59:09,250 by showing them that fundamentally: the game is rigged. 1040 00:59:09,250 --> 00:59:10,250 If you choose 1041 00:59:10,250 --> 00:59:12,660 to spy on your citizens then the NSA always wins. 1042 00:59:12,660 --> 00:59:13,790 And the NSA wants people 1043 00:59:13,790 --> 00:59:16,390 to believe that everybody is doing the spying. 1044 00:59:16,390 --> 00:59:17,390 So one of the things 1045 00:59:17,390 --> 00:59:20,750 I explained to people in the Ecuadorian Government and in Ecuadorian civil society 1046 00:59:20,750 --> 00:59:23,140 is that you can choose a different game. 1047 00:59:23,140 --> 00:59:24,490 You can choose not to play that game. 1048 00:59:24,490 --> 00:59:28,890 The only people that win when you choose that game are the NSA, 1049 00:59:28,890 --> 00:59:30,900 and potentially you – a few times. 1050 00:59:30,900 --> 00:59:31,900 But the NSA will get 1051 00:59:31,900 --> 00:59:34,620 whatever data you have stored away. 1052 00:59:34,620 --> 00:59:35,620 If you want to be secure 1053 00:59:35,620 --> 00:59:38,360 against the dragnet surveillance, if you want to be secure against people 1054 00:59:38,360 --> 00:59:41,720 who will break into that system you must not have that system in existence. 1055 00:59:41,720 --> 00:59:43,640 You must choose a different paradigm. 1056 00:59:43,640 --> 00:59:45,350 And when I told this to people in Ecuador 1057 00:59:45,350 --> 00:59:47,770 and they understood the trade-offs, and they understood that they are 1058 00:59:47,770 --> 00:59:50,670 not the best at surveilling the whole planet. 1059 00:59:50,670 --> 00:59:51,670 They understood that they’re 1060 00:59:51,670 --> 00:59:53,350 not the best in internet security yet. 1061 00:59:53,350 --> 00:59:55,570 They realized that the game is rigged. 1062 00:59:55,570 --> 00:59:58,290 And they got rid of Article 474 from the penal code. 1063 00:59:58,290 --> 01:00:02,030 And there is no Data Retention there in that penal code now. 1064 01:00:02,030 --> 01:00:10,310 *applause* 1065 01:00:10,310 --> 01:00:14,550 But I have to stress this not because of 1 or 2 or 10 people, 1066 01:00:14,550 --> 01:00:17,260 it’s because of a broad civil society movement. 1067 01:00:17,260 --> 01:00:18,450 Which is what we’ve also seen 1068 01:00:18,450 --> 01:00:20,840 in Germany, and in other places. 1069 01:00:20,840 --> 01:00:23,130 So this is something which you should have a lot of hope about. 1070 01:00:23,130 --> 01:00:25,590 It’s not actually dark everywhere. 1071 01:00:25,590 --> 01:00:28,540 We are actually making positive steps forward. 1072 01:00:28,540 --> 01:00:31,670 Roger: So there are other tools that we would like help with. 1073 01:00:31,670 --> 01:00:35,670 E.g. tails is a live CD, WiNoN and other approaches are trying 1074 01:00:35,670 --> 01:00:40,260 to add VM to it, so that even if you can break out of the browser, 1075 01:00:40,260 --> 01:00:43,410 there’s something else you have to break out, other sandboxes. 1076 01:00:43,410 --> 01:00:44,410 And there are 1077 01:00:44,410 --> 01:00:47,090 a lot of other crypto improvements that we’re happy to talk about afterwards. 1078 01:00:47,090 --> 01:00:50,860 The Tor Browser Bundle, the new one, has a bunch of really interesting features. 1079 01:00:50,860 --> 01:00:53,480 Deterministic Builds is one of the coolest parts of it. 1080 01:00:53,480 --> 01:00:54,480 Where everybody here can 1081 01:00:54,480 --> 01:00:57,940 build the Tor Browser Bundle and end up with an identical binary. 1082 01:00:57,940 --> 01:00:58,940 So that you can 1083 01:00:58,940 --> 01:01:01,440 check to see that it really is the same one. 1084 01:01:01,440 --> 01:01:02,550 And here’s a screenshot 1085 01:01:02,550 --> 01:01:03,550 of the new one. 1086 01:01:03,550 --> 01:01:06,880 It no longer has Vidalia in it, it’s all just a browser 1087 01:01:06,880 --> 01:01:11,050 with a Firefox extension that has a Tor binary and starts it. 1088 01:01:11,050 --> 01:01:14,510 So we’re trying to stream-line it and make it a lot simpler and safer. 1089 01:01:14,510 --> 01:01:18,890 I’d love to chat with you afterwards about the core Tor things that we’re up to 1090 01:01:18,890 --> 01:01:22,310 in terms of building the actual program called Tor but also the Browser Bundle, 1091 01:01:22,310 --> 01:01:25,590 and metrics, and censorship resistance etc. 1092 01:01:25,590 --> 01:01:30,020 And then, as a final note: We accept Bitcoin now. 1093 01:01:30,020 --> 01:01:34,840 Which is great. *applause* 1094 01:01:34,840 --> 01:01:37,360 Jacob: So all of the Bitcoin millionaires in this community: 1095 01:01:37,360 --> 01:01:41,760 we would really encourage you to help us get off of the US Government funding. 1096 01:01:41,760 --> 01:01:43,080 Don’t just complain, help us! 1097 01:01:43,080 --> 01:01:45,930 Mutual Aid and Solidarity means exactly that: 1098 01:01:45,930 --> 01:01:47,960 to put some money where your mouth is! 1099 01:01:47,960 --> 01:01:49,760 We’d really like to do that. 1100 01:01:49,760 --> 01:01:53,510 And it’s really important to show people that we have alternative methods 1101 01:01:53,510 --> 01:01:55,330 of funding community-based projects. 1102 01:01:55,330 --> 01:01:56,690 So think about it 1103 01:01:56,690 --> 01:01:59,790 and you can, if you’d like, use Bitcoin. 1104 01:01:59,790 --> 01:02:04,030 Roger: A last, right now, BitPay is limiting you to 1000 Dollars of Bitcoin 1105 01:02:04,030 --> 01:02:05,180 per donation. 1106 01:02:05,180 --> 01:02:07,550 We’re hoping to lift that in the next couple of days. 1107 01:02:07,550 --> 01:02:12,620 But if you would like to give us lots of Bitcoins, please don’t get discouraged. 1108 01:02:12,620 --> 01:02:16,400 And then, as a final note: starting right now in Noisy Square 1109 01:02:16,400 --> 01:02:20,720 is an event on how to help Tor and there will be a lot of Tor people there, 1110 01:02:20,720 --> 01:02:24,240 and we’d love to help teach you and answer your questions 1111 01:02:24,240 --> 01:02:26,330 and help you become part of the community. 1112 01:02:26,330 --> 01:02:28,730 We need you to teach other people 1113 01:02:28,730 --> 01:02:30,920 why Tor is important. 1114 01:02:30,920 --> 01:02:32,230 Jacob: Thank you! 1115 01:02:32,230 --> 01:02:38,540 *applause* 1116 01:02:38,540 --> 01:02:40,810 *no time for Q&A left* 1117 01:02:40,810 --> 01:02:44,290 *Subtitles created by c3subtitles.de in the year 2016. 1118 01:02:44,290 --> 01:02:47,733 Join and help us!*